Finally, someone was kind enough to email yesterday’s “Nelson Report”, which looks at the questions North Korea’s missile launch have raised in Washington’s Asia Policy community. I reprint it below for your reading enjoyment:
Wed., July 5, 2006
NK MISSILE CHALLENGE…A DEFEAT FOR THEM, OR THE US?
SUMMARY: our NK missile headline is equivocal, to reflect the heateddiscussion going on behind the curtain since the news came in yesterday, andwould seem to indicate that Asst. Sec. Chris Hill’s current mission to theregion is going to be much less satisfactory than many here seem to expect.
For a preview, see the apparent situation at the UN today. This shows thatfor all of the US and Japanese diplomatic effort of the past two or threeweeks, the international community has not risen up in unanimouscondemnation of the DPRK, nor is it likely.
The net of our discussions with past and present officials, defense experts,etc., is that Kim Jong Il’s decision to test fire every missile in his salesinventory can NOT be seen in simple terms, such as “this helps UShard-liners who never wanted to negotiate anyhow, and who support missiledefense, especially with Japan.”
In fact, regional experts, after thinking about it overnight, seem to agreethat very real Chinese, Russian, and S. Korean displeasure with Kim Jong-ilwill NOT displace the mutual, long-standing concerns over what Moscow,Beijing and Seoul see as the fundamental flaws in Bush Administrationposturing toward the DPRK: that is, that while Pyongyang is the active “badactor” in this drama, much of the blame must accrue to the the US, throughit’s refusal to enter into direct bilateral talks.
So that pressure will continue. More discussion below.
NORTH KOREA…
1. The current debate agrees that in policy terms, there are plusses andminuses, not all of which cancel each other out. The net of our analyst’sreaction to what is still a developing situation (more missile tests may bein the offing) is that Kim Jong-il may have successfully exposed theweaknesses in US policy and strategy at several critical levels:
– first, he’s shown that the US national missile defense system isnot ready for prime time;
– he’s shown China and S. Korea that he’s willing to stand up totheir public statements of displeasure, thus exposing the limits of the Bushpolicy’s fundamental reliance on others for success;
– the likely failure of US policy via the UN underscores thispoint;
– he’s continued, unchecked, his production of fissile materials atYongbyong, because the US cannot risk military action against him (Perry etal notwithstanding);
– while one can argue that his attempt to test an ICBM is a failure(and that may not be true…more below) all the focus on the Taepodong-2obscures the five or six (and more may be coming) variations of Scuds,Nodongs, et al, which may have been entirely successfully tested, thusenhancing their “market value.”
– if the US still has “time” to safeguard against an ICBM, thelesser missile tests underscore the presumed improvement in the DPRK’sdeterrent power (also offensive, if suicidal power) against its immediateAsian neighbors;
– the “lesser” missile tests, and the deterrent and marketingstrategy they represent, also has taken place despite US policy andpressures, and the public warnings of China, Russia, S. Korea and Japan;
– he’s not very subtly reminded Beijing, in particular, thatNodongs can fly in their direction, too;
– how have the missile tests changed the fundamental interests andconcerns of China and S. Korea such that they will change their policy ofurging the US to agree to direct bilateral talks? (Answer: they haven’t.)
– he’s shown everyone the flaws in the US focus on Iran, ratherthan the DPRK.
2. It’s not ALL bad for the Bush Administration, or from it’s presumedpolicy standpoint, of course. Here are some of the apparent gains for theUS:
– while the weakness of the current NMD program is embarrassing,despite the expenditure of some $41-billion so far, the NK missiles do havethe virtue of showing that US concerns about the DPRK’s program are real,and that the various components of the US system must be enhanced andbrought into real time deployment in the not too distant future;
– no question that this also boosts US-Japan cooperation againstboth N. Korea generally, and missile defense specifically;
– no question that China does not appreciate being embarrassed inpublic;
– no question that S. Korea has announced some sanctions it wouldnever, otherwise, have agreed to, so the DPRK can’t automatically count onits “insurance policy” from Seoul;
– no question China, S. Korea and Russia will want to continueefforts to persuade the DPRK to return to the 6 Party talks (setting asideany useful purpose other than to present a fig leaf for failed US policy)
3. No doubt there are other =/- points for Washington and Pyongyang in thissituation. But there are also issues or questions arising which just strikeyou as plain bad news for all, or as questions with no clear answer for now:
– Moscow…keep repeating that…it’s the hidden factor here maybe?
