The Marmot’s Hole

Fear not, dear readers—President Roh tells us all is well with the Korea-U.S. alliance:

“To get right to the point, there is no problem in the ROK-U.S. alliance,” he said. “And there is no problem in U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) support, which will not be reduced at all.”

And bah to all that talk about the need to boost defense spending because of the wartime command transfer:

“Some newspapers contend that it requires defense spending of 621 trillion won ($646 billion) by 2020,” he said. “This whole thing is simply preposterous. That is what we need to spend according to the national defense restructuring plan even without the transfer of wartime operational control.”

Preposterous, he said! After bitching out the Grand National Party, he also slammed conservative dailies (go figure) for accusing him of ruining the alliance:

“Some argue the Seoul-Washington relations have deteriorated a great deal since the launch of my administration and others argue there is no problem,” he said. “But every time I meet President Bush, he says there is no problem in our bilateral ties.”

Hey, Bush likes him, after all.

Meanwhile, the Chosun Ilbo, citing a diplomatic source in Seoul, is reporting that the Pyeongtaek move has been put on hold until the command transfer issue is resolved. But some fear this is only the beginning of more USFK reductions:

Many fear the halt of the master plan will mean further cuts to the USFK. Another diplomatic source said perhaps the U.S. Defense Department, seeing a major change in the alliance as inevitable after the return of wartime control, shelved the plans to be prepared for any contingency “including further cuts in troop numbers.”

We’ll see, I guess.

The usual cast of characters is up in arms about the command transfer:

A group of 77 retired generals Thursday urged the Roh Moo-hyun administration not to try to retrieve wartime operational control over its troops from the United States during its tenure which ends in early 2008.

…

The retired generals demanded in a statement that the next president be allowed to take care of the issue.

They released the statement during a meeting of the Korean Veterans Association in Chamsil, southern Seoul, denouncing the government’s move to get wartime command control back from the United States in 2009 at the earliest.

“The Roh government has misled the public to give the impression that they are waging a sacred war for the nation’s independent defense capabilities,” the statement said. “The hasty transfer of wartime operational control will cause great security and economic havoc in South Korea.”

Got it. Other conservative groups plan to protest tomorrow in front of City Hall. They expect 10,000 to be in attendance, but I predict a more modest turnout.

Meanwhile, in the WaPo, Anthony Faiola writes about the wartime command transfer and how it has divided South Koreans. Money quote:

Some are hoping that Roh’s visit to Washington next month for talks with President Bush may help smooth over cracks in the alliance. But most observers believe the mounting friction is unlikely to change before 2008, when Roh will leave office and U.S. voters will choose Bush’s successor.

“President Roh is effectively saying that South Korea really doesn’t need America the way we have all these years, and I can’t blame the Americans for saying, ‘Fine, have it your way,’ ” said Song Young Sun, a legislator with the opposition Grand National Party. “He wants to move South Korea away from the United States and closer to North Korea. And what we are saying is that this is just not a safe or smart thing to do.”

It has fanned a be-careful-what-you-wish-for mentality among some South Koreans, who now fear that their national security may be put in jeopardy if the transfer of wartime command comes too soon. Although such a deal is likely to yield only a small new reduction of U.S. troops stationed here, opponents say it would loosen the strings that bind the U.S.-South Korean alliance and could even pave the way for an eventual American pullout.

Funny Rep. Song would get quoted in the WaPo, because today she gave a rather lengthy—and interesting—interview with OhMyNews ripping Roh’s handling of the United States. In particular, she slammed Roh for accepting USFK “strategic flexibility” when he knew it meant the end of the Korea-U.S. allied defense system, and then packaging the resulting transfer of operation command as “independence.”

Song’s interview actually deserves a bit more attention, and I imagine the diligent folk over at OhMyNews International will translate it shortly. My favorite quotes:

“The United States probably thinks it must transfer operation command so that the Roh administration can’t generate anti-American sentiment and use it internally. But the United States must form an alliance with 47 million Koreans. I think it’s a not the proper attitude for the United States to pursue only its interests by dealing with those people who misunderstand the operational command issue or accept only what President Roh says.”

