UPDATE: Meet Mr. Yono-class submarine, or at least the Iranian Ghadir-class variety.
- Well, it’s official: South Korea has announced the result of the international joint civilian—military investigation team into the sinking of the Cheonan, and as expected, they concluded that the corvette was sunk by “an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North Korea.” More specifically, they believe the ship was sunk by a CHT-025 acoustic-homing torpedo fired from a small North Korean sub, quite possible a Yono-class midget sub.
- Oh, and hangeul was discovered on one of the torpedo fragments.
- Needless to say, the Hani — or at least the experts asked by the Hani — aren’t impressed. Christ, even the Seoul Shinmun is calling for retribution and criticizing China for enabling the North.
- The US State Department — taking time off from apologizing to China for Arizona’s enforcement of federal immigration law — issued a statement of support for the findings. Well, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell did, anyway. He also said the US and its allies would be facing “a very serious set of circumstances in the coming days.” Mrs. Clinton is going to have her hands full.
- Note to Joel Wit: engaging in talks is a rather odd way to respond to the murder of 46 sailors in an act of war directed against one of your closest allies. Somehow, I can’t see the United States responding similarly if Iran, Syria, etc. torpedoed a US Navy warship.
- Oh, and North Korea is calling the investigation report a “fabrication” (“Lies! All lies!) and is threatening “full-scale war” ™ if sanction are imposed on Pyongyang. They did, however, offer to send an investigation team of their own to the South. Helpful folk, they are.
{ 218 comments… read them below or add one }
Will the North Koreans also do some fact finding as to the backshooting they did regarding Park Wang-ja?
The North Korean leadership are criminals and cowards.
North Korean Investigation Team:
“We confirm the presence of Hangeul on one of the torpedo fragments and affirm that this conclusively demonstrates that the torpedo orginated in the puppet state to the south and that the Cheonan explosion was therefore ordered by the imperialist beasts who pull the puppet strings that move the traitorous fingers that squeeze the terrible triggers that fire the vicious guns that blast the peaceful land that raise the clouds of dust that block the rays of sun . . . in our scientific opinion, of course.”
Jeffery Hodges
* * *
The problem remains as to whether the sinking was sanctioned by the state, or was the act of rogue elements.
The reason the North did what it did in a cowardly way and then denied it is because it’s scared of what the alliance could do to it. This is not to say I think the North worried the alliance would actually do anything, just that doing something might not be a bad idea, since the North was scared of getting caught.
What’s so annoying about SK progressives is that it’s as if they still need the dictatorship to be around. The Grand National Party (under previous names) fabricated so many “NK actions” over the decades, executing people on trumped-up pro-NK chargers right at election time, that they just can’t bring themselves to believe the North could actually do something mean.
But 61% of Seoul Shinmun’s shares are gov’t owned, so this should hardly be a surprise. xoxo.
But at least progressives these days do have a little bit of a sense of humor (which is better than self-righteousness).
http://hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/421687.html
Dang, when I read they had found a propeller, I had no idea what they had found the whole assembly.
So, what will China do? Probably nothing. Investing in North Korea just got cheaper.
What with the ad for the personal radiation monitor? I’m almost offended.
“Needless to say, the Hani — or at least the experts asked by the Hani — aren’t impressed.”
–Robert Koehler
Well, I for one am very impressed with the sizes of the 호도s at the Hankyoreh: they’re so much larger than the brains there! Shall no one contact Ripley’s?
As for possible cosmetic measures, I hope the South Korean media stops referring to the leader of North Korea as “김정일 국방위원장,” or in the case of the Hanky: “위대한 장군님 김정일 동지 게서.” Doing so implicitly recognizes his legitimacy. Doing so is probably unconstitutional since the South doesn’t recognize the North as sovereign entity. I would also like to see official documents start calling the North “북괴” again.
That should be *께서
Here’s a notion I’ve been turning over in my mind: is it possible to start* a de facto naval war with North Korea without it escalating into a land war? Seems to me keeping a tight grip on the seas would bring just about any regime to its knees in a few years.
* Yes I know they’re already technically at war. You know what I mean.
If any of you thought North Korea really just wanted to have a chat, read this article.
According to sources, the US and North Korea were on the verge of another bilateral meet-up when the North went ahead and committed a terrorist attack. Most people who have engaged with the North, or who are well-read on the subject know that the North views direct talks with the US as a diplomatic holy grail of sorts. Pretending to reach an agreement and then backing away in dramatic fashion is a staple North Korean tactic. If they were willing to turn down such a prized-offer (and one that would have almost certainly resulted in unconditional aid in the near-term) with an armed provocation, then it shows they have given up on dialogue.
There some opposing interpretations of this however. The end of the Joonang Ilbo article above quotes a source as saying that he thinks the Cheonan sinking wasn’t ordered by Kim Jong Il directly, but by hard-line factions bent on disrupting the talks. Ruediger Frank said something similar to this back on May 9th.
On the face of it, such analysis is plausible, but ultimately pure speculation. Other experts seem to believe that such an attack could only have been ordered by KJI himself. His post Daecheon Sea Battle II visits to Pipagot, alleged calls for revence, and his re-promotion of Kim Myeong-guk seem to lend credence to this view. More evidence is needed.
KJI cannot afford to have subordinates who take personal initiative beyond their petty drug running operations/gulag slave labor camps necessary to fund their military.
One hallmark of a totalitarian regime is that the tallest blades of grass are the first to be cut. If KJI didn’t know about the operation Kim Myeong Guk would have been the highest ranking officer in a re-education camp or retired quietly with a shot to the head.
People who take initiative are a threat to the state. They have ideas and they are not fully controllable. If they do what they want, they might decide that KJI is a bad leader which doesn’t take too much imagination to begin with.
This is the country that routinely kills officials doing exactly what KJI told them to do. Head of currency reform: dead. The two briefcase men who handed over $500 million in cash to KJI from KDJ: dead.
Orwellian Headline of the Year (maybe the decade):
North Korea threatens war if punished for ship sinking. (Yahoo)
The sharp eyes of Dr. Andrei Lankov have noticed strange doings in Pyongyang:
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/05/137_66212.html
According to Dr. Lankov, North Korea has been acting more erratic and less rationally than they usually do. Pyongyang has been miscalculating domestically and internationally, and Dr. Lankov concludes that this has something to do with KJI’s ’08 stroke.
As usual, I’m inclined to agree with him.
“What’s so annoying about SK progressives is that it’s as if they still need the dictatorship to be around.”
And why is that? According to Oranckay, because “The Grand National Party (under previous names) fabricated so many ‘NK actions’ over the decades, executing people on trumped-up pro-NK chargers right at election time, that they just can’t bring themselves to believe the North could actually do something mean.” In other words, they’ve been supporting/making apologetics for/ignoring the previous attacks on the SK Navy, routine announcements by the north that it will destroy the south, reported human rights abuses of the dictatorship, etc., for years and years because the (alleged) past actions of GNP makes them do it….
Can someone remind us why the ubernationalist quasi-left in Korea are called “progressives”? They seem to have not progressed much at all over the years.
Anyway, I don’t expect nor honestly care to read a reply to my comment. My condolences to the families of those killed, though.
@ milton # 15: so the world risk a crisis of unthinkable proportions in a key economic area, triggering possibly a depression in the best case scenario cos the health of some short, fat, old drunk finally is catching up with his party lifestyle ?
So guys now what ?
What China would do in that case ? Turning a blind eye ?
My unasked-for 2 Won: Not much can realistically be done to punish NK for this; better to get the UN condemnation and keep up current sanctions.
However, I’ve got a wild proposal (that’s no better or worse than the so-called experts in the Korean affairs analysis cottage industry): on the happy day when KJI finally croaks, if one of his sons assumes power (even as just a front for the NK military), time for SK to make a proposition. SK would completely bail out the NK economy and allow NK to be a sovereign nation (for now) with Kim’s son in power if NK turns its military (and missiles) to a defensive instead of offensive posture. SK would give amnesty and cash to the military and party elite, the old KJI guard, if they retire quietly. All that SK would control would be the north’s economy, and NK would have its own currency (to curtail the black market and keep it domestic). The south would start small companies in basic manufacturing, farming, fisheries etc., along with clinics, banks and schools. The north would in turn draw down its military to work in the new factories, farms, construction, etc. Kim’s son could then be a quasi-legitimate leader (not guilty of the old regime’s abuses) and the political structure could be geared to actual development rather than cultish ideology.
This is a variation on Dr. Lankov’s amnesty proposal, only not with the current regime. And it’s obviously a long shot, but Kim’s sons are Western educated and might prefer this scenario to the one that ends with a glass parking lot.
Should have linked to Andrei Lankov’s proposal:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GE26Dg01.html
Sorry, I cannot agree with that above plan. No amnesty should be given to all those responsible for crimes against humanity. SK should not give such promises nor agree with the plan.
Well, CM, it’s Realpolitik, which isn’t always going to be palatable. But read the last part of Lankov’s article I linked to and consider the options: the continuation of the Kim regime for another generation, or a war-less transition to a somewhat normal nationhood.
As it stands, the KJI regime members will never face justice, they will die of old age or in a war that destroys the north. Lankov’s amnesty proposal has an aspect most will reject out of hand like you, but the likely alternatives (war, nuclear war, sudden regime collapse and millions of refugees) are far, far worse.
How about “defect now and receive an amnesty” in an offer with a deadline? I personally favor regicide.
I’m down with that
“KJI regime members will never face justice, they will die of old age ”
I doubt the abuses will stop, after KJI regime members die off. Every day, more of them are taking the place of those who have died, and are even more brutal. This is not a generational thing. Plus, it is morally repugnant to promise amnesty, and not even confer with the people who have suffered unimaginably under these regimes. You’re telling me we should deny them justice? Who gave us that right?
Eh, McArthur kept the Japanese emperor away from the hangman’s noose, and looky at what Lankov says:
“There is a precedent for this, from Idi Amin of Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko of then-Zaire to Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. The latter, the hereditary dictator of Haiti, if anything, was much more of a bizarre personality than Kim, but this did not prevent him from being warmly accepted by France after his downfall. ”
Yeah, I’m playing devil’s advocate here since it’s basically morally repugnant to me too…but again, KJI’s son is more or less innocent and my scheme hinges on him going along with this and somehow quashing the opposition, so yeah, it’s maybe a bit far out.
So, just settle in for Dear Leader 2.0?
Bork!
michael: what you write sounds really reasonable, except for the small detail we are dealing with completely unreasonable people. I suspect that what you propose it’s a piece of Unrealpolitik.
Mind you it would be probably the best solution: it would avoid first and foremost a war, it would avoid a catastrophic Ethiopia-like humanitarian crisis, it would create an incentive for the remnants of the old regime to cooperate instead of going guerilla. Finally it would allow the Norks to start developing at their own pace without ending up being second (or third or fourth) rate citizens in their own country and a humongous financial burden for their rich brothers.
The benevolent supervision of the South plus allies and trading partners would create a de facto protectorate without giving the impression of blatantly doing so.
A win-win situation for the Korean people (both Southern and Northern).
Too bad it has IMHO 0.0.nothing chance of happening. Infact here we have a regime that in the best case scenario, as IHBB et al. pointed out, is acting like a dumass tweaker whose lungimirance doesn’t extend beyond bullying people to get enough money for the next high.
In the worst case, and unfortunately probably most realistic, scenario
we have what Hamel and Milton outlined referring to Myers work: an autocracy (unfortunately backed by a large enough chunk population) drunk on their own delirious ethnocentric quasi-Third Reich revanchisme.
Keep engaging people like that reminds me of all the appesament attempts of the late ’30′s, we all know how it ended up.
It would probably be possible to cleanse the North of their suicidal/homicidal mystique, like it was possible to succesfully da-nazify Germany. It only took the obliteration of Europe inbetween.
This is one ugly mess
All the Korean commenters are going on about
the “1번” written in blue. (1번 = No.1 Hanara, blue) on the torpedo.
Hilarious, how they are saying,
쪽팔려. 선거동안..ㅋㅋㅋㅋ 1번이래…ㅋㅋㅋ
(oh, it’s so embarrassing, during the election..)
Also they are calling on Monami (the SK stationery compay) to reflect on the fact that markers from North Korea are so superior that they withstand salt water and explosion and rust.
Good points, Gangpe. Like I said, this all hinges on whether or not Kim’s son will be a “rational actor” who sees all the advantages you said, and that he retains power and the military has some sense of security, and that he brings in less-tainted new officials while sending the old regime off to pasture.
That’s a lot of “what-ifs” and a massive coordinated diplomatic agreement by SK, US, China….
Lankov’s proposal just sounds like a practical, if morally repulsive, way to avoid all the other bad scenarios.
“All the Korean commenters are going on about….”
Grow up.
Sorry Yuna, I meant the commenters, not you of course.
Bork!
That’s OK Michael, being told to grow up is a complement to some women at that critical age.
But I find it *hilarious* that it would be “1번” in written in blue they found. LOL 기호번호 1번, 한나라당 – satire, alive and well in those who don’t want to believe in the face of evidence
Someone else said “at this rate we will find a piece of evidence with Kim Jungil’s own handwriting on it 이러다가 김정일 친필까지 발견하겠군” Sorry I found that funny too.
compliment
That reminds me of somebody else i know who is shall i say very partial on being referred to as 아가씨
Yuna: There’s the expression “A woman of a certain age” meaning she’s over 40, so a “critical age” is what, over 70?
You’re right, the KJI joke is funny.
I’m no fan of the GNP (or any of the current politicos, really) but some people are getting a bit too “mad cow” about this.
Is it my mum?
A number of years ago my mum came to see me in London and we were walking in front of the V&A museum in South Ken, and a man (30′s?) came up to us and asked where we were from(Korea) and then started talking about Shiri and what a great movie it was etc. I was trying detach from him politely by dragging my mum on but then he said “You sisters”, and my God, I still remember the soprano arpeggio “ohohoho” laugh my mum emitted with her hand around her mouth..
Shiri was indeed a great movie , a bit too optimistic in retrospect though
Joshua at OneFreeKorea, a friend of Lankov’s, has some of the most well-developed, insightful thinking on this whole issue. A daily must-read, IMHO.
OneFreeKorea is a great site.
Dr. Lankov was just interviewed by the BBC a couple of minutes ago, saying basically what the Marmoteers already know, that SK will do some sort of diplomatic protest to “save face” domestically, while little else can/will be done.
That was preceded by some weasel from China’s FM who said they would reach their own conclusions about the attack, which means blocking any UN sanction and not signing onto any condemnation.
No worries, just keep shipping your lead-filled crap to WalMart!
“That’s a lot of “what-ifs” and a massive coordinated diplomatic agreement by SK, US, China….
Lankov’s proposal just sounds like a practical, if morally repulsive, way to avoid all the other bad scenarios.”
–michael
I would love for the world, in any preparation involving major economies to remove KJI, to do so in the public forum and in the media glare so that KJI can feebly observe all the minutes of how the world is planning to conspire to remove him from power–because nobody likes him. Might not his brain offer him a second helping of stroke, then? But that’s fantasy.
This Lankov idea has been a lot of people’s fantasy for a long time, too. Most likely including him. But. The problem is. Any plan that requires the dictator of NK play along must fail. I believe that this is one of the 13 laws and 10 commandments governing our universe. Srsly. You can look it up!
We can try though. Such a plan requires coercion. In this case, only Beijing can play the goon. It’s certainly not anyone in Washington or Seoul. And KJI has no incentive to play along. So. Then. You need to offer China reason to want to force KJI out. But. We may discover that the universe has 14 laws actually.
Getting China to do such a thing is difficult because as I understand it, there is intense political pressure in the party on the top leadership not to act like Washington’s Asian poodle. If we want to coordinate with them to conspire against their own ally and friend, we’d better do it soon because when the younger generation takes over the Politburo they are likely to be more maybe not “combative” or “defiant” but perhaps “assertive” with Washington.
Still, I just don’t see the Chinese pressuring KJI to retire. If they really thought that KJI was bad for them, they’d probably have come up with the plan and executed it on their own already. But all indications at the moment is that they are prepared to burn political capital with the people of the free world to save KJI’s rear after he had committed an act of war against one of their own major trading partners! Incidentally, if China doesn’t cooperate, this might be a good opening to sell Taiwan some F-16s.
