In a contribution to the Korean Overseas Information Service’s English-language monthly Korea Policy Review, the Center for International Policy’s Selig Harrison unsurprisingly gives the Roh administration two thumbs up for its handling of the Korea-U.S. alliance. Ordinarily, I need to have a bottle of Pepto-Bismol ready any time I read Harrison’s work, but in perhaps another sign that I’m getting mellower as I grow older (or the fact that nowadays, when it comes to anything involving North Korea, I really don’t give a shit), I was able to complete it without throwing anything at my computer monitor. Heck, he even makes some good observations. Anyway, read it and take what you will from it. Here’s just the intro:
In carrying out his election campaign pledge to reshape the U.S.-South Korean alliance, President Roh Moo-hyun has skillfully balanced conflicting national priorities during the first three years of his tenure. Economic priorities make it necessary to avoid a sudden disruption of the alliance. The U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty creates a climate of stability favorable for foreign trade and investment and for preferential treatment by U.S.-controlled international financial institutions. The U.S. force presence also provides an economic subsidy to South Korea by enabling Seoul to maintain a much more formidable defense posture than it could afford on its own. At the same time, the favorable economic impact of the alliance is offset by the constraints that it imposes on the scope and speed of the President’s effort to carry forward the accommodation with North Korea initiated by President Kim Dae-jung at his June, 2000, North-South summit with Chairman Kim Jong-il.
As they say, read the rest on your own.
27 Comments
“Changing regime” policy, as opposed to “regime change”. I like this description, it’s a nice turn of phrase and encapsulates the concept rather neatly.
I seem to recall having said pretty much the same thing, once upon a time, like a week ago, in the “World according to Jeong Se-Hyun” thread.
Roh’s Administration deserves the credit for formulating the beginnings of an independent foreign policy. Bush’s policy is too “black-and-white” “too US-centric” and NE Asia geopolitics is a composite of many different shades of gray. Roh’s words here make utter sense, but unfortunately I’m afraid it’s mostly lost on a US that’s evenly split between conservatives that are obstinately pro-Bush and liberals who are increasingly focused on domestic problems.
Harrison’s essay is an excellent must-read material but one point remains which I consider fisk-worthy.
Harrison quotes the direct costs of maintaining USFK, which is $2 billion per annum. Maybe South Korea was attached to the “big, fat udder of Uncle Sam” during the days of Park Chung hee, but that simply isnt true anymore. The ROK gov pays for most of the USFK defense budget in modern times.
Furthermore, this implication of dependency on the alliance as a form of economic subsidy simply doesnt hold any water. China has eclipsed US as South Korea’s largest trading partner. The SK gov is also spending hundreds of billions of dollars to reform the military and have embarked on numerous high-profile defense projects to achieve a self-reliant posture by the year 2010-2020 time frame. SK is also negotiating to take ownership of wartime military command which is currently being controlled by the US Pacific Command. It is simply not consistent with SK’s current plans for the future and the hashing out of an independent foreign policy which we are clearly witnessing in the present.
“Harrison quotes the direct costs of maintaining USFK, which is $2 billion per annum. Maybe South Korea was attached to the ??ig, fat udder of Uncle Sam??during the days of Park Chung hee, but that simply isnt true anymore. The ROK gov pays for most of the USFK defense budget in modern times.”
Another government and media-promoted falsehood. ROK pays a very minor percentage of costs that are strictly related to housing and relocation and such and what ROK pays is still only 40% of those particular costs.
Actual defense line items are paid 100% by Uncle Sam.
The figures given include non-cash estimates of the value of the real estate on which US military facilities are located.
Bottom line: ROK is leasing security for just pennies on the dollar, which amounts to a huge windfall as compared to having to maintain its own defense. In other words, the US is subsidizing Korea, and not the other way around.
“Furthermore, this implication of dependency on the alliance as a form of economic subsidy simply doesnt hold any water.”
