I really don’t know what to think of this—Washington has agreed to transfer wartime operational command over South Korean troops to Seoul by 2012.
Washington had been pushing to transfer operational command by 2010.
The Americans also reaffirmed that the transfer of wartime command would not compromise plans to dispatch massive U.S. reinforcements to the Korean Peninsula in the event of an emergency.
According to Yonhap News, the U.S. concession was due to, ahem, the departure of “more hawkish” figures in the Bush administration:
Although officials won’t go on record, they indicated that the U.S. met South Korea’s request after the departure of “more hawkish” figures in the George W. Bush administration.
“There was a lot of flexibility on the U.S. part. The atmospherics in Washington has changed much,” Jeon Jei-guk, South Korea’s assistant defense minister for policy, told reporters at a briefing.
The U.S. agreed to the year 2012 because it acceded to South Korea’s argument that the extra time is necessary to sufficiently conduct test drills, he said.
The South Korean side has been downright giddy since Rumsfeld’s departure, and for good reason. As I said when he left, whatever Rummy’s other failings, at least he had his finger on the pulse of his South Korean allies. Or, in other words, he was intent on making Cheong Wa Dae walk the walk and assume responsibility for its decisions.
That’s clearly not the case anymore. Rumsfeld was barely out the door before Korean officials were leaking to the press that the transfer of U.S. military facilities from Yongsan to Pyeongtaek—originally scheduled for completion next year—might be delayed until 2013. And so it seemed today—from Yonhap:
Still to be pinpointed is the date for relocation of U.S. bases and forces and return of the land used by the U.S. Forces Korea.
The relocation was initially planned to be completed by the end of next year, but it is likely to be delayed to as late as 2013.
“We did not discuss specific dates at today’s meeting,” Jeon said.
“The (relocation) plan is being delayed for variety of reasons, and we agreed to together search for ways to expedite the process.”
OK, so the Pyeongtaek moves gets delayed for, ahem, “a variety of reasons” while Cheong Wa Dae plays political games with their own country’s national security, and the Bob Gates-run Pentagon responds by…. covering Seoul’s ass.
Business as usual.
The transfer of command will spell the end of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), which will be replaced by a “supporting-supported command relationship.” I’d imagine this will play havoc on U.S.-South Korean contingency plans, but I guess that’s not really something that keeps Cheong Wa Dae officials up at night.
If you want to read today’s joint statement, you may do so over DefenseLink.
On a positive note for Washington, Seoul is apparently looking to invest in some new toys (in Korean) prior to taking over wartime operational command of its forces—Aegis warships and more F-15Ks are reportedly high on their wishlist.
47 Comments
Do the knuckleheads really think that in the event the US is going to send in massive reinforcements w/out demanding control as a precondition - or will it just decline on the ground that Korea’s defense plans and/or capacity to interact with US forces are inadequate? Somebody’s doing too much “philopon” if they really buy into assurances of reinforcements coming any closer than Japan once the boots on the ground are effectively gone. The command issue is a sideshow to that main event. This is all a prelude to Korea’s not even being included sotto voce within Acheson’s old perimeter unless the frog stops staring into the sun shining down into the well.
What’s another 4 years? This move to Pyongtaek was originally planned to happen before the 1986 Asian Games. So I ask, what’s another 4 years when we’ve been working on this move for 20 some odd years????
It is unclear what will happen, but I would remain far from convinced there were will be “no boots on the ground” any time soon. You would normally think there is no way in hell the US would put 25,000 troops in a situation where there would be split command during war, but it certainly is possible for the politicians in the US to do so. It would be surpising but not earth shattering to see it happen.
It looks to me like we are going to go back to business as usual. How many of the slated 1/3rd of USFK forces have already been pulled out since the draw down was announed in 2003?
That is a number to watch. If the US side stops the draw down (if the total number announced back then has not already left), then all bets are off - we will be in pre-9/11, pre-Rumsfeld mode for sure.
