B.R Myers has penned an absolutely brilliant op-ed for the WSJ’s Opinion Journal on why South Korea is soft on North Korea—it’s the ideology, stupid. Be sure to read it in its entirety (it’s short, anyway). Here’s is some of what to expect:
This support [from South Korea to the North] is not meant to expedite unification, which South Koreans are happy to put off indefinitely. Nor has it much to do with concern for starving children; by now everyone knows where the “humanitarian” aid really goes. No, the desire to help North Korea derives in large part from ideological common ground. South Koreans may chuckle at the personality cult, but they generally agree with Pyongyang that Koreans are a pure-blooded race whose innate goodness has made them the perennial victims of rapacious foreign powers. They share the same tendency to regard Koreans as innocent children on the world stage–and to ascribe evil to foreigners alone. Though the North expresses itself more stridently on such matters, there is no clear ideological divide such as the one that separated West and East Germany. Bonn held its nose when conducting Ostpolitik. Seoul pursues its sunshine policy with respect for Pyongyang.
Nobody has ever put it better. I’m a realist, which means I understand how states might support unsavory regimes when it’s in their interests to do so. I’m assuming that all the U.S. taxpayer money being pumped into Saudi Arabia and Pakistan isn’t going there because we like said regimes. But with the Sunshine Policy, frankly, half the time it seems accompanied on the Southern side by some twisted sense of moral inferiority vis-a-vis North Korea. It sure as hell ain’t accompanied by the kind of confidence you’d expect from a nation with an economy some 30 times larger than the North’s and a vibrant democratic culture. Of course, views of the North and North Koreans are complicated, and they’ll grow even more so as the two sides learn more about one another, but I don’t think it’s too much of an exaggeration to say that among those quarters of society that gave birth to the Sunshine Policy, there is a very real admiration for North Korea’s rabid nationalism—yeah, people are eating tree bark, but at least they didn’t sell out to The Man.
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So the perennial “innocent children on the world stage” routine allows them to abdicate any responsibility for their own actions, freeing them up to blame foreigners for whatever troubles beset them, and conversely to take full credit for any achievements made with the assistance of foreigners.
Sounds about right, another “self-licking ice cream cone.” Although I think that some kind of Stockholm syndrome on S.K.’s part also explains the unmonitored aid.
Yeah Robert, he’s making a good point in that little essay, a point that has some validity, but it’s just one block of the Mosaic — there are still other factors behind South Korea’s policy and behavior, such as giving highest priority to avoiding another mega-destructive war. A lot of people agree with that even if they think the nationalist/brotherhood arguments are ridiculous.
Ironic, isn’t it, that the North Korea leadership, born in opposition to Japanese imperialism, has ended up with a very close copy of Japanese fascism as the justification for its rule…?
Like that Dongmakkeol movie where the pure Korean spirit is represented by the child-like girl in white.
Ironic, isn’t it, that the North Korea leadership, born in opposition to Japanese imperialism, has ended up with a very close copy of Japanese fascism as the justification for its rule…?
Well, I think I posted about that already but here in Japan it is quite known that Kim Il-Song has taken the Great Japanese Empire as a example in making his own regime.
Years ago, during the first NK missile crisis, there was a news show in Japan disscussing whether Kim Jong-Il is serious with development of missiles and nuclear weapon. Most of the attendant at that time said that it was just a bluff, that the NK would never have the nerve to go to war, as they surely must knew that the result of such a suicidal attack is the collapse of the NK regime.
A university professors who is a expert about NK then explained how the NK regime was built upon the model of the Japanese Empire, and asked “What did the Japanese Empire in december 1941 in a similar situation?”
After that nobody was talking anymore that Kim Jong-Il was just bluffing.
The joke is really on them though because most of the world could care less about the Koreas except Koreans.
1. There is a constant threat from Kim Jongil that unless SK makes payments he will do a limited attack.
2. Sometimes, SK is late. Then, the WestSea intrusion or random gun firing in DMZ happens. SK pays.
3. Now, Kim has a nuke. He will milk SK to the max with this fact. SK may have to pay more in coming years. A lot more. Even the half of its national budget.
