In the Asahi Shimbun, Hiroki Fukuda reflects on Korea and the First Sino-Japanese War.
I don’t particular agree with all of it, especially some of the cherry-picked quotes (”Japan is a country that “fortifies its internal unity by stressing the threat from its surrounding nations,” “To date, Japan has never come up with a slogan that will win the empathy of its Asian neighbors, nor has it indicated values that are common to all Asians,” etc.), but the article nevertheless makes for an interesting read.
(HT to reader)


17 Comments
Not so sure I agree with the attack on the palace and it taking and the subsequent firefight taking three hours. As I recall it was much shorter and even though the Korean soldiers put up some fight - they realized they were outmatched.
Should have read:
Not so sure I agree with the attack on the palace and the subsequent firefight taking three hours. As I recall it was much shorter and even though the Korean soldiers put up some fight - they realized they were outmatched.
One could easily substitute “Korea” for “Japan” in that quote.
Exactly. Like China and the two Koreas don’t do the exact same thing.
“The path Japan has taken since the end of the Sino-Japanese War and observed that Japan is a country that “fortifies its internal unity by stressing the threat from its surrounding nations.” ”
That is simply wrong. Korea and China was never a threat for Japan. The threat was always “what happens when Korea and China becomes a colony of the western power”.
In other words, Russia and America was the imagined direct threat for Modern Japan.
I believe this whole belief of “the existence of Korea must be a threat to the Japanese, therefore they attacked us and colonized us (and they are still lingering for it)” is wishful thinking.
What slogan would that be exactly?
“It’s all our fault and North Korea, South Korea, and China tied at #1 at everything!”
tomojiro is absolutely right.
Then why did Hideyoshi invade? The first European colony wasn’t established until almost three centuries after the Imjin Wars.
“Then why did Hideyoshi invade? The first European colony wasn’t established until almost three centuries after the Imjin Wars.”
Imjin war was after Columbus and the colonization of the new continent.
Hideyoshi definitely didn’t invaded Korea because he thought Korea or China was a threat, on the contrary, he invaded Korea to conquer China.
Some state that actually his intention was to conquer Europe (!!) after conquering China.
It is said that his ambition arose after some catholic missionary showed him the world map by bragging how far both the Spanish and Portuguese have conquered.
OK, “never” was mabye a too strong word. If you go back until the mongol invasion, you could say that at that time “China (and Korea)” was a threat.
Sorry, for some reason I couldn’t logg in and I had to register again, so “tomojiro” and “tomojiro54″ are the same person.
Yes, indeed. One could argue that Japan used Western colonization and Qing domination of Korea as a pretext for annexing Korea. History is loaded with examples of regimes manufacturing or exaggerating threats as a cover for aggression.
Japan undoubtedly saw the European powers as a threat, and Russia’s gains of territory at China’s expense, by which the latter gained a common border with Korea, could hardly have eased their fears. That said, I doubt that the U.S. was yet on their screen. In 1894-95, the U.S. military still lagged behind the developing Japanese. As for the Imjin Wars, I accept Stephen Turnbull’s thesis that Hideyoshi’s intent was to conquer Japan and India. (”Samurai Invasion”) Though the Shogun was not quite sure where India lay. It is interesting to note that, whatever Korea’s problems were in those days, life under the Choeson dynasty was at least a rule of law. In the final analysis, what horrified the Koreans during the Imjin Wars was that they were being treated exactly as … non-Samurai Japanese.
Hi Lirelou
I agree that the Japanese didn’t thought that America was a real threat in 1894 to1895.
But that changed after 1905. With the rise of yellow peril in America, and with the weakening of the British-Japanese Alliance, some Japanese began to consider America as a potential threat as a rival about interests in the Pacific and south east Asia.
And some minor correction. Hideyoshi never acquired the title of “Shogun”. He couldn’t.
And in this era, the cast between samurais and non-samurais was not established. Social mobility was more fluid. That was established with the beginning of the Edo-era, beginning in 1600, with the adoption of quasi neo-confucian social orders (via Korea).
”And in this era, the cast between samurais and non-samurais was not established. Social mobility was more fluid. That was established with the beginning of the Edo-era, beginning in 1600, with the adoption of quasi neo-confucian social orders (via Korea).”
Interesting. I wonder how more fluid. And all the way to samurai? Certainly, Hideyoshi was not a member of this class, hence he could not be shogun.
#13: Tomojiro “I agree that the Japanese didn’t thought that America was a real threat in 1894 to 1895.
But that changed after 1905. With the rise of yellow peril in America, and with the weakening of the British-Japanese Alliance, some Japanese began to consider America as a potential threat as a rival about interests in the Pacific and south east Asia…”
Well, I suppose that’s true, but at any one time it’s probably safe to say that “some Japanese” considered every non-Japanese country as a “potential threast”.
Probably significant numbers of influential Japanese didn’t really begin to see the US as a military threat until the 1920’s, due to
1) the British empire’s decision to allow the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1903 to formally expire without renewal (after it’s 20 year time period expired; Japanese were not pleased about this);
2) The inferior position Japanese diplomats accepted vs a vs the US and the BE in capital ship ratios at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 (this really irked Japanese miltary, even though US agreed not to fortify its coastal defenses in the Phillippines);
3) The rise in the importance of a ready access to a source of oil (for powering warships, as opposed to coal) after WWI.
None of these things was a major factor in US-Japanese relations prior to WWI.
“Well, I suppose that’s true, but at any one time it’s probably safe to say that “some Japanese” considered every non-Japanese country as a “potential threast”. “
Well, as I wrote before the Japanese never thought Korea or China as a direct threat in modern history. Not until after 1945.
“Probably significant numbers of influential Japanese didn’t really begin to see the US as a military threat until the 1920’s,”
Interestingly, that seems not to be true. Already shortly after the Russo-Japanese war, it seems BOTH, Japan and the USA began to consider each other as potential enemies.
Do you know about the “Great White Fleet” dispatched by Roosevelt in 1907?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_White_Fleet
http://www.greatwhitefleet.info/history6.html
After that apparently many Japanese, especially the IJN saw America as a potential future enemy.
The Washington naval conference seems not to be the beginning of this hostility but rather oil which was thrown in to the fire.
#12: “That said, I doubt that the U.S. was yet on their screen. In 1894-95, the U.S. military still lagged behind the developing Japanese.”
Ever hear of the black ships of Commodore Perry, the squadron of ships whose presence caused the shogun to enbrown his kimono? Those ships who triggered the complete re-ordering of Japanese society? I ‘m going to go out on a limb and say the U.S. was on their screen.