The US may have decreased in importance in terms of trade, but that hardly means that their presence isn’t still important in terms of economics. The presence of the US in South Korea remains a very important factor to foreign companies and investors, I believe (though I only know of anecdotal evidence). Take out the forces and the credit rating and terms for investing in the country would command a much higher premium. The US presence is still hugely important, especially in terms of the ability of the South to forgo military spending.
That’s why most Koreans don’t ultimately want the US forces to leave here, cause their presence is still crucial. This might change in years to come, but for now, nobody other than Hangchonryon nutbars and leftists truly want the forces out.
“Harrison quotes the direct costs of maintaining USFK, which is $2 billion per annum. Maybe South Korea was attached to the ??ig, fat udder of Uncle Sam??during the days of Park Chung hee, but that simply isnt true anymore. The ROK gov pays for most of the USFK defense budget in modern times.”
Ditto Mizar5 on the direct costs, but how about the cost of Korea developing its own 7th Fleet? The post-war Pacific Pax Americana has allowed the entire Pac Rim to benefit, not least an outside resource-dependent nation such as Korea.
Roh skillful? Yeah, about as skillful as a drunk teenaged kid getting his first piece of trim. Figures who would have positive comments about that, ??nalysis.??
My take is that at least some in SK realize they can?? actually break the alliance without real consequences that they would have little control over;
http://www.dprkstudies.org/200.....long-term/
The reason Bluejives’ anaysis (sic - it’s Harrison’s - Blue is little more than an apologist for political propaganda) is so thorougly flawed is that it is so simplistic and reductionist. The jist of it is that the Korean side is skillful and nuanced while the US side is once-sided and heavy-handed. Just the opposite is true.
Having already disproven his assertion about dependency on the alliance not being a form of economic subsidy, let’s now show what’s wrong with his assertions on US and Korean policy. Let’s start with this whopper:
“Roh?? Administration deserves the credit for formulating the beginnings of an independent foreign policy.”
Our foreign policy has always been independent, that is, determined by Koreans for Koreans. It began in fact with Sigmund Lee, who was a constant thorn in the side of US policy, continued with Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, whose human rights violations were a major issue for the US, and on into future administrations. The Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae Joon administrations’ policies planted major anti-American sentiment. If Roh deserves acknowledgement for any real accomplishment other than pandering to anti-American sentiment, I’d like to know what specifically he is being credited for.
“Bush?? policy is too ??lack-and-white????oo US-centric??and NE Asia geopolitics is a composite of many different shades of gray. Roh?? words here make utter sense, but unfortunately I?? afraid it?? mostly lost on a US that?? evenly split between conservatives that are obstinately pro-Bush and liberals who are increasingly focused on domestic problems.”
Far from being black and white or US-centric, US policy is extremely nuanced and multilateral. US diplomacy carefully balances competing Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Russion interests, idiologies and issues. By contrast, Korean foreign policy is black and white and unilateral, focusing narrowly on Korean peninsular issues and characterized by hardline anti-foreign overtones (anti-Japanese, anti-US or anti-Chinese, whichever is expedient at the moment.)
“‘Changing regime’ policy, as opposed to ‘regime change’. I like this description, it?? a nice turn of phrase and encapsulates the concept rather neatly.
Yes, it encapsulates a concept, but not a reality. It is laughable to believe that Roh’s policy can soften the North Korean regime, turn Kim into a nice man and obliterate all the differences between authoritarianism and democracy.
To lay the entire US Korea divide on the doorstep of a few hardliners in the US administration totally ignores the leading role that Roh has played in alienating the US through his bungling nationalistic pandering and plain incompetence. The failure to strike a compromise position lies squarely on Roh and his hardliners for being by turns confrontational and arrogant and backing down when - surprise - this approach hasn’t resulted in progress.
A real statesman would be consistent and seek clear common positions and seek quiet, productive diplomacy rather than turning every issue into a major pro- or anti-US debate. Laying all the blame on the US and emphasizing differences has been the irritant to the alliance.