I said elsewhere in the K-blogsphere that we can’t gain much condidence in signs anti-US thought might have been waning since 2003 — until South Korean society becomes confident again that the US-SK relationship was not going to change.
Since 2003, we have had very frequent news items each year, pretty much each month, that have made Korean society fear USFK was heading out the door.
It seems now, by this time next year, the confidence that the US will never leave has a good chance of being firmly established. If it is, we can test my theory.
I guess the dream of hope was nice while it lasted….
Without going into details, the new OPLAN is coming along nicely, and will be effective well before the semantics of an honor guard ceremony make it official.
Don’t forget Patriot!
http://search.hankooki.com/tim.....p;media=kt
There were 37,000 or so troops in 2003.
http://search.hankooki.com/tim.....p;media=kt
So, it would only take about 3,000 more to fulfill the early drawn down announcement. Not much. I guess whether that 3,000 is taken or not will not mean that much….
I guess it will take another one or two 9/11s before we get out of here…
USinKorea, it’s actually worse than those articles point out, because they focus on mere numbers. What really matters is the tooth-to-tail ratio.
The thousands that have left have all been teeth.
The “supporting command - supported command” relationship is the standard for all other U.S. coalition-type partnerships with foreign militaries - the CFC is the only command structure of its kind in the world that I’m aware of. So we can think of this change as making the ROK part of the rule rather than the exception to it.
In my opinion the change to the supporting-supported relationship will actually improve wartime decision flow, as the current CFC strikes me as a whole bunch of supposedly combined organizations that are actually separate ROK and US efforts running parallel to each other, with links between the efforts ranging in quality from good to poor depending mainly on the personalities involved. The change will clarify things on that front, although thats probably an accidental consequence rather than a major factor in the decision to close down the CFC.
One more step in the slow move towards “strategic flexibility”.
My two won anyway.
Mark,
All been teeth you say. Very interesting. Can you elaborate a little?
I am disappointed. It boils down to there being no accountability for the Cheong Wa Dae folks to spit in the face of the US for political mileage here in Seoul. Whatever the military reality, I wish there would be more action to scare hell out of em.
On the other hand, having all those Korean defense ministers and academics and Generals come out in the news after Roh first got lippy about this, and spank his little ass publicly, really made my day. He’s paid politically even if it wasn’t at the hands of the US per se.
I agree wholeheartedly that Rummy did seem to know how to play hardball with Noh. It was an area where he seemed very on top of things. Was it an advisor that he listened to? If so, who, I wonder.
#8
But, where else in the world is the US still locked into a situation as it is in South Korea?
Where else in the world are we staked out in such a dangerous position?
Looking back at precident - has there been a major conflict where the US was in operation where it was co-equal in a split-command situation? I don’t know. What was the leadership structure of Iraq War I?
If/When North Korea collapses, and it decides to go for broke, do we really want to be backup to South Korea playing a supporting role but with 25,000 troops still in country?
Not me…
Relayer77,
No.
Relayer77, on second thought, without getting busted for an OPSEC violation, I can say that “teeth” are combat units whereas “tail” refers to combat support or service support elements. Tooth-to-tail ratio.
Mentos?
Relayer77,
Most of the “teeth” belong to the 2nd Infantry Division, of which various units are being rotated in and out of Iraq.
Robert,
I’ll just add for clarity that those Aegis systems, in the form of more KDXs will end up going to the Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo shipyards. Just the systems with be bought from the US.
Of course in the end the credit will vary depending on whether its floating or sinking. I’m sure once one of them hits a snag, they will blame it on the US Technology in them. Like the recent KF-16 crash where they blamed it on the engine, spending half the report talking about how it was American made, nevermind who maintained it and flew it.
BTW, Rummy had balls, he was a good guy brought down partly by his arrogance, but more so by the shameful sniveling defeatism that currently occupies the American psyce.
Bowing to the 2012 command changeover? What a slap in the face, I’m glad I got out.
This thought has stuck in my mind since reading the 2012 news and on two different points.
