The Marmot’s Hole

MUST READ!!!

Over at Coming Anarchy, Lirelou gives some MUST READ commentary on long-term peace in East Asia, especially after Korean re-unification. Read the whole thing on your own; here’s is just the intro:

My personal assessment about the chances of long term peace in East Asia are pessimistic. The “pax Americana” is coming to an end, but I do not see an Asian “age of aquarius” on the horizon. Rather, we are seeing a nationalist resurgence in China, Korea, and Japan—the legacy of state indoctrination programs in the two former, and recidivist nationalism in the latter.
The reunification of Korea is inevitable, but it will be a far more painful process than many Koreans expect. Once that pain is felt, who will they blame? The extreme left, which may be discredited when Nork gulags are revealed, will point the finger at the U.S. Right-wing nationalists will look to Japan, as Korea would never have been divided and developed into a modern nation much like Singapore and Taiwan were it not for Japan’s colonialism. That argument is likely to find support among the Korean populace, and will likely whet their appetite for revenge. Add to this the very real possibility that China’s continued economic rise has by that time cut into the Korean GDP (adding to real price of reunification), and you may have a social discontent factor that is presently absent in South Korea.

Like I said, it’s a good piece, so read the rest on your own.
Allow me to add some comments of my own. Let me start off with the question of Korean reunification. I agree the reunification is pretty much inevitable, although I think most Koreans already believe the process will be extraordinarily painful. My own guess is that when the realities of the gulag state are revealed in a way that can no longer be denied or ignored, the left will be too busy trying to take credit for “subverting” the North Korean state through Sunshine and fending off attacks from the right and the right too busy racking in political capital by blaming the left (especially if, as some suspect, the collapse of North Korea is accompanied by the revelation that more than a few South Korean figures were on Pyongyang’s payroll) for either group to focus primarily on blaming outside powers. And at any rate, the post-unification process is likely to be so painful that it might force Korea to be rather self-absorbed with its own problems for quite some time. The chances of post-unification Korean nationalism taking on a nasty streak, however, could increase dramatically depending on how the collapse of North Korea/reunification process goes down. In particular, there could be a great deal of resentment if Chinese troops are included in any international peacekeeping force sent to stabilize North Korean territory in the wake of an implosion. As it stands now, it seems the question is not whether or not China will send troops to North Korea for security reasons and/or to gain leverage over the reunification process, but rather how many troops it will send. If the Chinese are perceived to be pursuing an agenda quite apart from Seoul’s, Koreans might start to look for their modern-day Kim Yu-sin.
Apart from the Koreans, Korean re-unification–or at least the process thereof–could lead to tensions between other key actors in the region. This really needs no explanation, and is one of the reasons why the collapse of North Korea must be handled with the utmost care.
As for the long-term prospects of peace in Northeast Asia, I’m a bit more optimistic than Lirelou. I don’t expect any of the major parties to like one another anytime soon, but at the same time, there is much more economic and social linkages and exchanges between Korea, China and Japan than there ever was between the West and the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. Granted, economic and social connectivity didn’t stop World War I, and there certainly are flash-points (Taiwan comes immediately to mind). One must also keep in mind the possibility of conflict as a rising hegemon (in this case, China) begins to challenge an existing one (in this case, the United States). My own personal fear is that the wheels might come off the Chinese economic development wagon, forcing the Chinese Communist Party to play-up hyper-nationalist in order to redirect social discontent. There are tons of possible scenarios out there, some more likely than others. Ultimately, however, this is the nuclear age, and in the age of the atom, the big boys don’t fight one another. The costs simply outweigh the benefits of victory, especially when the status quo (with or without American troops) seems to be making so much money for everyone involved. East Asia is inhabited by “big boys” that either have nuclear weapons, are protected by American nuclear weapons and/or can develop nuclear arsenals overnight. Doesn’t leave much room for players to muscle around without blowing up the entire neighborhood. I could conceive of regional powers coming to blows outside the region–for control of oil and gas resources in Central Asia, for example–but I find it difficult to imagine, just to take one example, China threatening Japan’s vital interests in a manner that could prompt Japan (or its American ally) to respond by turning Beijing into a sheet of glass.
I could be wrong, of course. And often am.