4. It started when Kim DaeJung visited NK and promised to pay the Communists in exchange for peace. He was stupid. Black mail perpeturator always wants more. This is why the US would never talk to terrorists.
5. Kim Jongil with his whetted appetite for SK money will demand more next year. When SK does not oblige, he will do more limited attacks. SK has no recourse but to pay.
6. New president, be it LeeMyengbak or Gohgun, has to pay. He cannot risk a war. Since Kim DaeJung and Rho Muhyen set bad precedencies of paying to this terrorist, he will have to continue this bad policy.
oh, Christ. I agree with Baduk.
sorry marm, but don’t you think it’s a little bit biased when he doesn’t spend one sentence mentioning the very obvious fear of war?
It makes it seem like all that money and rice goes to North Korea, because South Korean population likes Juche. Seem a bit… autoerotic to me.
Fear of war - is much diminished now, along with North Korea’s military capabilities, and most South Korean utterances reflect that. Back when Seoul took a hardline stance, the threat was actually there.
I wonder if B.R. Meyers wil have contract renewal problems or visa issues.
Slim,
You are wrong. Let’s look at what happened in VietNam.
After Paris peace talk, the US started to withdraw from Nam. Feeling guilty, the US gave Namese hugh amount of military hardware. So much so that Nam ranked the fourth in the world in terms of military capability.
Fourth! Right after US, Russia and China.
However, VietCong spies in Nam started to attack the government. Young people skip military service and fled to oversees. Poor people demonstrated every day against the government.
When VietCong attacked, no soldiers were standing to fight. The whole defense collapsed. VietCong won easily.
This will happen in South Korea as well. When SK is sabotaged by Commies from inside, military will be weakened. People will lean toward NK and China as the US withdraws.
KJI may unite the whole Korea under him before he dies.
I agree with slim that the Nork’s military is diminished but it does not excuse the idiocy of our Dear South Korean Leader in throwing away a significant ally for nothing. Of the three powers, only America does not desire an actual permanant zip code. Baduk is right that the payouts will have to continue even under the next president. Realistically, payouts are better than having another a run of the Won and perhaps the collaspe of the Kosdaq (I kid you not, the entire equity of the Kosdaq could easily be absorbed by Korea’s neighbors . . . and maybe be better in the long run). Korea is screwed because you have to continue to make payments to the North until they collaspe, which is a disinvestment and waste of productivity. Upon collapse hell breaks loose.
The last that I had heard of Myers until now was an article in — I think — Korea University’s Granite Tower student magazine, where he was quoted as saying that some students considered him conservative for criticizing North Korea but that his actual politics tended toward the Green Party.
I figured that he’d get tenure, given his language skills, his scholarly abilities, and his intelligence.
Since then — and that must have been in 2005 — he seems to have taught at two different universities, the latter being in Busan, where he’s currently located.
So … I guess that he didn’t get tenure. I wonder why.
My life and Myers’s have twice intersected — earlier in Tuebingen and recently at Korea University — but we’ve never met.
Jeffery Hodges
* * *
“…I’m assuming that all the U.S. taxpayer money being pumped into Saudi Arabia and Pakistan isn’t going there because we like said regimes…”
As regards Saudi Arabia, this may be one area where I have somewhat more knowledge than anyone else here (though in the best spirit of the “blogosphere”, I’m always ready for informed corrections).
If your reference to “US taxpayer money” means US military advice/assistance to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I can assure you from personal knowledge that the Saudis pay their own way for everything.
I was told at the time I was there that this US military assistance/ advisory effort was unique in the world in this regard. To include KSA reimbursing the US treasury for the base salaries of US advisors during their tour, from the day they arrive to the day they leave (there are, or were, two separate “subsets” of these, due to the unique arrangement of the Saudi ground forces).
All the equipment of the US advisors is “paid for by the King”, as we used to flippantly say. To include housing, vehicles, furniture, personal use items such as stationary, and even our LBE (load bearing equipment, the slang/acronym for the web belt/harness combination with canteens etc hanging on it).
