Marking the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz writes in the New York Times that Korea should be a model for Iraq. Actually, this comparison isn’t new — in 2007, I mocked then-US President George W. Bush for making the same comparison. Still, we should hear him out:
The aftermath of another American war is instructive. Fifty-seven years ago, an armistice ended the fighting in Korea — another unpopular conflict, far bloodier than the Iraq war, although shorter. Civilian casualties were horrendous, and the United States and its allies suffered more than half a million military casualties. The South Korean Army took the heaviest losses, but the United States also paid a high price: 33,739 killed or missing in battle and 103,284 wounded.
Gen. Dwight Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election, in part, on a promise to end the war. According to a poll taken in April 1953, three months before the armistice was signed, 55 percent of the American public thought the war had not been worth fighting, whereas only 36 percent thought that it had.
Yet when the war was over, the United States did not abandon South Korea. We had done so in 1949, when our post-World War II occupation of Korea ended, opening the door to North Korea’s invasion the following year. This time, instead, we kept a substantial military force in South Korea.
The result, of course, is well known — South Korea went from being a basketcase to one of the greatest developmental success stories in the history of man.
Now for Iraq:
Some similar considerations apply to Iraq today. First, Iraq occupies a key position in the Persian Gulf, a strategically important region of the world — a position that is all the more important because of the dangerous ambitions of Iran’s rulers.
Second, whatever the failings of Iraq’s democracy, it bears no comparison to the regime that other hostile elements would impose. With all its imperfections, Iraq today is more democratic than South Korea was at the end of the Korean War, and more democratic than any other country in the Arab Middle East (with the possible exception of Lebanon).
We have withdrawn so many of our troops and relinquished a combat role because Iraqi security forces have been able to take on most of the security burden. Their numbers have grown from about 320,000 in December 2006 to more than 600,000 at the end of last year; they are also becoming more capable.
As what I said in 2007 still applies for the most part, I’m just going to copy and paste to save time:
I’ll grant that there are probably a lot more similarities between Korea and Iraq than anyone cares to admit — like today’s Iraq, South Korea was a complete and utter basketcase between liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and 1950. Something resembling a viable state eventually emerged, but that was only after the ruinous Korean War, and Koreans would have to wait all the way up till 1987 before they got a democracy in any meaningful sense for the word. I might even point out some of the ironies, too, like one of the “mistakes” we are criticized for in Iraq — removal of collaborators with the ancien regime (i.e., de-Bathification) — we are being criticized by many modern Korean historians for NOT doing in Korea between 1945 and 1948.
Anyway, might Iraq go the same way as Korea? One can only hope.
One thing I think is fairly certain at this point, however, is that the United States won’t be going along for the ride. A 50-year deployment? Put down the crack pipe — unless internal security in Iraq gets tangibly better real soon, this deployment won’t last one year before the White House is forced to announce a timetable for withdrawal, let alone 50. At least in Korea, internal security (i.e., burning villages, torturing leftists, etc.) was firmly left in the competent hands of the South Korean military and police while the US protected Seoul from external threats. Good luck seeing that anytime soon in Iraq. To talk about anything resembling a long-term deployment of US troops to Iraq at a time when you’re coming under intense pressure from your own public to pull out is, simply put, mad.
Heck, I supported the war, but I think we can admit now that things have not developed in the manner we may have wished, and now there is very little for US troops to do except stand around in the middle of an Arab civil war and get shot at. I’m not even saying Iraq is a lost cause — like Korea, it might eventually turn out fine — but clearly, Iraqis have some, ahem, issues to work out amongst themselves, and US troops have no role to play in resolving those issues.
The other thing is Iran is NOT the Soviet Union. A pain in the ass and possibly a serious nuclear threat? You bet. A superpower with dream of global hegemony, through, it’s not. It was the Soviet threat that elevated South Korea from just-another-Third World-post-colonial-shithole status to vital-national-interest status. Nothing like that threat exists in Iraq, just as nothing resembling the communal cleavages that plague Iraq existed in Korea.
