Pundits and politicians alike have long seen the six-party talks as more than just a chance to trade bombs and non-aggression pacts. Many hope that these negotiations could evolve into the framework for an East Asian economic and security forum, with the potential to resolve some of the region’s lingering 20th century woes. This broadening of goals, for better or worse, has already begun:
[On Monday] diplomats from the United States, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia will reconvene in Beijing with a docket that is still dominated by nuclear disarmament but that also now includes unresolved disputes that have bedeviled Northeast Asia for decades. The process might accomplish far more than denuclearization — a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War could be one dramatic possibility. Or it could just as easily collapse under the weight of so many moveable pieces and kill a nuclear deal, too.
Those pieces are not only moveable; they’re also explosive. Comfort women, colonialism, kidnappings, Dokdo, Goguryeo, Yasukuni, Taiwan–East Asia’s host of hot-button issues explain both why a regional forum is needed and why that forum might prove futile.
Meanwhile, as the locals spat amongst themselves, outside powers are working to shore up their own interests in the region. One of the more interesting developments last week was the signing of a security agreement between Australia and Japan, which not only delighted Washington, but also gave Beijing cause for concern:
Australia has been approached to dramatically upgrade its three-way security arrangements with Japan and the US to include India in a four-way security agreement that would encircle China. The Japanese Government and US Vice-President Dick Cheney are keen to include the growing economic and military power of India in the already enhanced “trilateral” security arrangements, locking together the three most powerful democracies of the Asia-Pacific region.
Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye set forth some similar ideas in their MUST READ report released last month on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the future of Asian international relations. They also stress that Japan must be the linchpin of U.S. involvement in the region, but are more prone to engage rather than balance against China:
[A] bipolar structure with only the United States and Japan facing China would be ineffective, because it would force other regional powers to choose between two competing poles. Some might side with the United States and Japan, but most regional powers would choose strict neutrality or align with China. Ultimately, this would weaken the powerful example of American and Japanese democracy and return the region to a Cold War or nineteenth century balance-of-power logic that does not favor stability in the region or contribute to China’s potential for positive change. Stability in East Asia will rest on the quality of U.S.-Japan-China relations, and even though the United States is closely allied with Japan, Washington should encourage good relations among all three.
Where does this leave Korea? The Donga is understandably worried about becoming a “lost child” in East Asia:
[W]e need to give a second thought to whether the U.S. doubts over the Korea-U.S. alliance and correspondingly, Japan’s Asia strategy, triggered the new tripartite alliance between the U.S., Japan and Australia.
I’m going to go with “yes.” More fretting:
The worst scenario would be for Korea to be isolated between the “maritime forces” led by the U.S., Japan and Australia, and the “inland forces” led by China and Russia. If the power structure of East Asia is realigned as such, how can we afford to take the burden of diplomacy and security that follows it?
A fine question indeed. 2007 is a crucial year on the peninsula for this very reason. The diplomatic course set by the Blue House’s next inhabitant may well determine Korea’s relevance in regional affairs for the next decade. One thing is certain: President Roh’s “Balancer-of-East-Asia” dream won’t amount to much if Korea is not even on the scale.
25 Comments
I don’t think it’s too late for S.Korea yet.
First S.Korea has to somehow salvage something out of the ROK-US alliance. And S.Korea can start by kicking out the left wing wackos in the government and ignoring pseudo civilian organizations that are practically North Korean fifth columnists. Even if the US forces start withdrawing, S.Korea should still try to keep a strong economic and political alliance with the US. As for Japan, I hope S.Korea set aside the history and territorial disputes (which I think is a lost cause in trying to convince Japan - just let them think whatever they want and not care) and forge a strong cultural and political alliance, to counter a menacing China. All this will be up to the new South Korean leadership, if they’re pragmatic. I think the Americans and the Japanese will still welcome S.Korea back to the fold, even with all the betrayals that the Roh government has perpetuated.