I’ve heard some on the K-blogs, and heard some in the US Defense Department, talk about USFK moving to a support role - primarily via air and sea. I’ve read K-bloggers talk about leaving the air assets in country.
Is that really what you want?
Do people really want to see a significant chunk of American troops left in Korea - to be defended by the Korean military - should a second war break out - when the chance of a second war breaking out is going to be significantly high as long as North Korea remains a stone’s throw from collapse?
Do we really want to count of US reenforcements pouring into Korea to save the asses of the soldiers we leave behind - and deal with a split command?
Does “tripwire light” really sound like a good idea?
I can picture politicans in the US going for such an idea. They usually don’t know how to focus on realities and probabilities but go for what sounds good.
But, I can’t picture the US military going for this idea.
To me, there are only two ways I can see big powers in the defense posture realm going for this:
1) They plan on all GI boots off the ground as we build to 2012 and have none left after that. Not even the Air Force.
or
2) They aren’t really worried about SK gaining war time control, because they believe South Korea will delay the deal to death, and we’ll gladly bury it with them when they decide to put it down - so agreeing now is meaningless.
But I think it is highly doubtful #2 is what is in the American mind even with Rumsfeld gone. I don’t think we would say, “We will agree with 2012 only if we set it in stone” if they didn’t mean what they were saying…
I think the US forces will leave by 2009 as it has planned. There will one colonel (very old nearing retirement with no family) sitting at desk from 2009 to 2012. He will be the only one moving to Pyengtaek.
I like “supporting-supported command relationship”. From “combined” to “support”. When SK gets invaded the US will hold hands and cry together. Troops? No troops. Just emotional support. The “support” does not clearly state the scale of the material committment. It could be next to nothing.
As Sperwer wrote, I think it will be nothing.
Somebody’s doing too much “philopon” if they really buy into assurances of reinforcements coming any closer than Japan once the boots on the ground are effectively gone. -Sperwer
Koreans are like wayward children. They like to be anti-American all they want and allow Commies to kick the US forces out. But, when NK invade, they will say “you promised!” and cry all over the place.
In the real world, crying amounts to nothing.
And, suprise, surprise! The US is not their parent. If Koreans really though the US to be their benefactor, they should have treated us better. They haven’t.
“Support”(this, historically, meant nothing between countries) is all they get. No real committment.
The US military officers from Pentagon down to CFC are chuckling inside, “these Koreans are buying “support” idea? What gullible fools! Ha, ha”
Well, Koreans are actually schizos. Right now, they are saying “I am all grown up, Pa. I can take care of myself”. But, when NK invades, they will say “You knew I could not hack it out there in the world. You knew I did not have enough resources. Yet, you still let me go. It is all your fault.”
I just know. These Koreans will all blame the US for something they are doing right now.
usinkorea #10: “…Looking back at prec[e]dent - has there been a major conflict where the US was in [an] operation where it was co-equal in a split-command situation? I don’t know. What was the leadership structure of Iraq War I?…”
It all comes back to politics, since the senior national military commander can always appeal any decision made by an “Allied” superior — one that he doesn’t agree with, for whatever reason — to his own national command/political authority. In fact, he will likely have very specific instructions from his own government about what he can and can’t do with his forces.
The commander of the Zaitun (sp?) ROK brigade in Kurdistan undoubtedly has extremely detailed and specific instructions in this regard, all of which could probably be boiled down to one summary sentence; “stay off the f’ing radar screen, at the peril of your immortal soul” (ok, that’s hyperbole, what Dick Cheney as Satan incarnate would say; I should have merely said “…at the peril of your career”).
To me the most interesting parallel is from WWI, where the US forces arriving in France in late 1917-early 1918 came in as the “junior” partner to the French and British (and the Canadians too) — “late to the table”, so to speak.
The French and British top commanders were so anxious to get the Americans into action that they wanted to take control of the formations of raw US troops as they arrived in France, almost literally “right off the boat” — integrating them directly into their own forces. To include in at least some cases, the officering of said US forces, right down to the platoon level; in fact, I think they might have even ended up providing the squad leader NCO’s for at least some US unit formations.