(HT to Ask a Korean)
{ 38 comments… read them below or add one }
Going to Paul Wolfowitz for advice about Iraq is a bit like asking the Pope about the best way to protect children from sexual predators.
His record is beyond laughable and fully into absurd territory. It’s quite difficult to find anyone that got so many things so wrong, so consistently, not named Cheney.
I don’t think South Korea should be a model for Iraq , but definitely a useful case study. Whoever’s planning Iraq’s future should study South Korea’s case to see what they can learn the “Do”s and “Don’t”s, at the least.
No, US troops have an obligation to help resolve those issues. You don’t waltz into a soveriegn state with (partly) naive and (partly) sinister intentions, and when things don’t quite turn out the way you hoped, fuck off. You stay and fix them.
You forgot about oil. You can be guaranteed that whatever happens in Baghdad, there will be US military bases in Iraq til the wells run dry.
HJ – Point #1 ‘the obligation’ will no doubt be used to justify Point #2 ‘the oil’. And nearly six months after the elections, a government still cannot be formed. A sectarian clusterf*#k of which only several generations at least will be needed to iron out. If ever.
On behalf of the American people, I hereby hope that the US Gov’t does maintain a presence and influence in Iraq until the oil is all gone. Joe Sixpack should be paid back for his bazillion dollar national debt that is partially due to this absurd war. Hell, I want to be paid back for my tax dollars wasted in Iraq.. will never happen, except maybe at the pump through lower prices. But I won’t hold my breath. For those who will cry colonialism, remember the massive spending on Iraqi infrastructure that has and will continue to occur, courtesy of the US taxpayer.
No matter what you think about the war, it’s hard not to feel for that taxpayer who has paid for this and so many other misadventures. That infrastructure will serve Ahmed very well for a long time to come, if it isn’t all blown up in the inter faith fighting that will continue for as long as anyone can see.
As for the US OBLIGATION to fix Iraq, I am quite sure you didn’t or won’t think about any semblance of responsibility on the part of Iraqi sectarian leaders, who will be focused on tearing each others’ intestines out more than anything else.
After all, (correct me if I’m wrong) in your worldview, any sectarian tension or violence was unimportant before the US arrival? And responsibility for what sectarian violence destroys from here on out can be placed on American shoulders (and let’s not forget Poland! THEY were in the coalition of the willing!)
I am so tired of hearing this kind of argument, that places full moral and legal responsibility on the shoulders of any actor from the western world but doesn’t consider expecting any accountability from Asians or middle easterners.
… remember the massive spending on Iraqi infrastructure that has and will continue to occur, courtesy of the US taxpayer.
You mean all that “there ain’t no business like no-bidness”? (Joke courtesy Trudeau.) That money was oozing with so much corruption and sticking to so many hands that you’d think ten times as much could be accomplished with half the money if spent in earnest. In fact isn’t that basically what happened, with individual US military units doing real rebuilding on paltry budgets while big no-bidness like Halliburton / KBR found a billion and one ways to “lose” the money?
As for Korea and Iraq, they sure are different in their economies. SKorea grew up with a state-subsidized export model aided by import-substitution, a strong industrial policy. I don’t see that happening in Iraq.
But Iraq has oil, totally unlike Korea. Who owns the oil? We’re told it belongs to the people of Iraq. Then why not try something new like oil trusts for every Iraqi citizen or family, and divide all the oil up as broadly and equally as possible?
This should in turn encourage democratic participation. Of course, if people just use their individual oil trusts to buy weapons and kill of the neighboring village, well, not so nice.
A system of oil money distribution could be run by a trusted neutral party, like Sweden. If that sounds weird, check out Paul Romer’s latest friendly neo-colonial ideas.
Direct revenue streams might obviate the need for some other social programs, or the people later could decide to pool money together in a social way, but in any case it seems you’d be protecting against creation of the kind of small corrupt power-elite that ruins most oil countries.
