The fall issue of “Global Asia,” the English-language mag of the East Asia Foundation, will focus on the changing nature of US power in East Asia, reports the Korea Herald:
“There is a quiet, but growing unease across Asia about the conduct of America in this region,” say Chung-in Moon, the magazine’s editor in chief, and David Plot, managing editor. “From cabinet meetings to academic gatherings and even among the general public, attitudes toward American power and its role in Asia are being re-examined.”
They argue that while much of such soul-searching has been a reaction to the policies of U.S. President George W. Bush — especially those driven by neoconservatives — the roots go back to America’s long, often positive, sometimes ambivalent, engagement with the region.
The magazine’s opening salvo asks whether US power in East Asia is even relevant anymore:
In an opening article titled “The Purpose of American Power in Asia,” Clyde Prestowitz says that the purpose of American power in the Asia Pacific region was very clear after the World War II, but since 1992, things have changed drastically — to a point that “it is difficult to say that American power has had any particular purpose in the Asia-Pacific region.”
Pointing to a slew of historical developments, Prestowitz says, “America is blithely unaware that in the near future there may no longer be any point in thinking about the purpose of its power.”
There’s plenty more from where that came from.
I know I’ve said it ad nauseum on this blog, but I’ll say it again — I’m not sure if there’s any point in thinking about US power in East Asia. Is there a pressing need, for example, for US military power in East Asia? How does doing a job — at great expense in terms of treasure and US military resources — that South Korea and Japan are fully capable of doing themselves serve US interests?
In the magazine, Kishore Mahbubani pens a piece, “Wake up, Washington: the U.S. risks losing Asia.” He writes, “More Americans need to become aware of how America’s standing has been damaged by Washington’s tendency towards incompetence.” Obviously, I haven’t read the piece yet, but the title leads me to ask, even if the US risks “losing” Asia, what’s the point in “keeping” it? So we can continue protecting Japan and Korea from making real security policy decisions while enjoying the short end of said nations’ neo-mercantilist trade policies? Korea’s recent Afghan debacle made clear how much “benefit” the US reaps from its high-maintenance East Asian alliances — not much.
And at any rate, who are we going to “lose” Asia to? China? Didn’t we go through all this with Japan during the 1980s?
I have no doubt that Chung-in Moon sees a good deal of unease about US conduct in East Asia. He was, after all, an adviser to President Roh Moo-hyun. But things are quite complex, to say the least. Anti-Americanism, which reached a high-point in 2002, has been on the wane in South Korea, where the conservative and relatively pro-American opposition stand a very good chance of taking back Cheong Wa Dae. US relations with Japan, meanwhile, continue to grow closer.
In fact, if anything, it’s not the US that should be afraid of “losing Asia,” but rather Asia that should be afraid of losing America. Rather than warning the Americans about the incompetence of US leadership, perhaps it’s time for Asian leaders to begin explaining to Americans why, exactly, it’s in US interests to stay involved.
27 Comments
Robert, you’ve nailed it on the head. Why should we stay? South Korea is a balancer. They can balance this region just fine without our help.
Rob and Wedge…
Very easy answer to your main question of why the U.S. should stay in Asia. Asia’s purchase of U.S. treasury bills finances America’s inexhaustible appetite for debt.
We buy Chinese, Japanese and Korean manufactured goods (A LOT of Asian goods mind you as any trip to Best Buys, your local autodealer or Walmart will make painfully obvious…) and give them dollars. Those little Asians take A LOT of those dollars and buy T-bills. Actually, they buy more T-bills than they should because of they economic shocks they experienced in 1997. Anyway, the guys at the Fed breath a sigh of relieve after the Asians do this and now have enough money they can lend to the regional banks. And the regional banks now have the ability to lend money to Mr. Suburb resident so he can live a life style he can’t afford.
Globalization is a bitch, ain’t it?
After the Tsunami only one country had the ability to project the aid required, and it wasn’t China, even though that was a close regional power. There is no one to take our place, militarily or otherwise, so I don’t see us losing it any time soon.
Why is the U.S. in East Asia (and Europe, etc.)? Look at why we developed a blue sea navy in the 18th century – to protect our interests overseas. And there are other excellent reasons.
Firstly, if it’s true the US is we’re in Asia to fund our debt, then that right there is reason to get out — time to go on rehab.
But really, even if the US were to disengage, would Asian nations start dumping T-bills? Would it be in their interest to spark a recession in the United States?
http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/001390.html
http://www.marginalrevolution......a_of_.html
You’re right — globalization is a bitch, but it’s a bitch for everyone involved.
