- The New York Times has a “debate” — not that there’s a whole lot of debate going on — on how to respond to North Korea featuring contributions from Victor Cha, Bruce Klingner, L. Gordon Flake and Bradley Babson.
- Also in the New York Times, B.R Myers discusses why North Korea will never play nice. I usually like Myers’ stuff, but I’m not fully on board with this one: I agree that North Korea’s behavior is largely a product of ideology and the nature of the regime, but that doesn’t preclude Pyongyang from making tactical decision, especially when those tactical decisions usually pay off. I kinda agree that “Pyongyang is thus virtually predestined to push Seoul and Washington too far,” but not because it wants to, but rather because Seoul and Washington have so little credibility that Pyongyang has no way of knowing where the real “red line” is.
- If you’re counting on Beijing to help, Gady Epstein tells you why you shouldn’t in Forbes. So does Gordon Chang. By way of contrast, courtesy GWU, here are some documents pertaining to past US efforts to keep Taiwan from going nuclear.
- In case you didn’t see it, here’s Donald Gregg discussing the attack.
- It’s never too early to start planning for the apocalypse.
Links worth reading (IMHO)
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{ 16 comments… read them below or add one }
Great roundup!
I’m sick and tired of everyone prefacing their editorials on this incident with, “well, there aren’t any good options but…” followed by either a plea for negotiations for negotiations’ sake (a la Charles Armstrong), doing nothing at all (a la Andrei Lankov), or my personal favorite: stepping up sanctions and isolation (a la John Bolton and Joshua Stanton).
But that said, there are plenty of good options. For example…
1) Shut down Kaesong and Kumgangsan once and for all. (This should be a no-brainer and should have happened on Tuesday)
2) Restart propaganda broadcasts. Let the NORKs shoot at the loudspeakers so a good excuse to retaliate militarily can be had. But more important that this: live up to the promises made in the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking.
4) Implement crushing sanctions against all financial entities and companies that do business with the Norks.
5) Stop kid-gloving China. Tell ‘em point blank there will be consequences for their support of North Korea. Sell boatloads of missiles to Taiwan to underscore the point. Reaffirm publicly our commitment for Japan and South Korea and emphasis that the US will no longer be a bystander in the dispute over the Senkaku islands. Set up a NATO-like organization in East Asia whose unstated goal is the containment of Chinese expansionism.
6) Adapt some of Joshua Stanton’s proposals laid out in his A Capitalist Manifesto.
That’s some good stuff, milton. I was planning on trying to start a discussion along these lines in the next open thread, but this is as good a place as any: what are some outside-the-box ways the ROK can stick it to the North?
As I’ve mentioned before, balloons seem to scare the North a bit more than one might expect. Especially the ones that carry cheap radios that can be tuned to any station. Lankov has stated on numerous occasions that breaking North Korea’s monopoly on information will be crucial. Let’s get on that, shall we?
I wonder how powerful a laser one would need to ignite and burn that big DPRK flag that they fly near the DMZ from the ROK side of the border? Just sayin’.
Thanks, Granfalloon.
I completely agree that it is essential to break the information monopoly. The balloons are a very potent weapon, as the Nork reaction clearly shows. I wonder if Pak Sang-hak and his group have any plans to launch any balloons in the coming days…
It seems, however, that Seoul has just ruled out the resumption of psychological warfare, reneging on the promises they made several times this summer:
http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=2010112659178
The money quote is at the end:
Couldn’t agree more. Pyongyang won this battle hands-down. Just as the won the Cheonan “battle.”
I guess we’ll just have to wait until “next time.”
Milton and Granfalloon, you guys are right on the money!
Thanks setnaffa.
Seoul is giving up on psy-ops? Well, we certainly wouldn’t want North Korea to feel threatened. I mean, they might sink a warship or shell a marine outpost or something.
Thanks, setnaffa.
I also want to challenge the claim that any military retaliation would automatically bring about the destruction of Seoul and the South Korean economy. This idea is repeated so frequently by experts, pundits, and the general public that it has become accepted as fact. In reality, it is nothing more than speculation about a future event. The best we can say is that it is a “possible outcome,” but we are unable to even assign it a level of probability.
What we do know about North Korean society and their military is that in order to maintain the level of control and obedience that they do, the regime keeps everything highly-centralized and highly-atomized. It makes me wonder: would a sudden, massive, surprise decapitation strike on Pyongyang targeting command-and-control facilities and government structures even prompt an immediate response from front-line troops along the DMZ? With their leadership paralyzed, would the rest of the military even be able to muster a counterattack? Would they have the initiative to act in the absense of orders from higher-ups?
