The JoongAng Ilbo took a look at how the South would respond if the North decides — as is always possible — to stir up the shit in West Sea.
Actually, since the departure of Chinese fishing boats from the waters around the NLL in early February, North Korean patrol boats have kept to their side of the line, guarding the North Korean coast. This is because with Chinese fishing boats out of the area, this would be the optimum time for the South Korean navy to put an intruding North Korean patrol boat at the bottom of the drink.
An official from the Joint Chiefs said that if a North Korean patrol boat were to cross the NLL, the South Korean Navy would warn them by broadcast three times before firing a warning shot. If the intruder didn’t return to its side of the line after that, the Navy would fire on the vessel. He noted that the ROK 2nd Fleet, which handles the West Sea, was keyed up about the possibility of an incident like the 2nd Battle of Yeonpyeong of 2002.
Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee summarized Korea’s response strategy during a parliamentary hearing last month thusly — “responding at the point of attack.” On Feb 26, he said at a function in Yongsan that Korea would respond precisely and resolutely to a North Korean provocation.
Military officials say the easiest way for North Korea to launch a provocation in the West Sea would not be a naval skirmish — the North Korean know all too well that they’d lose a ship-to-ship fight with the ROK Navy — but rather attacks by North Korean coastal artillery. In the 1st Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1998, the North Korean navy got their asses handed to them. Accordingly, military officials think it likely that the North would rather attack ROK Navy patrol boats with coastal guns and anti-ship missiles deployed in caves in places like Deungsangot Cape and Ungjin.
Taking this into consideration, the Joint Chiefs are considering ways to actively respond to a North Korean coastal artillery or anti-ship missile attack. Firstly, they are watching closely whether the North pulls its guns out of their caves in preparation to fire. If they do so, the Navy would pull its ships south for safety. If the North fires on a ship, the South would immediately respond with fire of its own.
The primary response would come from ROK Army K-9 howitzers and artillery radar deployed on Yeonpyeong Island. The radar would detect the location of North Korean guns within seconds of firing. The radar would automatically send the coordinates to the K-9s, which have a range of about 40km, thus placing much of the North Korean coast around the NLL within range. Unfortunately, there is a limit — the guns can only concentrate fire on North Korean coastal guns that have fired on South Korean ships, a measure taken to ensure things didn’t get out of hand. If the North Koreans continue to fire, it could be time to call in the ROK Air Force to launch precision attacks using JDAM.
If the North fires anti-ship missiles like Silkworms or Styx, South Korean ships would immediately take cover. The South can tell if the North is preparing to fire because to launch, the North would have to turn on their radar several hours before hand. If South Korean ships can’t get out range, they’ll use countermeasures like chaff and flairs.
Afterwards, the South would immediately launch strikes on the Northern missile base from which the attack was launched. The SLAM-ER carried on South Korea’s F-15Ks could accurately take out North Korean missile bases on the West Sea coast. The SLAM-ER, after all, can destroy targets 2—3m big from over 270km away. ROK Navy destroyers in the West Sea could also attack accurately North Korean missile bases with their ship-to-land missiles.
Military officials are not discounting the possibility that the North could launch air-to-ship missiles with IL-28 bombers. On Oct 7, 2008, the North tested in the West Sea two air-to-ship missiles developed from the Styx land-to-sea missile. A ROK Air Force official said the IL-28 is big and slow, so they can detect it from the time it takes off. The moment an IL-28 launches a missile at a South Korean ship, the South would intercept the plane, he said. To prepare for this possibility, the Air Force has been strengthening patrols along the West Sea with F-16s and other aircraft.
The Joint Chiefs also believe the North could launch provocations in the DMZ as well. A ROK Army official said that the North, in a piece of misdirection, could attack a Southern guardpost while it heightens tensions in the West Sea. The official said South Korean guard posts are under orders to fire three rounds at the North for every round they take; depending on the situation, they may even use all the ammo they’ve got.
Likewise, if North Korean troops cross the MDL, they’d be warned three times before a warning shot was fired. Another official said it was his understanding that if the North Korean troops ignored the warnings and crossed 50 meters over the MDL, Southern troops could shoot them.
The local commander does have to limit his response to one of self-defense, though.






{ 4 comments… read them below or add one }
I don’t see any major naval altercations that could be considered a “battle” between The Norht and South in 1998: http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/08/korea.navy.timeline/index.html
Perhaps the wikipedia authors mean this one in 1999?
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A05E7DD1138F936A25755C0A96F958260&scp=23&sq=&st=nyt
also
I’m pretty sure this has more to do with the characteristics and limitations of counter battery-fire than any willful non-escallation policy. With countery battery radar, you calculate the origin of the opposing artillery peice by the trajectory of the round it fired.
captbbq, your counterbattery example is true if you are firing at an artillery piece at an unknown location. All you need is an 8-digit coordinate, which you can get from any number of sources if you are firing on known North Korean artillery sites, to bring down significant counter-battery fire. If you want to hit them with a MLRS, you only need a 6-digit target reference. Lee also didn’t say he was limiting his strikes against any offending artillery site to just counterbattery. South Korea has a number of counter-strike options to include an hitting the artillery from the air. South Korea’s options are not as limited as North Korea’s.
I don’t know about anyone else but I’m really itching for something to happen.
…the South would respond if the North decides — as is always possible — to stir up the shit in West Sea.
De-Konglishifying this awkward phrase yields
…the South would respond if the North decides — as is always possible — to stir up some shit in West Sea.
Regarding #2
Yes, it is more of a matter of the physical nature of counter-battery fire than policy. The original statement seems to be indicating the limitation of the K-9′s that they can take out the NK coastal artillery ONLY AFTER SK ships have been fired upon, which is obviously not as good as a preemptive attack. I know all about this because I read Tom Clancy’s “The Bear and the Dragon”.
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