Same thing for US Air Force/Navy/USMC advisory efforts, admittedly these were fairly small efforts compared to the Army one. Though I think the USAF advisory effort was particularly important, due to the need for advice/assistance with the Saudis’ extensive purchase of US aircraft.
I’ll caveat by saying this is pre-1995 experience, though I doubt if the “reimbursement to the US treasury” status has changed. At one time some US military advisors in KSA were accompanied by their families (a 2 year tour, as opposed to the one year tour for unaccompanied (male) military advisors). In this regard, the “tour” arrangement for US military advisors in KSA was very similar to what exists (existed?) in USFK (US combat forces in ROK do a one-year unaccompanied tour, while I think that other support/logistics US military further south in ROK can do a two year tour accompanied by families — or at least this used to be the case, as far as I know it still stands).
I’ve lost touch with the actualities of US military advisory efforts in KSA since 1995, but I’m pretty sure US military families there would have been pulled out following the car bombing of a US military advisory HQ in Riyadh (my old HQ), in late 94 (Nov?) or 95, can’t remember the exact date. However, whatever US advisory assistance remains in KSA is certainly still fully funded by “the King”.
Same thing applies with any US equipment purchased for their armed forces — KSA pays its own way. Interestingly, the Saudis generally seemed to follow a philosophy of “not putting their eggs in one basket”, so you would/will often find a mix of different Western military equipment used by their ground armed forces (German and Belgian rifles, Belgian and US mortars, and a real diverse mixture of many different US/Euro trucks/ light vehicles/ armored cars/ tanks; I think some of the trucks/utility vehicles were Swiss or even Austrian).
Mostly US aircraft though, and they insist on the best first-line models, I think it’s a prestige issue. No second-tier equipment, or surplus US “hand-me-downs” for them, and they pay “retail” price for it. Even here though, the “diversification” issue may now be coming into play, as I see where recently in the news the issue of Saudi purchase of Tornado (EU, German-British-Italian consortium) fighter-bomber aircraft was being discussed (I think the deal fell through on a bribery issue but don’t recall the details offhand).
All this didn’t make for logistical and training efficiency for the various KSA armed forces IMHO, but it was their adamant choice, for what we used to speculate was mainly political reasons (both foreign and domestic).
So it’s always interesting to me to compare/contrast what I read here (and on GI Korea’s board) about similar debates/military policy issues, as regards ROK and the good old US of A.
I’m less knowledgeable about the economic sphere, but I tried to do some background reading while I was in KSA (and since) — and it’s my impression that the Kingdom has never taken a dime of any US economic assistance.
Prior to the formation of KSA in the 1920’s, the Saud family’s traditional power base was centered on Riyadh, which is located on a large desolate high plateau in the eastern center part of the modern country. They did not rule in the western area, where the religious cities are; this area was closely controlled by the Turks, until they were expelled during WWI by local Hashemite forces (not the British)(ref: the Lawrence of Arabia movie which is pretty historically accurate, that’s NOT the Saud clan depicted in the movie but rather Hashemites (ancestral family of King Abdullah of Jordan) and other local Hejazi tribes).
The western province was then briefly held by the Hashemites after WWI, until the founder of the modern Saud dynasty (Abdul-Aziz, died 1952 or 3) chased them out, with some fighting but mostly by the adept use of tribal diplomacy.
The Turks never really subjugated the Riyadh plateau/area, though they evidently mounted a punitive expedition into there sometime in the 1820’s or 1830’s. And — neither did anyone else ever subjugate it, for the very good reason that there was nothing there of interest; remember, no one knew about the oil until the late 1930’s.
Though of course the desert tribes were fierce fighters, and it was far easier for the Turks (and the British outposts in the Persian Gulf) to pay an annual “donation” to the various tribes (gold, sometimes accompanied by rifles and ammo as during WWI) than to maintain large standing military forces to fight in the extraordinarily difficult terrain.