I get so sick of hearing the whole “Seoul could be leveled in a few hours” routine, especially when people bring it up as if they have some kind of insider information. You’re right, milton, it is indeed a speculative model of what could happen, but it’s probably reasonably accurate as a possibility. Nevertheless, it presupposes a couple of things:
1. That the North would WANT to level Seoul. My understanding is that Seoul has many things they want, not the least of which is a supply of gasoline.
2. That the US and the ROK would stand back and let it happen. Don’t forget, the only reason we have this accurate model of what the North could do to Seoul is because we know how many guns they have, and we know where they are.
I’m not saying that the conventional wisdom is untrue: I repeat, I do not doubt the projections that the North could level Seoul are inaccurate in any way. I just don’t think this projection should be the end of debate about what the ROK should do. Also, lest we forget, this is not a MAD scenario. The North knows they would lose an all-out war. The South knows it wouldn’t.
As for a decapitation strike, I’m less optimistic. I think that if they believe their country is under attack, North Korean troops will fight to the last breath, possibly for years to come as fugitive militia. Grim, but I believe accurate. The only positive side here is they would quickly lose their stomach for battle if they were on the offensive in the South. Once they see what life in South Korea is like, looting will be more a problem than fighting.
I have some reservation about (some rhetorical overreaching in) Myers’ piece as well, but I think yours are based on a misapprehension. As I read him, Myers is not saying that the NORK ideology either precludes them from taking advantage of adventitious tactical opportunities, or compels them in some sort of Pavlovian response to “push Seoul and DC too far. Rather, his claim is that by failing to appreciate the real nature of NORK ideology (and shaping the expression of our policies in consideration thereof, rather than on the basis of some political scientists’ theoretical wet dreams of how the NORKS “should” “rationally” behave) our side keeps offering up, by omission as well as affirmative action, precisely tactical opportunities that play directly into the NORK’s strong suits,and the outcomes of which potentially may generate dangerously risky behaviour by our side arising from the resulting from cognitive dissonance and emotional frustration that our self-inflicted ignorance creates for ourselves, not least by the cumulative effect of our making the same mistakes over and over again.
Sperwer, I was about to post something to similar effect, though not nearly as eloquent.
Granfalloon, I agree and don’t doubt that many Nork soldiers would fight to the death and would even continue fighting after the regime has been disposed of. But I’m wondering if such a strike were to occur, would the South Koreans gain enough initiative and would the North Koreans be thrown into so much chaos that the South would be able to press on with an invasion (say, seizing Kaesong to carve out a buffer and push North Korean artillery out of range of Seoul) that they could avoid heavy civilian casualties and economic destruction? My assumption is based on my own speculation that North Korea’s military is so centralized that without coordination from Pyongyang, they would be unable to mount a coordinated counteroffensive that could give rise to massive South Korean causalities, but not so uncoordinated that they would just surrender en masse.
NK’s trying to make nice with China…KJI sent a wreath to the tomb of Mao Anying (Mao’s son who died in the Korean War), while emphasizing friendly, cooperative relations with Beijing.
http://news.naver.com/main/hotissue/read.nhn?mid=hot&sid1=100&gid=438117&cid=307283&iid=299090&oid=001&aid=0004788644&ptype=011
The view from China that I’ve been getting (and the one that is being fed to the people through state-run media) is that this event was a South Korean provocation because South Korea purposely conducted military training in a disputed area.
To clarify, the last bit about the potential for engineering ourselves into making dangerously risky responses is my gloss, rather than something I think Myers is saying.
And as further clarification, I don’t mean to suggest that we should refrain from actions that a significant portion of the chorus of usual talking bobble heads (mistakenly) regard as unacceptably provocative, e.g., increasing the frequency and intensity of combat drills and psyop operations, including loudspeaker broadcasts and balloon drops of radios cash; SK withdrawal from Kaesong and Gumgang and all other aid projects in the North – and I mean ALL, including ostensibly humanitarian ones, whether ROKGOV or private; interdiction of all weapons and weapons-related suspect NORK trade and financial transactions; and last but not least immediate revision of the relevant rules of engagement to enable the immediate reciprocal delivery of punitive strikes with means certain to produce the desired results in the event of any future NORK military action against Allied soldiers or civilians. As I’ve said elsewhere, in cases like the recent NORK shelling, this probably requires aircraft delivery of MOAB or equivalent ordnance (since ROK counter battery fire doesn’t seem terribly effective against the hardened NORK artillery and rocket launch sites). At the same time, I think we should make ourselves available, and in fact should initiate efforts at dialogue, even though it may seem to be little more than talk for talk’s sake, in order to explain our actions to the NORKS (while giving them a taste of their own “negotiating” tactics, as illustrated in Adm Turner Lovejoy’s book about his experiences at Panmunjom, and to assess their reaction from “seeing the whites of their eyes” and glean whatever intelligence may be had from such meetings. Pursuit of such dialogue would also be important for public relations purposes vis-a-vis that portion of the world with its head in the sand and its ass hanging out, and just just as “public relations”, but as a check on any propensity of our own to permit the pursuit of such a hard line to ossify into mere intransigence.