Pershing was adamantly opposed to this and the French and British commanders had their political leadership appeal this issue to Wilson. Wilson was equally adamant in backing Pershing, and so the “associated powers” had no choice but to allow Pershing the time he wanted to organize and train his forces in France “behind the lines”; they provided contingents of advisors to help train the Americans with their new equipment (most all of which, except for the rifles, was of French or British manufacture). Also in the various specialized combat techniques peculiar to what we now know as WWI style trench warfare (incorporating the standard use of “classic” chemical munitions; by “classic”, I mean not including the various nefarious varieties of nerve agents, which had yet to be invented).
US declared war in April of 1917, yet the first “major” combat involving US brigade and division size formations was in May 1918, over a full year later (in response to potentially war-ending German offensive breakthroughs, so the US forces were committed all-out to help in the French sector, even though they were still not considered to be fully ready by Pershing).
You can read an official US military history version at this link if interested: http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/amh/AMH-18.htm
We’re talking about the life and death of nations, as well as the lives of literally hundreds of thousands of men, so I find it illuminating to compare and contrast the relative “frames of reference”. The dispute between the US and its WWI “associated powers” basically involved a a “time frame” of a year or so (Britain and France wanted US troops in the line within a couple of months after arrival, Pershing’s goal was to have the American Army take over a major sector of the front completely independently, by late 1918 or early 1919).
And so, now we come to Korea. Fifty five years after the armistice, the US finds itself still kicking the can down the road in 3 or 4 year increments, as to when the citizens and government of the Republic of Korea will finally be able to assume full responsiblity for the entirety of their own ground defense. I don’t really know why this should be; maybe it’s because we Americans still feel guilty about not being ready in 1917, so we’re making up for it 90 years later by indulging the ROK.
Maybe I’ll do some more research, I think I’d like to see how the mileage of the Korean “DMZ” front compares to the mileage frontage of the US “sector” in France in October 1918.
By the way, we Americans probably owe a historical debt of gratitude to Pershing and Wilson for their stance. I don’t know that either of them has come down to us today as particularly well-regarded historical figures, at least as compared to their US WWII era counterparts; nevertheless, had they not stuck to their convictions, it’s almost certain that the US total of WWI combat deaths would have been very considerably higher.
Thanks for the military history lesson, Paul H. What’s your background?
I don’t think Iraq War II is worth comparison, and for the same reason I doubt Kosovo would be worth looking into. If/when Korean War II gets underway, we won’t have X nation handling Daegu (Basara) with Y nation in Seoul (Baghdad) and Z nation pushing toward Pyongyang.
If we do, I vote for the US to hold down the fort in Cheju until it is all over — kind of like what the ROKs have been doing in Iraq War II…
What about Iraq War II?
Anybody know how the command structure was then?
I vaguely remember it was something like in WWII, no? Where a combined supreme HQ under US leadership set up where individual large units were going to go with the flags of different nations dotting the map — so like the French being flanked by US units and so on down the line.
I just can’t see the US leaving a large number of GIs on the ground with the understanding if a 2nd war breaks out, we will have a split command.
Either we’re prepared right now today to let the plan die after the GNP takes over
or we are serious about locking SK down to specific dates and we are going to leave when that date comes - whether SK has done what it needs to prepare or not.
Right now, I think option #1 is more likely. I think we are going back to the status quo.
One worthless but slightly interesting thing to note is —
here within a couple of weeks, we have see Washington demand to lock the two Koreans into deals with a firm timeline and an understanding we will not allow screwing around with the deals as we have before…..
But, I believe we will allow screwing around with both deals….
The 2nd Iraq War II should be “What about Iraq War I?”
Sonagi, I’m retired military, as you might have guessed. Never been to Korea, just have taken an interest in the place for a long time.
usinkorea #21 & 22:
“…What about Iraq War [I]?
Anybody know how the command structure was then?