I mention all this to emphasize that the Saudis “pulled themselves up by the own bootstraps” to form their own country, so to speak. They were never subject to “colonization” of any sort, something in which they undoubtedly take great (if quiet) pride.
And also one reason (of many) for their modern political longetivity (as compared to several other now-extinct post WWI and WWII Arab monarchies). This presents a distinct point of contrast with Korea; one of the advantages to me of reading this blog for the last few years is learning about the Korean antipathy for the Japanese, which I guess I knew about intellectually before, but you have to see (read about in my case) personal examples to really “learn it” in your gut (ie, the cutting off of ears and fingers, etc).
The past is never really dead, is it? It keeps coming back to life, in unexpected ways and unexpected places.
the chance that there will be a war on this peninsula is about the same percentage that all muslims will embrace israel and middle east peace will occur
north korea will not start a war period!!!
the US and SK will not start a war period!!
that argument about SK doing all this to stop another war is weak matter of fact its insulting to anyone with an ounce of common sense becase lets face the facts
everyone knows the aide the north receives goes to its military forces and nuclear program so you are aiding to build up a military force that you think will not attack you if you continue to give aide!!!
absurd logic
what we have here is over the past 20 years is the apologetic feelings many SK’s have towards being everything that NK isnt
that reflects in this blind and ignorant views of reality in north korea
how many NK defectors have to tell you what they experienced up there to convince you that the place sucks
Not only is it unusual that a hogwon jockey has an op-ed piece published in the WSJ, it’s unusual that it makes more sense than most editorial pieces written about Korea.
KJI has his nukes as regime maintenance weapons, so he won’t get attacked. Nuclear weapons have utility in the threat of their use, not in their actual use. If Kim really used one he’d get blown straight to Mars and it would not matter who the US president was either. I think many South Koreans grudgingly admire the Nork’s proclivity to give the US and Japan ‘the finger’ and get away with it. But miscontruing that as love or support for the Nork regime is a mistake IMHO. The money sent north is sent in a vain attempt to get leverage with the KJI regime. Originally an innovative idea, but one which has not paid off. Once the Uri dang nitwits are out of power, I think that the next government in Seoul is going to seriously scale back these payments.
Hm… Doggbert, I am sort of unsure whether “hogwon jockey” is a good description of a person with PhD in Korean literature (a very obscure part of it) from a major Western school, especially if this person is also one of the most prominent/controvercial crtitics of the American literary establishment (yes, for Myers the NK studies is a side show, so he usually writes for the Atlantic on the modern English prose, not for WSJ on the NK politics). If this is the case, my humble self is defibitely a “hogwon jockey” too :-)).
http://opinionjournal.com/taste/?id=110002198
Well, his analysis is rather one-dimensional. There are other motivating factors. For one, the South Korean government continues sending food aid, despite knowing that it is being horded by the North Korean military, because they view it as a deterrent to a Chinese invasion. A common dirty trick in Korean politics is to label a politician as being anti-reunification, which implies that the politician is somewhat unpatriotic. Consequently, turning a blind eye to the North’s indiscretions is often viewed as a good political move. Besides, keeping all that subsidized rice in warehouses is costly. It’s simply cheaper to send it up North.
Think of the aid as a way to subsidize Korean industries. South Korea was forced to open its borders to rice imports, chemical fertilizers are less popular as consumer demand for organically grown produce increases…As Brendon pointed out in a previous thread, any loses incured while investing in North Korea is guaranteed by the South Korean government.
Someguyinkorea makes a couple of good points - particularly the leverage the NORKS get out of the ROK’s worry that the DPRK’s collapse will result in the loss of significant amounts of national territory to the Chinese.
Still, to acknowledge that there are many factors at work is only the perspective of the fox. Myers is the hedgehog who knows the one big thing.
Meyers’ essay has motivated me to say some things that are not particularly popular with several folks around here. For examples, the thinking many sensible people when dealing with a seemingly insensible situation of North Korea prevails — such as constructive engagement with Pyongyang. As rationale as that may be, I am pretty sceptical that approach will work.