Thursday Greetings to Mr. Koehler and posters at The Marmot Hole. With regard to international security politics and global finance, I offer that the time must come when John Q. Public is globally perceived to have “maxed-out” his credit. Then interest rates across the board will begin to increase sharply prior to credit being unavailable altogether. Even at the initial stages of such a rate acceleration, the weeping and gnashing of teeth will be terrible. Domestic politics will be quite upended.
This superpower, so long as it remains one financially, will ever require blue-water naval power of the first rank, and the other elements of armed strength that go with it. Whether such power should forever be unreciprocally obligated to the interests of other countries is another matter. In the First World War, other powers had largely exhausted themselves testing their opposing interests before the USA decided that it had a dog in the fight. A generation later, similarly, China and Japan in Asia, and Germany and the USSR in Europe, were fully engaged against each other before American power came into the balance. If in the present day, could a somewhat more reticent USA back off and allow the naturally clashing interests of other major entities to take place and the blood and treasure of these others to be fully engaged before we decide what dog we have in such-and-such a fight, if any?
Robert, it may be ad nauseam to you but it needs to be said over and over. It’s insane for the US to continue “enabling” dysfunctionality on both sides of the DMZ because it just keeps “going on on going on” in Korea — for decade after endless decade.
If a “deadline” for getting out of Iraq is so important why aren’t we applying that criteria to Korea? We long ago achieved a foreign policy objective of true “democracy” for the ROK (in fact we thought we had done this when we left in 1949, but I think it’s now safe to say we have more than compensated for that mistake).
Just announce a five year plan for withdrawal so we can be “fair” and give the ROK plenty of “notice”, yadda yadda yadda. Then execute, execute, execute. Shut down the new base a-building that gives so many ROK’ers heartburn and announce “all our bases will soon be yours”. If the ROK wants, they can set aside some territory in the south for pre-positioned stocks of US equipment, that way we could just leave behind the current stocks of tanks, trucks and APC’s in storage and under US control for any future deployments. A skeleton “forward detachment” for 2nd ID can also stay behind.
Are we still doing formal unit-level advisory work for ROK Army? I think we stopped that long ago, yes? If so, good; in that case all we need to do is provide ROK President and his/her JCS with an emergency atomic fire support plan and a red telephone.
“Here’s our proposed tactical nuclear weapon fire support plan, based on where we think the NorK gun/rocket concentrations are located north of the DMZ; adjust as you think is needed, but we do need to know any of your proposed changes before the actual commencement of NorK fires.
Oh, also, here’s a fully equipped broadcast video studio; one non-negotiable condition for emergency US fire support is that your request for fires be satellite broadcast worldwide, to preclude any future ‘revisionism’ about just whose idea it was in the first place”.
I’ve said it before, perhaps also to the point of ad nauseam, but I’ll say it again — if you want the current state of affairs to go on for at least the next 4 to 8 years, Hillary’s your girl. If you want the current dysfunctionality to end, I think it’s going to take an “outsider” Republican like Giuliani or McCain, someone who is willing to re-examine the whole premise of the ROK-US alliance — in the same way that Rumsfeld was slowly beginning to realize was necessary.
Robert, did you mean “Wither” or “Whither”? Or the first, but with a pun on the second?
Jeffery Hodges
* * *
Of course he meant the second. I’m disappointed you had to ask; the pun cannot be savored with secret enjoyment (as it should be) if you force it out into the open, there to be contemplated with eye-blinking amazement by the anti-American “Korea chainsaw massacre” bunch here.
Bah, in two months or so, both Bush and Roh will be hopefully replaced by more competent leaders.
I’m sorry. I realize that I’ve ruined the joke, explained the humor, and jumped the shark.
I’ll slink away…
Jeffery Hodges
* * *
And one of the architects of the Sunshine Policy. His opinions as expressed in the article are consistent with his overall views.
No apologizing or slinking allowed! Americans do too much of that already (I’m assuming you are a fellow American, if not please accept my humble apologies for insulting you).