I vaguely remember it was something like in WWII, no? Where a combined supreme HQ under US leadership set up where individual large units were going to go with the flags of different nations dotting the map — so like the French being flanked by US units and so on down the line…”
As I recall, this was basically correct for Gulf War I. Standard military doctrine, which is congruent with what common sense would tell you, is to let each national contingent have its own “piece of the pie”, in terms of “owning” a sector of the “front”. How big a piece is very much dependent on what assets the ally can bring to the table.
“Assets” meaning the totality of all types of units, to include support as well as combat. NATO allies, also US and ROK miltary forces, have (and presumably still do) practice this type of thing regularly, in “command post” exercises; also when there are actual “maneuvers” of sizable forces on the ground, as in the annual joint US/ROK maneuvers, where US forces from outside the ROK are deployed into ROK for a few weeks (”Team Spirit” is (or was) the standard name, if I remember correctly).
Every situation is different, and the various national military commanders (in conjunction with their political masters) will have to “organize to operate” based on the totality of their particular circumstances at the time.
The ability of each national contingent to support itself logistically plays as big a role in deciding this, as does the individual unit’s combat proficiency.
An Iraqi national army battalion may be able to fight enthusiastically out in the field, but if the Iraqi Ministry of Defense can’t get its own military support units to provide this battalion “in the field” with logistics (hot rations, bullets, motor fuel, spare parts, etc) over the weekend — and American support units have to step in and do it for them — then we aren’t making much progress towards the goal of withdrawing American forces from active combat in Iraq.
(This is a real example based on something I read fairly recently, can’t provide a link because I don’t remember exactly where I saw it).
Paul H.
Off topic;
the aggregator seems to be a bit screwy. It’s listing many posts as being from DPRK Studies when they’re from various other blogs.
Paul H., nice post.
Even some of the rifles too, you didn’t forget this travesty did you?
http://www.firstworldwar.com/a.....auchat.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chauchat
That’s “Herr” Paul H. to you, mein freund.
Nevertheless, I found your comment eerily prescient. How did you know my middle initial was a “V”, anyway?
Based on this historical role model (rather than a Prussian one):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vincent_de_Paul
Since we’re summoning the spirits of the dead here today, let’s hope his peaceful visage (rather than the grim and warlike Herr Feldmarschall) will be the one to watch over all the peoples resident on the Korean peninsula.
Like the recent KF-16 crash where they blamed it on the engine, spending half the report talking about how it was American made, nevermind who maintained it and flew it.
Ignorance of the press strikes again! The F-16’s were built on the peninsula under license. The engines are another story. It’s a great idea to blame g-lock on the engine, we buy it!
Paul H.,
I figured you were wise enough to take that as a compliment.
Capt BBQ,
Amen. The Chauchat is the biggest piece of shite weapon I can think of. When I went to Sandhurst in 1997, the British officer cadets weren’t that fond of their own SA-80, though, and many swore it was the worst weapon ever.
RailwayCharm,
I’d blame the Frogs on it.
#26 cptbbq:
I meant this rifle, specifically: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M.....ield_rifle
I thought I knew that this was the one item of equipment the US produced in sufficient quantity to arm all of its WWI soldiers; however, looks like I was wrong about that, at least acc to the wiki article:
“….By the time of U.S. entry into World War I, 843,239 [M1903 Springfields]… had been produced at Springfield Armory and Rock Island Arsenal. The demands of the war, however, spurred the production of an additional 265,620, still not nearly enough to train and arm American troops. This prompted production of 2.5 million of the U.S. Model of 1917 (M1917 Enfield), also in .30-06 caliber, but from British (Enfield) P13 and later P14 rifle designs. Most US soldiers were in fact armed with M1917 rifles during the conflict…”
Paul H.,
I don’t think it was guilt. I thought about this quite a bit and came to the conclusion that the Japanese bribe has kept the US Forces in Korea for this long.
I believe the Japanese war criminals became the underground bosses of Japan and controlled the country as well as Korea. These were very shrewd men. They have used money and women to turn Washington politicians to their way.
