North Korea’s top nuclear negotiator couldn’t find a moment to sit down with Mohamed ElBaradei today, who traveled to Pyongyang to follow up on the Agreed Framework, Part Deux:
ElBaradei was unable to meet Kim Kye-Gwan, who was “too busy” preparing for the next round of six-nation negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear programmes, Kyodo News cited IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming as saying. [via AFP]
Much ado about nothing? Perhaps. But this also doesn’t do much for “confidence building.” Nor does Pyongyang’s attempt to wriggle out of the February 13 agreement by demanding that financial sanctions be lifted before any steps are taken to dismantle the Yongbyon reactor. True to form, evidence of dismantlement is, shall we say, “slim”:
“There are no signs of any changes being made to the operational status of the Yongbyon facility,” South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-Soon said. [from the same AFP piece]
According to the agreement, North Korea had 60 days (now 30) to get the ball rolling. It remains to be seen if any further progress will be made at the next round of chats in Beijing. But in the interim, Pyongyang has bought (swindled?) some breathing room from Seoul that may have implications for the next election:
Despite the jolt North Korea’s nuclear test gave South Koreans last October, South Korean officials have seized upon the February 13th agreement as an authorization to cut even more deals with Pyongyang…. First, South Korea’s Unification Minister announced that the government had approved new fertilizer and rice shipments to North Korea and that these could resume even before Pyongyang freezes its plutonium production. Then, former South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hae-Chan and key Uri party leaders announced they were headed north to meet with top DPRK officials. It’s likely they will try to secure a North-South summit before the December elections, which will only strengthen the current South Korean government’s play for reelection. [h/t: One Free Korea]
Not about to let Uri steal the show, though, the GNP now appears to be moving its own policy prescriptions in a similar direction.
2 Comments
In other words, North Korea signed the agreement in order to make it easier for South Korea to continue delivering the goodies.
A note on that last link. It ends:
The differences between the GNP and the Korean left on North Korea will remain substantial even if events cause some shifting (Heck, the Nork nuke test made even Roh temporarily end his handouts to Pyongyang.).
Frankly, I don’t care much about these little dick measuring games the Norks play if they actually do what they have agreed to do. We don’t need a meeting to prove that; only inspections.