But then again, it might be worth exploring what we may be able to offer. One thing off the table must be the withdrawl of military support for Taiwan. Non-starter, that, of course. Otherwise. What is it that China fears in a loss of the DPRK? And what advantage would China gain? And perhaps most importantly, what would happen to the political climate in Beijing if Beijing forced out KJI?
China’s gain would be goodwill. An orderly unifying process in the peninsula would likely grow the economy in China’s northeast region. A unified peninsula would make easier direct access for Russia’s and China’s energy pipelines, highways, and railways to Seoul and Pusan. A unified peninsula would truly stabilize the region. Japan, Korea, China, Russia, and Mongolia do not really have any reason to want to fight. Each are still prioritizing trade with each other. A larger Korea would mean a larger market to export to. etc. Let’s see. A larger ROK means more money for China and no more security threat.
The downside would be that a unified Korea is a stronger American ally. Korea is not only a potential nuisance for sharing a long terrestrial border, but as a peninsula which curves overlappingly over part of china’s shores, relative to the Pacific, it’s a potential naval nuisance. If Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, and the USA band together, China might feel constricted–their closer allies are on the Indian Ocean, bordering India. etc. In other words, I just don’t really think the downside is all that bad.
The political fallout could be nasty, however. This could trump the benefits. It is my belief that, although the Chinese think of North Koreans as largely the object of their jokes, they still see them as their brothers in arms. Washington’s Poodle™, Beijing Headquarters. I just don’t think the commies could handle such a label.
Anyway. There is another set of issues. All this presupposes that even if KJI goes peacefully that there still won’t be mass illegal border crossings, which they would not be happy with. Or that the ROK politicians would have the technical skills and the finances to unify the peninsula in an orderly way…
What do you think?
SOMETHING TO WATCH:
Next weekend (end of May) the leaders of China, Japan and (South) Korea are set to meet for a trilateral summit on Jeju-do. This has been in the planning stage since at least April, so obviously the Cheonan sinking will not be the only item on the agenda (assuming, that is, that China allows it to be an agenda item at all).
If they do discuss it, Korea and Japan will probably be on the same page. Hu will be the Odd Man Out?
“Instead, America must embrace its lost love of beneficent anarchy and learn to see the subjects of totalitarianism as friends we’ve overlooked for too long.”
–Joshua Stanton
Interestingly, Joshua Stanton’s idea is to try to collapse the DPRK without Beijing playing an active role, KJI abdicating, or wishing for a military coup. He has been long interested in the factors which create a social environment or mood out of which a revolutionary movement can grow. It seems that he wants governments and private individuals to take advantage of the channels of smuggling to help bring outside news and goods to the people of NK. I do agree that KJI’s foolish policies in the last year or so has provided opportunity for such a thing to be accomplished. He doesn’t say it, but he probably would like our spy agencies to get involved. In the past, it was apparently impossible to infiltrate NK with operatives. Perhaps things really have changed?
But what’s at the end of this trouble fomenting? Aren’t we then forced to hope that the people who rise to take on the government can do so without adequate arms and without the state military and paramilitary cracking down on them? Didn’t we see something like this in Iran last year? Or is Joshua Stanton saying something else? I wonder what he sees as the end game of his plan. It’s still a good idea. I suppose we’ll have to wait for the last two installments of his opus.
“Next weekend (end of May) the leaders of China, Japan and (South) Korea are set to meet for a trilateral summit on Jeju-do.”
–hamel
One of the more exciting news related to the trilateral meeting earlier this month was the launching of a joint research on the possibility of a free trade pact. I didn’t know that things had already progressed this far.
Here is a statement from the British Foreign Minister, William Hague, which was linked from the website of the British embassy in Seoul.
UK experts were also involved in the investigation of the Cheonan sinking. It is not long so I will just paste the whole thing here:
Incidentally, if China doesn’t cooperate, this might be a good opening to sell Taiwan some F-16s.
Urgh world war 3,4,5 coming up…damn i’m starting to think like baduk
Maybe a circumstantiated plan to withdraw the 37k man of the US Army currently stationing in the ROK once the reunification process is stable enough ?
Question is would the South accept such a big role of China in the reunification process ? Could it be that the Norks work as a buffer for both China and S. Korea against eachother ?
20 years down the road for sure and
This is indeed truly exciting news and something that makes the sore pimple represented by the Dear Bastard regime even more grotesque in this amazingly booming part of the world, i guess we all have to deal with the trailer trash party pooper.
Interesting point, i think an uprising would work if it was truly some mass event, where pretty much the whole population revolt. What we have seen in Iran was basically a movement involving mostly the elite students of the capital, while the vast majority of the rural peasantry remained indifferent if not hostile. That’s why i’m not convinced by RobinHedge idea of smuggling more and more Western media into the North.
I suspect such an approach would reach a very thin layer of the urban population, happy and ready to be modernised: a not enough powerful force to unhinge the status quo.
“That’s why i’m not convinced by RobinHedge idea of smuggling more and more Western media into the North.”
– gangpehmoderniste
I think it’s worth doing anyway. We couldn’t do it before because the state control was too difficult to evade. Apparently. But if smuggling is rampant now and we have the opportunity to do so, then we might as well take advantage of this opportunity. I think every bit helps, if only at the margins.
“Maybe a circumstantiated plan to withdraw the 37k man of the US Army currently stationing in the ROK once the reunification process is stable enough ? ”
–gangpehmoderniste
I think this will have to happen after reunification. Imagine, if the US stayed, then everyone would know that the purpose was because the ROK did not trust China. Furthermore, I think Americans and Koreans would want the bases closed absent the threat of the DPRK. But absent the DPRK, the poor Okinawans might wonder why they have to maintain bases on their land. Taiwan could end up in an uncomfortable position…maybe.
“Could it be that the Norks work as a buffer for both China and S. Korea against eachother ? ”
–gangpehmoderniste
I don’t know about this. DPRK is not any kind of buffer state the ROK should wish for. And it’s not just because the DPRK happens to be China’s ally.
^^
Agreed
Yes, yes definitely, i explained myself poorly: any Us troops withdrawal from Korea would have to begin a couple of years down the road of the reunification process
I doubt Taiwan has any realistic chance to escape the Mainland warm, loving embrace. It has too much to gain if they do reunite (becoming the Silicon Valley the PRC desperately need) and too much to loose if they don’t. Some personal freedom will have to be sacrificed…oh well
I’ll readily admit it was a big hyperbolic
My impression though is that Korea, like every industrialised nation, is a very segmented, contradictory society. I’m not sure if sometimes their stance toward the North can’t get impaired by some kind of anxiety over China voracity
“I’m not sure if sometimes their stance toward the North can’t get impaired by some kind of anxiety over China voracity”
– gangpehmoderniste
Maybe you’re right. I wouldn’t know. ^^
But I think some South Koreans also have concerns that the Chinese may be taking advantage of North Korean resources.
…
You know, another thing about Lankov’s idea that might be worth mulling is if the DPRK felt that China was no longer trustworthy, how would the elites react? Some defectors have been insisting that North Koreans do not completely trust the Chinese. The DPRK-CCP relationship is pretty interesting, if maybe a bit opaque to me. But they seem to have come to a comfortable arrangement. That relationship would of course be broken if KJI felt threatened or pushed by the CCP. That bond may not be reformed. But that could lead to the DPRK’s collapse. So they can’t ignore the CCP. On the other hand, KJI’s pride is of the vain sort, I think. Might KJI do something rash, instead of going gentle into that good night?
^It probably need not be said, but those other guys who got shipped out…well, how many of them had a nuke or two do you suppose?
Yup it all boils down to the good old question: does His Midgetness retain some minimal degree of, if not mental sanity which would be a big stretch in his case, at least some minimal grasp on reality ? Or if not him at least somebody in his inner circle with a cocked&loaded gun ?
Shit, man now i’m scared for real, should i tell my wife old Auntie in 전라 북 to come camp here ??
grip not grasp **
#5 oranckay
That iPhone, 100% genuine, made in N.Korea.
Hilariously cute one!!!!
And those progressive netizens are spreading their fabrication theory on twitter saying that only U.S allies agree on S.Korea government by highlighting this quote, or a word from CBS news article.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20005423-503543.html
@ # 36,
You know Yuna… when some non-Korean guy comes up to you and rambles on and on about some Korean movie/drama that he liked… you know that’s virtually a pick-up line, right?
Too bad it was directed at your mom though…
If anything’s deserving of a little suspicion, it’s the timing of the announcement itself. Can’t blame the opposition for being upset that it came right after the official election campaign period started. Perfect timing, depending on your position.
Sorry, I just HAVE to link to this article. Look at the photo all you Korean 까막눈. Juvenile but hilarious.
@#53
Hmm. So I guess that whenever a Korean guy comes up to a white girl and rambles on and on about some American movie/drama that he liked.. you know he’s just trying to pick her up, right?
Yup.
Ah, yes, gotta love stereotypes.
Just for the record, Assistant SecState Posner didn’t apologize to China for anything. Ben Stein used to be a serious journalist, but has gone all sensationalist/gossipy since moving to Politico, which is the non plus ultra of inside the Beltway drivel.
As always, consider the source.
DLB
@ 56,
Probably… (unless it’s a Korean American, then he’ll use a standard corny pick-up line just like everyone else).
Wangkon936: I’m really not trying to pick on you or on Korean guys at all.. just trying to point out stereotypes that go both ways; and both ways they are unproductive.
timer,
You took my # 56 totally the wrong way then.
WK and others, have you seen the won (SK)? The trend is broken!
It shows up pretty clearly .
#59:
If some guy accosts a female on the street, and asks her right off the bat what her race or ethnicity is, then tries to engage her in unsolicited and unwelcomed observations about his affinity for that minority’s national cinema or other bizarre non sequiturs related to his connections with her national origins, that is tantamount to sexual and racial harassment.
#56:
Now if a guy meets a girl and tries to make conversation with her about anything he wants to — without prefacing the interaction with a rude and uncalled for reference or inquiry about her race/ethnicity or nationality — it would be a harmless pick-up line, or an attempt at friendly conversation, or just innocent small talk — anything at all except the racial harassing situation as described above.
*FYI, there’s nothing more ugly in the world than a stranger coming up to you out of the blue and asking what nationality or ethnicity you are. I consider it not only none of your fucking business, but racist and bad manners. (Do I go around asking white people what their ethnicity or national origin is when I meet them? If I don’t, why is it that so many white people ask this right off the bat from Asians?)
Some Korean people I have spoken with still don’t believe the North did it. The elections are coming up, and the government is trying to use this as a……something. I didn’t really follow (re:listen) to the argument. I just heard that they don’t believe it, and supposedly a lot of people on the Korean internets don’t believe it as well.
#63, it’s true. A minority, a sizable minority of Koreans still believe this was done by South Korea or the US. They refuse to believe North Korea can do anything wrong. Looking back at the history of North Korean offenses, it just does not support this assertion. In their minds, South Korean government is the axis of evil. That is why the Lee administration sought international cooperation in investigating this incident. But this did not change the minds of the people who have made up their minds. As I said before, no matter what you do, and no matter what concrete evidence you put out, these people will not believe it. They’ll believe what they want to believe and see.
@CM #64: circumstantial evidence ? – massive !
`Concrete evidence’ ?
Reposted from the wrong Odds and Ends, my mistake.
Tensions may hurt Korean stock prices but actually help Korean products and services gain market share abroad… Luckily this comes at a time when oil and other commodity prices are retreating. This is a kind of natural immunity in SKorea’s financial national defense. Up to a point…
On the SK won, much of the weakness (just shy of 1200 per $ now) is likely because of the DPRK, not the eurozone. But a weaker won is good for exporters. Ring the Hanky: the chaebol attacked the Cheonan because they wanted to sink the won and boost exports!
Ok, I remember one of the arguments: supposedly, the people who survived the attack are not allowed to speak about it. Why not ask them? Did they hear an explosion, or just a crash? Eyewitness account would be useful in this.
Again, that’s just what I’ve heard. I’m not sure if this is true or not. Were any of the survivors called as witnesses? Are they kept silent, and – if so – why?
Really crummy for those about to go on vacation, though. The Bloomberg says won is down around 1220 to the dollar now. Rats.
“Were any of the survivors called as witnesses? Are they kept silent, and – if so – why?”
–eatyourkimchi
Hello. If it makes you any feel better, at some point, most of them will be discharged from the navy and then some of them will start talking. Maybe one of them will even write a book. The survivors are not likely to be all GNP supporters.
But I wonder: can you tell me what kind of things they might say to make you believe that a torpedo did not sink the ship? What do you think they could possibly say to contradict the physical evidence?
Do you really think that based on the pictures you saw of the wreckage that a torpedo did not sink the ship?
FYI, I don’t agree with the people that are arguing against the torpedo. From what little I’ve seen, I’m convinced it was North Korea. I’m just saying what my Korean friends have said as a counterargument.
I remember watching the broadcast yesterday and one guy asked a question if they have anything better than circumstantial evidence. There’s a torpedo remnant, and a hole in a ship, but there’s no way to prove that the torpedo remnant is the one that hit the ship and not the remnants of some other torpedo from the past (or something like that…I only saw a few minutes of it).
Again, I’m not saying North Korea didn’t do it, because I think they did. I’m just saying that it seems that there is a sizeable (supposedly) group of people in Korea who don’t think this is the case.
Might it be possible that the majority of people who are not convinced it was North Korea are simply convincing themselves to not be convinced because it is much easier than facing the prospect of having to take retaliatory action?
In other words, the spill in the Gulf of Mexico is displaying more balls than they are.
“There’s a torpedo remnant, and a hole in a ship, but there’s no way to prove that the torpedo remnant is the one that hit the ship and not the remnants of some other torpedo from the past ”
–eatyourkimchi
This is how I think about your concern. (1) The images of the salvaged Cheonan wreckage clearly indicates that an external explosion split and sank the ship. (2) Seismic sensors actually detected an explosion when the ship sank. This is how we know the exact moment of the sinking. (3) The explosive that sank the ship left explosives residue on the ship. This residue can be linked to the DPRK.
(4) Thus, if the recovered torpedo is not the culprit, then the correct torpedo or mine fragment is still out there under the sea somewhere for us to discover.
(5) But what makes this recovered torpedo interesting is that it is a more modern torpedo–in other words, it is not a remnant of the Korean War–that happens to be part of the DPRK’s arsenal today. (6) Moreover, this technology happens not to be a part of the ROK’s or the US’s arsenal. (7) The Cheonan was destroyed inside the ROK’s territory. (8) Finally, by coincidence perhaps, this torpedo, which was destroyed by self-detonation, happened to be discovered in the relevant area around the Cheonan’s wreckage.
But it’s possible I have some facts wrong. :/
IMO it was China.
“IMO it was China.”
–Koreansentry
Why?
Very sad to see Leonid Petrov come out saying that there is not enough evidence to be conclusive:
“in disputed waters”?? As I recall from the maps I have seen, the Cheonan was sunk SOUTH of Baengnyeong-do (백령도), not NORTH of it. Since that island is definitely part of South Korean territory (I dont think Pyongyang even tries to claim this island, does it? Although they have kidnapped fishermen from this isle through the years) how can he say it was disputed waters?
“We cannot call it aggression”?
“I think more negotiations are needed between Seoul and Pyongyang to resolve this matter”?
“I believe the recent tragedy with Cheonan is the direct result of this change of climate”??
Sorry Leonid, but I think you might be on drugs now, because the above quotes are neither rational nor consistent. For starters, the last quote is based on North Korea being the one who fired the torpedo, something you already called into question. 아이, 정말!
Do I go around asking white people what their ethnicity or national origin is when I meet them?
I don’t know.
If I don’t, why is it that so many white people ask this right off the bat from Asians?
I don’t know the answer to the first question! What a confusion!
#75: Hamel–Is Petrov still running those tours to Deathcamp Fantasyland? Because if he is, there’s your answer.
Wedge: I don’t think that is the answer. I believe NK is responsible, but I would be willing to take such a tour. So would others. Look at Lankov, for example.
the eu troubles should increase weakness of the won and demand for korean imports going forward the next few months. my guess is a continued weakening of the won, which should coincide nicely with my korean travels in september.