For instance, every time there is a negotiation regarding the US military, a one-sided and lopsidedly misleadig report is leaked to the press to drum up public support based on incorrect information. The last one concerned contamination on the bases. Before that there was a big issue made of a few drops of fomaldahyde being dumped down a drain which, incidentally. was completely cleansed away by treatment facilities before it passed into the Han River. And then there are the blatently false claims that ROK and Korean taxpayers are footing the bill for the US military, when in fact our contribution is but a drop in the bucket.
In a nutshell, public posturing and insincere diplomacy are the twin causes of the schism, not US policy.
Mizar: Having already disproven his assertion about dependency on the alliance not being a form of economic subsidy…
You havent disproven anything.
From the Dod:
So if the price tag of USFK is ~$2 billion per year and the ROK gov is contributing over $1.5 billion per year, that means that over 75% of the costs are being shouldered by SK taxpayers.
This is not even counting the moves for gradual US troop reductions begun last year (which, of course, decreases the costs of having the USFK in the first place) being conducted in parallel with massive spending to achieve self-reliance.
Speaking of which, this is also not even taking into account the BILLIONS OF DOLLARS that SK spends annually on new miltary hardware purchases, the BULK OF WHICH is bought from the US. So not only is SK heavily subsidizing USFK, but also Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, etc.
So who is subsidizing whom now?
Who says the price tag of USFK is under $2 billion per year?
Even according to the Korean Times, your figures are problematic. They reported on Jan 10th that “South Korea paid $486.61 million in “direct stationing costs, such as on-budget host country expenditures, and $356.5 million in indirect expenses, including waivers of taxes, fees, rents and other charges.” The Defense Ministry puts this at “about 40 percent of the total expense.”
The report goes on to state: “Japan paid $4.41 billion toward the stationing of U.S. troops on its soil, the largest among nations hosting U.S. military forces at 74.5 percent of the total. Japan’s contribution amounts to over 50 percent of the total defense contributions paid by 26 allies covered in the report. South Korea’s payment is about 9 percent of total contributions.”
You are guilty of perpetrating the SK media myth the the US is profiting financially from protecting Korea militarily. The opposite is true. It costs the US far more than is recouped by Seoul’s contribution.
Your “analysis” is not only statistically inadequate but ignores the total costs the US military and government has sunk into Korea over the past 50 years in the form of direct subsidies, loans, favorable market access, access to international finance and monies freed up to invest in the Korean economic infrastructure.
Hint: read the article again.
Mizar5 and bluejives,
Hey, you guys are fighting about nuts-and-bolts aspect of the US-Korea relationship. The small things like couple of billions no longer matter. See the big picture.
Mizar5,
Stop saying “subsidies”. There is none and there has been none. If there were, the smart US tax payers would have taken the US government to court. The military presence in Korea has definite advantage to the US. The other day, President Bush warned America about the dangers of isolationism. Get the picture?
Besides, the US military needed a place to put and train its troops and Korea has been an ideal place up until very recently. USFK may move out of Korea in the future because the US may like to station and train troops somewhere else, in the Middle East for example. However, do not say that the US has stayed in Korea for the goodness of its heart. No government do anything for the??oodness of heart??or to keep a promise that was written fifty years ago. No government is that stupid and its citizens will not stand for that.
So, please do not use the term, “subsidies”. They were “troop training costs”. And, every item has been negotiated between two governments; both governments have agreed and paid for what is the equitable amount. It has been and still is a fair amount for both sides.
bluejives,
What is good for a goose is good for a gander. Both countries need each other. The US troops leaving Korea will have dire consequences - Korea will eventually (within 5 years?) become a China’s satellite. So, pay 100% if necessary. Keep troops in Korea.
Baduk: “Stop saying ??ubsidies”.
Gladly. I’m not attached to any particular term. Bluejives put the term out there and I adopted it as an expedient means to demonstrate to him the utter fallacy of the SK mediaspin and statistical voodoo he was parroting.
First, the basic proposition that the US government is making an economic profit from stationing its troops in Korea is false. Second, the assertion that the SK taxpayer is footing the lion’s share of the bill for the US miliatary presence is patently false. Although Korea has recently begun to increase its contribution, which is only right, The US taxpayer still pays for the vast majority of the costs.
These facts are incontrovertible. Put whatever spin you like on it.
