More ‘operational command’ bullshit

Hey, at least General Bell supports the alliance:

“We will remain in Korea as a reliable ally as long as we are welcome and wanted,” Gen. Burwell Bell said in the message.

USFK is a steadfast partner with the ROK military as guardians of the Korean democracy. We will fight alongside our ally to defend this nation,” he said, using South Korea’s official name, the Republic of Korea (ROK).

That was nice of him to say. Sure beats something like, “I have no idea why I’m here and I’d rather go back to commanding ground forces in Europe.”

Anyway, Korea’s “military elders” have been bitching up a storm about the operation command transfer issue, and Korea’s right wing press has been giving them a lot of space to do it. Via the Chosun Ilbo:

Sixteen former defense ministers and nine retired generals on Thursday expressed dismay at President Roh Moo-hyun’s remarks in an interview Wednesday that suggested Korea can withdraw wartime control of its troops from the U.S. any time. The president had told the Yonhap news agency Korea is capable of exercising sole wartime operational control of its troops “even if we get it back now” instead of leaving it in the hands of the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command.

This was kind of interesting:

Former defense minister Kim Seong-eun said when he asked the former U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Leon LaPorte who first proposed the handing over wartime operational control, LaPorte said it was not the U.S. that wanted to hand it over, but the Korean government repeatedly insisted on withdrawing it. Kim quoted LaPorte as saying Washington told Seoul to take back the control if it wanted since a refusal could lead to an outcry from anti-American group in Korea and give the impression the USFK wanted to stay in Korea as long as possible.

Now, just to show how there’s almost always a good deal of bullshit with things like this, Cheong Wa Dae is now claiming that during annual military talks with the United States in 1991, a provisional decision was made to turn over peacetime operational command to Korea sometime between 1993 and 1995 and wartime command sometime after 1996.  In addition, both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Ministry made internal decisions concerning the transfer of command in 1990 and 1991, respectively.  That, of course, was under the administration of President Roh Tae-woo, and no less than five of his defense ministers—including Lee “I’d tell Gen. Bell to ignore the Korean government” Sang-hoon and Lee Jong-gu (who was defense minister through Dec. 1991)—are on the list of “military elders” bitching about Roh Moo-hyun’s stance on the transfer issue.  Funny how that works…

8 Comments

  1. Posted August 11, 2006 at 4:53 pm | Permalink

    I would guess there is one problem with your analysis. The early 1990s was when Sen. Sam Nunn and others were talking about withdrawing all of USFK. The Cold War was at an end, and a move at the time was to scale down our military committments and spending. The first nuclear crisis put an end to that, but I would guess with the US seriously talking about getting out of Korea in the early 1990s, handing over both peace and wartime control would have been contemplated. So, given this, it isn’t a given that these former leaders are being hypocritical.

    I don’t know. Was there a push on the Korean side to get back operational control in the 1990s? I think there was for peace time, but also wartime? Or, was this driven by the US side as part of America’s desire to scale down after the eternity of the Cold War?

  2. Posted August 11, 2006 at 10:53 pm | Permalink

    Look at this picture:

    http://www.donga.com/fbin/outp.....mp;top20=1

    5000 former military officers including 17 former defense ministers gathered and demanded Rho to leave the wartime command issue where it is.

    They said they would impeach Rho once again if he insisted on his stupidity.

    I am former military officer and this issue is much bigger than one might think. This can be the proverbial camel’s back; the US would totally withdraw from Korean peninsula.

    Then what can Koreans do? Defend the country? Against NK with China’s backing? NO CHANCE. SK soldiers with soft lifestyle would run when they hear the first shot of gunfire. They would run for their lives. The US help may or may not come, or come at limited scale.

    It is VietNam all over again.

  3. snow your flag
    Posted August 12, 2006 at 2:26 am | Permalink

    I would have to disagree with you Baduk. I don’t really think the North would attack the South with the US troops gone (especially if the US kept SK under its military umbrella). But I do think that the North, with Chinese support, would try to suck ever more blood from their ‘brothers’ in the South while building their own strength up over time. At some point in the future, if they ever got strong enough, the North might consider attacking (though I think a US military umbrella would continue to scare the crap outta the fat dwarf and his descendents).