Ah, the wacky Looking Glass world of Korean nutizens….
So how is it that releasing a report on a tragic incident like the attack on the Cheonan at election time is spun as advantageous to the party in power when it could equally be argued (and is by some myopic editorial columnists in the U.S. media) that the attack shows the LMB government’s so-called “hardline” approach to the north is backfiring?
And how much better is the “nothing to see here, move along” attitude from the progessively more out of touch “progressives”?
I saw Lee Hoi-Chang, Chung Mong-joon, and Kang Ki-gap at Chogyesa on YTN this morning and thought, when will these people finally retire? Left, right, go away, bring in some centrists who aren’t in the pockets of the chaebol or the idiotic “civic groups.”
Or as Sperwer likes to say, Bork!
Bjork!
“we still don’t know who launched the torpedo, I think more negotiations are needed between Seoul and Pyongyang to resolve this matter.” ”
“I believe the recent tragedy with Cheonan is the direct result of this change of climate”
Contradiction of statements. If we don’t know who did it, how can he say it was because of South Korea’s alleged “hard line” policies? Why can’t people get it through their thick heads, they can’t negotiate with NK, they’ve tried everything, they’ve failed. Blaming this on South Korea is ludicrous. But that’s what many Korean Sun Shine Policy backers like the Labor Party are thinking – we really don’t know who did it, but this happened because Lee Myung Bak kkha-kkha who is the second coming of Hitler, has ruined the good relationship with North Korea. It’s all his fault.
Isn’t it interesting how major newspapers are saying crisis is “deepening” as South Korea merely “considers” shutting off Jejudo waters to the North Korean ships? In an ideal world, those waters would have been shut off *on the day of the attack*, no questions asked. What a tragic tragic situation.
In an ideal world, of course, North Korea wouldn’t even exist.
But I’m an idealist — I say let’s all work harder to make this world more ideal!
Jeffery Hodges
* * *
So this all comes down to one question it seems, what is the cleanest way to get rid of the North Korean government (ie. fewest casualties)? Once that’s figured out, then the economics of reunification can also be worked out.
One foot in front of the other.
I still think the DPRK is not something the ROK should allow to exist. And I still think that Beijing holds all the cards. So, this is my fantasy plan.
(1) The ROK should gather together the USA, Japan, Australia-New Zealand, Europe and any other state or entity which might help to collapse the DPRK. These others might include Russia, Indonesia, India, the IMF, the UN, NATO, the Red Cross. This is not an exhaustive list.
(2) The purpose would be to persuade Beijing to strangle and collapse the DPRK. If Beijing closes the borders, the DPRK will collapse.
(3) Beijing’s highest concern regarding the DPRK–regional stability. This is the primary reason why Beijing supports KJI and the other North Korean goons. But the benefits of a unified Korea if far greater for China than a divided one. As I wrote above:
China’s gain would be goodwill. An orderly unifying process in the peninsula would likely grow the economy in China’s northeast region. A unified peninsula would make easier direct access for Russia’s and China’s energy pipelines, highways, and railways to Seoul and Pusan. A unified peninsula would truly stabilize the region. Japan, Korea, China, Russia, and Mongolia do not really have any reason to want to fight. Each are still prioritizing trade with each other. A larger Korea would mean a larger market to export to. etc. Let’s see. A larger ROK means more money for China and no more security threat.
(4) To persuade Beijing, the states and other organizations the ROK can muster for the objective must fashion a “business plan” together, which would satisfy Beijing’s primary concern over a potential chaotic collapse. These concerns would include the formation of pockets of DPRK resistance or pockets of no government or police control; a mass refugee crisis tumbling into a massive border crisis; and possible disappearances of materials of WMD.
This business plan must show Beijing how the collapsing of the DPRK can be safely done. It must pose solutions to the military, police, humanitarian, logistical, and financial difficulties–understandably a very difficult feat–and it must be honest with the probabilities so that no one involved becomes self-deluded.
…
This is my fantasy plan. But I think Seoul should at least float the idea. It might have a…0.1% chance of working.
:p
Brendon where are you going on vacation. A friend recently went to Greece for his honeymoon… but with the riots they ended up skipping off to Turkey, and they found it more stable and more European…
Judge Judy you may be right but it’s hard to say. A few thoughts: first, a weak won means probably more market share, but not necessarily more exports insofar as the weakness is a result of one’s customers going broke… a technicality I guess, but exchange rate movements are pretty darn tricky. Also, the won has of course gained vis-a-vis the euro. I personally don’t know how the euro can weaken vs the greenback much beyond say $1.20 without a retracement. Maybe we’re seeing some of that today.
It will be interesting to see (or try and see) how much is DPRK-related and how much is eurozone. The question, when the euro strengthens, does the won follow? If not, that’s probably the Kim Jong Il effect.
Gotta run — sorry in advance for typos, mistakes, fractured thoughts…
This isn’t exactly apropos the Cheonan, but for everyone’s enjoyment:
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/because-every-country-is-the-best-at-something/#
The data points for North and South Korea are intuitive, I think. For the US, well….
DLB
I like the plan. The trouble for the US and ROK to date has been getting Beijing to discuss even privately North Korea end-game scenarios.
Moral suasion means next to nothing to China, so Seoul and its friends will have to provide material inducements for the Chinese, like mineral rights, a big chunk of the infrastructure projects involved and other service contracts. Distasteful perhaps, but necessary for attaining the bigger prize.
“so Seoul and its friends will have to provide material inducements for the Chinese, like mineral rights, a big chunk of the infrastructure projects involved and other service contracts. ”
–slim
You make a couple of good points. I think if Seoul and Washington tries this plan, perhaps Beijing will press for something like this. But perhaps others in the “consortium” may want something too. And why not. Annexation will cost more than the ROK alone can afford. I think what could be offered might be mining rights that could be leased away under favorable terms to foreign companies in exchange for favorable terms in financing from sovereign governments and banks.
Perhaps Korea can also loosen regulations to make it easier for foreign companies to do business in Korea.
As for the North Koreans, they would need jobs. It seems clear that that they must be employed at first in construction, mining, and agriculture. Might some massive public works projects supplement the building of low-cost housing? But they would also have to be given jobs in security as policemen and military police. I wonder if the capitalist Koreans could trust the former communists. Moreover, there might be all kinds of people who would like to settle scores.
Sorry, these are just random ideas. I know there are professionals who have had actual practical experience in nation building and Seoul should seek out everyone’s advice. Also, 0.1% probability sounds overly optimistic.
You guys can dream all you want but South Korea isn’t going to divy up North Korea’s $6 trillion (and counting) worth of mineral wealth to foreigners, especially the ruthless Chinese.
Those resources will be sorely needed to bring North Korea, back at least into the twentieth century.
That figure sounds hugely high, cm, but in any case, if the status quo is maintained, the loot will go to China before Seoul even has a say in the matter. That has already started.
‘You guys can dream all you want but South Korea isn’t going to divy up North Korea’s $6 trillion (and counting) worth of mineral wealth to foreigners, especially the ruthless Chinese’ cm
absolutely right. china has no historical claim on the northern part of korea so if it tries to take it by force, there will be war. and they will lose.
Those commandaries loom large in ancient Korean peninsular history; but anyway China has about as much claim further south as Korea does to Gando and Yanbian and the rest.
To whom, the US, which is exceedingly unlikely to get involved in an such contest. No one with an once of common sense would believe Korea alone capable of defeating such a grab by China – just as China had to save Korea from Hideyoshi
china has no historical claim on the northern part of korea. so if it tries to take it by force, there will be war. and they will lose.
ps china saved korea? yes. korea saved china? yes.
spervert, i’ll bet you believed the us could beat vietnam, no?
Han China’s former control of the four commanderies in and around the Korean peninsula has been cited as rationale for Sui and Tang’s invasion of Koguryo…
One of the interesting things about the commanderies, well at least the one with the most archeological evidence, Lelang, was that while the Han Dynasty underwent a lot of turmoil starting in 50 CE the commanderies went in and out of direct administrative control of the mainland. During it’s final 100 years or so it was pretty much ruled by warlords and independent from any power in the mainland.
ain’t nobody gonna buy china claiming it controlled northern korea TWO THOUSAND years ago. north korea is korean. as for this idea that the us won’t help, bullshit! it most certainly will in the form of arms and supplies. the japanese will be helping too.
china try to take northern korea, THERE WILL BE WAR. they will lose.
i remember spervert telling us the koreans had litlle to do w the winning of the imjin war. i found that a fantastical statement so i asked him to name english language sources that supported his claim. he responded by hemmin’ and hawin’. when i pressed him further, he responded w his usual dense prose that in actuality, said absolutely nothing. when i pressed even further, his responded by increasing the density. it got to the point where his own co-ethnics were saying he was being evasive ie.
korea prevented japan from invading china. china prevented the japanese from staying in korea. korea saved china. china saved korea.
so nice.
“You guys can dream all you want but South Korea isn’t going to divy up North Korea’s $6 trillion (and counting) worth of mineral wealth to foreigners, especially the ruthless Chinese. ”
–cm
Cart before horse, I know, but…
Within our lifetimes, the ROK will surpass $30,000 per capita. Will the Koreans then feel wealthy enough to seriously consider reunification? Or are they waiting to reach $40,000? No matter how much wealthier they become, if the ROK also becomes a much older society, then they may still find it difficult to finance reunification. They need to pay for it somehow. And the financing issue seems to be the single greatest anxiety which causes South Koreans to shirk from developing serious strategies for reunification.
And as you imply, no one is going to be trying out my idea anytime soon and I doubt anyone ever will. But no matter how the annexation occurs, Seoul will have to borrow to pay for it. I agree with you that the best way to pay for annexation is my mining the north. But slim still makes an interesting point, nevertheless, which made me think of something I hadn’t considered. Could Seoul make bargains with consortiums of foreign sovereigns such that in exchange for ridiculously cheap borrowing the Koreans actually lease prospecting sites cheaply? Korean would be the ones doing the actual running, of course. The point is, it is just another way to think about the potential use of the mines; I think many of us have been thinking that POSCO might end up with much of it. But the Koreans have to seriously think about stretching their every dollar and discovering the best way to finance everything.
And Slim’s own idea is interesting, too. If larger Chinese mining firms make stronger bids or if Beijing can come to an agreement to help collapse the DPRK and finance annexation, Seoul has to weigh such things prudently and with disregard for nationalistic sway. But I might even broaden that. Can China be persuaded with access to, not only mining sites, but also, a port of their own. Right now, Korea, Japan, and China are seriously considering a free trade pact. But China still does not have access via rail to South Korea’s conveniently placed seaports. However, upon annexation, could they be temporarily leased an actual site of their own on the east coast from where they may develop and operate their own seaport on Korean soil? Would that help?
The development of North Korea will require coordination with sovereigns, international organizations, and NGOs. This is because no matter how wealthy the South Koreans become, their national welfare programs are unlikely to be able to cope with the absorption of the North Koreans into the population. Their are two major problems with the foreigners. (1) The North Koreans may feel as if they are being colonized and may react in a destructive way. And also, (2) foreigners increase the likelihood of corruption.
During the development phase, I consider corruption to be the single greatest threat to the success of the endeavor–even greater than actual security threats. It’s bad enough that the South Koreans have a reputation for corruption. But when you add North Koreans, foreign nationals, tenuous security and government control, and enormous amounts of money on top, then I think it is possible that corruption may doom everything.
Another interesting challege that Seoul will have to implement is the actual governing structure for North Korea and the logistics of keeping the North Koreans well-informed with what is happening. If they flub on the preparation and execution, this may also lead to national catastrophe.
Anyway, cm, pawikirogii, what I was suggesting is not that Seoul give away anything, but rather that Seoul maximize returns on every single resource and money available to them without consideration for nationalism but with great consideration for national security.
lollabrats,
Where do you find the time to write so much??? Are you a full time grad student??? I don’t say it in a disparaging way… I wish I had so much time to dither with prose…
Korea’s best option would have been for the north to modernize at it’s own pace like China. Once after 30 years or so and North Korea became a little more moderinized then China is today, the reunification could not only be practical, but probably cheaper. I believe that was the original idea behind Kaesong. Give the North a beacon of capitalism. Let them dip a toe in. Let them eat choco pies! Once addicted, they will want more and will modernize slowly like China. Oh gosh how naïve they were….
Well, even if this happens make it a confederation first, then gradually reunify. Thus, true unification could take 50 years, but it’s one that South Korea could afford.
Oops. Comment in wrong thread:
http://www.rjkoehler.com/2010/05/20/another-shipwreck-off-jeju/#comment-373452
The announcement confirmed what everyone’s suspected all along, which leads to the question, what’s next?
Some form of “retaliation” will come from the S. Korean government, although I doubt any of it will be military. But, more important than talk of retaliation is the question of how could the ROK Navy let a N. Korean sub enter and leave S. Korean waters unmolested. Not to mention letting it get close enough to take a fatal shot at one of its major warships. Also, as my British coworker, who’s ex-Royal Navy, pointed out there’s also the question of why the Cheonan wasn’t on some form of minimal alert while patrolling a disputed border area.
IMO, this is the more important matter, because despite the talk of a blue water navy, the largest full-deck amphibious assault ship in Asia(ROKS Dokdo), AEGIS destroyers, 7th Flotilla(Strategic Fleet), missions off Somalia, etc, this tragic incident has demonstrated that the ROK Navy is incapable of defending its own back yard.
I think it’s time the ROK Navy and the defense establishment, do a very deep re-think of S. Korea’s future maritime strategy. Aping the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces ain’t exactly the answer, and in this case it hasn’t helped.
“Where do you find the time to write so much???”
–Wangkon936
No, I am not a student. The reason I can write so much is because of accident: this blog allows you to keep what you type in the “leave comment” section forever. You can refresh or you can navigate to a different page and then return, but as long as you don’t clear your cache or cookie or whatever it is, what you type in the little box stays there forever. So you can type a bit now and then and then publish it at any time. Interestingly, you would think that writing in bits would make it easier to proof-read. But it turns out that it makes it more likely that I will lose my sense of cohesion of argument and publish something that doesn’t make sense.
:p
@Wangkon936
It’s also easier to be longwinded when your head is full of only silly thoughts.
Actually, there’s a lot of little things that make this blog very convenient to use. I realized a while ago that these conveniences add up and are the main reasons why I have stuck around. There are a lot of more interesting and more informative blogs I have visited. But it seems this is the only one for which I keep returning to to submit regular comments.
I guess the other reason I have stuck around is because of another accident. I got hurt around the Olympics time and decided to take a lot of time off. That’s when I started commenting here regularly. And then the Cheonan sinking happened. That’s when I started coming here everyday. At some point in the near future, I am likely to stop commenting, however. Happily, my life is about to get a lot busier too.
…
I also think the Goldman Sachs recommendation you refer to, while the best I have heard, carries with it destructive potential consequences: we don’t want to make North Koreans become optimistic about their future and then dash it by virtually segregating them inside North Korea. That’s not confederation. It will feel more like colonization for the people of the north, I think, because ultimate control will be in the hands of the people from the South.
@pawikirogii
The US doesn’t really have an interest in seeing Korea united. A united Korea may be independent or have ties to China. The US already has a bridgehead in Japan, and it doesn’t have the will or desire to intervene or seriously counter Chinese predation upon the northern part of Korea. A divided Korea allows the US greater political maneuverability in the pursuit of its larger geopolitical interests against China.
Gooseshit:
I never claimed that Korea had nothing to do with the defeat of Japan in the Imjin waeren.
I did assert, contrary to the preposterous Korean triumphalist claims of yours, that the single most dispositive factor was Chinese intervention; (the second was Japanese over-extension of its lines of supply, leaving itself open to flanking attacks of just the sort the NORKS fell victim to in the Korean War at Incheon).
What you refer to as the density of my responses to your childishly sophistic demands for a single source for a claim I didn’t make, was a result of supplying you with an account of relevant facts, drawn from both english and korean sources, to support my assertion.
By now, of course, everyone knows, though, that you are willfully dismissive of any fact that contradicts your misbegotten faith in whatever it is.
