The Marmot’s Hole

joshua

Thanks for linking, Robert. I would like to clarify a few points, however. I don’t believe that summarily “cutting the string” is best for either country. Most of Hwang’s arguments are absolutely sensible. Unfortunately, that’s increasingly beside the point. Unless political trends change, we’ll soon find the alliance too constrained by an inhospitable environment to maintain minimal readiness, sustain morale, garner public support at home, or define its own mission. And yes, I realize that some will consider my views alarmist, but I think many people who consider some form of alliance worth preserving ought to be more alarmed than they seem to be.

Let me explain the problem, as I see it, and then try to drill down to the root of it. The Korean population no longer really understands why the alliance still exists or why all those rowdy foreigners are running around joyriding in buses and having sexy dance contests with their girlfriends, beyond the vague notion that their presence provides some economic benefits (ie., necessary evil). The Korean government seems to be doing its best to muddle The Existential Question for perfectly pecuniary reasons, and the U.S. government doesn’t always seem to grasp the depth of our problems (Amb. Vershbow, whom I recently had the privilege of meeting, seems to be an exception). You recently nailed it when you spoke of the Korean government’s tendency to portray itself as a victim that must “endure,” for example, a Free Trade Agreement that would be highly favorable to Korea (speaking of which, I haven’t heard anyone talking about the FTA for some time).

Yes, a peaceful divorce is preferable to where things are headed now – an ugly divorce – but what would be far better would be for the two governments to articulate what the alliance actually does for Korea and the United States. Now, if that’s simply beyond hope, then there probably won’t be an alliance five years from now, no matter how much sense Balbina Hwang makes. In which case, two democracies have exercised their free will, and let’s not entangle the Acheson Line in the shipping lanes as we move it somewhere east of Tokdo.

One self-evident fact is that the alliance can’t last long if the current government continues to actively undermine it, or coddles those who attack it and our soldiers violently. Those issues haven’t really hit home with the American people yet, but if Korea ever calls on America to defend it, I can assure you that those issues will get extensive play. They need to be dealt with now.

At the root of this is the problem that the alliance is still based on a 1960 model that envisions American infantry defending a weak, underdeveloped ally against Commie human waves. I doubt whether the American people (or the Pentagon) are prepared for the depth of brutality we would see on our television screens in Korean War II. If we’ve learned anything from the last few years, it’s the limits of American public support for bloody ground wars, the transitory nature of alliances, the skill of our enemies in exploiting our political weaknesses, and the remarkable power of the J-DAM. If our most potent deterrence comes from the air, sea, and space, why not move the drunken Yankee occupiers from Itaewon and Hongdae to Guam or Ft. Lewis? Or to Kandahar? Or Ramadi? That would still leave a robust naval and air component in Chinhae, Kunsan, and Osan as long as we were still welcome there.

Of course, that won’t be long, either, unless the Korean government exercises more political and diplomatic maturity than this one has.

joshua

Michael, I respectfully disagree. I can’t think of one other nation to which we have a major defense commitment where senior government officials regularly stir up negative sentiment toward us. We have disagreements with Germany, the U.K., and Japan, but senior government officials don’t take part in them publicly.