I also heard repeatedly that Wickham and Chun absolutely did not see eye-to-eye, as Wickham was pissed at Chun for commandeering CP Tango for use in the 12-12 coup. Rumor has it that after that they never met or spoke face-to-face.

The first clause of the first sentence is correct. But while Wickham undoubtedly was angry about the perpetrators of the coup commandeering CP Tango, the roots of his disapproval of Chun and gang run very much deeper in the seam of principle. This is clear from his book, in which he recounts some of his admonitions to Chun about various matters, including Kwangju, in the various face-to-face meetings they had commencing in February 1980 when, with Ambassador Gleysteen’s concurrence, he finally agreed to meet Chun after deliberately cold-shouldering him in the immediate aftermath of the coup. This was the first of many meetings thereafter stemming from what Wickham describes as a mutual desire to have regular contact; (in an unusual display of diplo-speak, Wickham also says his discussion was “frank and cordial” - I guess he means the kind of “cordiality” that accompanies “frank” discusssions with someone with whom you have serious disagreements.) He met with him in March too, and then again on May 13th, just before leaving for the trip to the States that had Wickham out of Korea when 5/18 occured - when according to the prevailing Korean folklore he was actively abetting or neglecting his duty to prevent the use of the Korean military to put down the protestors. In retropect, the most interestingly provocative aspect of Wickham’s report of his meeting with Chun on May 13th was his account of Chun’s Baduk-like rant about the infiltration of the colleges by communists and his claim that the North was orchestrating an incident that would topple ROKGOV and, in Chun’s words, provide “the decisive moment that North Korea has waited patiently for since the armistice in 1953″ - much as the death of a student in 1960 sparked the movement that led to the fall of the Rhee regime. As reported by both Wickham and Gleysteen, because of the absence of any corroborating intelligence generated by US and Japanese sources and, at least in Wickham’s case, a preoccupation with his duties as military commander and preparations for his trip to the US for consultations about the the military situation vis-a-vis the NORKS, neither Wickham or Gleysteen seemed to have given Chun’s remarks any particular credence or significance. I don’t mean to suggest that they are grist for the conspiracy theorists who claim that Chun & Co. themselves deliberately provoked and stoked the demos to justify a crackdown under cover of anti-communism in order to cow the bulk of the Korean population into acquiescing to their rule, knowing they could not otherwise gain legitimacy. But perhaps if their antennae had been a bit more finely-tuned, they later would not have been so shocked at the incipient Chun regime’s later conduct. Hindsight, naturally is 20/20, though, so that’s not meant as a criticism, particularly as (considering the constraints imposed by respect for Korean sovereignity) it’s not likely to have enabled them to take any action other than what they did - except perhaps better to have avoided the Chun regime’s efforts to ensnare the US in its efforts to suggest that its conduct was condoned by the US.

At least this might be better balanced than some of the ‘underground’ propaganda I used to see in 1989-90, when it seemed that the first wave of ‘facts’ about Kwangju were emerging. I saw one ‘documentary’ featuring clips of Kingston (2ID commander at the time) “Sealing Kwangju’s fate” by allowing 20th ROKID to leave the area for Jeolla-do (he had no authority over that unit).

As for Chun sending in the ROKSF, these units were his original military constituency, and ostensibly the most loyal to him. But I seem to recall learning years later that the ROKSWC commander at the time (a 3-star) was relieved of duty when he dissented over deploying SF to Kwangju.

I also heard repeatedly that Wickham and Chun absolutely did not see eye-to-eye, as Wickham was pissed at Chun for commandeering CP Tango for use in the 12-12 coup. Rumor has it that after that they never met or spoke face-to-face.

A couple years later the Filipino Senate voted the US out and we closed up our bases and left. Haven’t gone back and traced the internal Filipino political debate but the connection seems obvious.

I didn’t think our withdrawal was a good thing at the time, but in retrospect I think the Filipinos did both themselves and us a favor.

67 years after the end of WWII, and going on 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, we shouldn’t be all sprawled out with massive permanent US military presences in the homelands of our “allies”. Any US military presence in the Philipines currently is austere, of limited duration, and specific-mission oriented. And it’s abundantly clear to one and all that we are there at the specific invitation of a freely elected government and that we can go just as quickly as we came.

We (the US) ought to implement that same model for any future US miltary presence in the ROK. Annual “Team Spirit” type exercises for US Army & Air Force units, for a month or so each year, ought to suffice; the rest of the time the two Koreas can occupy themselves with either embracing each other or eyeing each other warily, depending upon which version of “reality” Koreans finally decide to adopt as their world outlook.

“Absence makes the heart grow fonder.” Or not; either way, all 3 actors (US, ROK, DPRK) would be better off with a little application of “mox nix” on the US’s part.

민주화 운동을 한다면서 교도소는 무슨 이유로 그토록 점거 개방하려고 필사적이었는지 알다가도 모를 일이다. Why were those “pro-democracy” people so eager to raid the prison and to release common criminals? (Who were leading this mob?)

지난 91년 3월 4일 북한 평양방송은 “[광주 5•18 항쟁] 부상자인 윤기권(29세. 전남 광주 두암동)이 위대한 수령님과 참조국을 찾아 의거 월북해왔다.…”고 첫 방송을 내보냈다. Yun who participate in the Uprising has defected to North Korea. What does this tell you about the nature of the Uprising?

한편 최근에는 또 한가지 희한한 일이 벌어지고 있다. 얼마 전에 질병으로 죽은 전라남도의 공산주의 원로 尹寄南(윤기남 미전향 좌익수 1925년 전남 해남 출생. 46년 남로당 입당, 순천, 장흥, 보성군당 위원장. 6 25전후시기 보성유격대 사령관 역임. 체포 국가보안법 위반으로 15년 징역형, 출소후 70년대 초 호남지역 ‘통혁당’재건 공작 참가. 재차 체포되어 2년 징역형. 73년 6월 미전향으로 출옥)을 이른바 국민연합과 ‘남총련’에서 광주 망월동 묘지에 묻었다. A known Communist is buried in the National Cemetary as a Kwangju Uprising victim.
http://altair.chonnam.ac.kr/~c....._4218.html

http://www.defence.co.kr/bbs/b.....;num=17261

http://cafe.joins.com/cafe/Caf....._id=332102

More facts about Kwangju will come out in the next administration.

More stories about Kwangju will come out. Things that were suppressed about the incident.

And, you were right about Chun’s election. It was not a proper election at all. However, you must admit the next election, president Noh, was a popular election. And, people voted for Chun’s lieutenant. What does it tell you about the people’s sentiment about Chun and Kwangju uprising?

Korean people wanted stability. A nation that is anti-Communism and prospering under capitalist system and under the US military presence.

The present government is neither anti-Communist nor pro-American. In the pretext of gaining the wartime command, it is in fact demanding the US to leave Korea. Who are they helping? KJI, that is who! The next election will boot these Commies out of the government.

The basic source of controversy about the U.S. role in Kwangju was the widespread public assumption that General Wickham in his capacity as head of the Combined Forces Command must have known about the deployment of Korean army troops in the Kwangju region and approved their role. In fact, none of the Korean forces involved in the mayhem on May 18-21 were under Wickham’s operational control. Nor did he or I have any knowledge of what those forces would be ordered to do.

(I keed! I keed!)