I’ve often been impatient with WangKon’s pavlovian sort “Johnny-did-it, too-” rationalizations of every Korean shortcoming, but I respect his integrity in acknowledging the facts. But your condition seems to be almost organic rather than learned, and I have nothing but pity for you; except when I suspect that you consciously and deliberately embrace your otherwise curable deformity, then pity turns too contempt and, quickly, dismissal.
i did not write that you said the koreans had nothing to do w winning the imjin war, i wrote that you said they had very little to do w the winning of the imjin war. you even said yi sun shin’s destruction of the japanese navy was minor. i don’t believe you so please provide an english language source that backs up your claim. the decimation of the japanese navy put an end to japan’s dream of conquering china. you say otherwise, please back it up.
Yawn… Ditto.
lollabrats,
Personally, it’s harder for me to write coherent passages in separate bursts. I tend to do better with prose in one sitting. That’s why back in college I would write my term papers a day or two before the due date.
Perhaps your brain is better constructed than mine…
asked and answered long ago; do your homework
“Perhaps your brain is better constructed than mine…”
–WangKon936
I believe I have the better perspective on this and I think the opposite is much more likely to be true. As for writing in bits, as long as you know what you want to say, it’s not so hard.
“(the second was Japanese over-extension of its lines of supply, leaving itself open to flanking attacks of just the sort the NORKS fell victim to in the Korean War at Incheon)”
–Sperwer
“the decimation of the japanese navy put an end to japan’s dream of conquering china.”
–pawikirogii
Sperwer, these points are related. Do you really believe that the naval battles were minor?
lollabrats:
No, that’s Gooseboy’s conclusory characterization of my criticism of his unsubstantiated and hyperbolic claims regarding the singular importance of the very few accomplishments of Korean arms in the Imjin War. I think Yi Sun Shin’s victories were impressive and important; I spent a couple of weeks a few summers ago studying them in situ, as it were, in South Kyungsang and Soth Jeolla.
“I spent a couple of weeks a few summers ago studying them in situ, as it were, in South Kyungsang and Soth Jeolla.”
–Sperwer
I’m sure you have heard of the drama, 불 멸의 이순신. In preparation for the show, many people tried to figure out what the naval battles may have been like. And they came up with some interesting guesses on some of the tactics involved. And I was wondering if you had heard of some of them. And if so, I’d like to know what you think about it.
Interestingly, I think they never figured out Myeongnyang. From the pictures of the strait, I just can’t imagine how the admiral did it. It is wider than I thought it would be. And not having experienced the current, I can’t tell how well a large flat-bottomed galley could act as a stable base for its guns. The anchors must have sustained quite a bit of stress. I’m sure many Japanese galleys crashed into them, too. Which is to say that I don’t know how none of the ships were overwhelmed by boarding parties due considering the numerical advantage.
The solution the show’s producers came up with is strange but pretty interesting. In the show, the Choseonese slow the progress of the Japanese ships by fashioning within two months a long chain of large iron links, which they string across the strait, and leave taut and submerged just under the surface. The chain acts as a barrier, which the Japanese ships must overcome before they may proceed toward the Choseonese ships.
Can you tell me what kinds of thoughts you had from the strait? Actually, I’d be interested in hearing anything interesting about any of the sites.
Regarding general tactics, it appears that the Japanese should have had the faster ships due to hydrodynamics, but it seems that the Choseonese were able to lure them to ambushes with their seemingly slower ships.
One of the more colorful tactics the show came up with was for an interesting problem. At Hansando, the Koreans apparently do not believe that the Choseonese could reload their guns fast enough to have executed the “crane wing” strategy. So they had the flat-bottomed galleys “spin” in a relatively tight spiral. So after one broadside, the gunners would reload. Meanwhile, the oarsmen would spin the ship so that the guns on the other side could be brought to bear. What do you think of this?
That’s called the ability to “turn on your axis.” Possible with “U” shaped hulls but impossible with “V” shaped hulls. Guess which type the Japanese had?
Also, the Japanese ships were made of light density cedar and iron nails. The good thing about this? Can make ships quickly. The bad news? Korean cannons eat up light density cedar like Takeru Kobayashi attacks a plate of hot dogs. Plus, iron nails rust, which means Japanese ships have less structural integrity. Besides the obvious strength issue with this, this also means that Japanese ships could not handle the recoil of cannon. So even the largest Japanese ship, the Atakebune, could only carry three or four cannons at the most. The Japanese later tried to remedy this by tying cannons to overhead structures and away from the hull, but this affected accuracy.
Korean ships were made of pine, a denser wood, and put together with oak and bamboo pegs. Once water gets into the wood pegs they expand and contribute to the structural integrity of the ship. Thus not only were Korean ships stronger, but could also handle the recoil of several multiples of cannon that an Atakebune could.
Sperwer,
What do you mean by “Korean arms?” Do you mean actual Korean weapons or standing armies or guerrilla and irregular troops or all the above?
WangKon:
I meant it generally, so it would encompass all that you mention, plus more, e.g., strategy and tactics.
The Chosenese, as Lollabrats so fittingly describes them, themselves acknowledged as much by later, deliberately and systematically, trying to incorporate both “Chinese” and Japanese arms and methods into their training manuals, e,g., the most well-known being the the last synthetic compilation thereof known as the Muyedobotongji (무예도보통지, 武藝圖譜通志).
Unfortunately, it did them little good, as the Chosenese military was systematically and progressively, defanged as a military – as Eugene Park demonstrates in his monograph on the Chosen muban examination system – by being subverted into yet another instrument for the pursuit of ascriptive status, both by the yangban families who had lost out in the stuggle for civil power to the capital elites and by lesser status groups whom the dynasty saw fit to permit entry into the lower echelons for a variety of reasons, including the outright sale of passing examination grades and commisions for revenue. But that’s a different story.
Of course, as is well known at least among some Korean and Koreanists with an interest in such things, and TV producers with an eye on nationalistic sentiment, the Chosenese also came up with a small number of technological innovations; but – with the possible exception of the turtle boats (or was it Yi’s tactical genuius?) – these appear to have been too few and too little deployed to have made any particular significant tactical, let alone strategic, contribution.
“In the show, the Choseonese slow the progress of the Japanese ships by fashioning within two months a long chain of large iron links, which they string across the strait,”
–me
I don’t know where they got the idea. But this is what the Americans did during the American Revolutionary War at Skenesborough, New York on July 6, 1777 and at The Battle of Fort’s Montgomery and Clinton on October 6, 1777, also at New York. Pretty cool idea during the days of wooden ships.
“That’s called the ability to “turn on your axis.” Possible with “U” shaped hulls…”
–Wangkon936
Well, if it’s possible then it’s possible, I guess. But I wonder when the Koreans will actually experiment and try it out–the whole process–and evaluate it. Broadside, turn, broadside, turn, broadside. Maybe Samsung can make a generous donation to fund the experiment. Or maybe the government. This question is, after all, of national interest.
Might not the gunnery crew have gotten a bit dizzy? But this flat hull is pretty interesting? The ships must have been incredibly stable.
Lollabrats:
I just got back in, am feeling pretty knackered after my latest confrontation with the reality that 300 pounds is 300 pounds, and would like to refresh my recollection by looking at my notes from my trip. I’ll try to respond to your questions in detail tomorrow.
Two points in the meantime: (1) although there is no evidence for it, I too believe that the “chain theory” has some merit despite its status as speculation, because (as you note in re the later American practice during the Revolution) the use of such a tactic was a well-known tactic in littoral seaborne warfare in many places around the world even at that time, so it’s reasonable to think that the Chosenese would have borrowed it (from the Chinese) or even come up with it on their own; (2) flat-bottomed boats are (generally) very stable and maneuverable in relatively protected inland waters (but I wonder just how maneuverable boats the size of the kobuksan, powered by oars, would have been).
Indeed it was. Such chains were employed to control the Bosphoros at Yoros Castle (at the confluence with the Black Sea) in the mid 1400s and at the Golden Horn during the Middle Ages – the chain was first overcome in the 10th century.
Darn… another thread hijacked by Imjin War nerd talk.
Okay. Let me start with Sperwer thoughts on Chosun’s military at the time. Personally, I don’t know if it’s fair to make the general assessment of “very few accomplishments of Korean arms in the Imjin War.” On the other hand, to make the assessment that many branches of the Chosun military and a lot of government totally mishandled the assessment and countering of the Japanese forces is rather fair. However, the man who wrote the book on the Imjin War, Sam Hawley, also makes some interesting points.
“Question: What was the ultimate reason, in your opinion, for Korea’s utter lack of preparation for the invasion? Did they really think that Japanese talk of invading China via Korea was mere bluster?
Sam Hawley: Even if the Koreans had managed to make better preparations, the Japanese likely would still have swept up the peninsula regardless. In other words, the Koreans were perhaps inherently incapable of resisting the power of Hideyoshi’s invasion force because of the way the country was set up. First, there was the fact that generals were kept separate from their armies except in times of crisis. This was considered necessary to prevent them from becoming too independently strong and possibly attempting a coup. The founder of the Choson dynasty, Yi Songgye, had been a general himself and had seized power, and he didn’t want another general doing the same to his new dynasty. Hence the expedient of separating generals from armies. It was definitely a stupid idea in terms of military preparedness in the face of an external threat. The fact remains, however, that the Choson dynasty lasted from 1392 on into the 20th century—so clearly it made sense in terms of internal stability. It was a case, in short, of sacrificing the ability to repel an external threat in order to guard against threats from within. It was a good trade-off most of the time—but a disaster in the face of the extraordinary threat posed by Hideyoshi.
About the Koreans mistakenly regarding Hideyoshi’s threats as bluster: It’s hard to overstate the enormity of what Hideyoshi was proposing to do, at least in the eyes of the Koreans. It wasn’t just a case of one country threatening to conquer another. Hideyoshi was threatening to conquer, as the Koreans saw it, the center of the world. To put it in modern terms, it might have been like Chavez in Venezuela threatening to conquer the USA. Well, maybe not quite like that. But you see what I’m saying. The threat seems obvious to us now. But if we put ourselves back in that Korean court and try to look at things like a late-16th century Korean, it becomes easier to see how Hideyoshi’s threats could have been discounted as bluster.
Another thing to consider is the innate inability of Korea’s Confucian scholar-led system to deal with the ruthless military efficiency of Japan. In Japan, the military had evolved for maximum effectiveness thanks to a century of civil war. There were no soft-palmed scholars getting in the way, no trappings or niceties to trip over. In Japan it was all about military efficiency. The same could not be said about Korea. As noted above, the Koreans in effect hobbled their military (separating generals from their armies) to guard against internal threats. Still more hobbling was effected by the Korean—and in turn Chinese—notion of the supremacy of a scholar class; the notion that mastery of the Confucian classics, as evidenced by passing the government exam, equipped a man to do just about anything—including things he knew little about, like overseeing armies. So you had this situation in Korea where military professionals were often being second-guessed by scholars who sometimes didn’t know what they were doing, but who assumed that they did because they knew the classics.
(We can’t be too critical of the Koreans here, for the same situation exists in Washington DC and just about every any other Western capital today: governments growing bigger and bigger, with officials thinking they know better than the professionals how to run things. There is actually the notion that government officials are somehow more virtuous than professionals in the private sector. It’s a mindset that would have been quite at home in King Sonjo’s Confucian-scholar government in 1592.)”
So, given the time period, the circumstances (and the incredible claims that Hideyoshi was making, if you really sit down and think about it) and the court’s traditional fear of military insurrection, the fact that Chosun was rather unprepared for the Japanese invasions is more understandable.
One third of the Chosun navy was scuttled by their respective commanders. The bulk of the fighting had to be taken care of by the Left and Right stations of the Cholla navy until after the Battle of Hansando. But. the Left and Right (and the remnant of the Right Kyungsang navy) Cholla navies were expertly handled by Admiral Yi.
Also, I believe you too quickly discount the ability of some Chosun leaders and of the population to wage irregular and asymmetrical warfare. The regular Korean army had very little offensive firepower or ability. It was the Chinese, for the most part, that generally provided most of the offensive ability to push the Japanese south. However, the Chinese army was about 30k in the first invasion and probably no greater than 75k in the second invasion. The total amount of effectives for the Japanese army was probably about 75-100k. Although the Japanese military forces in Chosun were listed as more, due to food shortages and sickness, the actual effective size of the Japanese army was less than one would think. So, although the Japanese had more troops on paper, they could never deploy more than two or three divisions (about 20-30k troops) directly against Chinese troops. Why? Part of it was food shortages due to the lack of supplied ferried by sea thanks to the Chosun navy. The other part of it was that the Japanese had to hold on to land in order to protect their lines of supply and communication. The Japanese had to worry about their interior defensive lines due to guerilla and irregular forces. The Chinese did not. This weakened Japanese offensive capabilities because they had to station troops in forts, occupy towns and put down uprisings.
Case in point. The Chinese army was badly beaten at Battle of Byeokjegwan but the Japanese could not follow-up on the victory because of a defeat against a Chosun fort near Seoul. General Kwon Yul had stationed troops at the castle of Haengju in hopes of supporting the Chinese offensive to recapture Seoul. However, due to the Chinese defeat at Byeokjegwan there would be no offensive to retake Seoul and General Kwon was just left there to fend for himself. The Japanese decided to send about 20-30k men to eliminate the Chosun threat to Seoul to consolidate their position. During that battle Kwon had about 30 hwacha arrow rocket carts that probably did a lot of damage to the Japanese. Although the hwacha is an ungainly looking thing, when directed against masses of infantry moving slowly up a hill it was probably pretty effective. By some estimates the Japanese lost 10k men at the battle of Haengju. The end result was, according to Stephen Turnbull, that the Japanese victory at Byeokjegwan was essentially cancelled out by their defeat at Haengju.
The Chosun land victories are very few and far between, but they ended up doing a lot of damage to Japanese forces because it wasn’t relevant at the end of the day because it was a lot of nameless Chosun scholars who took up arms and the common people who fought a lot of barely known little skirmishes and battles that wore the Japanese out and make them a lot less effective for the bigger battles so even if they won the big battles, the could not effectively follow-up on them.
The Vietnam War was won with largely irregular and asymmetrical principles of warfare. When the U.S. chief negotiator was talking to General Giap at the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords he said, “You know we won all the battles.” To which General Giap replied, “Yes, it is true you won all the battles. That’s true, but that’s also irrelevant [because we won the war].”
America’s lack of understanding and underestimation of irregular and asymmetrical warfare is what I believe is its military and government’s greatest foreign policy/expeditionary weakness. That misunderstanding and underestimation has costed the country a lot of lives and wasted a lot of treasure.
Ummm…. will the blockquote elves help me out with paragraphs 3-7?
@103
I think the Yono-class subs pose a problem due to their small size. If they stick to very shallow waters it will be hard to detect them, so they can probably sneak along the coastline, or hide out on the coastline of an island and then slide along to the South side for a quick attack on an ROK vessel. The thing is so small, I would imagine if it was close to the surface it wouldn’t have a much different profile from a fishing boat. Talking out my ass here though so anyone with even a hint of knowledge on the matter feel free to call me on it.
“America’s lack of understanding and underestimation of irregular and asymmetrical warfare is what I believe is its military and government’s greatest foreign policy/expeditionary weakness.”
–Wangkon936
This is no longer the case, today. Today, we have the greatest expertise in history in countering it. The hard part is actually doing it.
“Okay. Let me start with Sperwer thoughts on Chosun’s military at the time.”
–Wangkon936
I don’t think anything in that passage you quoted (paragraphs 3-7) contradicted sperwer. It does not even give cause to sperwer to mitigate his condescension. Actually, it seems to support sperwer’s beliefs very strongly, as you yourself noted. Sam Hawley, in trying to defend the Choseonese, pretty much explains why their government was inherently incompetent.
I myself disagree with sperwer in one aspect: I believe that the single greatest factor in the defeat of the Japanese were the naval battles. Had the Choseonese navy failed, Hideyoshi would have been able to strike directly into China without having to worry about the logistics of supplying via the entire length of the peninsula. What is shocking to realize is that Japan fought with only a small fraction of its full power whereas Ming and Choseon completely bankrupted themselves with great loss of life. Without the genius of Yi Sun Shin, I believe the Japanese would have captured Ming’s seat.