One of their objectives is to keep ground forces in Korea. This ensured that the war between the US and the USSR would have happened in Korea and not in Japan. When the cold war was over, they kept the troops as the protection against NK and China. However, recently the Chinese money made inroad into Washington and overwelhming the Japanese money. As the Chinese wish, the US is pulling troops from Korea.
Another typical Japanese wish may have been to sell their cars in lower price in the US, totally detrimental to the US automobile industry. Reagan may have been the biggest receipient of this money. Remember $2 millions for 30 minute speech?
No, Baduk, I don’t really believe it’s guilt that keeps the American ground force presence in Korea. That was an indulgent bit of sarcasm on my part, probably recognized as such by most others here; nevertheless, I should have refrained from it, to whatever extent that it actually deceived you as to what I truly think. I did you a disservice by such indulgence, since I believe you to be a straightforward person without any guile in his nature.
I would agree that the economic interests of Japan, ROK, and the US are an overriding consideration, one that puts enormous pressure on the US government to leave the US military defense arrangements for NE Asia more or less “as is”. These interests make an overwhelming argument for preserving “stability” in NE Asia, in order to allow peaceful trade to proceed; I wouldn’t put the matter in the way you do (you seem to imply it’s all a matter of rather crude bribery).
But I believe Truman made his original decision to intervene in the “Korean civil war” on a straightforward moral basis, one of opposing tyrannical communism; so IMO any continued alliance with ROK must ultimately find its strength in a moral foundation.
I believe it’s enervating (and ultimately degrading) — to both sides –if the US continues to carry the major weight of the defense burden for its allies — particularly if such a burden is one which they are unwilling to assume for themselves.
It’s really a mystery to me as to what ROK citizens (as opposed to “Koreans”) truly believe, deep in their hearts. Are they really willing to fight and risk their lives for their republic, or is their true allegiance to some mystical greater concept of Korean “volk” (in the cultural/sociological/racial sense of the word)?
As an American I really don’t have any sympathy for others mystical sense of racial nationalism, though they’re entitled to it if they want. But to the extent our continued presence in Korea allows the Koreans to put off resolving this dilemma for themselves, we do them (and us) a disservice.
But if I have to bet, I don’t believe anything is going to fundamentally change in the current US-ROK defense arrangements, anytime soon. I just hope we (US, Japan, ROK) can “make” it through the next decade or so; right now we (meaning the US) are dependent each day on the continued “rationality” of the North Korean regime, something that doesn’t make me very comfortable.
If Kim Jong Il and/or his ruling elite decide to wake up tommorrow morning and conduct another mass Scud missile test — and something goes wrong — we’re liable to have another major war on our hands. Just because this hasn’t happened for 55 years or so doesn’t mean that the danger isn’t a terrible one.
Korea is a small country. Korean people cannot afford to have any “resolve”; they have to line up to the winning side, to survive another day.
Right now, it is a public knowledge that the US is pulling out of Korea by constantly reducing the troop strength. Koreans are re-aligning to the Chinese side. If the US kept up the resolve about protecting South Korea, then this would not have happened. However, Koreans did misbehave just right time that the US had strong interest elsewhere, namely the middle east. Therefore, things are moving the way they are moving. Korean people are exposed to harm’s way in the big way, even though average Koreans have no idea how bad it will be in very near future(5 years).
And, while pulling the US troops out of Korea, don’t look back. North Korea is basically a local problem. It is a problem mainly for South Korea and Japan. NK missiles cannot reach the US. Besides, China is the owner of NK. When NK does do anything bad, we can hold China responsible for not jerking the chain. It is difficult for the US public to understand this type of “master-slave” relationship between countries but it exists as it has during the Cold War communism.
Yes, Baduk, I wholeheartedly agree with you on this issue. Do not get my criticism in the other thread wrong. Although I strongly disagree with you on the issue of the prevalence of “racism”, many comments you write about other topics are very much in point.
Baduk, I meant our disagreement in this thread:
http://www.rjkoehler.com/2007/.....rth-korea/
At the very end of the thread, to be more specific.