Note stories, soon denied, that Pyongyang informed Moscow 10 days ago of thetest, asking it to tell Beijing and Seoul;
– remember, all of this is increasingly linked at the hip to the UNand Iran…and that Tehran is watching closely, as Pyongyang is watchingclosely;
– Beijing…lots of loose talk today that “maybe this will be thelast straw for China”…OK…but so what? China cut off oil for 3 days backin 1998. This time? There is some current problem with the DPRK confiscatingChinese locomotives from the supply trains…maybe a cutoff of the trainsfor a while?
– do we know anything useful about Kim Jong-il’s internal politicalsituation, and how do we assess whether the missile tests show he has to”give the military something” after months of what, to the DPRK, looks likea diplomatic focus?
– note DPRK Amb Han at the UN saying, in public, he and thediplomats are out of the loop on a basically military question…OK, maybecover, but the implications are interesting, to say the least;
– how might DPRK internal politics play into Chinese concerns andcalculations about “what to do”? All our Chinese experts for several yearsnow have agreed with Chinese claims that Beijing’s influence in Pyongyang isnothing like the good old days…and in any event, many N. Korea expertswarn that KJI, in relative terms, is “moderate” and a coup would likelyreplace him with really dangerous, xenophobic generals who hate China asmuch as they do the US and Japan…and who want to “unite” with Seoul, onDPRK terms;
– and in Seoul, will the S. Korean Uri government want to pursueits little crisis with Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands, and if so,how might this impact on the selection of the next Prime Minister?
– same question for the missile tests: by most accounts, Abe, therelative hard-liner, is the beneficiary of the crisis with the DPRK, inJapanese domestic terms, but in diplomatic terms, does the presumed harm toFukuda’s candidacy make improved Japan-China, Japan-ROK relations morelikely, or less likely?
– how will continued Japanese diplomatic problems impact on broaderstrategic US interests, not just the DPRK?
– how will the test impact on the domestic ROK political situation,both in terms of Uri’s “Sunshine policy” through the Unification Ministry,and the rising chances of the presumed more hard-line Grand National Party?
– is there any reason to think the DPRK may have blown-up the TD-2itself, satisfied with the successful launch and initial trajectory andperformance…on the grounds that a successful (full range) test would haveprovided the US with too much intelligence information, while the partialtest served immediate DPRK diplomatic and strategic goals nicely? (This isa “too clever by half” scenario, but we note it as an interesting questionraised by one expert.)
– a more likely analysis comes in the very biting report by CSIS’sAnthony Cordesman, this morning, who argues
4. While we wait on answers to as many of the above as can be expected,Loyal Reader and Korea analyst Gordon Chang, author of Nuclear Showdown:North Korea Takes On the World sums it up for many of our correspondentstoday:
“The fireworks display in the skies over North Asia shows us one thing.Either China did not want to prevent the launch or could not. In eithercase, the Bush administration needs to confront one unpleasant reality: itis going to have to take the lead to solve the Koreannuclear-missile-counterfeiting-et. cetera problem. It can’t look to othersfor solving the problem for us.
“My solution? Some patient diplomacy to make Kim Jong Il look bad andthereby discredit the “progressive” forces in South Korea. If the GrandNational Party beats the progressives and wins the presidency next year,then we will be able to isolate North Korea. Without South Korea at itsside, China will then have to make a clear choice: it will have to side withits future–cooperation with the United States–or its past–its militaryalliance with North Korea. There are, unfortunately, no quick answers. IfNorth Korea can be patient, so can we.”
