And of course, it’s Defense Minister Kim Tae-young:
Defense Minister Kim Tae-yung on Sunday threatened North Korea with retaliation if it is found to have been behind the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26. “Retaliation — whatever form it takes — must be done,” Kim said on KBS TV. The possibility of a vicious cycle of retaliation “must clearly be considered,” he said.
The minister was echoing Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Kim Sung-chan’s pledge during Thursday’s funeral for the 46 sailors killed in the shipwreck that whoever caused the tragedy would not be forgiven and get away.
As we know, the defense minister talks a lot. But this time, he was joined by former USFK commander B.B. Bell (operative word: former), who, according to Ye Olde Chosun, called for strict blockade measures against the North if it is proven they sank the Cheonan.
The Chosun runs down some of the options, including large naval drills near the NLL, attacks on North Korean submarines, and my personal favorite — as it is of the defense minister, apparently — bringing in nuclear-armed US bombers:
Dispatching U.S. Air Force B-2 stealth bombers or B-52 bombers to the skies over the Korean Peninsula is also an option.
Asked by lawmaker Kim Jung of the Pro-Park Geun-hye Coalition at the National Assembly Defense Committee session last Wednesday whether deploying nuclear bombers alone could send a sufficiently strong message to the North, the minister replied, “I think it would be good show of force.”
Nothing like a little nuclear posturing to brighten one’s morning.
Anyway, I’ll believe any of this talk only when it actually happens.
{ 28 comments… read them below or add one }
From the first article link, on the right hand bottom in the More Stories section, shouldn’t it be “Japan mulls *over* New Visa …..” instead of “Japan mulls New Visa….”?
Probably not related, but there are a lot of military helicopters flying over my house this morning. Normally there are about 3 or 4 per morning, but today there have been about 10 in the last hour.
“Defense Minister Kim Tae-yung on Sunday threatened North Korea with retaliation if it is found to have been behind the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan on March 26. “Retaliation — whatever form it takes — must be done,” Kim said on KBS TV. The possibility of a vicious cycle of retaliation “must clearly be considered,” he said.”
–Defense Minister Kim Tae-young
“As we know, the defense minister talks a lot.”
–Robert Koehler
I like him. The Minister may be unprofessional in some regards. But I won’t hold that against him.
There are some rumblings out of Washington and Beijing that the Cheonan incident might be swept under the rug in favor of the North returning to the Six Party Talks.
In my opinion, this is bar-none the stupidest of all possible endgames. If President Obama calls for the North to return to the SPT, it would look like he is undercutting President Lee, whose official position is no talks until the Cheonan issue is resolved. But worse than that, in seven years of ongoing negotiations, we have accomplished zilch. Nothing. Nada. While, the nuclear problem has actually gotten worse—a lot worse—the North has reaped all kinds of benefits. How much more time can we realistically give this process?
History shows that North Korean cannot and will not give up its nuclear arsenal. Every time an agreement is reached in principle, the North backs away. In 2005, the 6 parties came really darn close, and a month later, the North pulled back from the brink. In fact, after the second phase of the fourth round in 2005, we have never been closer to resolving all the outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula. But then KJI realized he had gone too far down the rabbit’s hole and the North quickly stirred up trouble by testing its first nuclear weapon. The same thing happened in 2007 and the North yet again failed to live up to its end of the bargain. After being rewarded with removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, the North took its prize and instead opted for ratcheting up tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The situation is exacerbated by China who are keen to block any measures that could actually enforce provisions of the agreements reached.
Domestically, the narrative of “North Korea as a nuclear state” is by now far too interwoven into North Korea’s internal myths. The nuclear program is seen as one of the great legacies of Kim Jong Il’s Military First Politics. To do an about-face now would be as unthinkable as admitting that Kim Jong-Il is nothing but a cruel and petty tyrant. It won’t happen.
Let’s hope that Obama et al come to their senses and realize a new approach to North Korean denuclearization is needed. I’m thinking something with teeth…
(con’t from above)
Not to mention the fact that we would be ignoring a brazen act of aggression and sending a signal to the North that they can get away with such provocations. Essentially, by returning to the SPT without some sort of retaliation (military, economic, or otherwise) against the North we would be lowering their perceived costs of committing aggressive acts against the South and making it more likely that such warmongering acts will become a staple of their bargaining “toolbox.”
“There are some rumblings out of Washington and Beijing that the Cheonan incident might be swept under the rug in favor of the North returning to the Six Party Talks.