Another way to say the above is that had Yi Sun Shin never existed, we might not be looking toward a Chinese future–it might have been a Japanese one.
why do you refer to koreans as chosunese? are you trying to say they weren’t the ancestors of koreans? i find the name offensive.
sperwer, you’re lying again. you said that yi’s destruction of the japanese navy was minor. it isn’t my imagination, it’s what you really said on this board. you’re a man who dreams of beating up korean men, so i’m not surprised you think the way you do. when yi destroyed the japanese navy, he put an end to hideyoshi’s dream of taking china. that’s a fact courtesy of the korean man.
btw, would you refer to the people of ming china as minganese?
I think the correct appellation is mingers.
“btw, would you refer to the people of ming china as minganese?”
–pawikirogii
They’re the Chinese of China. But we commonly refer to the people of the dynasty as “the Ming” or “Ming.” The ruling ethnic Chinese were “the Han.”
The Choseonese are Koreans. They would be called, “the Yi” or “Yi.” But it is common to refer to the people of the dynasty instead as the people of Choseon. The term “Korean,” of course, is the western name for the people who also call themselves, “the Han” or “Han.” I don’t think that in either case, the Han peoples are called in English: Hanese, Hanian, or Hanish. I think they are just, the Han.
…
“why do you refer to koreans as chosunese? are you trying to say they weren’t the ancestors of koreans? i find the name offensive.”
–pawikirogii
“The Chosenese, as Lollabrats so fittingly describes them,”
–sperwer
I don’t quite understand what’s going on here. I thought I was speaking normal English. Would you happen to know the correct suffix? I do not know why anyone should be insulted by the suffix, “-ese,” which is quite common and literally means, “originating in” or “belonging to.”
sorry, lollabrats. there’s a history on these kind of boards where people try to tell koreans their yoksa ain’t their yoksa. sorry to jump to conclusions. w your clarification, i understand now.
‘I think the correct appellation is mingers.’
funny.
Interesting perspective, but I think it is flawed, because it begs the question why Hideyoshi then bothered with the peninsula at all; why not just sail directly to and attack China head on.
Of course, the easy answer to that question is that he was smart enough to be worried about having an ostensible Chinese ally on his flank – (although I believe that, had he done so, the Chosenese would have found numerous reasons to avoid getting involved in the fight – but that’s admittedly speculation (although based on consideration of the dynasty’s prior pattern of diplomatic maneuvering)).
I suspect the better answer to the issue is that the vagaries of seaborne supply of a large army so far away from home militated against it and necessitated the establishment of a forward zone of supply with greater proximity and transport security in the form of overland haulage – i.e., more or less what Japan did in Korea during the Russo-Japanese War (when it had a world-class modern navy and seaborne transport was more reliable) and later, on a much larger scale once it had colonized the peninsula, during the Manchurian campaign that began the Asian theater of operations in WW2.
In reality, both considerations probably affected the policy decision.
I honestly don’t harbor any condescension for the Joseon Dynasty; in fact the idea of doing so seems weird to me. I am impatient, though, with the sort of willful “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” ignorance of nationalist mythologists (Korean and otherwise) whose nationalist theology leads them to distort the historical record.
The problem inheres in the propensity of most nationalisms around the world, including the Korean variety, anachronistically to project themselves back into time immemorial as a way of creating a myth of the “people” and obfuscating the ways in which modern nation-states actually were formed. This now is a fairly uncontroversial perspective among contemporary historians, with its origins in the work of Benedict Anderson and E.J. Hobsbawm nearly thirty years ago. In the case of Korea, the case has been made by Andre Schmid. But because the specifically “Korean” nation did not even really begin to emerge as an idea until the turn of the twentieth century e.g., the Independence Club), received its most decisive shaping influences in the form of Japanese colonialism and has been the subject of intense internecine contestation, e.g., the Korean War, that remains largely unresolved to this day (e.g., the internal Korean history textbook controversies over, e.g., the dating of the establishment of the 9south) Korean state), this is a perspective to which Korean scholars and Koreans generally have not been receptive (to say the least). And others, like some of commenters here, haven’t even gotten the memo.
“Interesting perspective, but I think it is flawed”
–sperwer
Sperwer, I don’t know quite know how to reply to you here because the reason you give which causes you to disagree with me seems to have already been partially answered pretty well by yourself. You say your reason for disagreeing with me is:
“it begs the question why Hideyoshi then bothered with the peninsula at all; why not just sail directly to and attack China head on.”
–Sperwer
But then you give some wonderful and I think correct answers. And then you end your thought with:
“In reality, both considerations probably affected the policy decision.”
–sperwer
So I can’t quite tell whether you are agreeing or disagreeing with me. I would only add the following points to your own:
(1) The one thing which drove Hideyoshi’s generals to excellence was land. Land was the great reward. The promise of more land was what kept Hideyoshi’s war machine together. Without it, he had nothing else to offer to maintain their loyalty. This is especially because he lacked noble lineage, which would at least have given him legitimacy to rule over them.
(2) It seems to me that Hideyoshi correctly thought that Choseon would be easy to conquer. The level of preparation which went into the war effort against Choseon seems to have been pretty extensive. They knew the terrain. They had sleeper agents all over the place. They knew the capability and weaknesses of Choseon’s government and military–although they were fatally ignorant of the capabilities of one man and his naval station. And they knew exactly how much they needed to punch through the length of the entire peninsula. And they were pretty much at the border when they stopped.
(3) I think Hideyoshi thought he could conquer both Choseon and Ming pretty easily. And if it were not for Yi Sun Shin, I think he would have. Why don’t we flip your question and ask, if he really was primarily interested in Ming, which is what he professed to the Choseonese, then why did he bother to invade Choseon at all?
^There is clearly a confusion here and I think the reason is we have not explained our positions very well to satisfy each other’s question. I think I would be able to make you understand my point, if I could better understand your concern.
“the Chosenese would have found numerous reasons to avoid getting involved in the fight”
–sperwer
An attack by Japan might be different because of the proximity. Likewise, the Choseonese offered troops to help against the Jurchen invasion after the war.
RE: Chosunese debate
I checked the NYT archives and found that back in the mid to late 1800s, the Chosunese of Chosun were called Coreans in Corea. Chosunese sounds funny probably because the appellation was never used, even during the existence of the last dynasty.
Because, as I indicated, given the inefficiency and unreliability of maritime supply, he needed a staging area from which to concentrate and supply his forces for a (relatively) quick strike down into Beijing from the northwestern part of the peninsula and, as you indicated, he thought the Chosenese would be something of a pushover.
At the end of the day, while as I’ve already agreed, Admiral Yi’s accomplishments were both impressive and significant, I thus don’t believe his interdiction of Japanese re-supply from Japan was more than marginally important compared to Chinese intervention in the land campaign, which was the dispositive factor in denying the Japanese the most important source of supply (of food, fodder, etc.), i.e., the Korean countryside.
But that reflects the fact that the “Jurchens” (a sort of catch-all for various northern tribes that were common enemies of China and Korea for centuries) were enemies of long-standing and were not impeded by a significant water barrier.
Anyway, it’s sort of a moot point, as the Japanese really didn’t have any realistic way of getting at China except through Korea – precisely why the Chinese tolerated the Chosenese and gave them a relatively long leash as a marchland buffer state (who were also useful in distracting the northern barbarians from China proper)
Thanks, but I think I have to take the blame for creating the confusion by having reacted to your formulation of your point rather than to the point itself.
By whom, the white supremacist imperialists of New York imposing their own parochial master narrative of the degenerate modern nation-state on 5000 years of peninsular civilization?
Oh, is that where Koreans learned to think of themselves as such?
You guys aren’t still arguing aboutr nose-tombs, are you? That’s so 1593…
‘At the end of the day, while as I’ve already agreed, Admiral Yi’s accomplishments were both impressive and significant, I thus don’t believe his interdiction of Japanese re-supply from Japan was more than marginally important compared to Chinese intervention…….’
you admit now that it’s just your opinion. the few who’ve written about this in english don’t seem to agree.
“Why don’t we flip your question and ask, if he really was primarily interested in Ming, which is what he professed to the Choseonese, then why did he bother to invade Choseon at all?”
–me
This was badly put. Agreed. Very bad. Pardon.
“Anyway, it’s sort of a moot point, as the Japanese really didn’t have any realistic way of getting at China except through Korea”
–sperwer
Yes, we again agree.
“I thus don’t believe his interdiction of Japanese re-supply from Japan was more than marginally important compared to Chinese intervention in the land campaign, which was the dispositive factor in denying the Japanese the most important source of supply (of food, fodder, etc.), i.e., the Korean countryside.”
–sperwer
Ok, thanks for the clarification. Here’s the way I see it.
I think an invasion of Ming required both the subjugation of Choseon and the establishment of naval staging areas on Korea’s west coast. But Yi Sun Shin was stationed in the southwest. This meant that the Japanese navy would lack the access to the west coast necessary to invade Ming. The result was that Japan lost any hope to advance into China itself. The two key battles which denied Japan access to the west were Hansando and Myeongnyang. After each battle, the Japanese clearly understood that invading Ming would be impossible and reacted accordingly.
And it is because of these battles, Ming was relieved of the very real threat of an actual invasion. And this is why Ming was then able to use Choseon as a buffer and also push the Japanese south. Japan itself had no choice but to turtle south anyway because it was obviously impossible to maintain such long supply lines neccessary to maintain authority over the entire length of the peninsula. What Japan lacked were supply depots along the west coast which would have sustained the army in Choseon. But of course, because of Choseon’s navy, that became impossible.
And because of all this, the way I see it, each battle was the key turning point in each’s respective wars.
Furthermore, as you note, Yi Sun Shin constricted movement between Japan and Choseon. Coupled with the fact that the Japanese lost any hope to establish supply depots and staging areas along the west coast Yi Sun Shin had a devastingly cascading effect on their entire logistical system.
On a side note, Japan encountered difficulty in subjugating Jeolla because they could not invade from the sea.
Now, I suppose I must mention that Ming’s assistance was necessary. Had Ming not come to Choseon’s defense, the Japanese would have ultimately conquered all of Jeolla and maintained their power over the entire length of the peninsula. Perhaps they would never have defeated Yi Sun Shin’s navy, but their army would have seized the bases.
But this is not to say that Ming’s military was all that good. The pathetic fact is, both Ming’s and Choseon’s militaries were full of incompetent generals and poorly trained men. You earlier mentioned that the 2 wars weakened Ming to a state such that they were unable to defend against the Jurchens. That’s part of it. But the real reason Ming lost battle after battle against the Jurchens is that their military leadership were just as bad as Choseon’s. There were only three forces in all of northeast Asia at the time that were peopled with highly trained and highly competent military men–the armies of Japan’s daimyos, the bannors of the Jurchens, and the men under Yi Sun Shin’s command.
The Ming were awful. They were just horrendous. This is why I think Ming would have fallen easily to the Japanese. They were able to pressure the Japanese only because they obviously had the advantage in any war of attrition. And the only reason why Japan found itself in a war of attrition was because their logistics were completely compromised. By Yi Sun Shin. Without Yi Sun Shin, Japan would have fought unfettered as they fought when they first invaded Choseon. Ming’s armies would then have been decimated.
Anyway, that’s how I think.
“I checked the NYT archives and found that back in the mid to late 1800s, the Chosunese of Chosun were called Coreans in Corea. Chosunese sounds funny probably because the appellation was never used, even during the existence of the last dynasty.”
–Sonagi
That sounds right. But sperwer still makes a pertinent observation. The people of Joseon called themselves Coreans because that’s what the westerners called them. Just as it is today. But I suppose there’s no getting around the fact that “Choseonese” apparently is used only by myself and, thus, sounds strange to everyone else. I will stop using that term.
‘choseonese’ lollabrats
‘Chosenese’ spervert
i hope you’re able to see that sperwer holds koreans in contempt. i don’t believe a word he says.
Makes sense, doesn’t it, especially since English hadn’t yet replaced French as the preferred international language. I call myself a 미국사람, 美国人, アメリカ人, norteamericana, and Amerikanerin because that’s what speakers of those languages call me.
“Makes sense, doesn’t it, especially since English hadn’t yet replaced French as the preferred international language. ”
–Sonagi
I erred in making that comment. It is so insipid it probably makes people wonder why I wrote it.
What I was thinking when I wrote it is that there does not seem to be a good English word for the Korean people of the Joseon dynasty. “Korean” does not give enough clues that you are talking about Koreans during the Joseon period. There is no particular reason to have a name for it. But, as you say, Coreans are people of Corea. The English are people of England. But the British are people of Britain. Who are the people of Joseon? Koreans of course.
lollabrats,
Per your point on access to the Yellow Sea to make an invasion of China practical. Couldn’t agree more. Alexander had to take Tyre in order to free up the eastern Mediterranean for logistical purposes. If he didn’t do that then he couldn’t have gone into the interior of the Persian Empire.
I disagree with you your assessment of Hawley’s assessment of Chosun’s readiness. I think it’s easy to say they were not ready and it was terrible and leave it at that. Sure, if Chosun was better prepared for the Japanese invasion then it might have been different. Hell, if Admiral Yi, instead of Won Kyon would have been in charge of the 120 ships at the Right Kyungsang naval station there might have never been a Japanese invasion in the first place! It would have been like Sir Francis Drake and the Spanish Armada. Not one Spaniard stepped foot on English soil (unless he was swimming away from his sinking ship).
But when you really look at it with a guy like Hideyoshi claiming that he would conquer China and that Korea should either join or get out of the way, what is one to make of that? To the Koreans it was like they were Canada listening to Mexico telling them how they were going to invade the United States. Hindsight is 20/20.
You deserve recognition as the most polite participant in a debate on this forum. I did find the term “Chosunese” used in a late 1800s collection of essays about Korea. The writer’s English name was unrecognizable to me, i.e., it wasn’t Allen, Appenzeller, Hulbert, or some other well-known early Koreanist.
I thought about how residents of Asian dynasties are called, and I think “people of __________” is the standard term if the modern nationality name won’t do. The people of Qin, Yuan, Ming, Qing, Yamato, Heian, Kamakura, Goguryeo, Baekje, Shilla, and Joseon are just that.
And never take lessons in appellations from Sperwer, my fellow Great Lakes peninsular brother who thinks he’s male goose.
“Goguryeo, Baekje, Shilla, and Joseon”
–Sonagi
But these are the actual English colloquial names of sovereign states. That’s what makes it odd. For instance, Joseon Dynasty’s actual name is Yi! Joseon Dynasty is the Yi Dynasty. I think the reason Joseonese did not become accepted is simply because not enough English speaking people had need to use it.
What do you think?
Oh and I disagree on the prospects of Japan being able to conquer China in the 16th or even early 17th centuries. Why? I let history be my guide friend. Japan tried to conquer China in the 30′s. China wasn’t in any better shape under the Nationalists than it was under Ming. However, instead of using their heads and working with the various warlords in China and giving the people a viable alternative to corrupt Nationalist rule or collectivistic Communist rule, they tried to conquer China through unmitigated brutality. Japan’s inability to put China under sway lead to them seeking resources elsewhere. So, naturally they had to attack the European colonies in Asia. Then guess who was next? Yep. We were.
They could have waited for the Ming to internally disintegrate on their own and just move in, just like the Manchu. Somehow I don’t think that the Japanese would have been that patient. The Manchu also understood that they had to give the Chinese people an alternative between death or tyranny. Considering their behavior in Korea, I don’t think the Japanese would have been as patient or understanding as the Manchus.
“To the Koreans it was like they were Canada listening to Mexico telling them how they were going to invade the United States. Hindsight is 20/20.”
–Wangkon936
But that’s the point. They only had an inflated view of their abilities. I don’t see that that absolves them of their negligence or incompetence. And it wasn’t like every Korean felt that way. There clearly was a highly vocal opposition composed of powerful elites that was pushing to improve defenses and get the court to take Hideyoshi seriously. After all, that is how they got Yi Sun Shin to his naval post in the first place.
I just don’t think the 20/20 hindsight argument really is justified here. If Mexico starts telling Canada that they are going to invade the USA soon, Americans would take notice. And the Ming did take notice. After all, Wanli and Hideyoshi did not have a happy relationship. Wanli wanted Hideyoshi to take him seriously. Hideyoshi was openly announcing his intent to invade the continent.
But that’s just me.