Paul H. Amen to #6, except I would can the residual 2 ID presence and pre-positioned stocks of anything except POL and munitions. (I.e., no end items). The U.S. government runs via a system of benign neglect. If it’s not looming large on the screen, why bother. (Ergo, Puerto Rico. Still with us after 100 years despite an ambivalent attitude towards U.S. citizenship and a federal outlay of upwards of $22 billion a year in welfare and other matching payments.) The bottom line is that overseas based land troops amount to “entangling alliances”. Since we don’t intend to lose them upon the outbreak of war (as happened in China and the Philippines in 1941-42), we expend an inordinate amoung of moneys on Force Protection and NEO measures. Withdrawal of all bases on this side of the internatonal dateline would allow us to plus up our naval and air power projection capabilities, thereby maintaining our interests in the region “from over the horizon”.
That’s not isolationism, it’s strategic common sense.
I’m not sure any of the rpesent politicos could change this. We need another George C. Marshall in the Defence Department, and no one of his caliber and vision has worn a uniform in a very long time.
WK: We buy Chinese, Japanese and Korean manufactured goods (A LOT of Asian goods mind you as any trip to Best Buys, your local autodealer or Walmart will make painfully obvious…) and give them dollars. Those little Asians take A LOT of those dollars and buy T-bills. Actually, they buy more T-bills than they should because of they economic shocks they experienced in 1997. Anyways, the guys at the Fed breath a sigh of relieve after the Asians do this and now have enough money they can lend to the regional banks. And the regional banks now have the ability to lend money to Mr. Suburb resident so he can live a life style he can’t afford.
They buy Treasuries because they need someplace* to put their money, not because they are grateful to us for maintaining a military presence there. Your thesis would seem to imply that China will stop buying Treasuries if we pull the Navy out of the Pacific. I’m sorry - that’s just not a very tenable thesis. They sell to us because we are the biggest market in the world, not because we are a superpower. The Korean thesis that we are extortionists stealing Asian goods is just whack-jobbery reflecting the Korean affinity with Chinese-style magical thinking - how does this explain the flow of cheap Asian goods to all and sundry? Do they sell these goods for more money to those countries?
* In case you missed this - US Treasuries comprise the deepest pool of debt securities in the world. This means the spreads are thin, i.e. entering and exiting trades don’t involve high transaction costs. Can’t do that with Japanese or UK government debt.
And besides, those “little Asians,” Japan, Korea, and China, have differing views on the US presence in the Pacific. Far from punishing us by dumping T-bills, the Chinese would be ecstatic if we left.
They do sell those goods to themselves for much more money than they charge Americans.
Readers of this blog should be encouraged to visit the East Asia Institute’s Global Asia website where the full journal may be downloaded. It’s free, perhaps because no one sensible should be expected to pay for it.
Ambassador Sung Chul Yang’s piece has a pull quote where he manages to throw in three buzzword-compliance references to Paul Kennedy, Chalmers Johnson, and Noam Chomsky in the space of about 40 words. Yuck.
Hubs and spokes, people. Does anyone think, like me, these alliances can be continued without the need for basing tens of thousands of troops, ergo those with Australia and Malaysia?
Why the US SHOULD stay in East Asia:
(1) If you complain about East Asian nations not listening to US gov’t dictates now, just wait ’til we pull troops out of Korea, et. al. (I assumed you include Japan and the Philippines, and other US forces splashed about all over East Asia).
And having influence through various foreign policy tracks political, economic, cultural, and yes, military) pushes the US’s interests forward.
(2) Asia is the future. The center of influence in the global both politically and econmically is fast shifting from the Atlantic nations toward the Pacific nations. Trade growth, incomes levels, political and diplomatic clout are all rising in East Asia. The 21st century is a Asia-Pacific century. If the US wants a future as a global power, it must now wield its diminishing power prudently .
Marmot’s thesis seems emotional to me. Is he saying the military track has little play in foreign relations in general nowadays, i.e. the military isn’t important to wield FP influence? IF we abandon our military alliances in Asia, does he expect the US to still retain influence in Asian security matters? After the debacle in Iraq, if we abanadon our allies in East Asia, what credibility we will have???
He compains that Korea and Japan dont listen to us, but his suggestions seem to proffer simply throwing his hands in the air and giving up.
(Qualifer: I do agree that SK duplicity on many issues, trade and alliance issues included, frustrate me as well.)
Having said that, however, I submit that the only responsible and cool-headed thing to do is to re-double US efforts to improve its standing in East Asia in the most efficacious way possible.
Firstly, it’s not emotional at all. It’s simply a rational call based on geopolitical realities. Our military alliances in East Asia were built for the Cold War, and unlike NATO, they’ve yet to find any real reason to outlive it. Now, at best, they’re a drain on US resources. At worst, they breed resentment and complacency in our so-called “allies” and hinder their development into allies that might actually be worth having.