In my opinion, this is bar-none the stupidest of all possible endgames.”
–milton
Where have you heard this? I haven’t heard any such trial balloons. This seems contrary to what Washington was saying only last week. If it is true, then it would indeed become a self-evident strategic disaster for Seoul, Washington, and the alliance.
To my mind, the underlying cause of these hostile bahaviors from Pyongyang seems to be related to the succession issue. Which is to say that even if they did “sweep” Cheonan “under the rug,” Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo would still be expecting more hostile behavior anyway. They are already getting prepared for potential Rodong or Taepodong testing off the east coast in the summer.
Moreover, LMB is not likely to let this go. And even if he did, it would be political suicide for his party! And without LMB’s support or acceptance, Obama actually cannot talk to the DPRK on his own without harm to other aspects to America’s east-Asia policy.
Which is not to say that I think that you must be mistaken. I’m saying that something about this makes as much sense to me as it does to you.
:/
@Yuna – both are equally acceptable
It’s not so much that it’s unprofessional, it’s this — it’s one thing to talk, but another to act. Yes, I know there are political imperatives that might necessitate tough talk, but if you’re not going to follow up on it — and I’m not convinced he will — then I’d rather you not run your mouth in the first place.
I haven’t heard these rumblings, but much to lollabrats’ chagrin, I got the sickening feeling this morning that something like that might be in the works. Namely, it wouldn’t surprise me if North Korea announces something like they’re willing to restart the six-party talks during Kim’s visit to China. Yeah, I doubt LMB would go for it, but Obama might, and when he does, you’ve got instant fissure in the US-ROK relationship… which is North Korea’s favorite play. Yeah, you’d have to be stupid as hell — or an editorialist at the Hankyoreh — to take that sort of deal, but when tempted with the lure of a “diplomatic victory” on the nuke issue, I don’t trust Obama not to bite. To be fair to him, though, neither could Clinton or Bush.
@milton
To clarify my above post, what I am disagreeing with you here is your insinuation that the negotatiable value of Cheonan is merely a return to the past. Perhaps, we are just arguing over words. But I do want to say that of course it is true that Washington and Beijing wants to pin Pyongyang at the 6PT, hoping to cool it off. But Cheonan should be worth more than that. If Cheonan has any negotiable value, it should be its value to weaken Beijing’s own sense of a moral stance against truly enforcing any blockade against the DPRK. After all, it is not Pyongyang (or anyone else) that has any power to make or break the 6PT. It is Beijing alone.
It is Beijing that can make any sanctions really work or make it simply fail. And they’ve clearly signaled to us that they intend to make it hurt a little, but ultimately fail. We all understand their reasons why they’re like this. The only concern of theirs that we do really appreciate is their fear of a collapsed DPRK on its border, with its attendant possible problems, such as a power vaccuum, lack of security, and a refugee crisis. These are real concerns we must respect.
Furthermore, it seems to me that Washington would gain even more strategic value from the Cheonan by using it simultaneously as cause to relist the DPRK as a terrorist sponsor. They should be able to do this without fear of a DPRK retaliation. After all, KJI did already murder 46 sailors, which also led to the deaths of 11 more people who tried to help. Anything the DPRK did to retaliate against the relisting would be seen not as retaliation but as the instigation of a new round of hostile acts.
“To clarify my above post, what I am disagreeing with you here is your insinuation that the negotatiable value of Cheonan is merely a return to the past.”
–me
This of course needs rewording. Stupid me. Hold on while I reword this.
It must be clear to you that I do not think you are the one thinking the above. It must be clear to you that I agree with you 100%.
Rather, my feeling is that I do not think that the White House would be so stupid to think that the negotiable value of the cheonan is merely the return to the past.
Pardon me. How I worded the above is a great insult to you.
Lollabrats,
Officially, the US is taking a wait-and-see approach, but:
On April 9th State Department Spokesman Philip Crowley said:
“We want to see North Korea take further steps towards denuclearization…We would like to see North Korea re-enter the NPT. We will start our efforts, I think, on May 3rd towards strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And obviously the best route to do that is through the six-party process.”
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/04/116_63958.html
It was reported on April 23rd that Secretary Clinton said:
“We have said time and time again that the North Koreans should not engage in provocative actions, and that they should return to six-party talks.”
