One of the most ardent advocates of confronting North Korea in its nuclear proliferation — Robert Joseph — is leaving his post in the Bush administration.
Mr. Joseph favored pressing North Korea economically, through its banking interests, as Mr. Joseph observed in the New York Times:
Mr. Joseph has declined to talk publicly about why he left, but he told colleagues that he thought the deal would prolong the survival of a North Korean government he has publicly called “criminal” and “morally abhorrent” while failing to require it to give up the weapons it has already produced. In an interview, Mr. Joseph made clear that he “does not support the policy” that President Bush has now embraced.
“The approach I would have endorsed was to continue to put pressure on the regime,” Mr. Joseph added.
The Times also discussed Mr. Joseph’s reasons for advocating the seizure of North Korean funds — especially those generated from criminal activities :
Last fall, he (Joseph) argued vociferously against ending the action to seize illicit North Korean funds in order to get to a broader arms agreement. When he was overruled, he left the administration. “Pressure is essential,” Mr. Joseph said, “if diplomacy is to have any chance of success.”
Only through hindsight will we see if Mr. Joseph was guilty of faulty forecasting in his understanding of how to deal with North Korea.
{ 15 comments… read them below or add one }
I don’t believe “Long” is part of his name. Should be just “Robert Joseph.”
Good for Joseph for refusing to ride on the S.S. Appeasement. I suspect he’ll come around and eventually go public a la Bolton. At least there a few who choose to maintain their credibility rather than genuflecting at the altar of George.
If only he were the rule rather than the exception.
I think this is a not-seeing-the-forest-for-the-trees moment, again.
With intel under fire and the administration continually taking hits for not “engaging,” this agreement, which costs relatively little, gives the U.S. the chance to take the moral high ground as far as perceptions go (already there when using facts over emotion). When these talks unravel, domestic opponents to strangulation will look silly if they try to oppose such a policy, as North Korea will be the unambiguous reason for failure. Too bad Mr. Joseph judged this prematurely and unfairly.
Sometimes you need to take one step back (or appear to) in order to take two forward.
(More cliché’s apply, but that’s enough for now.)
Actually, the rule among conservatives in Congress, think tanks etc is to oppose or criticize this deal and wait for it to unravel. I’m not sensing the kind of support that ihbb is alluding to here and on various sites.
Part of the problem with the “The Times also discussed Mr. Long’s reasons for advocating the seizure of North Korean funds — especially those generated from criminal activities” was that the seizure of North Korean funds has not really been that well achieved.
North Korean diplomats have crossed into Mongolia with briefcases full of greenbacks … real ones or the Mongolian banks would not accept them. No funds have been seized there
At the same time, at least one bank in Macau closed when the US pressured the seizure of 25 million only to find out recently that all those funds were legitimate. That doesn’t help that bank now.
So that policy really has not been all that effective.
Unfortunately, Those running the State Department now are the kind who would still oppose strangulation even when this unfolding failure reaches its natural conclusion. Last month, one of the members of Congress asked Hill what would happen if the North Koreans don’t perform as agreed. His answer: we’ll deliver less fuel oil, … oh, and China will disapprove.
One could say that Hill was just being diplomatic, although I don’t see why a carefully worded discussion of consequences would do any harm. I think we can agree on more robust definitions of “strangulation” and “pressure” than merely reducing one’s extortion payments. For example,
* We never applied PATRIOT 311 or Exec. Order 13,382 to Kaesong or Kumgang, though both projects are most likely used to fund North Korea’s nuclear programs. Nor did they apply it to North Korea itself, though they could have. Any one of those measures would have thrown the palace economy into chaos overnight. Would some South Koreans have been displeased? Yes, but when we’re subsidizing Korea’s defense, we also have a right to be displeased that South Korea is effectively forking over our tax money to Kim Jong Il.
* We never strongly enforced the Proliferation Security Initiative, seeking the sort of confrontation that Joseph engineered with Libya, and to such productive effect. Just contrast that to how we handled the So San incident.
* We never challenged the regime’s political legitimacy through refugee policy, radio broadcasting, or full implementation of the NK Human Rights Act, even though these measures had unaminous and bipartisan backing in Congress. State’s failure to follow the NKHRA was arguably in defiance of federal law.
* We never used our bully pulpit to engage in a serious discussion of places like Camp 22. Bush’s meetings with Kang Chol Hwan and Sakie Yokota now seem rather cynical in retrospect. Contrast them to how Reagan was simultaneously able to challenge the Soviet system and negotiate with it. Reagan lacked Bush’s stunned timidity in reacting to his critics. He had the confidence and the articulate capacity to assert his views. As a result, he could negotiate from a position of strength.