Hello,
I?? new to this board, but havnig found the site, thought I might jump into the fray here on this one since it is a topic near and dear to my heart, having personally dealt with this mess for quite some time.
Without giving out any sensitive information I thought I?? try to clear up a few misconceptions about where the money comes from and where it goes.
I apologize if this gets a bit long and tedious.
First, the ??oney??USFK receives from the ROK Government is a cost-sharing burden mandated by Congress for all nations where US troops are protecting those who are able to protect themselves. It is authorized under Article V of the ROK-US SOFA and set out in a special measures agreement that is renewed after lengthy [and often ugly] negotiations every two years. The latest SMA was signed late last summer and negotiations for the 2007 agreement will begin later this year.
For what it?? worth, let me say, yes, the ROK government does actually transfer a large sum of cash from the ROK Treasury into USFK bank accounts. As soon as the transfer is made, however, they have a nasty little habit of calling the local press and bragging about it, or rather reporting it in such a way as to make it look like USFK is extorting money from the poor downtrodden Korean public. It’s unfair really. USFK does have strategic interests here, or else they would have called Korea’s bluff years ago and left town.
The real problem that has always been with us in regards to the SMA is how to accurately measure the money and how to assess who gets the most benefit from its use.
Traditionally, in each country where US troops are stationed, the host nation does the calculations that are announced to the public. In Korea, this has become a particularly sensitive problem, because of the way the ROK Government makes the calculations, as I will try to explain below.
As you may or may not be aware, the only cash that is transferred to USFK is specifically earmarked for the purpose of paying our Korean national civilian employees, and for military construction. USFK doesn?? get a windfall of money thrown in its lap that it can use for whatever purposes it sees fit. The ROK Govt. has agreed to be responsible for 70% of the cost of paying our Korean national employees, but only for those who work for appropriated fund activities. All the ??AF??employees [the thousands who work at the bowling alleys, gyms, movie theaters, hotels, restaurants, clubs, etc. on posts all over Korea] are paid 100% by USFK. This may help explain to you why last year, when the ROK side unilaterally decided it was slashing its cash contribution by 9% USFK?? immediate response was, ??ine, we??e firing 1,000 appropriated fund KN employees.?? There has never been a USFK move to get rid of NAF employees, because we are already budgeting to pay 100% of their costs.
[Another tidbit, in Japan and Germany, the host nation pays 100% of both appropriated fund and NAF local national employees. Korea is getting a deal--30% of the cost of employing 15,000 people--and not letting the Korean public know of it. By only paying 70% of the salaries, Korea ensures that another 15,000 Koreans are employed at steady and stable jobs at a net benefit to the local economy of 30% of their salaries.]
So, the real question is not why did USFK choose to take their anger out on the innocent and hard working civilians. What else could they have done? It?? not as if USFK can go back to Congress with a straight face and say ??ey, um, Korea decided not to pay for their own civilian employees who work for us this year and next, and they expect us to take up the slack for their part, so can we have more money??? Nope. If the Korean side won?? pay this part, we have no choice but to reduce the bodies. Like I said, the Japanese pay 100%, so there?? no chance in hell that Congress will appropriate more money to pay something the Korean government refuses to pay.
Next, as mentioned above, the remainder of the cash payments are earmarked for military construction. The catch is, as you might suspect, the money must be paid to local construction firms. It?? not as if USFK can use that money to bring in builders from the states to do the job. Except in a handful of rare and unusual ??ensitive??cases, 100% of the money goes right back into the local economy. In fact, the past four or five years have shown that much more than that goes into the economy, because the ROK Government usually chooses, or at least recommends, the contractor, much of the work is shoddily performed, and inevitably USFK?? own milcon funds have to be spent later on to correct the mistakes. It’s Korea’s cash and they can earmark it however they want.
