The Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow reminds us that even if the relatively pro-American Grand National Party takes the next presidential election—and that looks like a very good possibility—the United States needs to overhaul its antiquated military alliance with South Korea:
FAR MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, is the fact that no ROK government, whatever its ideological complexion, can create a new raison d’etre for the alliance. The fundamental issue is not whether the Roh government is liberal or naive or hostile — it is all of them, but it still clings to America’s defense subsidy. Rather, the issue is whether the U.S. has any reason to continue underwriting the South Koreans, and it does not.
There’s still good reason for positive relations between Washington and the South. Cultural, family, and economic ties all remain strong. Implementing a free trade agreement would help enhance the latter.
The military alliance, in contrast, is no longer relevant, having been created for a different geopolitical purpose in a different geopolitical time. Happily for both the U.S. and South Korea, the good guys won the Cold War. Neither China nor Russia would back the North in a new war, and the ROK is capable of deploying whatever size military that it deems necessary to deter potential DPRK aggression.
There are no good secondary uses for the troops now stationed on the Korean peninsula. Most of the subregional squabbles within East Asia aren’t of much concern to America; Washington’s other friends and allies, like South Korea, are capable of defending their own interests.
I agree with Mr. Bandow that, at the very least, U.S. ground troops need to be removed from the peninsula, where they do the United States absolutely no good whatsoever. That being said, there’s still good reason to keep a healthy security relationship with Seoul—despite the political troubles, Seoul and Washington are cooperating militarily in a number of out-of-theater operations like Iraq and Afghanistan, and Korea can be a useful ally in regional contingencies, especially as it develops its naval assets and power-projection capabilities. It should also be said that one of Bandow’s presumptions—that Seoul would never join an anti-China coalition (not that anyone is calling for one)—can no longer be simply assumed as South Korea and China grow increasingly suspicious of one another. None of this, however, takes away from the fact that the alliance as it’s currently structured is a Cold War relic that needs to be brought into the 21st century or consigned to the dustbin of history.
(HT to reader)
17 Comments
“There are no good secondary uses for the troops now stationed on the Korean peninsula. Most of the subregional squabbles within East Asia aren’t of much concern to America; Washington’s other friends and allies, like South Korea, are capable of defending their own interests.”
The US military is generally a source of conflict and should be pressured to exit the peninsular like an unwelcome disease. Its exit will if anything pave the way to reunification of the two Koreas.
I’m personally sick of seeing these US army goons, several of whom have tried to beat me up for airing my freedom to dissent. Call the US military what it presently is: a tool of imperialism, death, torture, and rape.
Rape, eh? Torture? Imperialism? Care to back any of those up?
All militaries are, in one aspect, a tool of death.
I don’t doubt that the US leaving will “pave the way” for reunification. But you might want to reflect on whether that’s really something you want.
in the time i’ve been reading this blog, i’ve seen many bullshit comments. beechtreem above takes the cake.
bandow makes some great points. the truly unfortunate thing is that multi-billion dollar base that’s about to be built in pyeongtaek. i guess it could still be used by the koreans if the US left. but that’s not the point. what it really indicates is that bandow’s thinking has not entered the discourse in the US military (which still enjoys being able to put a 4-Star somewhere out in the field in a “war” environment) or in the corridors of power in Washington (where there is far too much myopia to understand that Koreans in general view relationships as win-lose instead of win-win). Washington will continue to be used by Seoul and spat on by ordinary Koreans while the benefits for America to be here with such a permanent military presence dwindle by the day.
colonos wrote:
“I don’t doubt that the US leaving will “pave the way” for reunification. But you might want to reflect on whether that’s really something you want.”
Especially since beechtreem is complaining about “death, torture, and rape”
Even if it rains we should do what we’ve been talking about doing since 2002? What’s the point here? The transformation is already happening.
“Beechtreem” wrote:
Much like the North Korean regime or the pro-North Korean agitators, um?
“Its exit will if anything pave the way to reunification of the two Koreas.”
Yeah, good luck and you can pick up the tab, too.
The US and UN should never have gotten involved in Korea in the first place. I hope and pray the US does pull out and use their military where it’s wanted and needed. Keeping the US forces here is a waste.
Considering the policies and actions of the Roh administration, I can understand why Americans will want the USFK to pull out of Korea. But let’s look at this from an another perspective.
First, the 2ID is being transformed from a Cold War structure to a structure that can deploy easily to other areas in case of emergency. This transformation will be complete when the 2ID moves to Pyongtaek. So pretty much the Cold War is being thrown out the window in terms of the 2ID’s mission here in Korea.
Second, is the US ready to let the PRC call the shots in East Asia? Even if the DPRK goes the way of the DDR, the USFK along with the USFJ will be needed to keep the PRC in check. If the USFK were to withdraw from the peninsula, and the PRC decides to extend its territory a bit more, what is there to keep it from going down the peninsula and hopping over to the islands?
Third, despite the improved capabilites of the Japanese and Korean armed forces, there are still far from being the military that can operate without US assistance/involvement.