#58
Paul H.:
I don’t know…we really didn’t make much fuss about the Iranian Scud party, although they are next on the chopping block.
Then again, maybe timing is everything.
I couldn’t read the Iranina Scud Party link text since it was in Korean, but I think all those particular Iranian Scud tests were done within Iranian territory, no? In one of their vast desert areas, presumably.
If they’d fired several of them into the Persian Gulf, on the fourth of July, in order to have them splash down halfway towards US bases in Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar — I strongly suspect there’d have been “a bit more fuss” about the matter.
Did you know that even during the heighth of the Cold War, when he US and USSR were testing ICBM’s, they never fired a test one towards each other’s territory? In fact there’s an international protocol requiring notification of such tests when they are conducted over international waters, so that shipping can be warned; the North Koreans ignored this, of course, and this accounted for a big part of the attention that got paid to them.
What if one had hit a Japanese merchant ship, or even a US warship, conducting normal operations in the Sea of Japan (ok, the East Sea)? Sounds “laughable” as it’s long long odds, but of course it was long odds too that a US nuclear submarine would do an emergency surface for some on-board visitors near Hawaii and then just happen to come up right underneath that Japanese fishing vessel.
As far as the “chopping block”, I don’t think there’s going to be any US attack on Iran, anymore than I think there will be a US attack on North Korea. I think the world is going to have to learn to live with the eventual Iranian possession of nuclear weapons, at least until/unless they use one on somebody.
The Euros aren’t really worried about it, anymore than the South Koreans are worried about the North’s nukes/missiles, because they think deep down inside that it’s a US problem and they will always be able to get a free ride from the US defense shield. That happens to be another bubble of complacency that badly needs puncturing.
Fantasy,
As an European growing up in HongKong, you may not have encountered much racism. Since your skin color is associated with the rich and the educated, you have been treated better. Now, if you had been from an African country…
In America, as an Asian growing up in Brooklyn NY in 80s, I did hear some whites, mostly Italians and the Irish, make racistic remarks about Orientals. Things are much better now. I have to thank my black brothers for that. As they move up in America, all other races benefit. Whenever I hear Rev. King’s speech, I weep inside. Yes, all men are created equal.
When I served in the US Navy (as an officer) and worked for the US Government as a scientist, I did again encountered racistic remarks and attitudes. Much more so than my high school days in Brooklyn.
Racism is a basic human instint coming from the herd instinct. One bonds faster with someone who looks like you. It is natural.
Many foreigners in Korea may encounter racism, especially if you are of a darker skin color. Koreans associated “white” skin color as the mark of the wealth and the high education even among Koreans. Women with whiter skin color are deemed of “higher class”.
“Women with whiter skin color are deemed of “higher class”.”
This phenomenon is not limited to Korea but may be widespread throughout the world. I remember coming across this idea amongst Canadian Indians (natives) where lighter-skinned is considered better (darker skinned natives are often ‘teased’ about it). And I’ve heard that many blacks would prefer to be more light-skinned. Is it only whites that like to get a tan?
It seems that most Korean and Japanese women avoid the sun because they don’t want to risk darkening their skin (maybe they’ve also heard about the damage that the sun supposedly does). I know that my wife hates the sun and frets about being a bit darker than other Koreans on average despite my exhortations that it doesn’t matter. I also remember having a very dark student who I think felt uncomfortable at being considered a ‘country boy’ by the other students because of his accent and dark skin.
I’m not saying it is right or fair to judge on skin color, but it does seem to be a common perception amongst some non-whites.
#41, Baduk’s comment:
“As a European growing up in Hong Kong, you may not have encountered much racism. Since your skin color is associated with the rich and the educated, you have been treated better. Now, if you had been from an African country….”
Baduk,
I sure see your point, and I agree with most of what you say in your above-mentioned comment.