That?? all fine and good. The real sticking points here come when calculating not the cash payments, but rather that ??n-kind??contributions. The biggest ??ool over the eyes of the public??move here is that the ROK Government provides military manpower to USFK at no cost to USFK in the form of KATUSA troops. Why would this be a problem? For a couple of reasons. Most importantly, as most of you know, the monthly base pay for a Korean soldier is approximately $35. What you may not know is that when calculating the value of a KATUSA to USFK the Korean Government uses the base pay as if this were a US troop, assigning a monthly base pay figure of about $1,400. Multiply that by the total number of KATUSAs provided each year [on the order of 1,500] and it suddenly looks like the ROK Government is providing USFK with a whole lot more resources than it really is. And this is the number that is inevitably released to the media.
The next really ugly part of this equation comes when the ROK Government insists on calculating ??aived fees??as if they were actual contributions, i.e. as if the protecting force anywhere and at any time had a moral or legal obligation to pay such things to the nation it protects.
They do this even though the SOFA [and practical common sense] says that USFK shall not be responsible for government fees. Here?? how it works. A new US soldier arrives at Inchon airport, fresh from the states and ready to serve his time in Korea. A military van leaves Yongsan and goes to pick him up. On the way out the van passes through a toll booth and the 11,000 Won fee to use the road is waived. Another 11,000 Won fee is waived on the way back. Repeat this about 20,000 times per year for incoming troops, another 20,000 for outgoing troops, 10,000 more times per year for troops coming and going on TDY and other official business up and down the Kyong-Bu Expressway and other toll roads around the country, and pretty soon you have a situation where it can be made to appear that the ROK Government is doing USFK a huge favor in waiving fees that the public would otherwise think they had a right to enforce against us. Of course that is not the case. In no nation on the planet does a protecting force pay fees to a protected nation. And while the Koreans have long thought that USFK should pay for the privilege of protecting the ROK, that in no way makes it appropriate.
So, where does the truth? I guess it all depends on who you ask.
For one thing, unlike the situation on Germany, here in Korea USFK receives no credit for improvements to installations when those installations are turned over to the ROK government. So, for example, when Camp Page closed last year, it had a fully functional modern airfield. If this had been Germany, the FRG Govt. would have had a legally binding duty to pay the US military fair market value for that property, even if they don?? plan to use the property as an airfield later. In Korea, this is not the case. The ROK government now has a new airfield in its inventory, that the ROK Army will probably move onto very soon, and yet has no obligation to give USFK either cash, construction credits, or anything else. A hundred million dollar windfall that the Korean public will never learn about. Although this is a an Article IV issue and not an Article V issue, it goes along for the ??ame ride,??the winding trip through the Korean public?? collective sense of nationalism by which they think the United States is continually ripping them off, when in fact, nearly every cent paid to USFK goes directly to the benefit of the Korean public, and keeps their own tax burdens incredibly reasonable. As one poster noted above, it is a tremendous benefit to Korea not to have to develop its own 7th fleet.
I??l try to post more later when I have more time. Right now I need to go watch the Seahawks battles it out with the Steelers. The point is, if you use the ROK Government?? numbers, the ROK is providing up to about 40% of the ordinary stationing costs to USFK. If you use numbers that have a more realistic basis, the percentage quickly and drastically drops to laughable levels. It?? all in how you perform the calculations.
Thanks for reading.
Charles Kim, interesting info, thanks. It adds some detail to other things I’ve heard/read.
As for Roh, he’s setting Korea adrift without a rudder–signalling weakness to China is not the brightest foreign policy move.
For what it?? worth, let me say, yes, the ROK government does actually transfer a large sum of cash from the ROK Treasury into USFK bank accounts.
Charles, how much is that sum?
Thanks, Charles. I have obtained some idea of the misinformation from a US Army employee who negotiates facility matters with the ROK. Naturally, I have no official numbers to report, but I have heard informally about the problem.
It has long been the SK government’s practice to leak (ie. plant) deliberately misleading stories about USFK in the media in order to obtain popular support for more favorable terms in negotiations with USFK.
It’s short sighted but they get away with this deception in the short run. For example we now have the most generous SOFA agreement of any nation as the result of negotiations following the government-encouraged anti-American hate orgy following the death of those two schoolgirls. SOFA was already on a par with Japan at the time but now contains additional provisions for environmental protection.