    I think that without US troops, South Korea could be in for a long and slow decline, especially if they continue to brown-nose the North and kowtow to the Chinese. The North would probably try to suck the South dry, and the South might not be able to do much about it, if the North kept getting stronger. They would have no choice but to pay appeasement cash to stave off the threats of the North. It would certainly not increase its independence, but rather would slowly lose influence.

  4. Posted August 12, 2006 at 8:43 am | Permalink

    I would not put money on anything concerning what NK might do without USFK in country. I do not think war is probable, but I also don’t think it is unlikely.

    North Korea is like a bubble boy. The head gets a view of the outside world. Their is some method in their maddness when it comes to geopolitical pressure making. But, it is still out of touch with the world.

    NK might believe the South is very weak. I doubt they have much respect for the South’s strengths. They will see democracy as weak. They will also look down on their brothers to the South as havnig become too “unKorean” with all its contacts with the outside world.

    In short, NK could very well miscalculate.

  5. MrChips your flag
    Posted August 12, 2006 at 8:58 am | Permalink

    The first push for peace time control came in the years leading up to 1978. ‘78 saw the CFC formed and for all practical purposes that began the era of ROK Army peacetime control. Ostensibly control rested with the CFC commander, the US 4-star, but in reality ROK army commanders controlled their forces on day-to-day issues without consulting CFC. FROKA and TROKA commanders have since reorganized their reporting lines to stifle communication with UNC and even the Korean 4-star deputy of CFC. The Army commanders report directly to MND. The formal hand over of peacetime control in 1990 was just that, a formality.

    As a member of the UN investigation team that enforced Armistice compliance among the guardposts throughout the DMZ I noticed that the lower echolon commanders had been trained to ignore UNC/CFC instructions. They will only follow orders given directly from ROK Army commanders. Unless, you are escorted by a DSC official; then they comply fully. Funny how that works.

  6. Posted August 12, 2006 at 5:03 pm | Permalink

    The Joongang Daily had a column that put the previous move to give war time control to Korea in the context I mentioned above.

    http://joongangdaily.joins.com.....09011.html

  7. MrChips your flag
    Posted August 12, 2006 at 9:27 pm | Permalink

    As editorials go that’s a good snapshot of what Roh T.W.’s administration was doing in regards to the alliance. I’m not confident at all though that Mr. Song, referenced to in the piece, knows what he’s talking about. The only talks about transferring war time control that I’m aware of were not negotiations but feasability studies. CFC does those all the time (loosely put). It has long been the opinion of the defense department that US ground troops in Korea will only operate under US war time control. War time control transfer has hence been tied to a prerequisite withdrawal of ground forces (i.e. infantry, mech, armor). Serious discussions to do that have yet to take place but perhaps they are in the offing.

  8. Posted August 12, 2006 at 10:58 pm | Permalink

    I think 2 years from now, this issue will be the definative sign of whether USFK is heading out or not.

    2 years from now, both administrations will be passing away. The GNP is likely to gain the Blue House. Any US administration could alter any previous policy of withdrawing. If 2 years from now, the US is pushing for war time handover - pushing to keep on schedule any deal they make on this issue this year or next while Roh is still in office, then it will be an unmistakable sign the Pentagon wants out and is going to move to get out. If the US isn’t pushing it and just lets the plans go the way of so many others in the 50 years of the alliance, then it will be back to the status quo of whoring out the US military indefinately.

2 Trackbacks

  1. By Left Flank on August 12, 2006 at 12:19 pm

    Summer Defense Circus Risks Empowwering Roh…

    Kim Dae-joong has to be careful about this proposal:

    The questions of sole operational control of our troops, the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the future of the Seoul-Washington alliance cannot be determined by any government at will. Other policy …

  2. [...] Politics is theater, most especially in Seoul. This explains more than anything else the seemingly farcical progression of news stories on the wartime control issue. It keeps the Roh administration in the thick of the fight, with a chance to influence the next election in a positive way. With respect to Kim and other K-bloggers, it’s more prudent not to stir the hornet’s nest and just hope for a conservative president and a conservative parliamentary majority in 2008. National defense issues favor the progressives, and Roh is too lucky and resourceful when he’s cornered. If only it were December, 2007 now! Permalink • Trackback (0) [...]

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