Removing the American troops would ease Chinese fears of American troops on the Chinese border, and so ease their fear of regime change in the North. The nice irony of withdrawal of American troops is that it could hasten regime change in the North, and force the South to deal realistically with the prospect of unification.

And there you have the real, main reason for an American withdrawal: the South Korean establishment has a deep investment in the continuation of the North Korean regime, and is willing to finance that cretinous government, even at the risk of encouraging a rogue nuclear program. The American interest is overwhelmingly in preventing the nuclear arming of jihadis.

The American military presence in South Korea facilitates the financing of the North by the South, thereby enabling the very thing that it is paramount for American policy to prevent.

(b) maintaining US forces on the ground in Korea with the costs and consequences known today based on some putative utility in the future based on errant speculation about the unification of the Koreas. Hmmm?

Bandow has long ignored the danger of a) nuclear proliferation in the event USFK leaves a perceived security vacuum on the peninsula, and b) what will happen to the NE Asian security ‘big picture’ after the Koreas do reunify;

Ever since the alliance was created the ROK hasn’t told the US what to do with its troops stationed here, and the US has reployed [sic] units as it sees fit. Case in point, the deployment of the 2ID’s 2BDGE to Iraq.

History is past and Iraq is a bit special, you know. ROKGOV repeatedly has made it clear that it won’t tolerate - I guess they’ll stamp their feet and hiss between their teeth - the deployment of locally-positioned troops to sensitive assignments in East and Southeast Asia.

Korea shares a border with China, which means that it’s a perfect place to start something,

Last time I looked, USFK was stationed in ROK, which shares a border with the NORKS, not China. If China makes a move on the NORKS, the US should sit back and count its blessings. A vacuum on the part of the peninsula that matters won’t exist simply because of the withdrawal of US boots on the ground - provided that Korea moves out of its bedroom in grandpa’s house and starts footing the cost of its own defense and the mutual defense treaty and US nuclear umbrella remain in place. And if Korea doesn’t want to cut the apron strings, and leaves itself vulnerable, the US has no compelling interest in spending its citizens’ blood or treasure in protecting its mercantilist little sandbox.

The next administration will most certainly be GNP, and they will be more willing to accomodate the US than the current administration. So I wouldn’t write off Korea as an unreliable partner.

The GNP is the successor in interest to several generations of Korean regimes that quite successfully squeezed far more out of the American mammary than was ever justified by the relative positions of the parties. They got away with it, as Lee Tong Won unabashedly brags, because of the Cold War. Circumstances have changed. The GNP will talk a good game and try to resurrect the shared blood and sacrifice meme, but they won’t walk the walk; their most important supporters will be the first to further accelerate the movement of assets and operations abroad if ROKGOV tries to raise the tax revenue needed to begin assuming its responsibility for self-defense.

Ever since the alliance was created the ROK hasn’t told the US what to do with its troops stationed here, and the US has reployed units as it sees fit. Case in point, the deployment of the 2ID’s 2BDGE to Iraq.

|US troops in Korea aren’t a necessity for |checking China. They can be based on other more |hospitable places in the region.

Korea shares a border with China, which means that it’s a perfect place to start something, if the PRC decides to go off on some territorial adventure. If this happens, do you think that they will leave Korea or Japan for that matter alone, if there is no US deterrence in Korea? Even if the US has forces in more ”hospitable” locations, it still leaves a vacuum on the peninsula, which I’m sure the PRC will gladly exploit.

|more reason to consolidate US assistance in |places where its appreciated and the partners |can be reliably counted on to be partners, |i.e., not Korea.

OK, the current administration isn’t acting like a true partner, but this administration leaves office at the end of the year. On top of that the politicians that share the same ideals as Roh, will never be in a position to exercise power and policy. The next administration will most certainly be GNP, and they will be more willing to accomodate the US than the current administration. So I wouldn’t write off Korea as an unreliable partner.

http://www.dprkstudies.org/200.....arms-race/

But let’s look at this from an another perspective.

First, the 2ID is being transformed from a Cold War structure to a structure that can deploy easily to other areas in case of emergency.

The 2ID doesn’t need to be based in Pyeongtaek for that mission - particularly if Korea thinks its positioning there should give them any voice in how it is deployed.

Second, is the US ready to let the PRC call the shots in East Asia? Even if the DPRK goes the way of the DDR, the USFK along with the USFJ will be needed to keep the PRC in check.

Non sequitur. US troops in Korea aren’t a necessity for checking China. They can be based on other more hospitable places in the region.

Third, despite the improved capabilites of the Japanese and Korean armed forces, there are still far from being the military that can operate without US assistance/involvement.

Correct; more reason to consolidate US assistance in places where its appreciated and the partners can be reliably counted on to be partners, i.e., not Korea.

Good luck on that one bowl of rice a day, Chief.

First, the 2ID is being transformed from a Cold War structure to a structure that can deploy easily to other areas in case of emergency. This transformation will be complete when the 2ID moves to Pyongtaek. So pretty much the Cold War is being thrown out the window in terms of the 2ID’s mission here in Korea.

Second, is the US ready to let the PRC call the shots in East Asia? Even if the DPRK goes the way of the DDR, the USFK along with the USFJ will be needed to keep the PRC in check. If the USFK were to withdraw from the peninsula, and the PRC decides to extend its territory a bit more, what is there to keep it from going down the peninsula and hopping over to the islands?

Third, despite the improved capabilites of the Japanese and Korean armed forces, there are still far from being the military that can operate without US assistance/involvement.

In short, yes, the alliance has to be transformed from an alliance geared toward Cold War threats to an alliance that can handle the threats and challenges of the 21st century. But this does not mean that the US should leave a vacuum in East Asia for a new power that doesn’t share the same ideals.