…thanks for putting up with my little brainstorm…;) but the main thrust is to look for development models that can work from the individual level up instead of top down.
Robin,
Because Iraq has oil… it has much less of a need for state-subsidized import-substitution model.
As I always like to say… having a lot of natural resources covers over a multitude of sins… unless you are Sub Saharan Africa. Then it just makes your problems bigger.
No thanks to the Koreans themselves of course. Robert, could you be a little bit more disingenuous? Crediting U.S. interference in Korean affairs, which caused the second-largest genocidal war of the 20th century after WW2, with Korea’s current economic prosperity is like giving credit to the rooster for the rising of the sun, in other words, pure post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning.
Also, using Korea as a developmental model for Iraq is like comparing an ADHD-riddled child to the hyper-achieving Asian kid next door. Not only is it illogical, it fails to take into consideration sociological, cultural, religious, and even genetic differences.
Yes, we can say that Iraq and Korea are two countries that were devastated by war. But that’s where the similarities end. Iraq before the war — and long before the U.S. embargo in 1991 — was actually relatively prosperous. Iraq also has something that Korea never had — oil-rich resources.
Going back to ADHD-riddled child metaphor, a better analogy — or baseline for comparison — would be another ADHD-diagnosed child on Ritalin™. For Iraq, that would be another relatively well developed and relatively democratic Persian Gulf or land-locked Arab state, like the UAE or Jordan, for example. Whatever you compare Iraq with, don’t compare it to Korea for petesake. That’s just ignorant.
U.S. interference in Korean affairs, which caused the second-largest genocidal war of the 20th century after WW2
What was the alternative, Jenny? That everything would have been peachy-keen if the U.S. had allowed the Soviets to occupy the entire Korean peninsula? Take a look at the situation north of the DMZ—see how well that worked out? Are you seriously suggesting that Korea and Koreans would have been better off united under that regime?
Let’s be clear: the “second-largest genocidal war of the 20th century after WW2″ was caused by Kim Il-sung, full stop. Any suggestion to the contrary is patent nonsense.
Read the entire sentence — not just the relative clause — before you respond half-cocked (the issue here isn’t the Korean War):
“Crediting U.S. interference in Korean affairs, which caused the second-largest genocidal war of the 20th century after WW2, with Korea’s current economic prosperity is like giving credit to the rooster for the rising of the sun, in other words, pure post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning.”
FYI, it takes two to tango, if you didn’t know. That said:
1) Never get involved in a land war in Asia;
2) Never get involved in someone else’s civil war;
3) It’s premature to claim victory in a war that isn’t over and has no victors or losers declared. Until then, shut your mouth.
4) Whoever wins this war gets to decide how who was responsible for the second-largest genocide since WW2. Until then, shut your mouth.
Pineforest,
The US entered Iraq for a number of reasons. One of them was, ostensibly, to remove a bad dictator and to deliver democracy. The exercise was touted as “nation-building”. Remember, no few people called this (ostensible) objective naive (including America’s closest allies), but Bush went ahead with the exercise anyway.
If you claim to have a madate to “nation-build”, then in my opinion it follows that you inherit the obligation to “nation-fix” when things don’t go according to plan. Especially when:
1. Many (most?) of Iraqis prefer Saddam to the current government. A damning indictment if ever there was.
2. You control the Iraqi oil fields and therefore Iraqi sovereign wealth – the finances needed to keep provided security and stay on task.
8675309,
I loved your analogy, but I really don’t believe that Mr. Koehler thinks that Koreans themselves didn’t play a huge/majority role in building up their country.
FYI, it takes two to tango, if you didn’t know. That said:
1) Never get involved in a land war in Asia;
2) Never get involved in someone else’s civil war;
3) It’s premature to claim victory in a war that isn’t over and has no victors or losers declared. Until then, shut your mouth.
