As for the matter of control, of course I agree that the U.S. has looked askance at proliferation partly out of concern of weakening its own influence with its allies. But this determination to maintain its influence over the security policies of its friends in the region comes at an ever increasing cost—the U.S. will need to devote increasing resources keeping its dependencies allies safe. Hence you gotta ask yourself if it’s worth keeping your friends weak and inviting their resentment in order to maintain your clout over them. An alliance is only as good as its constituent parts, after all. And at any rate, Britain and Israel developed their own independent deterrents while maintain close security cooperation with Washington, while Washington’s clout over both non-nuclear Turkey and Greece didn’t stop them from mixing it up repeatedly. Is there any reason to believe that Japan or South Korea would be any less cooperative with the United States than they already are were they to acquire security infrastructures commensurate with their national power, or that U.S. influence over said countries could prevent them from grinding their axes with other nations in the region?

Forgive me for using a truism, but politics is messy and policy formulations are never clear cut. There is always back and forth weighing on the benefits or limitations of one course of action. I believe China is trapped in a sort of policy dilemma in regards to North Korea. On the one hand, a nuclearized North Korea is not to China’s benefit as it is potentially destabilizing and could affect China negatively depending on the resolution of the situation and the actions of other parties involved. On the other hand however, a nuclearized Korea can serve as a tool to gauge U.S. responses and intent and an erratic Kim Jong Il also serves to divert U.S. attention and to keep “Uncle” otherwise pre-occupied. Whether one policy is ultimately more beneficial than the other in the minds of Chinese policy makers is unknown, and Chinese action, or rather inaction, seems to be a result of this policy dilemma.

On the second issue, I believe China’s political influence on North Korea is grossly overstated. Unlike Baduk, I do not believe KJI is China’s stooge, but rather that he has his own interests at heart, that is the survival of KJI. Historically speaking, Chinese influence in North Korea has waxed and waned depending on circumstance and KJI’s predeccesor played the Soviets off against the Chinese when it suited him. Most of the pro-Chinese North Korean communists have been purged long ago and it is unlikely that KJI enjoys good relations with Beijing. China is also limited in taking concrete actions to affect North Korea because doing so would be destabilizing to North Korea and the ultimate goal of China seems to be stability uber alles. Preserving the North Korean state, but not letting the situation degenerate too far out of control (in Beijing’s reckoning) seems to be the modus operandi of the Chinese.

regarding nukes, i’ve always been of the opinion that less is better.

The first one is the issue of Chinese nuclear policy. At present, China’s policy is one of minimalist deterrance, quite cost effective I might add. A small counter-value arsenal of 20+ ICBM’s capable of reaching the U.S. and a few hundred more IRBM’s. This means that although the U.S. does have to keep the Chinese arsenal in mind in it’s nuclear planning, it is impossible that China would be able to launch a first strike on the U.S. Thus the nuclear threat to the U.S. is minimized.

If Taiwan, South Korea, or Japan were to go nuclear, it would quite likley neccessitate a change in China’s nuclear posture. The presence of nuclear weapons so close to China under U.S. auspices would likely lead to more pro-active deployment policy on China’s part. Meaning more nukes to increase survivability. The reason that the U.S. and the Soviet Union built tens of thousands of nuclear weapons each was not because it requires that many to destroy one another but rather to increase the chances of survivability to launch a counter-attack should the other launch first. Most U.S. and Soviet missiles were targeted at each other since even a few hundred would be sufficient to destroy nearly all major population centers.

What Japanese/Korean/Taiwanese nukes will mean is that China will likely re-initiate fissile material production, mate warheads to delivery vehicles for quick launch capability, and build many more delivery vehicles. By nuclearizing China’s neighbours, the number of missiles capable of reaching the U.S. could mushroom from 20+ weapons to 2000+, ultimately making the U.S. more vulnerable rather than less.

There is also a secondary reason why the U.S. would not look kindly upon proliferation among it’s allies in the Pacific. That is a matter of control. With the U.S. maintaining a nuclear duopoly in the Pacific, it has more control over it’s allies and ultimately has control should the situation ever escalate to the point of a nuclear standoff. Should one of China’s neighbors develop an independent nuclear capability, that would mean the U.S. has less control and less influence on any situations should the proverbial shit hit the fan.

Were Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons now, however, the Chinese might launch preemptive strikes and claim the Iraq War as justification for their action. While I think China could tolerate a nuclear South Korea and a nuclear Japan, a nuclear Taiwan under DPP control would make the CCP go apeshit. On the other hand, if Japan went nuclear, a non-secession-minded KMT leader in Taiwan could get away with launching a nuclear program while saying “nice doggie” to the mainland.

–Remort