‘asia’s three most powerful democracies.’
australia is powerful? it’s got about 25 million people. it’s powerful or riding the coattails of a powerful nation?
part of the reason for all this friction between the us and sk was the fact that the us wanted to treat korea as a junior partner while treating japan as an equal partner.
i’m all for korea rejoining the us/japan fold but only if korea is treated as an equal partner on par with japan. of course, that shouldn’t be hard to do since korea is simply more important than a country like australia and america has no problem treating the aboriginies as equals.
美國石鶴
i think it is crucial for korea to show her loyalty to US. korea must show that US is their most important ally. Having US as korea’s “big brother” is better than having china as korea’s “big brother.”
i dont think korea will ever be treated as an equal partner like Japan. korea’s economy and military influence is not enough for US to care too much about opinion of koreans. korea must close her eye and cross her finger and hope that US and Japan wouldnt ditch korea in the future… maybe if korea show little bit less of anti japanese and anti american sentiment, maybe they will take us little bit more seriously.
Much like how it punches well above its weight in international sport Australia’s influence is certainly greater than its population.
Good idea. Requires Korea to treble the amount of money it contributes.
Korea does contribute to the alliance (Vietnam {where the Koreans fought well against the commies}, Iraq and Afghanistan). Korea’s problem is that their position leaves them little strategy flexibility.
Unless the Kim Dynasty in Pyongyang falls, the bulk of the ROK’s military will be planted along the DMZ 10, 20 and 30 years from now and the bulk of Korea’s diplomatic efforts will continue to be little but corollaries to its relations with NK and the USA.
BTW, nice post.
Got the child part right.
Re.: East Asia’s “Lost Child” Mar18th2007
Dear Author,
thank you…; your evaluation seems to be based on thorough analysis of any of the political- or diplomatic developments witin the region.
Your perspective not only triggers a possible discussion among us, the readers, but it lays hands onto an issue of substancial importance, which to my surprise, I have never seen elaborated on (..or simply picked-up by..) platforms (media, discourse) from within-Korea.
It seems the overall idea of seeing oneself as a constructive and integral part of a regional community, with all of its gives-and-takes, is something the political establishment of this fine people feels not inclined to seriously explore. It seems further that the intellectual framework of strategic-thinking as a method, is culturally closer to a logic as layed-out in (Sanshiliu Ji Miben Bingfa) those renowned 36 strategemes….,
focussing only onto parameters of immediate financial benefits.
I won’t elaborate on the countless examples of short-sighted campaigns, springing-off from every angle of the country, all of which bearing the imprints of an mba-consultant-attitude rather than being results of sound commitments to political philosophy.
Korea’s political establishment would have numerous of good reasons of taking an-outside-in-view approach onto its situation and potential.
Well-trodden-paths of agonizing about historical injustice, of unfair treatment by forces from outside-Korea, are beginning to dry down and have already led into a status of political impasse. Yes, this historical triangle of China, Korea and Japan resembles a picture of sad bonding; but it equally resembles a picture of regional facts, a source of potential for commonly shared responsibilities for this part of the world and its cultures.
It seems about time that Korea strategically places itself onto political maps, which are currently drafted and worked out by forces, who naturally have other interest in the region. Being an integrated player within the process of building a regional Union of Asian (or East-Asian) powers, Korea could be a masterminding contributor to a system of balanced powers, as much as it could be a protected beneficiary from such orchestrated agendas.
Despite all the differences in historical- and cultural context, I should not hesitate to recommend the union-building-process of the EU for analysis…, being a possible role-model for such approach. A post-ww-history of deténte, with two core-players at the point of initiation, France and Germany, overcoming their historic differences, taking-up their responsibilities for the region, leading to V. G. d’Estaing and H. Schmidt masterminding the framework of a common currency (initially “ecú”, then “euro”), leading to F. Mitterand and H. Kohl holding hands at Bergen-Belsen…..; All of which being important cornerstones on a long path, which paved the way to a European Union - as much as it had paved the way to a re-unification of two German states.
This contribution might be lacking in academic quality and in-depth-analysis, but I hope it helps adding to the scope of your criticism.
Yours sincerely,
KJE. (Seoul)
“i’m all for korea rejoining the us/japan fold but only if korea is treated as an equal partner on par with japan.”