4) Whoever wins this war gets to decide how who was responsible for the second-largest genocide since WW2. Until then, shut your mouth.
–8675309
I can’t tell whether you are being ironic.
1) Who is this directed at? Land wars in Asia have had clear benefits for some.
2) Why? South Koreans and Americans clearly benfitted from American involvement.
3) South Korea won. The war need not be over, but the result is that the DPRK is contained and the ROK is rapidly emerging as a large economy able to exert a great deal of cultural influence beyond its borders. The sinking of the Cheonan does not change this fact. There is no likely scenario in which the DPRK can “win.” Rather, the reason why no one considers resumption of war a necessity is because everyone assumes that the DPRK will ultimately collapse under its own incompetence and institutionalized ignorance and that the ROK, and possibly China, will pick up the pieces.
4) I don’t even know what this means. This makes no sense.
Finally, I wouldn’t call the Korean War a genocidal war. You can call it that. But that does not mean that other people will understand what you mean. The war was not waged to destroy the Korean people. The communists fought, not to destroy the Korean people, but to unite them under a totalitarian police state. America and the ROK fought to stop that from happening–not to wipe out the Korean people. Certainly America could have decided not to fight for Koreans, but that would just mean that Koreans today would either all be Japanese or communists–a happy thought.
…
If you claim to have a madate to “nation-build”, then in my opinion it follows that you inherit the obligation to “nation-fix” when things don’t go according to plan. Especially when:
1. Many (most?) of Iraqis prefer Saddam to the current government. A damning indictment if ever there was.
2. You control the Iraqi oil fields and therefore Iraqi sovereign wealth – the finances needed to keep provided security and stay on task.
–hoju_saram
1. This sounds disingenuous. Even if every single Sunni Arab loved Saddam–and this is not at all the case–they still only make up 15-20% of the Iraqi population. The frustrations felt by the vast majority of Arab Iraqis seem to have much less to do with wanting Saddam, the person, than wanting improved goverment services. While security today is still a concern, it is far less a concern than 3 years ago. And, nowadays, Iraqis want less congestion for highway travel, a reliable power delivery system, and jobs.
2. Can you share with me what you know? As far as I know, Iraqis control the oil. There is are lots of internal disputes among Iraqis about how to do divide the revenue. The Kurds in their own autonomous region don’t want to give up the northern oil fields. The Sunnis don’t have much, if any. And the central government, currently dominated by the Shiite, wants to control all of it. Foreign oil developers have to negotiate with the Iraqis to develop the oil fields and make profit. Having their own concerns about these internal disputes, they have to lobby the Iraqis for better terms.
As for “fixing” Iraq, at this point, that is the responsibility of the Iraqis themselves. As far as I and “many Iraqis” are concerned, America has done its job and it is time for America to leave. Reportedly, the decision to pull all US troops by the end of next year was already settled during the second Bush term. Iraqis themselves, and not you, have determined that this is for the best. Personally, I think Iraq is going to turn out fine.
Mr. Koehler does, in fact, believe Koreans themselves played a major role in the development of South Korea. That said, he also thinks the analogy and the claim that “U.S. interference in Korean affairs [...] caused the second-largest genocidal war of the 20th century after WW2″ are ridiculous.
So is denying that the United States contributed decisively to Korean economic prosperity.
I assume that was directed at 8675309, as I didn’t deny that, either.
I would say that America’s major contribution to the security of South Korea contributed decisively to said country modernizing and/or reaching a level of economic prosperity. The same can be said for Japan (Yoshida Doctrine) and Germany (NATO) as well. In terms of direct economic aid and advice I don’t think the contributions were decisive. American has had a very checkered history in terms of nation building. Its’ generally done a poor job in helping a country economically through direct policy and capital infusion. The political advice America offers tends to not fit a country’s society or culture very well and the economic aid given tends to be wasted away into corruption. America’s most recent example of shitty nation building? Afghanistan.