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/04/23/world/international-uk-korea-north-usa.html
On April 28th Philip Crowley was asked if State was suspending its efforts to bring North Korea back to the SPT bargaining table in light of the Cheonan tragedy. His reply reiterated the official wait-and-see approach, but he somewhat tellingly noted:
“I wouldn’t necessarily link those [the SPT and the Cheonan investigation] directly.”
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2010/4/140964.htm
China, for its part has been ramping up its efforts to restore the SPT. On April 22nd, Chinese Foreign Minister Jiang Jiechi met with Russia’s SPT negotiator and agreed to work with all parties to see an early resumption of the talks. One of the main topics of KJI’s ongoing China visit is said to be resumption of the Six Party Talks.
China-Russia
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-04/22/c_13263101.htm
@milton
What I am saying is this:
(1) I agree with you that the 6PT is inherently non-functional.
(2) I agree with you that both Beijing and Washington want the 6PT to continue.
(3) Philip Crowley also said last week that if they find definitive proof that the DPRK sank the Cheonan, then that that revelation must affect the 6PT. LMB also said the same thing. It seems to me that the announcements were coordinated and that Seoul and Washington are in the process of trying to maximize their leverage from the murders against Beijing and Pyongyang.
(4) I don’t blame Bush and Clinton at all like many do. I think that their failures have given reasonable folks undeniable proof that KJI does not negotiate in good faith. I think Obama and every future president will work under that assumption.
So, what I’m saying is that I am not certain that a return to the 6PT will necessarily be of the nature you and Robert, understandably, fear. And I do recognize that your concerns are clearly warranted. So I may be wrong. But that is all I am saying.
Lollabrats,
Would you mind clarifying for me what you mean by “return to the past?”
Sorry, blockquote fail on my part. Should be like this:
There was no insult at all.
“Would you mind clarifying for me what you mean by “return to the past?””
–milton
This is merely my snide of way saying: “going back to the old non-functional way in which nothing works because Beijing won’t let it be functional.”
I think the fundamental problem of the 6PT is that Beijing and Seoul believe that a true blockade may indeed collapse the DPRK. I believe that their concerns are legitimate. As every Korean knows, the ROK cannot finance the annexation of NK on its own. The underlying financial difficulty is that NK is really 20 million poor, unskilled, uneducated people who would have to be cared for by the ROK’s government welfare. The fact is, the entire developed world would have to take a major financial hit to pay for Korea’s reunification, unless we follow Goldman Sachs’s recommendation. Their recommendation is that the annexation take place in stages, in which the ROK keeps the peninsula partitioned and develops the two parts at different rates.
I think that Beijing has been responding to this reality of the ROK’s circumstance by intentionally sabotaging the sanctions. As I said, they have a legitimate fear that the ROK does not have the capability to contain the collapse of security in NK should the DPRK government collapse. After all, NK has no real sustainable economy. A total blockade would indeed collapse the DPRK. So what I am saying is that the DPRK only lives because it is an actual threat to die.
I think every single member of the 6PT is completely aware of this reality. This is why Pyongyang can return and exit and return and exit at will. They can’t take it as anything other than a game to them.
Still, I think Beijing, Tokyo, Washington, and Seoul all do want Pyongyang to return to the 6PT. There’s probably other reasons why they want this. I’ve heard a couple, but none which convinces me. I think the idea is still to try to make Pyongyang think that there is some kind of consensus and vague conviction of disproval.
Any return to the 6PT must also include punishment for the DPRK. It must. So it would seem that the DPRK would have a disincentive to return to the 6PT. So, what I am thinking is that Washington has to sell to the DPRK a reason to return to the 6PT unpunished. At the same time, they must sell to the DPRK that they are also going to also punish them and make it seem not linked to the return. Or something like that.
“At the same time, they must sell to the DPRK that they are also going to also punish them and make it seem not linked to the return.”
At the same time, they must sell to the DPRK that, as an unrelated issue, they are going to be punished.
–EDIT
What I find interesting is that China has once again allowed KJI to dictate to it the terms on which he will visit their country. This whole armored train + entourage + media blackout thing must cost the Chinese a bundle in terms of manpower and inconvenience, and yet they let him do what he wants because he is afraid of flying (for good reason).
It sure makes NK look more powerful than it really is every time they do that. I wonder if it annoys Hu?
Hamel,
In the NK-China relationship, I often wonder who really pulls whose strings?