The ball is in Korea’s court. Korea pays a fraction of the real costs, enjoys the benefits of a high-quality defense and regularly badmouths the US. Why should the US give more? If Korea wants to join the ‘winning’ side, it will have to throw its dreams of being a ‘balancer’ and the equally dumb idea of cosying up to China (with the ridiculous hope that China will treat Korea better than the US has) out the window. All this short term whining over how bad they have it in alliance with the US will lead to long term pain in no alliance or in alliance with China.
pawikirogi
of course, that shouldn’t be hard to do since korea is simply more important than a country like australia and america has no problem treating the aboriginies as equals.
I think the Aussies would disagree. They feel like second class citizens too. Especially with ITAR issues.
pawi:
“korea is simply more important than a country like australia and america has no problem treating the aboriginies as equals”
I hope this comment was tongue-in-cheek. A few reasons why Australia will always be treated with more respect than South Korea, and deservedly so:
1. Australia is perhaps the most loyal ally the US has ever had. ANZUS was signed in 1951; Australia has since fought alongside the US in WW2, Malaya, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq 1 and 2 and Afganistan.
2. Australia packs above its weight in wartime. South Korea packs below its weight. For 2 years prior to Pearl Harbor Australia did all the heavy lifting against Japan, inflicting the imperial army’s first defeats. Australian Jungle ops were unmatched in Malaya and Vietnam. Australia also does a lot of regional work, ie as INTERFET leaders in East Timor and in other roles across the pacific. In the Korean war the ROK forces were abysmal. Amends were made in Vietnam, but what else has SK done to aid regional stability?
3. Australia hosts important US bases, and is strategically located. Pine gap being the most notable - one of the largest and most important US satellite ground control stations in the world.
4. Australia acts in the spirit of its alliance with the US. Perhaps the most important point. Unlike Korea, whose very existance has historicaly depended on their alliance with the US, yet whose people and leaders often act like churlish ungrateful children. Rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, a growing tendency by the government in Seoul to appease Pyongyang, and the Korean penchant for blaming the United States for blocking unification are all good reasons why SK deserves nothing better.
I think this link sums up South Korea’s appalling attitude to their alliance and why they don’t deserve more respect:
http://blogcritics.org/archive.....013448.php
In sum: Nearly half of South Korean youths who will be old enough to vote in the country’s next elections say Seoul should side with North Korea if the United States attacks the communist nation.
At the same time, 40.7 percent of the 1,000 young people surveyed said Seoul should remain neutral in the event of hostilities between Washington and Pyongyang, according to the poll by The Korea Times and Hankook Ilbo dailies. Only 11.6 percent said the South should back its longtime U.S. ally.
Very well said.
Australia is an exceedingly valued ally and friend to the U.S. and if anything, the U.S. needs to do more to express its gratitude and friendship to that great nation, whose greatness of course is measured in things more relevant than a head count.
Just ask them how they liked the treatment from the U.S. gov when they bought 737 AEW&C.
The problem, as described by the precipitously descending arc of Korea’s commitment illustrated by the Vietnam-Afghan-Iraq axis, is that Korea’s contribution has been steadily eroding over the years - except, perhaps, in the matter of its contribution to the upkeep of USFK, which remains too pathetic to justify Korea’s whingeing about being treated as an equal partner.
But even Korea’s contributions to the US defense of it, such as they may be, only serve to reveal the deeper problem. Even when Korea made its undeniably significant contribution to the Vietnam war effort, it only did so in a very mercenarily-calculated way. Apart from the relatively superficial, tactical anti-Communist response of the times, Korea’s participation really was not based on any shared commitment to the ideals and principles that are larger than (while also often, but (alas) not always necessarily inclusive of) national self-interest narrowly imagined. And today, in the absence of even a shared tactical commitment to the containment of the NORK’s perverted vestige of communism, Korea’s fundamental lack of commitment to the sort of principles that underpin the frirendship of the US and Australia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Japan, have become ever more apparent.
I just finished reading the entire file: The U.S.-Japan alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020. S. Korea is no more than an after-thought. I admit, as much as I dislike the soemtimes churlish and childish behavior of some of the S. Korean people, that report actually left me with a very cold feeling where Korea was concerned.