But the public still believes now, as they did then, the absurd notion that SOFA is “inequitable.”
We have always known that the Korean public is misinformed. But knowing how Koreans wheel and deal for short term advantage, it is bizarre that some people could be so gullible as to actually believe that the US is taking advantage of SK when the opposite is true.
Over the long run, pissing off the US could sink the Korean economy.
Charles, how much is that sum?
Hi again.
The cash amount varies from year to year, but on average stays right around 10% of the overall “ROK burden-sharing contribution.”
So, for perspective, last year the ROK Government claimed upwards of $660 million of contributions towards USFK. The actual cash payment was $58 million, unilaterally pushed down from about $63 million the year before.
Everything else consisted of waived tolls, taxes, and fees, KATUSA salaries, in-kind barracks and range construction, and that sort of thing. Projects that usually accrue at least as much benefit to the Korean military and to the local communities as they do to USFK.
Thanks alot for the interesting info, Charles. It’s great to have real facts and numbers to back up the argument. Cheers!
Thank you for your insight and welcome Charles. I am not very surprised at your statements. I get enough fanciful bookkeeping from Korean management types as it is.
It sounds like you have dealt with the topic in some kind of a professional capacity. If it’s not too sensitive, do you mind telling us what your job function was and who you worked for?
do you mind telling us what your job function was and who you worked for?
Hello, bluejives. I apologize for not being more upfront, but as you suspected, it is kind of a sensitive issue, and I don’t want to put my current job at stake by giving out too much detail about my past job; both of which are for the US military.
I have this info from my time working at USFK during which I sat across the table from the Korean MOFAT reps during several of the negotiation sessions, not specifically negotiating the SMA, other more senior team members did that, but I was part of the team that dealt with the many peripheral headache issues that were directly affected [created] by the SMA.
For what it’s worth, I won’t come out and say the SMA is “unfair” to either side per se. Given that both sides put their signatures on the final memorandum, it is, by definition, a “fair and equitable” agreement. My points are not that it was not fair, but that there is a lot of inaccurate info given to the media usually by the same ROK Government reps that negotiated it, and this often makes the agreement look a lot different [i.e. better for the US and worse for the Korean people] than it really is.
In reality, the Japanese and German citizens are footing a far larger percentage of the bills to have US troops stationed on their own soil than the Koreans are, and in Germany at least, they pay the US for improvements made to the land such as airfields, hospitals, and the like, but their governments don’t have a history of trying to score points with the public by inflating the burden-sharing figures to make it look like the US is taking advantage of them. This is a uniquely Korean phenomenon that USFK needs to dig deeper into to find out why it is happening and how best to deal with it.
Charles, what is your take on the costs that the ROK side is taking/will take for the move to Pyongtaek?
Charles, what is your take on the costs that the ROK side is taking/will take for the move to Pyongtaek?
Hi again. I??l try to answer as best I can based on my own observations, but I can?? guarantee either the complete accuracy or the relevancy of my notes since I am no longer in a position to see these things for myself as they unravel and haven?? had first hand experience of the negotiations involved in several years now. I can tell you what I knew while I was there though.
The most important thing to get out on the table up front I think is that I believe the ROK side is probably willing to pay 100% of the costs to get the troops out of Yongsan Garrison and down to the Pyongtaek area. I think they?? do this even if the legitimate costs [??egitimate??as defined by ROK MND] ran way over projected estimates, and they?? do it willingly.
But there?? a catch. A big catch.
The sticking point here is not with relocating troops. It never has been. The ROK government wants the land back for many different reasons, most of which are symbolic and have to do with getting foreign troops out of the nation?? capitol, but there are also very practical reasons such as traffic and property tax revenue issues. I think these reasons are undeniably valid.