We are not talking about the North Korean problem and our challenge is not getting China and others to help Pyongyang come around to a more realistic, positive position. Rather, we are dealing with a Korean problem in which we cannot expect successful results when dealing with two Korean governments playing games with the rest of the world on one level and concurrently engaging in an entirely separate field of play between themselves on a different level.
In other words, that the US and the rest of the world should hold Korea, regardless of its divisions, responsible for what goes on the entire peninsula.
For example, an alternative policy may be for the US to break off all engagement with the DPRK and publicly declare that it recognizes the ROK as the only legitimate, democratically elected and functioning government on the Korean peninsula. And as such, the US recognizes the ROK’s territory to also encompass what is currently being occupied by a well entrenched organized crime family north of the DMZ. Accordingly, all aid for all parts of the Korean peninsula would be channeled through Seoul. At the same time, Seoul would be held accountable for all activities — including criminal activities that take place within its overall territory, starting with the Yalu River and on south to Chejudo.
Now, obviously this position would not be welcomed by Pyongyang nor Seoul. Yet, such a policy would signal to both Korean capitals that the world has grown tired of this half-century of impasse and it’s now time for the Koreans to get a full grip on their own responsibilities and duties — and not simply blame the rest of the world for their dilemma.
If acted upon, this would be a radical turn in American diplomacy, so there is no chance of it happening. But a threat of something like it by American diplomats with their counterparts both in Pyongyang and Seoul could serve as a catalyst to get matters beyond the current stalemate.
Meyers’ essay has motivated me to say some things that are not particularly popular with several folks around here. For examples, the thinking many sensible people when dealing with a seemingly insensible situation of North Korea prevails — such as constructive engagement with Pyongyang. As rational as that may be, I am pretty sceptical that approach will work.
We are not talking about the North Korean problem and our challenge is not getting China and others to help Pyongyang come around to a more realistic, positive position. Rather, we are dealing with a Korean problem in which we cannot expect successful results when dealing with two Korean governments playing games with the rest of the world on one level and concurrently engaging in an entirely separate field of play between themselves on a different level.
In other words, that the US and the rest of the world should hold Korea, regardless of its divisions, responsible for what goes on the entire peninsula.
For example, an alternative policy may be for the US to break off all engagement with the DPRK and publicly declare that it recognizes the ROK as the only legitimate, democratically elected and functioning government on the Korean peninsula. And as such, the US recognizes the ROK’s territory to also encompass what is currently being occupied by a well entrenched organized crime family north of the DMZ. Accordingly, all aid for all parts of the Korean peninsula would be channeled through Seoul. At the same time, Seoul would be held accountable for all activities — including criminal activities that take place within its overall territory, starting with the Yalu River and on south to Chejudo.
Now, obviously this position would not be welcomed by Pyongyang nor Seoul. Yet, such a policy would signal to both Korean capitals that the world has grown tired of this half-century of impasse and it’s now time for the Koreans to get a full grip on their own responsibilities and duties — and not simply blame the rest of the world for their dilemma.
If acted upon, this would be a radical turn in American diplomacy, so there is no chance of it happening. But a threat of something like it by American diplomats with their counterparts both in Pyongyang and Seoul could serve as a catalyst to get matters beyond the current stalemate.
What about the South Koreans that opposed the “Sunshine Policy” and continue to oppose the Roh administration’s appeasement policies? Did the reason he gives magically appear with the 386 generation, since the vast majority of those before (i.e., the generation dying out currently) most certainly would (did) not approve? What about the South Koreans involved in helping North Korean refugees in China, etc.? The “pure blooded race” gibberish certainly is the reason for some, but Myers uses “they” with too little qualification – chalking up the present form of engagement/appeasement to Korean nationalism/racism as accepted by an entire population is just too simplistic and conveniently ignores the above.
I take “they” to be the decisionmakers and implementers of ROK policy since the advent of the Sunshine Policy, which is the scope of Meyers’ brief essay. I don’t think he claims to capture the views of all 48 million South Koreans, only the ones who set the North Korean policy that sticks in the throat of the outside world.