@18: correct
America’s security umbrella was important, no doubt. In the 50s and early 60s, besides direct security and military aid, US economic aid, subsidies, loans, preferential trade access and terms, etc. also constituted upwards of 90% of Korea’s GNP (the number varied from year to year). If that’s not decisive, what is? The much touted “wisdom of the ancestors”? The fact that a lot of aid – both economic and military – was sucked up in graft and embezzlement is on the Koreans. America’s admittedly spotty record in nation-building elsewhere is irrelevant. to the case of Korea
Okay, I change “America’s major contribution” to “America’s decisive contribution” even though it’s bad form to use that word twice in the same sentence.
Agreed. Everyone knows that the right strategy is to occupy Papua New Guinea and just build up and build up…
Yes, but the U.S. has done this in other countries as well and in many cases have not gotten similar results. It’s the Korean people that took this assistance and didn’t let it go to waste, as it so often does, unfortunately. It still took Korean engineers to design good products, Korean workers to endure poor pay and difficult working conditions, Korean economic planners to formulate the policies, Korean industrialists to dare to dream of multi-billion dollar entities back when Korea’s per capita GDP was Africanish…
The bulk of America’s direct economic help was in the 50′s and 60′s and it was extremely important in keeping Korean bellies full and in rebuilding from the Korean War. The bulk of Korea’s development was in the late 60′s, 70′s, 80′s and even 90′s where America’s direct economic contributions were much lower.
No one – at least not me – is denying the importance of Korean agency in the process.
Sperwer,
I think it’s best to think of it this way. After the Korean War America had a tremendous incentive to supplement Korean GDP because South Korea’s economy was completely wrecked during the Korean War. A Korea that couldn’t stand on its own would be a terrible bulwark against Communism and these considerations drove the bulk of American foreign policy thinking in the 50′s and 60′s. The figure that you gave that American direct economic aid was about 90% of Korea’s GNP in the 50′s and early 60′s sounds about right. I’ve heard it before.
However, once Korea reached a level of economic and political stability under Park Chung Hee, America was at a disincentive to provide direct economic aid. The goals of having a anti-Communist client state had been achieved so why pour any more money into it except what was absolutely necessary, right? As an American tax payer this makes a lot of sense to me. Plus, after the mid-60′s America was getting it’s hands and feet into the EXPENSIVE quagmire that would be known as Vietnam, so how much more assistance would the U.S. give Korea beyond subsistence? So, what this means is that a bulk of the economic development for Korea to go beyond just subsistence and a stable bulwark against Communism had to be the responsibility of the Koreans themselves.
And, of course, the base provided earlier by American $ and know-how – like the Japanese contributions during the colonial period – was thus inconsequential. When did you say that Korea (re-invented the wheel?
Well of course some of the left over Japanese infrastructure helped but seriously, South Korea’s economy after the Korean War was, on a per capita basis, smaller than Ghana… Ghana. Think about it. How much of this Japanese infrastructure could have been left in southern Korea if this was the case?
I bet you even late Joseon Dynasty’s per capita GDP would have been higher than Ghana’s!
However, I do believe that Japan made a lot of contributions to Korea’s development via education, business deals, tech transfers, soft loans, etc. in the 60′s to the early 90′s… but it didn’t have to be annexed by Japan to get them.
Interesting article from Strategy Page.
http://www.rjkoehler.com/2010/09/01/korea-the-model-for-iraq/#comment-389673
September 1, 2010: As the U.S. is reorganizing its remaining forces in South Korea, to make it easier to move American forces into, and out of, the country…
Infrastructure for 12 brigades? That’s 3-4 divisions. That’s one to two corps. That’s over 100k ground troops and support personnel. Is there any truth to this?
Can’t leave out market access for Korean goods — lopsided until (maybe) recently.
The Eighth Army headquarters is designed to be reinforced in time of war. That way, they get to have a bunch of billets for general officers.