“Since strategic flexibility is U.S. global strategy, we must unavoidably accept it. The problem is that we did not attach any conditions. The acceptance of strategic flexibility means that the United States may move USFK anywhere at any time in accordance with American national interests. The United States will use its bases in Korea as forward bases only. The is virtually a ‘New Nixon Doctrine.’

At the very least, we needed to attach the following conditions: while threats exist on the Korean Peninsula, Korea should come first even if a threat arises in another area; in wartime, reinforcements should come to Korea first; and even if the allied defense system is terminated, the United States should assume a similar level of responsibility as now, and the United States should ensure that when USFK is sent abroad as an expedition force no problems should arise in the Korean military’s ability to carry out operations.”

“Did the government not know that [by accepting strategic flexibility] that the allied defense system would end even if U.S. troops continued to be stationed in Korea? It clearly knew. Of course, it knew that the transfer of the Yongsan Garrison was taking place in accordance with the U.S. Global Posture Review.

Accordingly, the government shouldn’t have simply told the people that the Yongsan transfer had been promised since the Roh Tae-woo administration and was happening out of national pride. It should have explained to the people that this was taking place due to changes in U.S. military strategy and would end the allied defense system, and it should have used citizen pressure to get the United States to accept conditions

Yet the government just said ‘yes’ to the United States. For the government to irresponsibly accept strategic flexibility and now package the transfer of operational command as ‘independence’ is to scam the people and kill them twice.”

(About government lies) “First, it said operational command was the ‘flower of independence.’ But is that really so? Just because we brought over Hiddink, did that make [2002] colonial football? You have to look at the actual results and efficiency.

Second, the claim that we won’t need to spend more money is a lie. The United States has provided millions of dollars in intelligence assets. If the joint defense system goes, will the United States just give us these because it feels bad? It takes a lot of money to acquire the power to independently get intelligence assets.

Thirdly, it’s a lie that U.S. reinforcements will be sufficient in wartime. U.S. forces based overseas will be reduced to 300,000 men. To use a metaphor, the Korea-U.S. allied defense system is like two people who are married even though they dislike one another. If they divorce, they’ll meet new lovers. The husband won’t go back to see his ex-wife.

Fourthly, it’s a lie to say there are no problems in the Korea-U.S. alliance. Winston Churchill said the greatest thing he ever did for his country was to get the United States on Britain’s side. The greatest alliance is to get under the greatest power and pursue your interests under its protection. But after the end of the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command, the United States will stop looking out for us and simply use Korea as a forward base for its expeditionary force.”

Then there was this exchange:

—In the early 70s, during the Park Chung-hee administration, the United States withdrew the U.S. 7th Division in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. Toward the end of the 70s, President Jimmy Carter withdrew a few more. The United States did what it wanted. We’ve never been able to stop them.

“Just because of this you mustn’t sit around and watch U.S. actions with arms crossed like it has nothing to do with you. The United States wanted to reduce U.S. troops in Korea from 70,000 to 46,000 in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, while Carter wanted to pull out all U.S. ground troops.

But due to President Park’s persuasion and effort, only 600 troops were withdrawn in the end. By replacing the UN Command with the CFC, 900 more U.S. troops came to Korea. By having Korea and the United States respond jointly to North Korean threats through the Combined Forces Command, President Park tied the Americans’ legs. This was extremely telling. The United States moves in accordance with U.S. interests. But we can make the United States change depending on our capabilities. Even if we can’t get the United States to change 100 percent, there’s a way to maximize our interests.”

—But is there a way to stop the Americans now?

“Did President Park have anything decisive to stop the Americans from leaving? He just stuck at them. For example, Park’s aides at the time told him not to raise the issue of U.S. troop withdrawals when meeting with Carter because the U.S. president would be angry. But rather than talk with Carter, Park gave a 45-minute speech. Carter was extremely angry and ordered that USFK be withdrawn immediately, but in the end, he sent even more troops.”

Fun stuff.