Let me, however, please point out to you that, if you saw me, you would not regard me as “White”, nor did the majority of people in Asia regard me as “White” - in Singapore, the place to where our family moved from Hong Kong at the end of 1977, and where we stayed until 1985, I was generally regarded as an “Indian”. Although this classification is incorrect, I regarded it as an honour to be described in this way, as I admire the Indian culture. I even dyed my hair (which is naturally dark-brown) to let it appear pitch-black so that I would resemble the real Indians even more.
In the American terminology of race, which has no equivalence in the languages of Continental Europe, I would probably be regarded as a “Caucasian with colour”. Over here Germany, however, nobody of any social standing has even been thinking of introducing a scheme for such a classification, thus nobody bothers me with inappropriate questions (which I would refuse to reply to, and did refuse to answer in Britain where, due to the cultural proximity to the US, the “race distinction virus” seems to be taking root.
The entire issue is simply a non-starter in the whole of Continental Europe, as “race” is not regarded as a suitable criterion for distinction, whereas culture, meaning the ability to speak a language at near-native speaker level and the knowledge of the “unwritten rules”, customs and conventions which bind a society together, very much is. Many immigrants over here face serious integration problems as they do not manage to adapt to the culture.
However, East Asian and Subsaharan African immigrants actually seem to be doing considerably BETTER than those with a lighter skin (e.g. Turks, Arabs, Kazakh or Russians (the vast majority of the latter group are actually of German extraction, but that does not seem to help at all for their integration into German society - due to their apparent inability to adapt, members of this immigrant group have a disproportionate tendancy to turn to crime to make a living. It is therefore understandable that they are not very popular with those already resident and established in this country, irrespective of race or ethnicity. So, what does this tell you ?
Clarification:
I meant that the vast majority of those Kazakhs and Russians WHO MIGRATE TO GERMANY are of German extraction - I did obviously not mean that the vast majority of all Kazakhs and Russians are of German extraction; both countries are populated by an ethnically diverse population.
But it is those of German extraction who tend to come to Germany as they fall prey to the fallacy that, due to their genetic similarity to the German population, they would fit in nicely in this country. Alas, this is wishful thinking, indeed…
“Racism is a basic human instinct coming from the herd instinct. One bonds faster with someone who looks like you. It is natural.”
I know that this idea is widespread in North America but it runs counter to my own experience.
Baduk,
please remember that, in my comment in the other thread which you are referring to in your reply above, I talked about all the French-speakers in my school in Hong Kong hanging out together ?
These French speakers came from such a diverse range of countries like France, Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauretania, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Cameroon, Congo…
Some were White, some were Arabs, some were Black, some were Polynesians, all spoke French.
This is the common factor that made them bond easily. Race really played no part in it.
Similar case for the Hispanics btw.
Of course, there are other aspects of a culture than merely language. But language is the most important point - and a common language frequently (though not always) leads to similar cultural beliefs, as is the case with the various Anglo-Saxon countries. For me as a German, it was quite interesting to realise the extensive cultural similarities of countries w´hich share the same national language, even if they are oceans apart, e.g Canada and New Zealand. Were it not for their common language the connections between these two countries would probably not be very strong. And Québec retains its close connection to France, despite not having been ruled from Paris since 1760…
As for me, who should I bond with, according to your opinion ?
My answer: I am trying to bond with all those who are friendly and open-minded, irrespective of their race. The problem is that there are stimm many racists. And do believe it, I’ve met a lot more “Yellow” racists than “white” ones, despite the fact that I am clearly not white.
That should have read:
The problem is that there are still many racists. And do believe it, I’ve met a lot more “Yellow” racists than “White” ones, despite the fact that I am clearly not white (in the view of people to whom race matters) and was regarded as a South Asian (and thus a fellow Asian) by some Asians. But, in the Singaporean environment that constellation worked out fine - I was really regarded as a native !
“Women with whiter skin color are deemed of “higher class”.
Also this statement does not really hold true in Europe, where, generally, southern European females are regarded as the most beautiful. The average German male (those ones who are not interested in looking for wifes too far away from home) would rather start their search in Italy, Spain, or Greece than in the Netherlands, Norway, or Sweden.