The U.S. helped Korea rebuild itself from the destruction of the Korean War, in the same way that they helped rebuild Germany and Japan after WW2.
Economic prosperity, however, which is the long term picture, is solely due to the hard work, the scrimping and saving, the will to survive and succeed, and the sheer willpower and talent of the indigenous people of Korea, Germany and Japan.
While these war-torn countries are certainly appreciative to the U.S. for providing for the national defense and rebuilding their governments from the ground up after the war — as well as for providing food and numerous free loans to a starving population and a bankrupt nation in the aftermath of war — it is unseemly for the U.S. to take any credit for the hard work, industriousness, and skill that fueled their economies and prosperity afterward. (I don’t see intelligent Americans trying to take credit for Germany’s or Japan’s economic successes or current prosperity. However, in Korea for some reason, all types of expat revisionist historians seem to pop up a bit too eager to take credit either directly or indirectly for Korea’s successes and current prosperity.)
“Ten Deadliest Wars Since World War II”*:
1) Congolese Civil War (1998-present): Military & Civilian deaths: 3.9 Million.
2) Korean Civil War (1950-53): 2.8 Million
“North Korean death estimates range from 1.2 million to 3 million. South Korean totals range from 500,000 to one million.”
3) Chinese Civil War (1945-49): 2.5 Million
4) Second Vietnam War (1965-75): 2.0 Million
5) Sudanese Civil Wars (1983-present): 1.9 Million
*Reference: The Book of Lists; Chapt. 11,”War & Politics”, pp 360-361; Copyright 2006, Canongate Books.
Someone needs to remind Robert that we sent the U.S. Marine Corps. — not the Peace Corps — to fight in the Korean War. Also, if our Army doesn’t kill more of the enemy than the enemy kills of them, then that army is absolutely worthless and ridiculous. That said, the U.S. Army during Korea was hardly ridiculous. Genocidal may be too strong a word, but that’s what our highly efficient and effective modern Armed Forces achieved using superior firepower in a densely populated area, regardless of whether it was intended or not.
Someone needs to remind Numbers that killing large numbers of people in war does not necessarily equal “genocide”, just as killing one or five doesn’t necessarily equal “homicide”
I for one don’t deny the contributions of the peoples of Europe, Japan, Korea etc. to the rebuilding of their countries and the achievement of prosperity. And I don’t think you can adduce any examples of the revisionsim you claim to be afoot – as distinct from efforts on the part of some to redress the propoensity of Koreans to arrogate to themselves all the credit for Korea’s remarkable eocio-economic progress or at least – as by silence on nearly every August 15th (other than when the GNP has other reasons for blowing smoke up Uncle Sam’s ass) to make beleive that they weren’t liberated but became independent — to deny by silence the contributions of others. Might that have something to do with the difference between commenters’ attitudes towards the Korea as compared with Germany, et al?
That’s because The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and Japan’s role as the engine thereof, collapsed. I’m not a big fan of Bruce Cumings, but he has written convincingly on the political economy of Japan and Korea’s role in it and the strategy of the US in both recreating a regional economic system in Asia and linking it to the US economy as a centerpiece of the reconstruction of East Asia after WW2. So your “analysis” amounts to nothing but a stray observation.
WK,
I’m guessing it’s connected to this:
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/08/205_72053.html
Yeah, I remember seeing that article as well. It could be that since Okinawa is in doubt at times that the U.S. might see Korea as deployment alternative? I don’t know.
Strategy Page is like a “Bleacher Report” but for the defense industry so you have to take what it says w/a grain of salt…
To that I say… how nice of the Japanese to create an economy in Korea that was dependent on demand for their war effort!
The so called “The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” is a discredited concept in most academic circles (outside Japan). Personally, I wouldn’t bring it up if you want credible arguments.
Here’s what a quick wiki search netted:
I’m fine if you want to rephrase your point.
I’d agree with the other half of your comment, but I’m not sure how it relates to my point you quoted or how it makes it irrelevant like you said.
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