1) You want out of the box, eh? How about tearing that box up and setting it alight?
As pretty much everyone agrees, Korea has snookered herself by putting the crown jewels and the best and brightest all within NK artillery range. Stuck they are and paralyzed they shall remain. The cost of retaliation is greater, far greater, than the perceived benefits, so Seoul is left with little more than empty words and insignificant gestures. And everyone knows this. Seoul lacks credibility. But lack of credibility and 4000 won still gets you that cup of coffee.
What does Korea pay the US each year for defence? About billion or so? Give that money to KJI instead. Heck, give NK more. It’s family.
The UNC/CFC/USFK shuts down and the US military withdraws. This surely removes an irritant for both much of the Korean public and China. Korea’s economic relations with China deepen.
Working with Pyongyang SK companies deepen their investment in NK along the lines of Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), giving SK access to some of the best yet cheapest and most obedient labour in the world. Any messy labour problems are handled by the NK authorities, and they stand to earn a lot. Strengthening Pyongyang’s financial footing lessens the possibility of NK implosion, which is a concern for Beijing and Seoul. NK is just one bad harvest from famine, and why does Seoul have to endure this prospect year after year? Get those NKs off the collectivized farms and into the SK-managed factories.
SK scientists and technicians head north to assist their brethren build atomic weapons. This is Korea’s sovereignty keeper, a stick to shake at Beijing and Tokyo.
There is the issue of trust. With USFK gone do we trust Pyongyang to keep the troops north of the DMZ? Abso-flippin’-lutely! Seoul already trusts Pyongyang to not over bombard, and in the new paradigm there’s even less benefit for Pyongyang to do so. Why destroy your benefactor? Of course Seoul maintains its credible defence, but over time ties deepen and trust builds, so those guns and missiles can be moved to the Chinese border or aimed at Japan. (Of course it could be argued that trust isn’t all that important; Koreans don’t trust anyone, much less themselves, and they are able to get on just fine building their economy. Anyway, with or without trust, Koreans are stuck with other. This ain’t a business contract. It’s blood.)
I could go on and on, but you fellas are bright enough to see the gotchas and find the work arounds.
2)
I’ve long advocated that. The next good chance it at Kim Jong Il’s funeral.
What a prizefigher!(diplomat?)
I just read this fascinating snippet in by Christian Oliver in yesterday’s Financial Times :
Relations between the two hit a nadir n a Johannesburg lavatory (!) at the opening ceremony of the football World Cup in South Africa. North Korea’s ambassador to Pretoria suddenly grabbed his South Korean counterpart by the arm and threatened that Seoul would face unspecified consequences unless it stopped accusing Pyongyang of sinking the Cheonan warship last March.
Just amazing! What next…..
It seems North Korea has put civilians and the military on an “emergency footing.” I don’t know what that means exactly, but per the article:
http://news.mt.co.kr/hotview.php?no=2010112610130971242&type=1&sec=all&hid=201011220901283135&htitle=%DD%C1%2C+%C7%D9%B5%B5%B9%DF+%C0%CC%BE%EE+%BF%AC%C6%F2%B5%B5%BF%A1+%C6%F7%C5%BA+%B0%F8%B0%DD
Anybody remember what civilian measures NK ordered during the ’94 crisis?
Also, Kan Naoto ordered all Japanese cabinet ministers to remain in Tokyo this weekend and be ready to report to work in one hour, should an emergency arise:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-26/kan-tells-japan-s-cabinet-to-stay-in-tokyo-amid-korean-exercises.html
I predict this weekend’s drills going off without a hitch, because my gut tells me the training will take place nowhere near the NLL.
In case you were wondering, this weekend’s military drill will “simulate” an attack on North Korean coastal artillery batteries, despite being called “defensive” in nature and despite having been planned “before this incident.”
http://www.fnnews.com/view_news/2010/11/26/00000922155924.html
I haven’t heard anything about the exact location of the drill, other than that it will take place in the West/Yellow Sea. North Korea said the drill will push the peninsula to the “brink of war”— though that is a pretty standard North Korean boilerplate response to joint military drills in that area.
Also, progressive groups, including PSPD (the group that sent the Cheonan letter to the UNSC), and the Hankyoreh have denounced the North Korean attack.
http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2010112601071327281002
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