Nye and Armitage state that “approximately 100,000 Americans are resident in Seoul”.
Even including U.S. military personnel and ethnic Koreans holding U.S. citizenship is that accurate?
Just wondering if anyone saw this news article. Yes, it’s China, not Korea. I wonder how much that will help in building an East Asia Forum.
China lawmaker pitches ‘Humiliation Day’
http://tinyurl.com/yveg2o
Collective
insecurity.When Roh declared that Korea is the “balancer of East Asia”, he, as always, didn’t think throughly before opening his mouth. By making the above declaration, Roh has implicitly stated that the ROK will not support US foreign policy and go on its own way, in order to ensure the security of the ROK and of course East Asia.
What Roh didn’t realize before the speech is that the ROK doesn’t have the economic, military, and political clout to influence anybody in East Asia, and it certainly doesn’t have what it takes to go on its own way. At the same time, he helped further alienate its most important ally which isn’t helping things either.
Right now, the only road the ROK can take to ensure its security while having its say in the future of East Asia is to drop its unrealistic and nationalistic dreams of being an independent power and strengthen its alliance with the US, by doing its part. Simply mouthing ,”The alliance is important” and/or making symbolic contributions, just for the sake of saying ”Hey, we did our part” won’t do.
If Roh had been thinking before he opened his mouth, he would’ve declared that Korea is the “whore of Asia”.
‘korea is no more than after-thought…’
let’s keep in mind that armitage wrote the piece, ok? armitage does not have a very good track record on predictiing the future. let’s remember that he was part of the team who brought us phrases like ‘it’ll be a cakewalk.’ ‘they’ll greet us as liberators.’ in other words, the guy is just a washed up neocon clinging to his now defunct ideology.
From #12 hoju_saram:
“….For 2 years prior to Pearl Harbor Australia did all the heavy lifting against Japan, inflicting the imperial army’s first defeats…”
Need to review your Aussie mil history here soju. British Empire and its dominions did not declare war on Japan until after Pearl Harbor.
It’s certainly true that the Australian Army and Air Force were heavily involved in WWII prior to Pearl Harbor, but this was as part of the British Empire forces fighting the Germans and Italians, mainly in the Mediterranean theater.
After the disastrous loss of Malaya and the surrender of Singapore in Dec 41-Jan 42 (which involved some Australian forces, can’t remember how many offhand), your Prime Minister at the time (Curtin?) insisted on the return to the Australian theater of two(?) divisions of Australian troops, from North Africa. (Churchill wanted these divisions diverted to assist in the defense of Burma; good thing they weren’t, as Burma was also lost to the Japanese in mid-1942).
These two divisions ended up doing some extremely hard fighting against the Japanese, for which they didn’t get enough credit (except among their fellow Australians). But this was after Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941).
Dudes……I think Australia-Korea compare and contrast was not the issue of the post concerning how Korea is ..alas, again, “a shrimp among whales” with no where to swim.
As Walter wisely noted, “Dude, the CHinaman is not the issue, Dude!”
Let us all take pause to those sage words.
It is funny how what people say about SK today was said about Japan in the 1980s and, especially, 1990s. With the difference that in the case of the US-Japan alliance, 80-90% of “experts” thought that it would not be in place by 2010. I wonder how many of those saying that the US-SK alliance will break or even weaken are as clueless about foreign relations as RMH was. An alliance does not break just because those at the top cannot stand each other. RMH is gone, GWB will be gone soon. These two could not even pretend not to dislike each other. Yet, the US-SK alliance was reinforced while RMH was president, mainly because of SK commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Australian troops are being withdrawn from Iraq. Does anyone think that the US-Australia alliance is going to suffer significantly because of this? Please. The same goes for SK, Japan or any other long-term ally that the US has. It takes much more than some friction and two unable leaders to break any alliance.
One Trackback
[...] U.S. interests have dovetailed in recent years. What’s not yet clear is whether Seoul will be left out in the cold, or whether it will manage to use its economic clout to play Washington and Beijing off each other. [...]