However, here?? where things have bogged down. The ROK government has no experience with or patience for an all volunteer military and openly expresses dislike for the idea of a ??ittle America??community in its midst, whether it?? in Seoul or Pyongtaek. While the ROK Government is perfectly willing to move the military headquarters and other military operations out of Yongsan, they have never been willing to pay to move, and rebuild again brand new, things they perceive as non-military, and therefore non-essential. For instance, recreational facilities, bowling alleys, movie theaters, the P/X, and most importantly, DODDS schools and family housing. ??ow do DODDS schools and day-care centers help preserve peace and economic prosperity on the Korean peninsula???r
The ROK side has always seen Yongsan as strictly a military headquarters and consequently held to the line that at relocation, they should only have to pay to relocate the soldiers and their military gear, but that families and recreational facilities are here at the convenience of the Americans and therefore Uncle Sam should foot the bill to rebuild these people and facilities down south.
Looking at it from this perspective, it?? not an entirely unreasonable demand.
From a US point of view however, it is totally unacceptable, not even negotiable. For one thing, the ROK govt. has always taken issue at the US side calling Korea a ??ardship tour??and Uncle Sam?? willingness to give out extra pay incentives to soldiers to come here. It?? insulting to Korea and Koreans, they say. Yet, at the same time, the only way for USFK to get around some of the ??orea stigma??[i.e. being 8,000 miles from home and loved ones, while not drawing hazardous duty pay or getting tax breaks] is to have as many ??ommand-sponsored??slots as possible, and provide quality of life incentives and US-style conveniences for the troops AND their families, and of course for the 7,000 civilian employees and THEIR families.
Yes, the ROK side has also balked at taking responsibility for moving the 7,000 or so US and Korean civilian employees working at Yongsan, nearly all of whom have been in Korea far longer than any of the soldiers and who provide USFK with nearly all its professional competence in many non-combat related specialties. Again, the ROK side?? reasons are that these are non-military and non-essential personnel who are only present in Korea to provide convenience for USFK.
The ROK wants the new Pyongtaek HQ to look like a typical ROK army post, very Spartan, no family members, no swimming pools, or state of the art fitness centers, or driving ranges or clubs, or restaurants, or movie theaters, and where ALL of the civilian employees are local Koreans. Basically, they have a vision in their minds of row after row of nice new freshly painted Quonset huts with a couple of nice hooches for the general officers.
This is where the two sides butt heads. For USFK?? part, they stand by the position that these ??onveniences??the ROKs complain of are all necessary to providing a fully functional and stable military headquarters community with high troop morale while being stationed far from home. They say that this is a reasonable request given that Korea is not Iraq and therefore this is a permanent base, not a forward deployed base, and that if US troops have longer tours in Korea they will be able to do their jobs better than if they are only here for a year at a time. Accompanied tours equate to happier troops, and longer tours in the same job giving more time for skill development and expertise and bringing stability to the mission, and of course fewer costly PCS moves. And so USFK said that if the ROK side was unwilling to pay to rebuild these facilities down south, then USFK would be happy to just simply remain in Seoul.
Remember, this is not an unreasonable request either. The SOFA allows the ROK government to demand return of a facility at any time for any reason, but at the same time imposes on the ROK a responsibility to provide USFK with similar facilities elsewhere if they do this. USFK is simply saying ??f you aren?? willing to give us similar facilities to what we already have right now, all of which we paid for with US taxpayer dollars to enhance troop morale and thereby improve the quality of service we provide to the ROK and which we therefore consider important to operational success, then don?? ask us to leave Yongsan anytime soon, because we have nowhere else to go but Hawaii or Japan, and you really don?? want that.?? USFK also points out that when relocating to Pyongtaek, they will be leaving behind hundreds of millions of dollars in assets that the ROK side inherits for free. Think of the $70 million dollar upgrades to the 121st General Hospital and the new $20 million dollar Yongsan helipad, for example. Fair is fair, they say.
So, now we come to what we see in the papers and on TV now, a whole lot of posturing year after year as the ROK side periodically lets slip to the press comments that ??t?? just getting too expensive,??and they do nothing at all to stop the violent protests in the Camp Humphries area, but there is almost no movement yet to actually build this new base. Sure, they??e bought out many of the landowners down there, but it?? going to take a lot longer than 24 months to build what is essentially an entire city. How long does it take to build a helipad, or a new modern hospital, or modern barracks for 8,000 troops, or a fully wired 4-star headquarters building complete with all the sewer, gas, electrical, and fiber optic infrastructure that has to go into the ground before any buildings can go up. And that doesn?? include housing for families and schools assuming those actually get built. This is going to take a long time.