I might also ask, why would we want to retain influence in Asian security matters? And even if we did, would it be worth the cost? And would said influence even be sustainable?
why does NATO even exist?
counter Russia.
USFK and USFJ?
counter China. China. The very reason why Korean War and Vietnam War resulted in mucho causualties. Meddling in neighbors to make them poor as shit.
Another perspective, U.S. interest in Asia is being shuffle around to match changing time. South Korea and Japan are developed countries, both with proper governance, economy and military forces. A U.S. security umbrella in that part of Asia seem moot.
Ties with India has never been closer and becoming increasingly so. S.E. Asia are on the same path as India in general toward the U.S. I doubt we’re going anywhere yet.
Time for another open posting?
Guys,
America’s continued engagement in the world will be a necessary thing and we cannot go back to a 30’s style isolationism. Not because its got choices mind you, but because America is too big, too vast and too important to be disengaged. Our size and economic value depends too much on stable energy supplies, whether it be the ethanol rich sugar cane fields of Brazil or oil fields of Saudi Arabia, and open economic markets.
The cheap labor of China has probably helped the U.S. keep inflation under control and has given the Fed wiggle room to keep interests rates under control. The free flow of goods from Asia has benefited the U.S. consumer tremendously. Minerals from Africa are essential in telecommunications, aerospace, defense and computer industrial applications. So on and so on. Thus, the world is a much smaller, complex and in a sense, more dangerous world then it was 50 or even 20 years ago. But, the U.S. has never depended on the rest of the world so much as before. As America was expanding and developing new states and finding new resources in the 19th century, it could afford to be isolationist. How much would the world be different if America stayed engaged after World War I and Wilson would have been able to moderate the concessions that the Allies imposed on Germany? It was the severity of those concessions that caused World War II.
America is a reluctant superpower, which is a good thing. It’s never a good idea to give power to those who crave it. However, being the most powerful country in the world, the biggest kid on the block, it’s got a responsibilty and a burden to the rest of the world. As Spidy’s uncle said, “With great power comes great responsibility.”
Besides, it’s in our best interest to stay involved. American’s withdraw from world affairs in 1919 essentially set the stage for WWII. America learned its lesson and stayed involved after WWII and sparred with the Soviets in the Cold War. The child of America’s victory in the Cold War is a world that’s never been smaller and closer at the same time. However, it has it’s own dangers and the work isn’t done yet. When the U.S. ignores problems in the rest of the world, the chickens often have the nasty habit of coming home to roost.
Friday Greetings to All. The debate on this thread “W(h)ither American Power in Asia is excellent; would that legislative deliberations at the highest level offer as much constructive back-and-forth.
To take matters further, I would suggest that the choice proposed previously of “1930s-style isolationism” or “continued engagement” apparently through the current melange of alliances and security obligations, is a false choice. As long as the USA is a populous, prosperous, and powerful nation, it must always have the means and will to make its weight felt in the service of its true interests. I submit that these interests are not well served by never allowing ourselves to leave a part of the world once the rationale for us having become engaged there is finished. NATO was very necessary in that the temporarily prostrate European powers were in no condition to stand up to the USSR of Joseph Stalin. Today, if those European powers have the will, they certainly can create the means to more than balance out Vladimir Putin’s resurgent Russia (such as it is) or any other threat on the horizon. Similarly, in east Asia there is no power prostrate and unable to effectively resist a theoretically predatory neighbor as was the case two generations ago. Therefore, the security alliances of two generations ago have been successful and have outlived their purposes. We should adjust our commitments accordingly. Being willing and able to make such adjustments on our own accord will leave us willing and able to make new commitments to counter new threats if and as they materialize. In most conceivable international security questions, we are naturally in a position to balance the conflicting ambitions of others, if only we remove ourselves from various outdated extended positions whereby diverse, naturally conflicting others (as Russians and Iranians) imagine that it is in their interests to coalesce against us. Is it possible that arguments of a couple of rocks in the Straits of Tsushima will disappear if Koreans and Japanese must become fully grown-up and self-responsible in the assessment of their interests?
We can never safely become disengaged from this world and retreat into a shell. Yet wise, sustainable engagement surely requires repeatedly recognizing and adapting to a profoundly changing world when and as the change occurs.