It’s commonly accepted that China has leverage over North Korea, but I’ve always doubted this, or at least felt that such leverage was exaggerated. North Korea has continued to act in a manner that is completely at odds with China’s apparent goals in the region by developing nuclear weapons, whipping up tensions with the South and the US, and failing to meaningfully reform their economy. But yet China keeps on giving and protecting. For reasons that are completely beyond me, they have come to the conclusion that its better tolerate North Korean arrogance and disrespect than it is to upset the status quo.
“It’s commonly accepted that China has leverage over North Korea, but I’ve always doubted this, or at least felt that such leverage was exaggerated.”
– milton
I think you are both right and wrong, but not for the reason you gave above. DPRK has power over the CPP because they are a threat to die. And I gave my bit of analysis above regarding that to explain why the CCP cannot make itself punish the DPRK. Nevertheless, the CCP has the real power because they are the only entity on earth, which can legally kill the DPRK–by enforcing sanctions. So I guess the philosophical question would be: who do you think has the ultimate power–the Lilliputian who ties down Gulliver or the giant with the big trampling feet? I don’t think either of us are really wrong. I just tend to think that CCP does have the ultimate power. That is all.
Perhaps another way of looking at it would be this: if the CCP demanded under threat of enforcement of sanctions that the DPRK liberalize and initiate market reforms, would the DPRK still be able to get away with, if not survive, ignoring the CCP’s demand?
Lollabrats,
I agree with you. In the first part of my post I was “wondering aloud,” but I wrote “always” when I meant to write “sometimes.”
The idea I was going for is best summed up in the last line.
The point I was making (which was in agreement with Hamel’s point) is that even though China does have power of KJI’s regime they continue to allow KJI to thumb his nose at Beijing and crap all over them.
“For reasons that are completely beyond me, they have come to the conclusion that its better tolerate North Korean arrogance and disrespect than it is to upset the status quo.”
–milton
But then does this mean that you do not agree with my point above about why the CCP does not act? I mean, it is not just that the DPRK makes the CCP look weak and diplomatically less trustworthy. It seems to me that the existence of the DPRK is the single greatest reason why economic development in NE China and far east Russia has been stunted all these years: their existence makes it difficult for the ROK’s and Japan’s economic influence to penetrate efficiently via land into these regions. The DPRK’s behavior hurts the Chinese both diplomatically and economically. So it seems to me that the reasons for their hands-off approach has to be tremendous.
I suppose that, in addition to what I wrote above, the CCP has other reasons as well, starting with the fact that the Chinese may sincerely see the DPRK as allies whom they should support even if they think NK is ridiculous and incompetent. There is also the oft-cited observation of the usefulness of NK as a buffer state against the spread of American influence on the continent and also as a chip to use on the Taiwan issue.
…
But I have two thoughts regarding what may change their views on the nature of their support for the DPRK. One is this debt-fueled asset bubble in their urban centers people are worrying about. If in the next 24 months, a massive real-estate bubble in China, the ROK, India, Hong Kong, and Singapore burst, might that not affect the DPRK, too? The DPRK has little trade with these nations/ cities. Except with China. The DPRK has slipped through the noose of sanctions and have flagrantly avoided intelligent behavior because they have been under the impression that they can rely on the CCP to finance them when things get shaky. Like a prodigal brat. But another way to see this problem is thus: DPRK has essentially put all their eggs in one basket–the CCP.
But if China currently is indeed blowing up a colossal bubble fueled by debt…and this bubble bursts…would the CCP still want to deal with the DPRK? Would they even be able to? Could a second massive recession so soon after the US-UK recession and one possibly even bigger than what we just went through change the nature of the CCP’s strategic thinking? I wouldn’t want to learn the answer this way. But it may be in our future.
The second thought is this. Does the CCP have a limit to their patience regarding the DPRK. As many have noted, the DPRK, unlike China and Vietnam, cannot liberalize because the DPRK actually has a rival more successful government. The DPRK can only exist by continuing and doubling down on what they have been doing. To do otherwise, including agreeing to disarm, would, as you have noted, defeat the very purpose for their existence. So, the DPRK cannot do anything other than continue to embarass the CCP. The CCP is supposed to be reknown for their patience. But I wonder about that. The Cheonan must have had some impact on their patience, though I doubt any effect is significant. But if, as I am assuming, the DPRK cannot do anything other than exhibit more hostile behavior, should we be counting the straws being loaded on the CCP’s back? Probably not, I’m thinking. But it’s something.
I’m assuming this is referring to #16?
