Open Thread #81

Jewook (#21) wrote:

Let another country steal your turf just because they asked for it?! Yea I’m sure the rest of the world respect us after doing something stupid like that.

No, Korea would not have to do that. Korea could simply agree to take the issue to the International Court of Justice, as the United States and Japan wanted Korea to do when the dispute first came up in the 1950s. That way, Korea would not have to worry about losing the respect of the rest of the world by giving Dokdo back to Japan simply because Japan asked for it. She would be giving it back because the court would most likely find that the evidence supported Japan’s claim. The world would respect Korea for abiding by the court’s decision.

Frogmouth (Steve Barber) (#24),

Post the statement where Edo Japan “clearly admitted Dokdo was Korean territory.”

The Korean (#25),

Here is the Korea Times article about it.

Japan unconditionally surrendered to the Allied Forces in 1945, and in January 1946, the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued “Supreme Command for Allied Powers Instructional Note #677″ (SCAPIN No. 677), which separated certain of Japan’s “outlying areas” from Japan’s governmental and administrative control. Those outlying areas included “Cheju, Ulleung, and Liancourt Rocks (Take Island),” but this was only a temporary measure and it was not meant to mean that these areas would not “ultimately” be recognized as being part of Japan, as was indicated in the instructional note, itself:

6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Postdam Declaration.

Also, just to point it out, the 1946 note referred to Liancourt Rocks as “Take Island,” not as “Dokdo.”

Anyway, because of SCAPIN No. 677, Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo) was excluded from Japanese governmental and administrative control until the San Francisco Treaty in 1952; therefore, a regulation from the Japanese Prime Minister’s office on June 6, 1951 would have naturally excluded Liancourt Rocks.

Yes, the San Francisco Treaty recognized Japan Liancourt Rocks as Japanese territory in Article 2A:

(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

Quelpart referred to Cheju, and Dagelet referred to Ulleungdo, but notice that Liancourt Rocks was not included among the islands to be recognized as Korean territory.

Also, after his mission to the Far East 1954, Special US Ambassador James A. Van Fleet wrote the following in his report:

“The Island of Dokto (otherwise called Liancourt and Take Shima) is in the Sea of Japan approximately midway between Korea and Honshu (131.80E, 36.20N). This Island is, in fact, only a group of barren, uninhabited rocks. When the Treaty of Peace with Japan was being drafted, the Republic of Korea asserted its claims to Dokto but the United States concluded that they remained under Japanese sovereignty and the Island was not included among the Islands that Japan released from its ownership under the Peace Treaty. The Republic of Korea has been confidentially informed of the United States position regarding the islands but our position has not been made public. Though the United States considers that the islands are Japanese territory, we have declined to interfere in the dispute. Our position has been that the dispute might properly be referred to the International Court of Justice and this suggestion has been informally conveyed to the Republic of Korea.”

However, Liancourt Rocks was part of Japan before 1952. It was incorporated into Shimane Prefecture in 1905 and the rocks were recognized as Japanese territory even before that. See HERE

I hope this helps you to understand the issue a little better.

CM,

Japan had just fought a bloody war with the United States and surrendered unconditionally. Why do you think Japan would have been in a better position to negotiate than Korea? The US needed both Korea and Japan to check communism.

Korea was given Ulleungdo and Jejudo because it was historically Korean territory, as you said. That is the same reason Japan was allowed to keep both Tsushima and Takeshima, in spite of the fact that Rhee Syng-man had wanted both those islands.

Korea had no historical documents or maps to back up her claim to Dokdo (Takeshima), which was why the US rejected the Korean request.

It was Korea who was lobbying hard for Dokdo, and if Korea had had historical documents and maps to support her claim, she would have probably gotten it. The fact that the US rejected her claim is evidence that she did not have such documents and maps.

This July 19, 1951 record in the “Foreign Relations of the United States” of a meeting between the Korean ambassador and John Foster Dulles shows that the United States was willing to give Korea Dokdo if Korea could prove that it was part of Korean territory before the Japanese annexation:

Mr. Dulles noted that paragraph 1 of the Korean Ambassador’s communication made no reference to the Island of Tsushima and the Korean Ambassador agreed that this had been omitted. Mr. Dulles then inquired as to the location of the two islands, Dokdo and Parangdo. Mr. Han stated that these were two small islands lying in the Sea of Japan, he believed in the general vicinity of Ullungdo. Mr. Dulles asked whether these islands had been Korean before the Japanese annexation, to which the Ambassador replied in the affirmative. If that were the case, Mr. Dulles saw no particular problem in including these islands in the pertinent part of the traty which related to the renunciation of Japanese territorial claims to Korean territory.

