Then you have sugar. Somehow, sugar beet farmers in the U.S. have amassed a huge amount of political clout. This has kept tariffs high on imported sugar. Who gets hurt by that? Well, how about candy makers? But guess what, Canada has no sugar tariff, so it makes sense to move your American factories to Canada, where they can enjoy much cheaper inputs, then sell such tariff-free candy back to the U.S. Result: Rich Beet Farmers 1, American Public 0.

That’s not quite correct.

1) It’s not the sugar beet growers, it’s the sugar _cane_ growers, many of whom are politically-connected Cuban emigres. Not only do they benefit from subsidies, high prices, they achieve their goal of denying U.S. sugar users from purchasing Cuban sugar.

Just google “Fanjul” to see what I’m talking about.

2) You are completely wrong about American candy makers moving to Canada and importing candy into the U.S. Just look at the ingredient label of any sweet, candy bar, or cola sold in the U.S. 99% will contain no sugar — they’re all sweetened with high fructose corn syrup. Disgusting. It’s been a boon for the corn producers, though.

Proofs: (1)rice was off the table. Korea has 700,000 citizens with non-transferable job skills in this industry. But they’re all over 50, so the problem will eventually resolve itself. (2) the 25% tariffs on pickup trucks remain - the last source of jobs for America’s anemic auto sector. (3)Beef allowed to open gradually - where Korea has fewer workers, but the timeline for tariff reduction fits those workers’ life expectancy.(4) consumer goods - the area where both sides, but especially Korea, have the most to gain, were opened up. I’m sure there’s more, but I haven’t done my homework.

Whether this deal passes in America or not will be a matter of individual Representatives calculating the impact on employment in their respective districts. Whatever they say to the press, this will be their only consideration.

Regarding education, it’s not the hakwon owners that make up the domestic lobby, it’s the teacher’s union. Consider: Korea tops the OECD 30 in TOTAL education spending, but ranks second last, ahead of Turkey, in government spending on education (per capita basis). What does this mean economically? It means that the bulk of money spent on education is spent in a ‘free market’, where parents can choose among hakwons, private tutors, online courses. It is natural that the best teachers will be attracted to this market. Here they will make money, bad teachers won’t, and will withdraw from the market. Let the pot stew for 30 years, and there will a steady accumulation of untalented teachers in the public sector (the teacher’s union), and talented teachers in the market system. You must realize that the union is aware its members would never make it on the market - they’re just not good enough. They fight like hell against even the most basic government proposals to allow occasional classroom monitoring. They will, figuratively speaking, set themselves on fire before they will consent to market opening, or even any objective evaluation of their performance.

No, I’m not a fan of Babar.

Let’s look at a couple of cases. Bush decides it’s a good idea to protect steel jobs in Pennsylvania and slaps a tariff on steel from elsewhere, including real allies like the UK. Yes, the Keystone State keeps jobs otherwise lost, but more jobs are lost in the auto industry, which relies on steel big time. Also, steel companies in the U.S. are given a breather from having to innovate and/or consolidate, thereby putting off the enhancement of their own competitiveness.

Then you have sugar. Somehow, sugar beet farmers in the U.S. have amassed a huge amount of political clout. This has kept tariffs high on imported sugar. Who gets hurt by that? Well, how about candy makers? But guess what, Canada has no sugar tariff, so it makes sense to move your American factories to Canada, where they can enjoy much cheaper inputs, then sell such tariff-free candy back to the U.S. Result: Rich Beet Farmers 1, American Public 0.

Nevertheless, I don’t think this will make much of a change in the short term for the simple fact that this agreement will never contain all of the specific legal legal language necessary to make both sides accountable and willing to enforce it of each’s own accord.

I’d like to see this ratified, if only because open markets in your home country are better than closed regardless of what the rest of the world does. The FTA may be incremental and misnamed as “free,” but it goes in the right direction.

That is the argument quite persuasively made by Tim Harford in his book, “The Undercover Economist”.

open markets in your home country are better than closed regardless of what the rest of the world does

Wedge, if you think about that for a moment, you’ll realize it’s preposterous.

Since, as I think you’ll agree, we are not talking about free trade but managed trade here, the question comes down to whether it is advantageous to the US to countenance continuing to subsidize Korean producers (and US consumers) at the expense of US producers who are prevented from realizing the benefits of their comparative advantages until, possibly, such time as Korean producers have succeeded in eroding such advantages. One might, for other policy reasons, want to coddle a Korea, especially where allowing US firms to enjoy a competitive advantage in an utterly uncompetitive environment, i.e., one where the locals can’t compete, might slacken their zeal for innovation, but once those extra-economic policy considerations no longer apply (as I would argue is the case with Korea nowadays), it’s folly and economically inefficient (let alone grossly unfair to all but the most competitive firms in the most competitive US industries) for the US to keep leaving the tit out there for Korea Inc to feed.

I’d like to see this ratified, if only because open markets in your home country are better than closed regardless of what the rest of the world does. The FTA may be incremental and misnamed as “free,” but it goes in the right direction.

It’s telling that Roh was disappointed education and medical services weren’t on the USTR’s agenda. It’s much easier for a Korean politician to be seen as “forced” to open up under outside pressure than to actually fight against entrenched local interests (hagwon owners, hospitals) to pass legislation beneficial to the nation.