Well, Sprewer, he chose to omit quite a few facts in order to give strenght to his argument (besides, South and North Korea are neither Turkey or Iran). As Richardson points out,it appears he neglects to consider a variety of socio-economic factors, such as the generational gap, religion, and political and economic concerns.
If I was to make gross generalisations based on my own observations, I’d say South Koreans are now mostly against the Sunshine Policy and the deliveries of food aid to North Korea. When I ask my friends and family about the Sunshine Policy, they all concur that it’s a waste of ressources, for one reason or another.
Addtionally, when I approached the subject with my students in the last few months, fewer students were in favor of it than in past years. Most of them described North Korea’s nuclear test as stepping over the line.
Tomcoyner, you write well and eloquently. but you might as well advise that we build castles in the sky.
You wrote, “In other words, that the US and the rest of the world should hold Korea, regardless of its divisions, responsible for what goes on the entire peninsula.”
In case you haven’t been reading the news, “the rest of the world” is kinda cheesed at us. The “rest of the world” I assume, you mean countries like EU countries who are not supporting us on Iraq/Iran. Places like China and Russia who actually agree with South Korean instead of us. Places like South America where anti-american Chavez’s rhetoric resonates. Places like Africa whose policies don’t really affect anyone. So who is this “rest of the world” are you talking about? Oh, we can’t forget the vast Islamic countries who have our most loyal undying support.
You wrote,
“For example, an alternative policy may be for the US to break off all engagement with the DPRK and publicly declare that it recognizes the ROK as the only legitimate, democratically elected and functioning government…”
What do you think Chris Hill is doing now? Don’t you think our current policy is your so-called “alternative” policy?
You wrote,
“Accordingly, all aid for all parts of the Korean peninsula would be channeled through Seoul.”
when we don’t send any aid to DPRK, effectively, all aid is being channeled through Seoul since they are the only ones sending anything. Oh, i forget, the “rest of the world” aka, China, also send them stuff.
You wrote,
“At the same time, Seoul would be held accountable for all activities — including criminal activities that take place within its overall territory, starting with the Yalu River and on south to Chejudo.”
Oh yeah. Great idea. “Hey Roh Moo Hyun, you are counterfeiting US currency at BDA. What? You won’t send troops to Pyong Yang to stop them? Well, I’m imposing a sanction on you!” If we kept listening to your advice we’ll probably see a unified communized Korea under Roh Moo Hyun’s dictatorship.
You wrote,
“Yet, such a policy would signal to both Korean capitals that the world has grown tired of this half-century of impasse and it’s now time for the Koreans to get a full grip on their own responsibilities”
hahahahaha… This is my favorite part. Because well, I guess Kim Jong Il and Roh Moo Hyun just did’t really understand that they pissed off big Mommy and Daddy, aka USA and “Rest of the World”. I guess putting all the burden of diplomacy on South Korea, this would “signal” to them that we are really really mad. They are sure to understand our anger now!
I will end my annoying attack on you by saying regardless of what you recommend or not, KJI’s days are numbered. But becareful of what you wish for, because the solution may not look so pretty.
Mcnut,
how the hell would you know KJI is not going to charge in?
I mean, it doesn’t seem to make sense, but then again, I thought he would be incredibly stupid to pop the nuke. And guess what? He got away with it clean. He might think that he can actually use it in war against ROK and get away with it as long as US is not in the picture. And he is doing a fantastic job cleaving the alliance.
Look at the man’s historical record. His closest family members die from mysterious circumstances. His defector nephew gets capped by him in Seoul. His niece hangs herself in Paris. His mistresses die from diseases in exile. His oldest son takes a trip to Japan’s disneyland in what appears to be a defection attempt. He has a screwed family. This is what he does to his OWN family. Don’t you think that qualifies someone as being clinically f*9ked up?
