Yes, many S Koreans are dissatisfied about the billions of dollars sent to N Korea in what seems to be almost acts of mindless charity, but they also understand the value of good bribes that have reduced the tension along the 38th Parallel. If there is a real rub with many S Koreans, it is not so much that that money sent North has been “wasted,” but rather how they would rather have seen at least some of that money be better spent in the South.

Regardless, at the end of the day, most S Koreans wish continued rapprochement with Pyongyang and Pres. Lee will necessarily act not all that different than Pres. Roh. If there may be a departure, Lee will likely try to better coordinate his N Korean initiatives with the US and others. But the Americans should be aware after a half century’s experience, S Korean presidents tend to behave much more independently than how Washington may prefer So, I wonder if Eberstadt is being a bit delusional about Washington potentially missing a strategic opportunity. On the other hand, his summary of Bush’s Pyongyang foreign policy over the past 12 months is certainly on target.

Also, I agree with knickerbocker’s assessment of Howard French’s commentary. French should focus more on a subject that he understands, such as China. But I also agree with Koehler that French is an excellent photographer and worthy of anyone looking at his work via Marmot’s hot link.

How is GWB’s policy with the DPRK confrontational? I think the consensus is that Six Party Talks have engaged Pyongyang.

I’ll say this—the Howard French piece in the IHT was ridiculous. Bottom line: Under Roh’s watch, the DPRK detonated a nuclear device. THAT is the Roh legacy. End of story.