The following is the footnote to the above paragraph:

In the document cited in footnote 2 above, Mr. Rusk continued: “As regards the island of Dokdo … this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea

Korea had also tried to claim Tsushima, as can be seen in this March 30, 1950 letter, but dropped the claim when she realizated that the US was not just going to hand over the island without checking the historical evidence of Korea’s claim:

The island of Tsushima has been recognized for many years by the community of nations as an integral part of the Japanese homeland. It was included in the territory placed under the Allied Military Occupation in 1945 instead of being detached from the Japanese Empire as conquered territory subjectto future settlement at the peace conference. After the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, however, Koreans began to deman that Tsushima be taken from Japan ad returned to them.

The Korean demands to date do not constitute a formal claim to sovereignty; they are, rather, declarations of future intentions and desires. The first statement on the issue was made by President Rhee Syngman on August 17, 1948, when he said, “In the heart of every Korean is a longing for the return of those islands,” and indicated that this would be the only demand for territory made by his government against Japan. The Japanese Prime Minister immediately denied the validity of any Korean claim, and heated words were exchanged by the Korean and Japanese press. The Korean demand was stated again in a petition sent to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in late 1948 by the Old Men’s Patriotic Association of Seoul, a minor right-wing political organization. President Rhee reiterated his demand on January 7, 1949 with the statement: “Tsushima was not robbed by Japan in the past forty years, but nevertheless the island originally belongs to our country and its return should be demanded. The question was taken up by the National Assembly on March 22, when Assemblyman Yi Kuowon introduced a resolution calling for the return of Tsushima to Korea. The motion was shelved after a brief examination by a subcommittee. When Rhee was questioned in a press conference on December 30, 1949 as to the advisability of sending “a research group” to the island, “in order to certify historically that Tsushimaa [sic] island belongs to the Republic of Korea,” he replied that this was a problem for the Japanese peace conference and that premature discussion of it might prejudice Korean relations with other countries.

While many Koreans may be convinced of the valiity of the claim, it is obvious that the government’s demands and popular support for them have not been based on a rational, legal analysis of the issue. The demands appear to be both a reflection of and a calculated appeal to the nationalism and the anti-Japanese feelings that prevail thoughout the Republic. They may also represent an attempt by the government to extract some small concession from the Allied Powers. Public reaction to these demands has been generally favorable, but there has been some open ridicule of tham and there has been little natural interest in or support of them except from small segments of the population as the nationalist historians. The lack of extensive public interest and a more dispassionate analysis by the government of its chances for success probably account for the prolonged silence following the first show of interest. The President’s cautious statement of December 30, 1949, to the effect that pressing the claim could produce a conflict of interest with nations, appears to indicate that the government has made a rational reappraisal of its entire position in the matter. The American Embassy in Seoul is of the opinion that the government now realizes the inability of proving its case and will no longer press the claim.

Here is a footnote regarding Korea’s claim to Tsushima:

Almost no original source material is available. The sources that are available are vague, confusing, and limited in scope; there are notable discrepancies in the reporting of alleged facts. Much more American and Japanese source material is available than Korean, and as a consequence the Korean position may have been underestimated.

When Korea realized she could not get Tsushima, she started pressing her claim on Dokdo and Parangdo, of which Parangdo was an island that no one could find. When she realized she could not get Dokdo, either, President Rhee unilaterally declared his “Peace Line” on January 18, 1952, just a little more than two months before the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have returned Liancourt Rocks to Japan. Koreans later illegally occupied the rocks, and that is where we are today.

Baduk (#30),

I do not care if Korea keeps Dokdo. I only want the historical truth known.

Frogmouth (Steve Barber),

By the way, here is the response to the above November 14, 1952 letter I just posted above:

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
American Embassy, Pusan

December 4, 1952

Dear Ken:

Sorry to hear that your trip has again been postponed. However, we will very much look forward to seeing you early in the new year.

I mush appreciate your letter of November 14 in regard to the status of the Dokdo Island (Liancourt Rocks). The information you gave us had never been previously available to the Embassy. We had never heard of Deen Rusk’s letter to the Korean Ambassador in which the Department took a definite stand on this question. We of course knew of the ROK Government’s desire to have Article 2(a) of the Peace Treaty amended to include Dokdo and Parangdo and convoyed that request in a telegram to the Department at that time, along with other ROK suggestions for amendments to the draft treaty. We were subsequently made aware of the fact that Article 2(a) was not to be amended but had no inkling that that decision constituted a rejection of the Korean claim. Well, now we know and we are very glad to have the information as we have been operating on the basis of wrong assumption for a long time.

I am sending with a transmitting despatch, a copy of the note that we have just sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which includes as a final paragraph the wording suggested in the Department’s telegram no.365 of November 27 and which refers to Dean Rusk’s note to Ambassador Yang of August 10, 1951.

Sincerely yours,

E. Allan Lightner, Jr.

Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Escuire,
Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,
The Department of the State,
Washington25, D.C.