I think it has more to do with the fact that English-speaking residents of Joseon preferred to call it Corea/Korea. I defer to Sperwer on this because I believe he has read more early English literature on Korea than I have. I will not defer to him on the naming of residents of our home state, however.
The Bohemian Grove old boy’s club blew up the Cheonan. The North Korean torpedo was staged. This is merely a continuation of 9/11 in a quest for world domination. The Middle East is getting old fast, and this is just the beginning of Uncle Sam digging his fork into Asia. The table has been set since 1953. Dinner is getting cold.
Lollabrats, the Hole commenter most knowledgeable about 19th Century English terms for Korea and Koreans would be Robert Neff. Maybe he’ll share his informed opinion.
“They could have waited for the Ming to internally disintegrate on their own and just move in, just like the Manchu. Somehow I don’t think that the Japanese would have been that patient. The Manchu also understood that they had to give the Chinese people an alternative between death or tyranny. ”
–Wangkon936
I strongly disagree here. How many Chinese did the Manchu massacre after they ordered the haircuts?
But it is possible that I am overstating the Japanese strength. But the Japanese were superior to both the Jurchens and the Ming, I think. The Japanese had superior seige ability. The Jurchens perhaps had the best horsemen. But the Japanese infantry probably defended against horses the best in northeast Asia at the time. Had Yi Sun Shin not interfered with the timing of the 1st invasion, Japan could have been inside China with arquebus technology and skill superior to what Ming had by mid 1590s.
Who knows. I was merely extrapolating. We will of course never know. The Ming had Yuan Chonghuan and the Jurchens had Nurhaci. Ming’s court and the military ranks may have been a mess, but China was a huge empire. Furthermore, after Hideyoshi’s death, the easterners led my Tokugawa could have seized the west while their masters were across a sea, fighting a war against the huge Chinese population.
Where are you posting from, Lollabrats, if you don’t mind my asking?
lollabrats,
If you wrote that on a site like China History Forum, you’d have 10 guys flame you and go on and on about how powerful Ming’s army was. I kid you not!
I think if Admiral Yi had failed (or didn’t exist as a naval commander) then I would agree with you that Japan would have conquered Korea and have staging areas in western and northern Korea to invade China. I think any direct invasion of China by the Japanese would have likely been bogged down. The Chinese people would have resisted them if they were as brutal as they were in Korea. It would probably been better for the Japanese to conquer Liaodong and/or maybe Shangdong and bid their time as internal rebellions and external enemies exhausted the Ming. Then the Japanese would just have to fight the Manchu for the barely breathing carcass.
“Where are you posting from, Lollabrats, if you don’t mind my asking?”
–Sonagi
California
It’s 3pm. The sun is shining, and the breeze is perfect!!!
“I think any direct invasion of China by the Japanese would have likely been bogged down. ”
–Wangkon936
We’ll never know. I think Hideyoshi’s death would have been a dangerous moment for the westerners. On the other hand, if Japan had subjugated Joseon, then Ming would have had to contend with both Japan and Nurhaci. I wonder if Ming could have fought both and won.
“If you wrote that on a site like China History Forum, you’d have 10 guys flame you and go on and on about how powerful Ming’s army was. I kid you not!”
–Wangkon936
I’m sure the Chinese know their own history better than I know theirs. So I could be wrong. On matters of history, especially, there is no benefit to thinking that you alone know the answer. I’ve been disabused many times.
I would also agree that if the Japanese did occupy Korea… they would not have left, even after Hideyoshi’s death.
Here’s another can or worms. What would the Toyotomi line (and their retainers) be like if Korea was conquered? Would there ever have been a Sekigahara?
Ah, there’s some food for thought.
Lastly, be careful with the statement of how the Chinese may know more about their history than others… Some Chinese have a rather peculiar notion of their history… just like some Koreans and Japanese have some peculiar views of their respective histories.
“if Japan had subjugated Joseon, then Ming would have had to contend with both Japan and Nurhaci.”
No, at this time Nurhaci had not yet rebelled against the Ming. He ruled with some autonomy over Manchu tribes but under ultimate Ming control – under a title granted by the Ming to ‘barbarian’ tribes on their periphery.
In fact, Nurhaci fought Hideyoshi’s troops when they crossed the Tumen River and he offered to defend both Joseon and the Ming. The Jurchen were also Hideyoshi’s second target to conquer, after Korea, and before China and India.
OK, I see where you’re coming from better now. A couple of points, though.
1. I think you grossly overestimate the importance of Japanese access to west Chosen ports for the purposes of supplying their troops in the Chosen land campaigns. Of course, the Japanese had to bring men and arms from Japan to Korea, but they could effectively do that by funneling them through Busan and the other ports in the southeast and east that they could rely on without much interference from Yi. The big supply issue was food, fodder and miscellaneous provisions, and for that their plan all along was to rely on the Korean countryside. That’s how all armies at the time functioned. Yi’s interdiction of Japanese naval access to the west coast was thus marginal in this respect.
2. I’m not sufficiently familiar with the sources to say for sure whether or not the Japanese intended to use the west coast as a jump-off point for an amphibious assault on China across the west sea. It’s not plausibly out of the question, though, that such an assault may have played some role in their strategy; it would have been a good way to subject Beijing to a pincer attack that threatened its envelopment, or at least to create a big diversion that would force the Ming to divide their forces so as to weaken their defense against a main thrust from the Japanese main body attacking from the north after sweeping up through Korea. From what I do know of the sources, though this northern thrust in fact was the primary strategic principle. So, again, it was the relative effectiveness of the Ming intervention on the ground in Korea – despite its gross military inefficiency – that deprived the Japanese of the ability to use Korean resources to supply themselves – that was the dispositive (albeit not the only) reason for Japan’s ultimate failure.
@144:
Wow, that’s reading an awful lot into a typo. I continue to be amazed by your capacity for reasoned discussion.
Anyway, you shouldn’t extrapolate from the contempt that I have for you anything about my attitudes about Korea and Koreans in general. Putting yourself forward as some sort of representative of things Korean is what is really contemptuous of Korea.
‘ that was the dispositive (albeit not the only) reason for Japan’s ultimate failure.’
please site english language source for your OPINION. this is about the 15th time i’ve asked you. japan lost because of yi sun shin, korean irregulars, and chinese intervention. in fact, yi sun shin’s destruction of the japanese navy was the dispositive reason for japan’s failure.
i think you better stick to posing nude on your website, chump.
Well said.
Sort of like South Korea, Japan, the US et. al. waiting the past 20 years for Norkland to implode, huh?
Thanks for the continuing history lesson, gentlemen.
#166,
That’s an awesome suggestion, Pawi. Let not others denigrate your purity of purpose.
“would’a’ could’a', should’a'” – the plaintive refrain of the Korean nationalist counterfactual historical chorus
Sperwer,
Well, we can’t talk about the future or what we know about the future. However, history tells us that Ming did weaken a lot on its own to a point where someone (the Manchus) came in and filled the vacuum.
OK, finally back to the technicalities of the so-called “Myeongnyang strait” engagement (1597).
Having refreshed my recollection, I think we need to jettison the chain barrier notion because: (i) it is not mentioned in any of the more or less contemporary sources, including Yi’s diaries or his nephew’s accounts of his exploits, and (ii) it isn’t strictly necessary to explain Yi’s success.
The reason for the last contention stems from the nature of the “ground”. Myeongnyang strait is only 320 yards wide at its waist (where the bridge now connects Jindo and Haenam-gun); the current is reportedly among the swiftest of any such inter-island passages in Korea, running from the NW at up to 9.5 knots.
The battle commenced when Yi order his fleet of 12 to move S/SW out of their anchorage at Usuyeong northeast of Myeongnyang strait to meet the Japanese fleet of 133(!) sailing northwest into the strait from the southeast. The Japanese were running with the tide. but against the current. One would think the situation for the Choseonese would have been vice-a-versa, but here’s where an important wrinkle came into play. The battle did not actually take place in the Myeongnyang strait proper, but between Haenam-gun and Yangdo. The Choseonese thus were shielded from most of the effect of both current and tide by Yangdo. In order to join battle with them, the Japanese on the other hand were forced to funnel into the battleground in relatively small numbers through the Myeongnyang strait and then execute a 45% starboard tack to the NE while coping with both current and tide, and then had to deal with the falling off of the influence of each as they came under the lee of Yangdo. At the point of contact, moreover, even the waters between Yangdo and Haenam-gun were no more than ~500 yards wide.
Despite the enormous disparity in the respective fleet sizes, therefore, the Japanese were unable to achieve combat superiority at the “schwerpunkt” because the “terrain” limited the number of their ships that could actually be brought to bear. The actual combat probably consisted of exchanges between some portion of the Korean fleet and some series of Japanese cohorts of more or less equal number; there is some indirect support for this in the fact that only 31 of the Japanese ships were destroyed before the Japanese broke off the engagement.
Of course, one might ask how the Choseonese found the endurance to, in effect, fight the same battle several times in order to defeat the Japanese; but – as indicated by the number of ships the Japanese lost -apparently they didn’t have to do so. Apparently, relatively early on in the battle, Yi – in the lead – successfully destroyed the Japanese flag ship, in the process killing the Japanese commander Kurishima; Kurishima had been one of the original commander of the initial 1592 invasion. The Japanese commander’s body was fished out of the water by the Choseonese, who ostentatiously dismembered it at Yi’s command (because he was offended at its “wriggling’) and posted the Kurishima’s head at the top of Yi’s flagship’s mast. The effect was to demoralize the remaining Japanese. As the tide ebbed, the Japanese also were impeded by the current which prevented more ships from quickly entering the conflict.
WangKon:
Point taken, but so is lollabrats’: the Manchu did not just stroll in on a Sunday afternoon excursion.
“I’m not sufficiently familiar with the sources to say for sure whether or not the Japanese intended to use the west coast as a jump-off point for an amphibious assault on China across the west sea…From what I do know of the sources, though this northern thrust in fact was the primary strategic principle.”
–sperwer
As for sources, I have none. My thoughts are speculative. I hope that’s alright. My thinking is based on two things: (1) how the Japanese reacted after Hansando and Myeongyang and, (2) as you say, how access to the west coast clearly would have relieved pressure from their main thrust and helped resupply.
As I’ve already said, we agree that Ming’s pressure and assistance were necessary and kept Japan in check. Without Ming, Japan would have ultimately captured Yi Sun Shin’s bases and shut down his logistical system. Without Ming, I think Japan could have maintained their positions in northern Joseon, even with the threat of disruption to logistics. And ultimately and quite clearly, only Ming–and not Yi Sun Shin–could force Japan out of Busan, which would end the Japanese threat and define victory. We are agreed on the basic points.
I suppose the best way to communicate how I’m seeing things differently is with a hypothetical question. Let’s say there is no Yi Sun Shin. And the Japanese have access to the west coast and the river leading to Seoul. Would Ming and Joseon’s regular and irregular armies still have the strength to drive Japan back to Gyeongsang?
Without Yi Sun Shin, many calculations must change. Principly, without him, Jeolla would have fallen easily because its defenses would have been caught in multiple pincers from land and sea. Capturing Jeolla seems to me to have been an essential objective in Japan’s war effort, since it is a major center of agriculture in Korea. And interestingly, the Japanese diet is heavy in seafood, which would have become easy to harvest off Korea’s coast. Jeolla’s coast happens to be rich in seafood.
There’s another interesting benefit in capturing Jeolla. Japan, then, would have been able to keep Jeolla’s resources away from Ming and Joseon.
And for the same reason that caused Japan to have difficulties in trying to invade Jeolla from the north and east, Japan might have likewise been able to defend the province well enough from Ming’s and Joseon’s forces marching south, especially if both Gyeongsang and Jeolla could be chained together by a defensive network of fortresses.
With Jeolla secured, it seems to me that Japan would have had access to the entire west coast. One important consequence would be that Japan would then be able to resupply Seoul’s garrison by sea. Seoul seems like it could have become a more convenient town to use as a staging area than Busan against any aggression from the north. Certainly, it could absorb a larger army than other towns. Perhaps Japan might have been able to combine its forces and strike back at Ming in a more favorable position had they been able to base themselves securely in Seoul.
There’s some other minor things. Anyway, all this is, of course, mere speculation. Obviously, I can’t really cite sources because none of this happened. What do you think of this?
“The Japanese were running with the tide. but against the current…The battle did not actually take place in the Myeongnyang strait proper, but between Haenam-gun and Yangdo.”
–sperwer
Thank you for getting back to me. I found your notes extremely helpful.
“No, at this time Nurhaci had not yet rebelled against the Ming. He ruled with some autonomy over Manchu tribes but under ultimate Ming control – under a title granted by the Ming to ‘barbarian’ tribes on their periphery.
In fact, Nurhaci fought Hideyoshi’s troops when they crossed the Tumen River and he offered to defend both Joseon and the Ming. The Jurchen were also Hideyoshi’s second target to conquer, after Korea, and before China and India.”
– dokdoforever
Hello, dokdoforever. How’s it going?
I didn’t know how to respond to your comment because the musing of mine you were replying to was not anything really serious I was contemplating. And yes, the Japanese attacked the Jurchens and probably did not respect them. I wasn’t implying that the Japanese and the Jurchens were natural allies. Had Joseon fell, Ming might have ended up contending with 2 powerful enemies. That’s all I meant.
Sorry for the intromission but that just brought up to my mind some particularly classy alpine say that could be grossly translated as “Money make a big cock” well it makes more sense in the original version…anyway once a man take care of that particular problem (the dough i’m talking about) most of the envy goes away, seen with my own eyes plenty of ugly as shit dudes lookin as happy as it gets, ever ventured in the Gulf ?
pawi: thanks you hang in there too, they’d be lost without you
thanks, gangpe.
Lollabrats:
Ok, let’s start with #2 (and I won’t get to Myeongyang in this post because the separation in time between it and Hansando (and the existing of many other intervening events and circumstances dictate that it receive separate evaluation). I think you’ve misapprehended the import of my remarks on this score.
My observations were directed at the possible desirability of west coast access to the Japanese in connection with your speculation regarding its use as an embarkation point for (a) a presumed (and at most, diversionary, in my estimation) amphibious pincer move against Beijing to augment the planned main strike from the north, and (b) a transfer point for seaborne resupply of both such diversionary force and the main northern strike body landed at Seoul/Pyongyang for overland transhipment north from there.
While no doubt desirable, I don’t think such west coast access was necessary, strictly-speaking, for resupply of the main northern strike force, which (unlike speculation re an amphibious invasion across the west sea) we know was the strategic principle.
The Japanese had swept up the peninsula from Busan to Sunan, a bit north of Pyongyang, in somewhat more than two months before calling a halt before what remained of the disorganized and disheartened Korean army at Sunan, while the Chosun court cowered even further north at Uiju on the Chinese border. At that point, the Japanese had perhaps only 20-25,000 combat effective troops available, having seen the ranks of their shock vanguard thinned, not so much by casualties as, by the garrisoning requirements of various strong points set up along what was in effect the MSR and illness.
The Japanese might very well nevertheless been able to overcome the numerically much larger, but hapless, Choseonese regulars at Sunan and go on to capture the Chosun court at Uiju (which IMO likely would have effectively ended the war – at least as far as Korea was concerned); but they stopped – because (i) they apparently didn’t have good intel regarding the inability of the Chinese effectively to intervene at the time, (ii) they needed rest, (iii) they (thought they) needed fresh troops, reinforcements (in anticipation of the expected Ming horde (the Chinese were promising King Sonjo 700,000 men) and resupply, and (iv) the Chinese in late August 1592 sent an envoy, the adventurer Shen Weijing, to parlay in a bid to gain time for the Liaodong Army to complete the Ordos campaign against the Mongols in the far west, rest and refit and march thousands of kilometers back to the Korean border.
Desultory talks between the Chinese and the Japanese continued for several months, and it was 5 months before the Chinese had prepared their forces sufficiently to enter Korea, which they did on or about January 26, 1593.