Now let’s look at his historical provocation against South Korea. He sent agents to assassinate South Korean presidents so often I lost count. Let’s try to count them all. He sent in a commando unit to the Blue House, they reached the fu&*n’ gates. He sent assassins and planted a bomb in Burma to wipe out Chun Doo Hwan. He sent snipers to kill Park CHung Hee, but he missed and killed his wife. Let’s go to his other acts of terrorism. He sent hundreds of commandos to communize a ROK island, killing a young boy. He blew up KAL airline to spoil the 1988 Olympics. He sent in numerous midget submarines landing commandos who killed ROK civillians.
IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, THESE ACTIONS WOULD HAVE SPARKED A WAR. This is what KJI is capable of doing. What this tells me is that KJI is NOT afraid of war.
What about the fact that KJI power elite are all soldiers? These are people who have all been trained by people’s army veterans who launched a SURPRISE attack against ROK. Notice the number of tanks in DPRK arsenal? Tanks were the main reason why DPRK won a blitzkrieg. They are not preparing for a defense war. Notice their number of special forces, aka guerilla fighters, underground bunkers,& tunnels? They are not planning to fight US airforce.
You think he is pulling off brinksmanship now, you just wait until he start to do REALLy screwed up sh17. You’ll see it flying when we start to see news of REAL riots and REAL rebellions ocurring in NK. You think a man who got nothing to lose wouldn’t fire that shot?
History tells us he is capable of it, and our current situation tells us that he might see it as his only option.
I recall thinking as early as the late 1980s that the world would surely tire of the solipsistic Koreans’ internecine feud — a thought that grew stronger after the European revolutions of 1989 and after years of “North-South reconciliation” is my dominant thought about the peninsula.
I think many commenters are trying to pin too much on Meyers’ very brief commentary — which never purports to be a compendium of explanations for South Korean policy — and the resulting criticism misses the mark. The explanatory power he offers stands independent of the popularity of the United States and the sucess/failure of its policies.
To Tom Coyner’s ideas, I would for starters add that if the ROK is going to insist, to the extent of almost ruining FTA talks with the US, that “Made in Kaesong” = “Made in Korea”, then we can extend the argument to “Made in Yongbyon” = “Made in Korea” and ask Seoul to take a fair degree of ownership for other behavior emanating from a Pyongyang regime that the South bankrolls. The ROK of Roh Moo-hyun behaves like a petulant, irresponsible teenager because so far its behavior has brought few consequences.
virtual wonderer, could not have said it better myself. To mcnut, you idiot! Clinton himself said he was 15 minutes away from bombing the Norks and his decision not to is the reason for the mess the South is in. If you don’t belive ask the Marmot, the a**hole who convinced Clinton otherwise is now a professor at Georgetown Univ. The elites in Korea were aghast that there was no heads up from Clinton and rightly so.
Guess the Korean military wasn’t feeling too uri when it wrote this report
Thank you all for reading the piece and taking the time to write your comments. I need hardly point out that an editorial is aimed at advancing a clear point in a very short space. Some may choose to understand “to a large degree” to mean “to the exclusion of other factors,” but that is not what I meant. I might also add that the piece that ran in the original WSJ had “a good deal of respect for Pyongyang” and not just “respect”, which means something slightly different.
Now I see no indication that public support - I repeat, public - for the Sunshine Policy has anything to do with fear of war or Chinese encroachment. The scenario of a North Korean collapse is also something the South Koreans ponder far less often than we do. They say simply “we must help them, they are our brothers,” while at the same time expressing a) an awareness that the aid goes straight to the government and b) a general indifference to the plight of the poorest and most oppressed in the North.
Now on to the question of whether the worldview I described is indeed a majority one.
Considering the enormous loss of life incurred during a war that the North started, and considering the constant violent provocations launched by Pyongyang in the decades that followed, the very fact that South Korea’s dictatorships had to expend so much energy and expense to maintain an anti-North mood in itself serves to back up my main point.