This is a long-term project that has not even gotten off the ground, but you can be sure, when the 2008 deadline looms, the ROK side will be back at the table asking USFK to finally relent in its ??tubborn??demands for schools and family housing.
And that, my friends, is when the real ??uture of the Alliance??negotiations will begin.
Everything going on right now about whether a retaining wall/dike is enough to prevent flooding at the new site or whether the entire flood plain needs to be elevated, is just meaningless posturing and diverts from the real issue: that the ROK wants USFK to consist of only lean, mean war-fighters who leave the families back home, while USFK wants to retain the quality of life improvements they spent so much to build up, but which they claim are actually very effective long-term cost reducers and force multipliers.
Finally, one more problematic issue has been that at one time there was talk about USFK putting all civilian employees in on-base housing at the new location. This sent the Korean side into the stratosphere. The only way they were able to sell to the Korean public this idea of paying for the relocation of Yongsan Garrison was to remind them how much money they?? eventually make renting apartments to the Americans in Pyongtaek. If USFK decided to put these people in on-base housing, more than $150 million per year in ??ommunity benefits??has just been taken off the table. I??e been out of the loop so long I don?? know what became of that proposal, but do know that USFK was serious about stopping the flow of blood [i.e. US taxpayer dollars] going so freely to the dirty pockets of local landlords. As many of you already know, the off-base housing situation at Yongsan is a complete fiscal disaster??ith local landlords being able to call out practically any price they want because USFK simply has no other way to house the employees and employees not being willing to relocate to Korea unless they can have their families with them. But on-base housing will work. This is what has happened in Japan for many years, so it wasn?? something new; it was a way for Uncle Sam to reduce expenses, but the ROK side found it untenable.
That?? really all I know about this thing so I won?? try to go further. I hope it was helpful though.
That was very interesting, Charles Kim, thanks for the info.
Charles — thank you for the information. Great explanation.
Well, now this is going to seem like a love fest, but Charles Kim, I too want to thank you for taking the time to repond in such detail.
There are a good number of us who have been in Korea (or were there) for years and have picked up information as we’ve gone along, and on this blog’s comment section and our own blogs, have taken on what some consider the distortions that are regular in the Korean media and public.
Most do their best to provide links, usually to newspaper articles, but more indept sources we run across, but we don’t have the kind of knowledge that someone working on the issues directly would.
Such information you provide is gold.
Much of it is specfic and some will, I’m sure, do some tracking from it to verify and get links, and the information will be used in the future when these recurrent issues surface.
I hope you stick around the site and some of the other blogs that post pretty much daily that have similar topics covered.
It could actually make some difference.
I think a good bit of what you wrote about contains things that I’ve read USFK explain in press releases it gives the Korean media and even the civic groups and local community groups when things like the Wonju contamination cases, but you have to dig for stuff like that because it is here today, gone tomorrow.
By commenting on the blogs with this kind of information, it will tend to stay fresh, even if you don’t post a lot, because others will pick it up and remember it for the next time.
(I make the http://www.usinkorea.org site, and it is a safe bet bits and pieces of what you wrote above and in the environmental contamination thread will be used in future work.
and if you read my work there, and you find any major discrepancies from what you know, please let me know — usinkorea@hotmail.com. As I said above, I got most of this from the news media, which doesn’t have the space to get into so much detail.)
This kind of info needs to be disseminated in Korean and to Koreans, without the filter of the media, who never seem to look up even published SOFA details, let alone dig for facts inconvenient to the national cause.
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ROKUS POCUS: The Alliance…
Charles Kim, a commenter at From the Nakdong to the Yalu, has penned a wonderfully clear and concise summary account of the way in which ROKGOV shamelessly misrepresents its contributions to the costs of the US military protection extended to South Kor…