* We never challenged North Korea’s diversion of food aid or pressed China to change its refugee policy. Now, our own Shenyang Consulate is pretty much behaving like South Korea’s, and again, it’s probably violating the law by doing so.
* Jay Lefkowitz testified in Congress last month, and the Korean press hardly cared. Even they know he doesn’t really speak for the Administration anymore.
I agree that there are cosmetic benefits to holding the high ground if you plan to back it up with decisive action. The problem is that one would logically claim said high ground in the first two years of one’s Administration and pursue the decisive policy in the time remaining, with the capital thus earned. All these missed opportunities really just speak of a policy that’s indecisive and rudderless.
I concede that I can’t be sure what Hill, Burns, and Rice are really thinking. You could be right, and I could be wrong. We can only interpret the facts we know. If you’re right about this, it would be a good way for the Administration to reconsolidate its position with a new Congress. It’s far more likely that a combination of events — that is, North Korea’s behavior, intense pressure from conservatives, and the Dems’ increasing factional paralysis — will force a scenario like the one you describe. But I’d wager that the response will again be reactive and indecisive, with the principal goal being to buy time.
For all of the criticism from the hard left, which would of course hate this Administration pretty much regardless, Bush has never been strong or consistent in pressuring Kim Jong Il. It’s all been talk. The only significant act anyone in this entire Administration took to really pressure the North Koreans was done by an Undersecretary in the Treasury Department in 2005. State obviously wishes even that had never happened. I can’t believe that’s about to change now.
….”when the US pressured the seizure of 25 million only to find out recently that all those funds were legitimate”
This is not accurate. Most of the funds were illegitimate and China still seems unwilling to handle the transfer of “dirty money” that is holding up the talks.
I disagree with your assessment slim. There has been some scattered criticism from the right, but it’s all been very mild, wait-and-see type stuff. A stark difference from the fire and brimstone that followed the 94 version of the same agreement. I can imagine what the reaction would have been like if a President Kerry or Gore had struck this exact same deal, and we would still be cleaning the blood off the walls.
Wonder how many veins in Dick Cheney’s neck exploded when he found out that holding the moral high ground now includes guaranteeing the survival of a mass-murdering dictator and founding member of the Axis of Evil, with a full arsenal of WMD’s no less. Who knew that defeating evil included feeding it life support?
Sadaam Hussein must be kicking his dead cat thinking that all he had to do was appeal to Bush to take the moral high ground and fret about perceptions in order to get a sweetheart gift basket and avoid being invaded. Oh wait….many other countries did make that appeal and conservatives laughed it off as appeasement. How quickly things change when you’re responsible for justifying crap policy.
And since when did conservatives give a rat’s ass about anyone’s perception anyway? Wasn’t the entire run-up to the Iraq war just one long “fuck you” to anyone that even mentioned the perceptions of the international community in relation to US policy? Now all of a sudden, getting a pat on the head from the rest of the world is cited as justification? Funny that.
Who cares about domestic opponents? They have no influence on the strangulation policy anyway since American pressure alone is like trying to strangle someone with your pinky. Strangulation requires the cooperation of China, Japan, and South Korea, of which only Japan is a reliable ally in enforcing that policy.
I’ve heard the theory elsewhere that this deal is a setup for failure, and that the ultimate goal is for it to collapse, thereby giving the US the upper hand and proving to our allies once and for all that North Korea cannot be trusted and must be strangled.
And it’s a fucking ridiculous theory that shows absolutely no understanding of South Korea and China. Even if the deal does fail and North Korea predicatably reneges, that fact would not further the argument for strangulation. In reality it will have the opposite effect. Because every time you give North Korea an opportunity to prove their trustworthiness, it is another opportunity for South Korea and China to cite as evidence that North Korea should be given another chance. It’s a vicious circle that only refusing to sit down with them in the first place will end.
Just like with previous agreements, NK complies just enough to get what it wants, but not enough to give up anything of value permanently. SK and China point to the part of the agreement that NK did comply with, and ignore the violations. Partial compliance is evidence of potential full compliance NEXT TIME. Always next time.
That’s why entering into ANY agreement with North Korea is pure stupidity. It gives them legitimacy, even if they renege. And anyone that actually believes that SK and China will EVER turn their backs on NK and embrace strangulation over endless bullshit bribes/agreements, is an ignorant fool.
And sometimes when you take one step back, the momentum leads to two more steps back.
Slim was right on the mark; many conservatives and Republicans, including think tanks, dislike and have criticized the deal publicly. There has been widespread skepticism on the Right from the start, mostly based on an incorrect interpretation of what the deal actually encompasses, IMO.