If I read you correctly, you’re saying China can act, but they won’t because they are afraid of North Korean collapse. Correct?
If so, yes, that’s one possible reason. But then it negates your contention (and mine) that China holds power over North Korea. Power that can’t be exercised isn’t power. It’s like owning a tank, but having a bomb strapped to your chest that will explode if you don’t follow certain instructions. If China is a hostage to North Korean collapse, the arrow of power flips around to Pyongyang. Small and puny as North Korea is, if China is afraid of some alternative that might arise from not giving NK free reign, then North Korea is really in the driver’s seat.
There may be another possible reason, thought. According to a professor at PKU in Beijing (sorry, forgot the citation and name), China has three goals in Northeast Asia:
1) Maintain peace and stability
2) Ensure access to resources and markets for Chinese companies
2) Prevent internal separatism
Perhaps it’s number three that prevents China from acting. Perhaps they are so afraid of the Korean revanchism that might arise if the two Koreas teamed up or unified that they prefer an arrogant, unyielding, isolated North Korea that has no designs on Chinese territory to a liberalized North Korea on good terms with its neighbors, but which might have to contend with nationalist impulses to reunite the entire minjok or to which China’s own Korean population might be tempted to flee.
But, it seems to me that goals one and two would be infinitely better served by leaning on North Korea to liberalize and rejoin the international community. I agree that North Korea is stunting China’s economic growth along the border region (spectacular as it has been already) and preventing China from gaining better access to South Korean and Japanese markets. Peace and stability is best ensured by not having a nuclear-armed saber-rattler living on your doorstep.
I realize I contradicted my position in #20 and #23.
When does NK start to collect the tribute?
“China has three goals in Northeast Asia:”
–milton
“If so, yes, that’s one possible reason. But then it negates your contention (and mine) that China holds power over North Korea.”
–milton
Sorry for the delay in response. It is likely that we are in different time zones from each other.
And yes. That is what I meant by the analogy of the Lilliputian tying down Gulliver. However, unlike a bomb that can kill you, DPRK’s collapse would only cause a large security risk to China, but not one which would be so great as to lead to its destruction. And even so, the security risks, I think, could be somewhat well-managed with international help south of the Chinese border areas. I do believe that white military patrols in much of NK could be disruptive because we do not know how the population that has suffered generations of racist propaganda may react. But I think some sort of coaliation, with a heavy use of Asian contingents, and with help from NGOs could maintain both security and keep refugees from streaming into China’s poor NE.
Ultimately, I think China’s security concerns have more to do with political considerations more than with a sense of mortal fear. And yes, one of their security concerns is probably that Chinese or Korean groups, who they may be paranoid about, perhaps even with good reason, may use NK as staging ground for anti-CCP acts.
As for the ROK’s concern about a precipitously collapsed DPRK, I think their concerns are just totally backwards wrong.
The world first realized that the ROK cannot finance annexation when the 2 Germanys reunited and discovered that it is expensive. And as costly as reunification was for Germany, everyone extrapolates from that experience that the ROK’s financial burden would be awesome.
That is one of the main reasons why KDJ initiated the Sunshine Policy. One of the ideas was to try to gradually raise income levels in the DPRK so that at some future point, it would not be so economically prohibitive as it is now for the two Koreas to reunite. However, this was never going to work. Instead, what has happened is that due to their divergent political interests, the southerners became much much wealthier. And now, the costs are even more staggering than it was during KDJ’s presidency. And the costs are only going to rise. In fact, now, people in the DPRK are not only poor, unskilled, and uneducated, a large minority of them are also suffering physically and mentally due to chronic malnutrition. So the ridiculousness of it all is that the farther back the ROK pushes the moment of reunification, the more everything is going to cost them. But the reason they want to push farther back the moment of reunifiation in the first place is because they are hoping that they will be able to afford it at a later date.
Also, yes, I do happen to agree with your Beijing professor’s beliefs.
I guess what I am saying is that I think we can somehow get Beijing to cooperate with killing the DPRK if the ROK can show that they are competent enough to handle the responsibility of annexation in an orderly way. But then we also have to convince Koreans that they should take the commit to annexation today. But they won’t make a commitment unless they can get a great deal of financial support from the world. After all, there’s no reason to unify if the result is a financially doomed state. But it is not like there is a lot of unfettered money out there among the states.
Nevertheless, the CCP can still force the issue at any time by enforcing sanctions.
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