Tom Plate was underwhelmed by the Korea-U.S. summit.
My only question is, did you really expect anything more, Tom?
Like the “prevailing sentiment” in Seoul mentioned in the column, I was just happy the summit concluded without Roh saying something suicidally stupid or Rummy bitch-slapping any South Korean officials.
Prof. Plate is probably correct on a couple of points:
- Relations between the two Koreas are unlikely to improve until new occupants are in the Blue and White houses. And even then, there’s no guarantees;
- Differences over North Korea is the immediate irritant, although there are greater geopolitical factors as well (see below). It should also be noted that these differences may not go away even if the generally pro-American GNP retakes power. The GNP could well decide it’s in Seoul’s national interest to pursue a policy of engagement the North, although there is also the danger—should GNP hardliners take power in Seoul while the Democrats take back the White House—that South Korea may end up taking a more confrontational stance against the North than Washington. The former, IMHO, is much more likely than the latter, but it needs to be remembered that prior to the Kim Dae-jung administration, South Korean governments traditionally adopted a more belligerent posture against Pyongyang than the United States (although this, too, is complicated);
- The long-term prospects for the Korea-U.S. alliance are further complicated by geopolitical trends in the Asia-Pacific region, namely, the “rise” of China and an increasingly assertive Japan. One day, North Korea will be consigned to the dust bin of history, but China and Japan will always be with us. Much ink has been devoted to Korea’s growing ties with China. Those ties are complex, and are likely to grow even more so. Yes, China is Korea’s largest trading partner. Yes, there are tons of Koreans studying in China. Yes, China has been an attractive target for Korean investments, although attempts by Korean firms to relocate plants to China has met with mixed results. At the same time, China is feared as a potential economic competitor in industries critical to Korea’s economic well-being and a potential military threat. If North Korea collapses, this could present Korea and China with ugly choices that could lead to an even uglier situation. If the GNP retakes power, this makes things even more complicated, as many GNP politicians hold China in open contempt and blast the government for kowtowing to Beijing. Of course, the GNP, as an opposition party, has the luxury of taking a hardline against China. Once in power, they may see the virtue of being on good terms with the Chinese, especially if the GNP’s corporate sponsors encourage them to play nice (the corporations, too, have mixed feelings about China—like the market and the cheap labor, but fear competition from rising Chinese firms and resent Chinese companies ripping off their shit). The wild card here is Korean reunification, which would not only potentially boost Korean nationalism, but also create a land border between the Republic of Korea and China, leading to all sorts of fun and potentially destablizing possibilities involving territorial claims;
- There’s a generation gap between generally pro-American older folk and younger folk more skeptical of the United States. But alas, it gets more complicated. Firstly, the young radicals of today become the old-fart conservatives of tomorrow. Secondly, while today’s ruling 386 generation has no recollection of the Korean War, the generation after them has no recollection of Gwangju and U.S.-backed military dictators. A recent survey revealed that Koreans in their 20s were surprisingly hostile to the idea of a U.S. withdrawal from Korea, especially if it translates into longer mandatory military stints. Skeptical we may be of the survey results, we cannot assume that just because the 386 generation is perceivably more anti-American than this trend will continue through future generations.
Another note. Plate noted changing Korean attitudes toward North Korea and China and its influence on the Korea-U.S. relationship. Also important, however, is the U.S. reassessment of its alliance with Korea. It’s not just a question of “losing” South Korea, as Plate asks in his headline. The United States is now questioning the value and utility of its existing commitments to Seoul, especially in the post-Cold War and post-9.11 world. Even if Seoul reenters the fold with a GNP electoral victory, the United States may not take the Koreans back.
7 Comments
Why on earth is that? I tend to enjoy listening to Roh make a fool of himself and those Rummy bitch-slaps.
“The wild card here is Korean reunification, which would not only potentially boost Korean nationalism”
and we all could use a little more nationalism around here, couldn’t we?
That article is interesting Tom Plate boasted to me two years ago that he could easily solve the Korea problem. Tom’s solution? Simply withdraw American forces. Okay, Tom is an intellectually honest guy and he may have come across new information. Anyway, most of us here in Korea were relieved that the summit did not go worse than it did. Pairing up the two shoot-from-the-hip leaders, with little love actually lost between the two of them, could have gone a heck of a lot worse.
Also, as Robert points out, the situation on the ground is a bit more complicated than Tom may appreciate. There is a resurgence of pro-American feelings among the young, blond-dyed hair kids as well as similar sentiments remaining with the silver-haired crowd. It is no longer a generational divide but a fracturing, with the strongest anti-American crowd, being in their late 30’s and early 40’s, sandwiched between pro-American generations — and even they are starting to see the writing on the wall as China becomes increasingly dominant in various theatres concerning Korea’s immediate and future well being.
Anyway, Tom may have less to worry about the [sic:] 32,500 armed force personnel. Even with a more accurate count of 28,000 — that number is likely to be very substantially reduced in the coming 24 - 36 months as the Pentagon takes the initiative to redeploy forces elsewhere. The demand by Roh for the wartime control handover was a godsend for US military planners since though it operationally changes little, it gives much more political freedom for the 8th Army not to be bogged down in Korea. This week the US Air Force has been threatening to withdraw some of their planes if the Koreans can’t get their domestic political scene together to allow the USAF a bombing/training range here. Koreans tend to overlook that in the final analysis, the US does not need Korea’s permission to leave. The current ROK administration seems to be regularly creating convenient opportunities for the Pentagon to find reason to send its forces elsewhere.
From Plate’s LA campus perspective, the question may be asked, who lost Korea? In fact, we are seeing the the US at its own initiative, cynically loosening its commitment to Korea in consideration of its overall global priorities. Today, the overwhelming motivation is for the efficient deployment of military forces in the War on Terror. Tomorrow, it may well be to America’s advantage not to be too closely aligned with a contentious peninsula affixed to China that has historically been under Beijing’s close sphere of influence. The damning conclusion is that American leaders may have decided that Korea is no longer worth the headaches and heartburn. The Cold War is over. China is on the rise. Japan is drawing closer to America. A new order needs to be reconciled in northeast Asia without hanging on to a relic of Cold War politics. The only major concern is keeping Pyongyang from trading nuclear arms — if in fact they are capable of doing so.
So, my question in the future may be, who jettisoned Korea?
War on Terror?
What War on Terror?
Plate’s lame attempt to lend some gravitas to his piece by using his title to meme the the debate in the early Truman Administration about the “loss of China” demonstrates just how lacking in seriousness — justifiably so — is the whole notion of losing Korea. But if it needs answering, the clear candidate is South Korea itself - although perhaps that means the question should be reframed as “who lost the U.S.?”
That’s exactly what I was thinking when I read Tom Plate’s dopey, ill-researched article. Who lost Korea? is hardly the question, because it is based on the 15-years-outdated proposition that Korea means something to American interests. It doesn’t. Korea needs America far more than America needs Korea.
Who helps Tom Plate get dressed in the morning, and what does he have against Tom Plate? is a far more interesting question, to my mind.
During he past Presidential election I thought that the Courts-Martial of the two soliders for the accidental death of the two school girls (Highyway 63 incident) should have been delayed until after the election. I thought that the not guilty verdict caused the current administration to win the election. How stupid could USFK be? Now I realize that this (Roh being elected) was exactly what the US wanted and needed to speed the departure of US troops from Korea. Score: USFK-1 : AFCHIEF-0