Now back to the Battle of Hansando (and related naval engagements in South Jeolla. They had all taken place before August 15, 1592, when the battle at Hansando was concluded. The most significant resulting Japanese reaction was Hideyoshi’s order to abandon any further attempts to breakthrough Yi Sunshin’s defenses in the West and to concentrate on resupplying Japanese forces through Busan and overland within Korea. When Yi Sunshin showed up with an augmented fleet at Busan in October 1595, he found over 500 Japanese ships harbored there that already had offloaded their cargo. In the ensuing battle, he destroyed only about 130 – in a battle that was less a naval battle than a turkey shoot in which the Korean ships fired at will into unmanned Japanese ships whose crews tried to respond with a bombardment from the harbor forts – and then retired. I haven’t double-cecked this yet, but I don’t believe there ever was any other serious interference with Japanese traffic to Busan thereafter.
Given that after August 1592 (whatever else it might have been beforehand), Japanese policy was to push reinforcements and supplies through Busan and up the MSR, and that nothing done by Yi effectively interfered therewith, the questions thus are: (i) whether in fact the Japanese ground forces didn’t get the reinforcements and resupply they needed; and (ii) if not, why not; and/or (iii) were there other considerations that better explain the deteriorating strategic position of the Japanese after January 1592 – such as the entry of the Chinese elephant into the sarangbang?
there are three scholars who wrote about the imjin war in enlgish and all three see yi’s destruction of the japanese navy as one of three major reasons for japan’s defeat. keep in mind, sperwer is no scholar. nuff said.
Here is the reference for Lollabrats and Neff about Imjin era military tech that I said I would dredge up:
Swope, Kenneth.
Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed During the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592-1598
The Journal of Military History – Volume 69, Number 1, January 2005, pp. 11-41
The issue is not whether Yi made a significant contribution to the outcome of the Imjin War, but what precisely his contribution, and its weight, were. The Battle for Pelelieu in W2 was an extraordinary chapter in the history of the USMC, but it was patently insignificant to the outcome of the war.
For someone who constantly calls for the names of authorities the hem of whose academic gown he can kiss, you are remarkably coy about identifying the ones that you say support your chauvinist fantasies about the Imjin War. I suppose you mean Hawley, Turnbull and Swope. Hawley was an instructor in English composition at Yonsei, and Turnbull a writer of coffee table books; Swope is a scholar in the conventional sense. Although I disagree with them, I respect them – unlike you – because they actually make arguments.; it doesn’t really matter to me that Hawley was not a professional historian or Turnbull a popularizer. I happen to disagree with them – on some points – because I don’t think some of their arguments are well-thought out, persuasively argued and/or substantiated by the evidence. I’m prepared to state my reasons why and to construct my own arguments, and have my views assessed, based on their cogency and consistency with the available evidence. But, hey, you should feel free to indulge your uncritical faith in authorities until your head explodes when your theological certainties are destroyed by reasoned argument.
Correction: The date of Yi Sun Shin’s attack on the Japanese fleet in Busan harbor was October 1592 [not 1595]
Sperwer; Wangkon; Lollabrats etc.
Sorry for the dumb question: i was wondering if you had any good general entry level book on Korean history to suggest: particularly some title covering the 3 kingdoms era, also some work covering the timespan of the Goryeo-Chosun eras.
Sorry for the rather generic question: i was wondering if a Korean equivalent of the Cambridge history of the British Empire exist
Thanks in advance for the help
Gangpe:
James Palais was working on a volume of Korean History that I believe was going to be appended to the big Cambridge series on China, but I’m not sure what’s become of it since his death a couple of years ago.
The single best comprehensive one volume Korean history in English, and one of the most available in Korea, is probably still Lee Ki-Baek’s New History of Korea , first published in 1967. It was continuously revised since its original publication; I think the most recent version came out in 2002, two years before Lee’s death.
There is also a slightly abridged version: Korea Old and New: A History by Carter Eckert, Ki-Baik Lee, Young Lew, and Michael Robinson, from 1990, which is even easier to find here.
Either one is probably as best a place to start as there is.
gangpe,
My personal favorite is William E. Henthorn’s History of Korea. It was written around the time we were born (early to mid-70′s) and it’s out of print but it covers all the bases up until Rhee’s presidency. That’s okay, there are better books that cover that period of Korean history anyways. You can get it used for about $3 on Amazon.com.
The standard “Korean History 101″ book is Ki-Baik Lee’s “A New History of Korea.” However, I think it’s a little sterile (i.e. boring).
There really isn’t that much available in the English language on Korean history that’s really all that good. I did compile a list on Amazon a while ago.
http://www.amazon.com/Korean-History/lm/1SAKFZ7D89NPF/ref=cm_lm_byauthor_full
Thanks guys really really appreciated !
Sperwer,
A few counterpoints to your comments in #180 and #183. There were a lot of problems to having a base of supply only in Busan. The transportation infrastructure in 16th century Chosun were primitive, to say the least. We are not talking about Mac trucks or asphalt paved super highways or rail. We are talking about dirt trails and ox carts. Compound that with mountainous terrain and bands of guerrilla fighters to harass lines of supply and communication, the difficulties become clear.
Drawn a rational overland route from Busan to Beijing and what do you have? Maybe 1,000 miles if not more? Vulnerable to Korean guerrilla, Chinese guerrilla and Jurchen tribesman attacks? Even you indicated that Japanese combat power in Pyongyang was about 20-25k. It might have been less than that actually. Maybe 15-20k total combat effective? It was primarily only Konishi’s division. The rest had to be used in garrisons like you said. Imagine garrisoning and protecting an additional 700 miles? In my mind, the only way for the Japanese to invade China proper would be to have a secure naval position with ready access to the Yellow Sea. Admiral Yi was able to (with a secure naval base in Cholla at least already discussed) deny them that.
There was a similar situation for the Chinese back in Sue and Tang times when they needed to secure the northern Yellow Sea to invade Koguryo (southern Manchuria and northern Korea). Also issues of supply. Every time their naval arm was defeated, their land elements were defeated as well. It wasn’t until Tang secured supply commitments from Silla and a supply base in conquered Paekje that they were able to provide the sustained pressure (i.e. winter Tang armies in occupied Koguryo territory) to cause Koguryo to fall. Similar logistical situation with Persian invasions of Greece. An invading army had to be supplied by the navy. Once the navy was defeated, the Persians have to substantially reduce the size of their army, which allowed it to be beaten at Plataea.
“Sui,” not Sue.
“Given that after August 1592 (whatever else it might have been beforehand), Japanese policy was to push reinforcements and supplies through Busan and up the MSR, and that nothing done by Yi effectively interfered therewith, the questions thus are: (i) whether in fact the Japanese ground forces didn’t get the reinforcements and resupply they needed; and (ii) if not, why not; and/or (iii) were there other considerations that better explain the deteriorating strategic position of the Japanese after January 1592 – such as the entry of the Chinese elephant into the sarangbang?”
–sperwer
Yes, I believe that your comment here is to the point. But before I continue, I would like to mention something.
Sperwer, I must admit to you that I am happy that you are sharing your thoughts with me in a very helpful way. You are the only person with whom I’ve ever had such a lengthy discussion regarding the two wars. Having this discussion has led me to rethink certain things. One of these is that I realize now that, in my characterization, I have actually been unduly minimizing the role of the Ming in the war, despite my understanding of the decisive contributions they made toward victory. It is strange to me now how I could have thought otherwise, although I think I can guess how I came to think that way. But I still am not convinced that Yi Sun Shin did not play a decisive role himself.
If we take Ming out of the picture, then Japan successfully annexes Joseon and Yi Sun Shin must either lose or flee to China. Here, we agree. On this point alone, I must concede. But with caveat. Did Ming succeed because of their military brilliance and excellence? Which I question? Or was it because the Koreans laid the groundwork for Ming’s victory? The point of contention is, as you say, what the admiral’s “contribution, and its weight, were.” And to discover that answer, we must speculate in the same way as we do when we imagine what the war would have been like absent Ming’s intervention. This speculation is, after all, how we can arguably conclude that Ming’s intervention was decisive. And that is why, to measure Yi Sun Shin’s role, we must speculate him off the theater. That makes sense, does it not? I believe what you are saying is that even without Yi Sun Sin, Ming would still have been able to force Japan south. And this is where we disagree.
In my last comment, what I was trying to respond to was what I thought was your main concern–and a very important one at that–about Japan’s lack of access to enough of Joseon’s arable land to commandeer for their own use. You believe that Ming’s pressure caused them to lose vital farmlands, thus sharply diminishing their food supply. I should perhaps take this moment to clarify something: my previous comments are speculative only because Yi Sun Shin ensured that it would be nothing more than that–speculation. It is his success which keeps us from understanding clearly what value Japan’s access to the west coast and access to Jeolla’s farmlands would have played in the war.
In its inital thrust, Japan drove north, bypassing Jeolla, because of timing. Jeolla is out of the way of the path from Busan to Seoul onto Pyongyang. Initially, the rapid capture of those cities were strategically more vital than capturing Jeolla. But it is Jeolla, which would allow Japan to become self-sufficient in Joseon. You can’t possibly be saying that leaving Jeolla unsubjugated was ever in Japan’s long-term, or even mid-term, planning. It is not only the breadbasket of the peninsula, but it shares a long border with the province, which was the base of Japan’s operations in Joseon–Gyeongsang. Indeed, the Japanese invaded Jeolla often–but only by land and with difficulty.
And as for whether Yi Sun Shin ever followed up his attack on Busan with sea lane interdictions, I haven’t found anything, which is interesting because this is, after all, an important point. All I can tell is that after Hansando, the Japanese do change. Incidentally, in Japan itself, increasing number of Japanese were becoming some of the best nourished people on earth. They were eating three meals a day and the threat of mass harvest failure was no longer a concern. Japan, with an abundant food supply was actually growing, while their soldiers in Joseon–not all that far away–would end up suffering. If support via the sea was adequate, I would think that Japan would have been able to supply more than enough to fuel its war machine.
With that in mind, let me return now to the passage of yours I quoted above. It seems to me that the Japanese in the north did have concerns that their logistics indeed had been compromised. But on this point, I only have questions, too. What was Japan’s real situation concerning supplies? Here, the traditional Korean thought is that the Koreans did in fact disrupt their long terrestrial supply lines and that this did have a significant effect. Ming may have pressed down from the north. But only the Koreans could raid behind the lines. It was the Koreans, who caused the Japanese to stretch out their forces instead of concentrating and destroying the Ming in a decisive battle. When it comes to logistical concerns, it was the Koreans–not Ming–who did the damage.
In January 1593, a couple of months after Hansando, Japan began their defense of Pyongyang against Ming’s troops of about 35,000-40,000 men with cavalry and massive siege cannons. The Japanese had something like 12,000-20,000 men to defend Ming’s gateway into civilized Joseon. I can’t help thinking that something dreadful had happened. Don’t you find something odd about this? Could this really have been what they intended? The whole point of invading Joseon was supposed to be to invade China. How did the Japanese ever figure that 12,000-20,000 men (numbers seem to be all over the place, but my point stands) would be sufficient to conquer Ming and garrison Pyongyang at the same time? But that seems to me to be the implication of what you are saying. Hansando was August. Pyongyang was January. Taking into account Korea’s potentially deadly winters, I think the Japanese had intended to reinforce and resupply Pyongyang by sea.
Beyond the seasonal factor, the Japanese had long ridiculed Joseon’s lack of real roads. Whatever MSRs there might have been, it would not have been an efficient way to transport via land.
Consider Myeongnyang. Yes, the earlier Jiksan was a tremendous Ming-led victory. But at Myeongnyang, something like 200 ships, three-fifths of all the Japanese ships, were just supply ships. There were many more supply ships than warships. Why do you suppose that was? Where were they going with all that? And what were they going to do with it? In general, my perception is that bringing in cargo and men to forward positions by sea would have been safer, quicker, and more convenient than taking muddy supply roads that get buried in snow in winters and are havens for roving bands of Korean irregular fighters. It must have become clear pretty quickly to the Japanese that overland supply lines were inefficient and dangerous. Hence, this is why Yi Sun Shin–not Ming–is the reason why Japan turtled south.
Before I close, I want to make two points. I would like to make a comment about Kurishima’s death at Myeongnyang. He was one of the sea pirate Daimyos and the only daimyo killed in Joseon. Of course the loss of a daimyo would have had a tremendous effect. And probably, the Japanese were terrified of Yi Sun Shin to begin with. But I wonder how demoralizing his death really could have been. He volunteered to lead the assault against Yi Sun Shin for a personal reason. He did it in honor of and with hope of avenging his brother who was killed years before by Yi Sun Shin at Sacheon. The Japanese command must have known that it was a virtual suicide mission. But they granted permission anyways. Everyone must have seen it as an act of honor and sacrifice, sort of like in “Glory,” when Matthew Broderick volunteers his 54th Massachusetts Infantry regiment to lead the charge on Fort Wagner.
Also, capturing Uiju probably would not have meant capturing the court. The court likely would have slipped out of the country. The problem posed by Jeolla would still remain and give Ming reason to continue to view Joseon as a buffer. This may be another reason, on top of the ones you also gave for why the Japanese did not try to chase the king. They did take princes as hostages at any rate.
“Hence, this is why Yi Sun Shin–not Ming–is the reason why Japan turtled south.”
–me
I commit the same mistake. I should rephrase:
“Hence, the Koreans made decisive contributions, which caused Japan to lose their forward positions.”
“There really isn’t that much available in the English language on Korean history that’s really all that good. I did compile a list on Amazon a while ago.”
–Wangkon936
Thanks. I’ll follow your list, too.
Sam Hawley earned an MA in history from Queen’s University. Other than writing the book, he never worked in the field, but he had the scholarly training. One of Swope’s criticisms was that Hawley was unable to read and comprehend any of the primary sources in their original language and thus relied on translations. That is correct. Sam collaborated with others who summarized or translated documents into English for him, a laborious task considering the volume.
@Lollabrats:
I used to own the history books recommended by Sperwer and gave them away. I find comprehensive history books on any country, even one as young as ours, overwhelming. Trying to learn everything, I remember nothing. I understand history better when I focus on one event, era, or theme. The brain is wired to package and store information and skills in meaningful chunks.
lollabrats,
I would agree w/Sperwer in that marine time flow of traffic in Busan from the peninsula to the archipelago was to large degree, uninterrupted. Yi’s diary constantly mentions new Japanese ships coming and going in Busan. However, the Japanese actually wanted to move back to the southern tip of Korea to consolidate their forces and keep them away from isolated attack by Korean bands of guerrillas and into a network of self supporting and interconnected forts called the wajō. The Ming, although having a lot more offensive firepower than the regular Korean army, were badly mauled at Byeokjegwan and were very reluctant to go on the offense again. After Haengju and other unsuccessful sieges against Korean fortresses, the Japanese were tired and used Ming negotiations to make sure their retreat to (and their construction of) the wajō went relatively unmolested. So, the Japanese were “working” while they were talking.
I have my own thoughts on Myeongnyang. I just haven’t had the time to really write about it here.
well, you haven’t written a book on the imjin war. if you do, let me know. ’till then, you’re just a nobody whose opinion is just an opinion. my opinion is the koreans provided two of the three reasons for japan’s defeat. of course, that’s just my opinion but it’s an opinion shared by those who’ve published books about the war. looks like you’re just farting in the wind.
wangkon, no ‘memoirs of lady hyegyeong’? kibi? i will buy that book.
“However, the Japanese actually wanted to move back to the southern tip of Korea to consolidate their forces and keep them away from isolated attack by Korean bands of guerrillas and into a network of self supporting and interconnected forts called the wajō”
–Wangkon936
This was my original point, too. But I am starting to think that perhaps the combination of Ming, Yi Sun Shin, and Korean irregulars, in equal measures, collapsed the Japanese forward positions. Ming at the front. Koreans from the rear. And Yi Sun Shin on the sea. I’m starting to think that if you take out one factor, then I don’t think Japan collapses from Pyongyang.
“Yi’s diary constantly mentions new Japanese ships coming and going in Busan.”
–Wangkon936
Ah, thank you. But I wish I had a better sense of what that actually meant.