Instead of write up a ton more verbage, this article sums up my views perfectly…
http://commentisfree.guardian......ehind.html
Here is a direct paste for those interested…
The World Left the US Behind
By Tim Watkin, Guardian Unlimited
September 7, 2007 9:00 PM
As George Bush strolls into the leaders’ meeting at Apec, I half expect to see him rubbing his eyes in a somewhat sleepy, surprised manner, like a bear coming out of hibernation.
I’ve just been out of the US for a fortnight, and returning to the States this past week I can’t help but notice how cut-off and caught up in its own concerns this country is at the moment.
I keep thinking of Rip Van Winkle or the film While You Were Sleeping, where a character goes into a coma or long sleep and awakes to find the world a very different place. Except in this instance Bush is Van Winkle and the film title would be While You Were Iraqing.
This is Bush’s seventh Apec meeting, so you’d expect him to be a comfortable and dominant player. Yet there’s a sense everyone else has moved on, while he and his country are still stuck in the same place they’ve been for years.
The US is still very much a country at war, with so much of its focus is on its troops in the Middle East. As a measure of his priorities, Bush is actually leaving Apec early, returning to Washington to prepare for the Petraeus report.
There seems to be little oxygen left in the White House, and even in the mainstream national debate, for the issues on the agenda of the other Apec countries - climate change, free trade, and tariffs. Sure, they get mentioned here, but they’re not nearly as dominant on the political or news agenda.
Part of the problem is that the US media remains guilt-stricken about its mistakes before the invasion of Iraq - its failure to question the spurious WMD evidence, Rumsfeld’s strategies and the overall rationale for war.
As some kind of penance they now seem to cover little else. The odd natural disaster aside, the only other issue getting any widespread play is the 2008 presidential election. The Sunday TV morning talk shows have given up debating current policy and just debate the campaign ad nauseum.
ABC World News on Tuesday evening was a classic example of this blinkered view - it led with reflective stories on Iraq and how the presidential candidates are expected to deal with the crammed primaries early next year. Neither story had any news element - it was as if they were just the only stories anyone could think to cover.
In the past four years, America has taken its eye off the Pacific and China’s growing influence to the extent that Bush this week has had to publicly deny that Apec has become a China summit.
While Bush spent US political capital in Iraq, China, India and Russia all regained status as leading nations in their own right, and others such as Brazil are staking their claim for a seat at the big table for the first time.
While Bush hesitated, most western countries accepted that humans had a role in causing climate change and must play a part in addressing it. And now as Bush enters his lame duck days, Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy are launching new programmes in Europe.
In the major world events of the moment - say North Korean negotiations or the Middle East peace process - America is either just one player among many or its influence is failing. The changing tone was there for all to see at Friday’s US-South Korea leaders’ press conference. Close ally President Roh Moo-hyun was willing to press, even embarrass, Bush in public. In previous years, with previous Presidents, he wouldn’t have dared. These days, though, the US doesn’t carry the same clout or demand the same respect.
The polite analysis is that Iraq has put the US in a reflective mood, reappraising its own assumptions about itself. Less politely, you could say it’s getting horribly out of touch and behind the times.
The world is moving on without America. There’s a sense that the smaller countries in Apec feel more able to disagree openly with the US and treat its president as an equal in a way they wouldn’t have in 2000.
The Financial Times’ Martin Wolf wrote in Foreign Policy magazine earlier this year (subscription required): “Delusions of an invincible superpower have perished in the sands of Mesopotamia … The United States will long remain the world’s greatest economic, military, technological, and cultural power. But its position will be one of leadership, rather than unchallenged domination.”
Wolf is undoubtedly correct that any hope of domination - in the manner of the neocons and their American century - has been nipped in the bud by America’s hubris and foreign policy failures. He’s right that its power in economics, technology and the rest remains ahead of any other country.
But I wonder whether you could go further now and say its position of leadership is slipping. If you look at the issues being debated at Apec, America is not at the forefront of world debate on any of them, except terror and security.
There’s a fear you hear expressed these days by analysts and political commentators around the world that America under the next president will turn isolationist, focusing inward on domestic issues, protecting its own markets and workforce, and shirking from a more Roosevelt- or Marshall-like role of enlightened world leadership.
My impression arriving back in the US is that it already is isolated. That may be a good thing. When the characters in those stories were in a coma, the world carried on without them and even benefited from their absence in some ways.
But back to its best America still has a vital role to play in the world, beyond its obsession with Iraq and terrorism. The question is whether it can earn back its place and the respect of others.