“Domestic” refers to Democratic opposition to a hardline approach to North Korea, especially those that blame Bush for the Oct 2002 break and tout “diplomacy” and “engagement.” With a Democratic congress leaning toward such utopian policies, it’s necessary to demonstrate this in order to gain political capital for strangulation. That should be clear to most following/understanding the issue.
With potential U.S. hold on banking tighter than ever, and Japan cutting off both remissions and trade, North Korea is hurting. The U.S. has a couple of levers to apply both China (trade) and South Korea (USFK issues) as well. Above Joshua mentions a number of areas that have not been acted upon but could be. Things have changed significantly since Jul and Oct 2006.
And yet that theory is what’s happening. Again, after 04 July and 09 Oct, perceptions changed in South Korea a good bit, and Roh is on the way out. China has grown increasingly impatient with North Korea, as evidenced by the delay in funds transfer, among other things.
We all think North Korea will renege; which is why this deal doesn’t give them what they want until they comply. The stages yet to be negotiation are sure to do the same thing. If the current banking snag doesn’t tank the talks, I’m guessing U.S. pressure on admitting to the HEU program will; but it’s clearly called for in the deal, and not declaring will clearly put North Korea in breach.
Democrats are all too aware of their well-deserved reputation for being weak on defense (and the current situation is Clinton’s legacy, since he swept it under the rug rather than deal with it in the late 1990s when he was told of the HEU program), which may even lead them to propose taking up some of the strangulation techniques available.
When the deal breaks, the Bush admin the chance to act; we’ll see if they do.
Wow, you’re approaching baduk-like levels of insanity. Yes, North Korea is hurting. Just like they have been for the last 20 years. Woop de doo. Right on the edge of collapse. Just where they’ve been the last 20 years. Adding your name to the list of observers who continually underestimate NK and their ability to deal with the hurt hardly gives you any credibility.
So Bolton, Joseph, and others are just too stupid to understand the deal? That’s your argument for writing them off? If only you could have 10 minutes with them to explain the “real” deal to them, then they’d suddenly reverse course and support it, right? Funny how only you seem to have the “correct” understanding of the deal, and two guys that would seem to have relatively good reading comprehension skills and experience in North Korean issues, just don’t get it. Amazing that you’re not running the East Asian bureau of the State Department given your unique ability to understand an agreement that no one else can seem to grasp.
Or maybe you’re reading through Bush-tinted glasses, and the critics choose not to delude themselves.
Leverage on China through trade? Never going to happen. We’re far too heavily invested in Chinese manufacturing for that to occur. More fantasy. And you think a “delay” in transferring funds is a sign of China going hardline? Uh right, kinda like the “delays” in aid from SK after the nuke test were a sign of SK taking a hard line. Oh no! Don’t make us wait a week! What will we do?
Leverage on SK through USFK issues? Already played that card, and they responded by shoveling more cash to NK not only through Kaesong, but by announcing direct payments in addition.
You really think a new president is going to abandon Kaesong, Hyundai tourism projects, and all the other bribes-in-sheeps-clothing that SK has spend the last decade investing in and developing? You’re high. I seem to remember a load of experts predicting SK would pull the plug on NK aid if a nuke test occurred. Wrong again. And you think another broken agreement in a long line of them is going to be the straw that broke the Sunshines back? High. Really, fucking high.
SK and China are both moving further and further away from strangulation, and you think they’re getting closer? Both told NK there would be severe consequences if they tested a nuke. NK called their bluff, and they were right. The money and oil kept flowing.
Thanks for throwing in your requisite “IT’S ALL WILLIE’S FAULT!” comment there at the end. It just wouldn’t be a Richardson post without it. Here I thought that was Bush’s signature on the North Korean Capitulation Agreement of 07′, but it turns out it was all engineered by Clinton. Bubba had no idea he was even the architect.
I am personally going to see what goes on over the next couple of months before deciding on this one.
If this turns out to be just Agreed Framework II, I will be just as pissed as Joseph and Bolton. If, on the other hand, this is one of those “Nixon in China” things that actually gets ride of the Nork nukes (unlikely) or gives the US a good excuse to keep current sanctions in place, I’m for it.
IHBB,
Do you have an actual position on what to do about North Korea or are you just pissed off in general?
Whew, that takes a load off; knowing you are personally going to take charge means we can rest easy
)
bite me. ;^)
IHBB; And everyone who disagrees with you is a dumbass? You can stop the strawman arguments based on things I didn’t say, it’s sort of trite. So when you get tired of trying to be clever smartass, give it another shot.
Andy; I think Joseph’s resignation was a gross overreaction and premature, but agree that we’ll just have to see where the talks go.
While it seems it will take more than 3 planes into buildings to wake the american government up, this is a move in the right direction. Good.
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