“The Ming, although having a lot more offensive firepower than the regular Korean army, were badly mauled at Byeokjegwan and were very reluctant to go on the offense again. ”
–Wangkon936
One of the more interesting characters in the wars seems to have been General Li Rusong. I exaggerate, but he seems to have made a career of walking into every trap his enemies laid for him. I can’t help but think that this was intentional. I can’t believe any rational man would repeatedly make the same deadly mistake risking thousands of his better troops at a time until it killed him. Byeokje didn’t have to turn out that way. His luck did run out eventually, but in a different war. It probably was a pitiful end to an arrogant general. But he seemed not to have been a coward when he was forced to fight. And maybe that’s why he personally led his troops into these traps. I just don’t know what to make of him. He seemed to make a lot of mistakes, but it seems he also could devise some clever plans. Attacking Pyongyang when he did probably gave him a decisive advantage, for instance.
“Trying to learn everything, I remember nothing.”
–Sonagi
I’m the same. Even when I pick up a complete history of___ book, I still end up reading the parts I’m most interested in first.
:p
Nothing inherently wrong with taking relatively narrow core samples. When I was first in graduate school that was the approach of my adviser. His field was modern European intellectual history, and he had a special interest in the concept of “modernity”. But, rather than try to encompass developments all over Europe, he zeroed in on fin d’siecle Vienna – a brilliant choice when you consider the enormous creativity the place spawned in mathematics, physics, chemistry, medicine, psychology, philosophy, painting, architecture, literature, etc. It fit right in with my background, too, as I had studied philosophy as an undergrad with one of the original members of the “Vienna” school and with one of the principal students of Wittgenstein.
On the other hand, texts like Lee Ki-Baek’s also work when the author is skilled enough to arrange the information in conceptually compelling “packets”, and readers are clever enough to grasp what they are. The hurdle that such texts present, though, is they contain so many disparate sorts of such packets, not all of which will be congenial to the temperment of a given reader; I have to strap myself in to wade through even well-written expositions of some kinds of economic information, e.g., agricultural production data.
Yes, just a nobody capable of reading critically and without the distorting lense of a crippling need for validation of national prejudices.
Anayway, you know what they say – be careful what you wish for ….
lollabrats,
I still tend to think that Yi’s denying the Japanese free reign in the Yellow Sea had a bit of a cascade effect, as you had earlier mentioned. The difficulty of logistics, especially the farther north one went in the peninsula, caused the Japanese to do two things that contributed to the increase in irregular force activity. First of all, it gave Korean guerrillas a nice, vulnerable and juicy target to go after, the soft underbelly of supply and communication lines. If you couldn’t substitute the Yellow Sea for some of those supply and communications, then it makes the land route all that more vulnerable. Second, without enough to eat, the Japanese resorted to raiding the countryside… which has the effect of creating more guerrilla fighters. Much of the Chosun population was apathetic to the dynasty that ruled them, but after Japanese brutality showed them that their lives and property were at risk that’s when they formed sizable bands of literati lead uibyeong (i.e. Righteous Armies).
So, in my opinion, Yi’s sea victories did at least two things. First of all it made Japanese land based supply and communication lines bigger and more unwieldy, thus giving guerrilla fighters not only more targets but more vulnerable targets and it made the Japanese plunder more from the Korean population, which increased Korean motivation to form and join resistance movements like the uibyeong. The fact that the Japanese decided to do without the long land lines altogether in 1593 and rely on a network of wajō probably proves that. It certainly wasn’t because they were doing a lot of fighting against the Chinese. The last major Ming/Japanese battle was Byeokjegwan, a Ming defeat.
I mean…. “The last major Ming-Japanese battle during the first invasion was Byeokjegwan, a Ming defeat.”
“The last major Ming/Japanese battle was Byeokjegwan, a Ming defeat.”
–Wangkon936
Oh, I see what you’re saying. What I’m saying is Ming may have been the hammer on the long nail that was the supply line that was being corroded by the Koreans. Ming’s ablility to concentrate their force was something Japan may not have been able to ignore. The Koreans kept Japan from concentrating. But the Koreans by themselves may not have been able to push Japan out of Pyongyang.
Yes… something like that.
I tend to disagree w/Hawley’s assessment that they may have been able to do that all my themselves.
^To follow up. Let’s say that Ming had not intervened. And let’s say that the Koreans did cause Japan to pull back from Pyongyang. In the south, Japan would have become concentrated. And they may then have been able to invade and capture Jeolla by land.
It’s hard to say because we are dealing with a lot of speculation. However, what I’m at least certain of is that Yi’s sea victories put a lot of pressure on Japanese land based logistics. It was very difficult for the Japanese to even keep 20-25k troops in Pyongyang relying on land based supply lines alone. Could Konishi have spent a winter in Pyongyang with or withing the Chinese rooting him out? It’s hard to say. Konishi lost a lot of troops due to starvation and disease.
WanKong:
Your reminder of the difficulties of the overland supply route on the peninsula are well taken. But your attempts at a comparative perspective/historical parallels are inapposite. Persuasive historical explanation, finally, is all about the differentiating and uncontrolled time-constrained and contingent details – except perhaps for those naive , bamboozled (most so-called social scientists) and/or possessed of wishful thinking enough to believe that it is no different – at its most characteristic – from that of the physical sciences (i.e., the formulation of general laws of universal application).
In the case of the overland supply route, the best perspective on what actually faced the Japanese in the peninsula was — wait for it — exactly what they had faced. They managed in the first 2.5 months of the campaign to move 125,000 men, their equipment, horses, food, fodder and miscellaneous supplies the 600+ kilometers from Busan to Sunan, north of Pyongyang (albeit the numbers of each steadily dwindled as they left garrisons behind them as they went) over the rough, ill-improved roads and cart paths of that difficult terrain – and they did it while fighting the regular Choseonese army (not a very impressive bunch, admittedly, but still better trained and disciplines than uibyeong bands.
And the speculation that it would be difficult for them to repeat that feat for the additional ~800 klicks to Beijing (without securing west coast tran-shipment points denied them by Yi) attempts to prove too much and thereby proves nothing. The fact is that they didn’t move on to Beijing, because they hadn’t sufficiently secured any reliable base in Korea, although they had won every significant engagement except the Hansan-do area sea battles, before they stopped for more than five months primarily for the reasons I adverted to earlier – the totality of which militate against any claim of particular significance for Yi’s naval successes in stopping the Japanese from accomplishing their objectives in 1592. And once 1593 comes around, and hostilities are renewed after the cease-fire that obtained in the late summer and fall of 1592, it’s obviously the intervention of the Ming (as well as the fact that Hideyoshi himself seems to have lost interest in the war altogether after the death of his mother and, perhaps, the belated realization that Korea did not in fact possess enough resources to be looted to support the Japanese campaign) – not Yi who had already shot his wad 3 months earlier — that forces the Japanese back, puts paid to the first invasion and results in another more extended bout of negotiations until the second invasion of Spring 1597 (in which Hideyoshi demonstrably had NO interest in moving onto China or even taking any more of Korea than the three southern provinces.
Obviously the disease factor was unaffected by the absence of sea-borne resupply.
As for food, it doesn’t appear that it was ever the intention of the Japanese to provision its troops from Japan; despite what Lollabrats said earlier about the relative abundance of rice in Japan at the time, Hideyoshi was the Lyndon Johnson of his time and place, promising – as his appellation “beneficent provider” indicated – guns and butter. The Japanese seemed to have grossly overestimated the carrying capacity of Korean agriculture to support their thoroughly conventional (for the time) plan to feed off the conquered land and to have been lured (by the ease of their land victories) into moving up the peninsula faster than their consolidation of their rear echelon warranted; at this early stage they din’t really face much in the way of local, “guerrilla” opposition; they just got out much too far in front of themselves too fast.
Sperwer,
I think both lollabrats and I have been patient in starting our case for Admiral Yi’s contributions to the logistical difficulties he presented the Japanese. Now, I can’t speak for lollabrats beyond that point, but I’m just starting to think that no amount of evidence or logic we bring to the table will change or significantly modify what you have always believed and what you will always continue to believe.
Given that I believe no amount of information will convince you otherwise, I’ll just have to leave you with the collective weight of scholarship on the matter:
Eric Niderost
“The naval operations of May through September proved Yi Sun Shin to be one of the greatest captains of military history…. Hansan Island… [was] a decisive encounter that saved China from invasion and Chosun from permanent occupation.” - “Turtleboat Destiny,” Military Heritage Magazine.
Barry Strauss
“After Hansan Island, Hideyoshi ordered the Japanese to avoid sea battles entirely. In effect, Admiral Yi and driven the enemy from the water. The Japanese fleet was kept out of the Yellow Sea and therefore it could neither supply nor even communicate with its forces in Pyongyang. The invaders had to carry all supplies by men or horses along Korea’s insecure roads, which severely taxed their organizational ability and manpower.” - “Korea’s Legendary Admiral,” Military History Quarterly
Barry is also author of “The Battle of Salamis.”
Stephen Turnbull
“… just as at Pyongyang in 1592 [due to the battle of Hansando], the necessary troops never arrived and Chiksan was to become another last outpost of a Japanese advance. Seoul was never taken, and the reason why the attack never happened was again the result of a naval victory gained by Admiral Yi Sunsin at Myongyang.” - “The Samurai Invasions of Korea, 1592-98.
Samuel Hawley
“… here lay the problem. The only supply line Konishi and Kuroda had available to them was the 685 kilometer-long land route from Pusan, totally inadequate for the tens of thousands of men and the heaps of supplies that had to be moved north prior to talking on the Ming. The only practical method of transportation was by ship, around the south western tip of the Korean Peninsula, north through the Yellow Sea.
Yi Sun-sin’s “Slaughter Operation” in June [1592] awoke the Japanese to the fact that the Korean navy still posed a threat and that the essential supply route north via the Yellow Sea was not open after all.” – The Imjin War.
Yu Songnyong
“The enemy originally planned to attack us from the west side with the joint army of land and sea, but as a result of this single defeat [at Hansan Island], they lost their momentum, and Yukinaga dared not advanced any farther despite his capture of Pyongyang. Yi’s victory made it possible for us to secure Cholla and Chungchong provinces and parts of the sea along Hwanghae and Pyongan provinces. As a result, we were able to deliver military provisions as well as military orders [with little interference], which was critical to the restoration of the country.” - The Book of Corrections.
Kenneth M. Swope
“As Yoshi S. Kuno observes with respect to the Japanese, “on land they fought like tigers but on the sea, when engaged in navel battles with the Koreans, they could fight no better than a tiger could fight in the water against a shark.” But Hideyoshi needed to secure the sea lanes to transport supplies and troops if his invasion was to succeed. Thus other Japanese navel commanders… hasten to Pusan and prepared to deal a death blow to the Korean navy.” – A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tale.
Also,
Regarding your comments on the Japanese wanting to sustain the invasion with Korean rice. The Japanese did not have control of Korea’s “bread basket” Cholla province until late 1597, so they didn’t have access to it’s rice until late into the war.
Plus, with Japanese and Chinese armies roving about a lot of farmers left their farms and became dead, guerrilla fighters or (more likely) refugees. Korean rice production by the end of the war fell from 2.4 million pyong to just 500k.
WangKon:
Right back at ya!
I’ve been very patient with your careless disregard for actual evidence and the logic of historical explanation, and your persistent recourse to bogus analogies, uncritical acceptance of conventional “wisdom”, unexamined assumptions and faulty explanatory logic. I really have no dog in this hunt apart from an interest in it as an exercise in bona fide historical explanation. You, on the other hand, transparently have an ethno-sentimental interest that, together with the problems just enumerated, strongly suggests that it is you for whom no amount of evidence or logic I bring to the table will change or significantly modify what you have always believed and what you will always continue to believe. [But hey, unlike Pow Pow, you don't apparently believe that he invented the lightbulb or SAVED SINITIC CVILIZATION - so good on ya for that.]
Your latest is just the proof of the pudding. Rather than respond to the specific evidentiary and argumentative points I’ve made, you choose to take refuge in “authority”, indeed in citations of the most unsubstantiated and conclusory statements by such authorities (only some of whom – Swope, Hawley and to a much lesser extent Turnbull – IMO qualify as such, the others either simply being originators or regurgitators of the received “wisdom”). To paraphrase Mencken: Appeal to Scripture is the last refuge of the party with neither fact or logic on his side.
Exactly. The “causal” issue is why. I’ve stated the reasons why during the first invasion this fact can be better explained by the relevant evidence regarding Japanese strategy than by Yi’s victories at Hansan-do and Busan.
Yi was a militarily polymathic genius and a genuine hero for a host of reasons; and he made important contributions to the Korean cause in the Imjin conflict – particularly in boosting Korean morale and stiffening Korean resolve and, to very much less certain extent, foreclosing certain strategic and tactical options that may, or may not, have favored the Japanese. But he didn’t “save” Korea, let alone China.
Hello Sperwer,
I think a number of us have been addressing your various points in a detailed basis over the last several dozen comments. My conclusions are the result of a lot of research that I’ve done, not because of my ethnicity. None of the scholars I’ve mentioned, with the exception of Yu Songnyong have a”dog in the hunt” neither from an ethnicity standpoint yet they disagree with you. You can be right or wrong regardless of your heritage of background. I really wish you would stop with that straw man and “poisoning the well fallacy.” It’s getting old and it’s not very convincing. Attack my viewpoints with logical counterpoints please.
I’m curious. Are there any knowledgeable scholars out there you can quote that agree with your assessment? If there are please share. Perhaps they have written the sufficient monographs that I can read and thus can change my opinion. I’m all ears… seriously.
WangKon:
Wasn’t it you who, instead of replying with argument based on evidence and logic to my last substantive post and its specific claims, pompously and piously presumed to say first that I was trying your patience because I had the temerity to remain unconvinced by your unconvincing arguments (for the specific reasons stated) and thus was for some unspecified reason incorrigibly wedded to some indefensible position. Dottore, first go heal thyself before you have the effrontery to lecture.
“Exactly. The “causal” issue is why. I’ve stated the reasons why during the first invasion this fact can be better explained by the relevant evidence regarding Japanese strategy than by Yi’s victories at Hansan-do and Busan.”
–sperwer
Hello, everyone. I really enjoyed this discussion. I’m sorry to see it begin to unravel. I suppose we should put an end to it now. Even though opinions of people did not change much, I want to thank both sperwer and Wangkon936 for helping add a bit more to my knowledge of the invasions. Even if you have become frustrated by this exercise, I hope that you can find some satisfaction in the altruism of sharing ideas with someone less knowledgeable than yourselves.
Sperwer, I do not believe that I am being overly irrational or illogical by disagreeing with you, but I do understand why you disagree with me. You have given me some things to ponder.
Thanks all.
Lollabrats:
I don’t think you’ve been irrational or illogical at all. My only issue with your argumentative style is what I regard as your penchant for what you yourself describe as unsubstantiated speculation. Counterfactuals are a respectable way of formulating hypotheses to be tested against the evidence and what can be reasonably inferred from it, but one needs to be careful in historical explanation of what actually happened in the past (insofar as it can be reconstructed from the more or less available evidence) to stick with what the ascertainable facts can sustain and not get carried away by supposedly “common sense” of what must have happened.
Anyway, enjoyed it; thanks.
WangKon936 ,
Let’s be a bit more honest here. 유성룡 didn’t just have a dog in hyping up Admiral Yi’s achievements. He was the chief patron of Yi in the Joseon Court, and his own political legacy was tied up with Yi
I am also pretty familiar with Barry Strauss’ scholarship, and my understanding is that he is a classicist without an expertise in Korean or East Asian history. So I am not persuaded that his judgment on this matter is relevant. Sometimes less is more
Otherwise, this was a spirited but informative discussion, and I applaud the primary participants–Sperwer, lollabrats, and Wangkon936.
WJC,
Points well taken. However, I did want to include at least one primary source and I suppose you can say that about all the primary sources if you think about it. They were participants and contemporaries and they were literate (not a common skill in the 16th century), meaning that politics was always in the foreground, but in terms of primary sources that’s all we have.
I included Barry because in his article I thought he displayed a healthy amount of skepticism in Admiral Yi’s personality. He openly questioned why Yi had achieved so little up until the Imjin War and his weaknesses in being unable to sufficiently politically maneuver the intrigues of the Chosun court. Barry was familiar with Themistocles, who was both able in war and politics and Yi fell short of this example. Plus, Barry had written a lot of books on the Peloponnesian War and one on the battle of Salamis. The Persian problems of naval borne logistics supporting its army has useful parallels to the Imjin War, in my opinion and thus Barry’s thoughts on the matter have some value.
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