The nature of the propaganda confirms it too. Contrary to popular belief, most of this was not anti-communist in nature. If a shared memory of the North’s invasion would not suffice to override the feeling of ethnic oneness, then anti-communism could hardly be expected to do the trick either. The propaganda was thus aimed at denying the Koreanness of the North Koreans. The DPRK was referred to as the North Monster (북괴), anti-North children’s cartoons showed Koreans fighting monsters, teachers encouraged students to believe that the people there were reds in the pigmentary sense too, and so on. In more sophisticated contexts it was the North’s subservience to a foreign power and an alien worldview that was made most of.
Now, we tend to exaggerate the extent to which the Sunshine Policy gang has spread pro-North propaganda. For the most part it just turned off the spigot of the anti-North stuff, and let ethnocentricity take its course. This is borne out by what South Koreans themselves say. “We grew up believing they had red skins and horns. Then we found out that they’re Korean, just like us. How could they mean us any harm?” That’s all it took!
Bear in mind recent polls indicating that support for the Sunshine Policy now transcends generational and political lines. At most, people want to see a few conditions attached to the aid.
I admit that there are still conservatives with a deep-seated aversion to the North and to the Sunshine Policy - but this is the minority view. I find such an aversion to be stronger among New Right intellectuals, who for the most part are internationalists, than among the Old Right, which has always had an ethnocentric and anti-American streak, as anyone who watched KBS under the Chun or Park regimes will remember.
This raises the question of whether the dictatorships themselves loathed the North Koreans as much as they claimed, or whether they were not primarily using the anti-North mood, like the anti-Japanese mood, for their own ends. The so-called Red Cross talks of the early 1970s - conducted at the absolute peak of anti-North rhetoric! - speak for themselves. Let us not forget that Roh Tae Woo announced his own version of the Sunshine Policy - declaring his intention to treat the North as a partner and not an enemy - less than a year after the North Koreans blew up a South Korean airplane. Never mind how sincere Roh really was, and consider the very fact that such a statement could be made without a public outcry in what was then still a very conservative country.
U said it Koelher.
At least they didn’t sell out to “The Man.”
Hallelujah!
It’s fun to see people run around in circles in this blame game,but(here’s a giant butt sticking out), nothing can be done about this whole issue of “Unification” until China agrees to go along with it. As you remember, Germany wasn’t unified until USSR decided to end their little Evil Empire thingy, and to call it something else few years later under
RasputinPutin, dear soul.Personally, It’s difficult to tell if China is as rational as I think they are, or can be. If I have to be honest, I’m probably wishing more than I care to speculate. Non of what I have read about China recently gives me any reason to hope other than to speculate that they have increasing become more arrogant as their economy has clipped along at an impressive rate.
Translation? They’ll give up North Korea over their dead stinking carcase! After all, Chairman Mao lost his stinking son during the Korean War.
They have issues.
To tell you the truth, I have never seen a time when China ever shrunk? They’re like a typical fat-ass with a proverbial weight problem.
They can’t even lose weight even when they go on a diet; they’ll wake up at night sleepwalking and snack.
What’s a stinking North Korea to them when they have recently goggled up Tibet? If you were to ask these stinking Chinese they’ll probably tell you, “it isn’t the size, it’s the location.”
So much for the “venerable” Chinese and their sense of rationale.
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[...] There is a fourth reason why the P.P. will recover considerable support, and it’s the timeless appeal of nationalism, particularly in Korea (ht). The P.P. leaders, Comrade Chung and (especially) Kim Geun Tae, show no sign of any ethical, political, or financial restraints to stop them from setting new lows in crass appeals to those sentiments, to include anti-Americanism and racial hatred. In 2007, expect the post-Roh Korean left to get meaner and more confident in the purience of such appeals, and that will be even more true in 2008 if it becomes an opposition party. By doing so, the P.P. will survive as a major political force, but not without saddling all of Korea with the consequences of more ugly manifestations of Korea at its worst. [...]
[...] recover considerable support, and it’s the timeless appeal of nationalism, particularly in Korea (ht). The P.P. leaders, Comrade Chung and (especially) Kim Geun Tae, show no sign of any ethical, [...]