In short, yes, the alliance has to be transformed from an alliance geared toward Cold War threats to an alliance that can handle the threats and challenges of the 21st century. But this does not mean that the US should leave a vacuum in East Asia for a new power that doesn’t share the same ideals.
“Its exit will if anything pave the way to reunification of the two Koreas.”
Good luck on that one bowl of rice a day, Chief.
The 2ID doesn’t need to be based in Pyeongtaek for that mission - particularly if Korea thinks its positioning there should give them any voice in how it is deployed.
Non sequitur. US troops in Korea aren’t a necessity for checking China. They can be based on other more hospitable places in the region.
Correct; more reason to consolidate US assistance in places where its appreciated and the partners can be reliably counted on to be partners, i.e., not Korea.
Bandow has long ignored the danger of a) nuclear proliferation in the event USFK leaves a perceived security vacuum on the peninsula, and b) what will happen to the NE Asian security ‘big picture’ after the Koreas do reunify;
http://www.dprkstudies.org/200.....arms-race/
|particularly if Korea thinks its positioning |there should give them any voice in how it is |deployed.
Ever since the alliance was created the ROK hasn’t told the US what to do with its troops stationed here, and the US has reployed units as it sees fit. Case in point, the deployment of the 2ID’s 2BDGE to Iraq.
|US troops in Korea aren’t a necessity for |checking China. They can be based on other more |hospitable places in the region.
Korea shares a border with China, which means that it’s a perfect place to start something, if the PRC decides to go off on some territorial adventure. If this happens, do you think that they will leave Korea or Japan for that matter alone, if there is no US deterrence in Korea? Even if the US has forces in more ”hospitable” locations, it still leaves a vacuum on the peninsula, which I’m sure the PRC will gladly exploit.
|more reason to consolidate US assistance in |places where its appreciated and the partners |can be reliably counted on to be partners, |i.e., not Korea.
OK, the current administration isn’t acting like a true partner, but this administration leaves office at the end of the year. On top of that the politicians that share the same ideals as Roh, will never be in a position to exercise power and policy. The next administration will most certainly be GNP, and they will be more willing to accomodate the US than the current administration. So I wouldn’t write off Korea as an unreliable partner.
History is past and Iraq is a bit special, you know. ROKGOV repeatedly has made it clear that it won’t tolerate - I guess they’ll stamp their feet and hiss between their teeth - the deployment of locally-positioned troops to sensitive assignments in East and Southeast Asia.
Last time I looked, USFK was stationed in ROK, which shares a border with the NORKS, not China. If China makes a move on the NORKS, the US should sit back and count its blessings. A vacuum on the part of the peninsula that matters won’t exist simply because of the withdrawal of US boots on the ground - provided that Korea moves out of its bedroom in grandpa’s house and starts footing the cost of its own defense and the mutual defense treaty and US nuclear umbrella remain in place. And if Korea doesn’t want to cut the apron strings, and leaves itself vulnerable, the US has no compelling interest in spending its citizens’ blood or treasure in protecting its mercantilist little sandbox.
The GNP is the successor in interest to several generations of Korean regimes that quite successfully squeezed far more out of the American mammary than was ever justified by the relative positions of the parties. They got away with it, as Lee Tong Won unabashedly brags, because of the Cold War. Circumstances have changed. The GNP will talk a good game and try to resurrect the shared blood and sacrifice meme, but they won’t walk the walk; their most important supporters will be the first to further accelerate the movement of assets and operations abroad if ROKGOV tries to raise the tax revenue needed to begin assuming its responsibility for self-defense.
(a) presumably, proliferation would be triggered by ROKGOV moves, but that can be nipped in the bud by a combination of carrots (continuation of Mutual Defense Treaty and US nuclear umbrella coverage) and sticks (e.g., managing trade on the basis of strict reciprocity of market opening);
(b) maintaining US forces on the ground in Korea with the costs and consequences known today based on some putative utility in the future based on errant speculation about the unification of the Koreas. Hmmm?
An American withdrawal would be disturbing to the status quo in many ways, including the path to unification. The South Korean establishment, for all of its sentimental public posturing about unification, regards the prospect with poorly disguised horror.
Removing the American troops would ease Chinese fears of American troops on the Chinese border, and so ease their fear of regime change in the North. The nice irony of withdrawal of American troops is that it could hasten regime change in the North, and force the South to deal realistically with the prospect of unification.
And there you have the real, main reason for an American withdrawal: the South Korean establishment has a deep investment in the continuation of the North Korean regime, and is willing to finance that cretinous government, even at the risk of encouraging a rogue nuclear program. The American interest is overwhelmingly in preventing the nuclear arming of jihadis.
The American military presence in South Korea facilitates the financing of the North by the South, thereby enabling the very thing that it is paramount for American policy to prevent.
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[...] Institute’s Doug Bandow (via TMH) is just not minimalist enough about his reasons for reforming the ROK-US [...]