Former Unification Minister Jeong "Pearls for a Pig" Se-hyun continues to run his mouth off, this time in an interview with CBS (Korean). I’ll probably translate it this evening, if for no other reason that to give English speakers a little insight into the mindset of some of the key figures determining South Korean policy toward the North in the age of Sunshine.
Sphere: Related Content
94 Comments
I’ll do it:
Fomer Minister of Unification: ??here is no need to follow America.??/b>
Former Minister of Unification Jeong Se Hyeon stated with respect to the counterfeiting issue, ??orea and America are different countries ??this is a matter of national pride.??n
Jeong noted that, ??here is no need to follow America,??with regard to the Bush administration?? demands that South Korea exert pressure on the North on the counterfeiting issue.
On the question of whether there would be conflict with the Bush administration?? high pressure tactics as brought up during President Roh?? New Year?? press conference, Jeong stated in an appearance on CBS Newsradar that, ??orea is a member of the OECD, and has grown into the world?? eleventh largest economy, and as an influential country, cannot unilaterally follow the United States. This is a matter of national pride.??n
Mr. Jeong added, ??t is unrealistic to expect that there will not be differences in perspective between Korea and the United States with regard to the North Korean issue??Korea and America are different countries, and more than that, their goals and national interests are separate.??n
He further added, ??his is a kind of lockstep politics and diplomacy ??The Bush administration is speaking for the interests of the military industrial complex and is taking a hardline unilateral diplomatic offensive against small countries to force them to follow its lead.??n
Regarding the reopening of the six party talks, ??here is significant potential for the six party talks to be delayed due to the hardline American position with regard to the counterfeiting issue??It is unlikely that they will be reopened within February.??n
The phrase, “getting too big for one’s raising” comes to mind.
Hmmmm, the new issue here seems to be counterfeiting.
Well, if you continue to put sanctions on North Korea, duh, that’s what they are gonna do. Work to integrate North Korea into the global economic network and maybe they wont need to do stuff like that.
But maybe I’m missing the point altogether. This is a just a test to see if South Korea would tag along.
South Korean and US interests will continue to diverge in the future.
National responsibility = national pride. The national pride Jeong speaks of is meaningless.
How much power does this guy have in the government now?
South Korean and US interests will continue to diverge in the future.
What are the conservatives saying about this? Oh, please, please, please God, don’t let the “progressives” win in 2007.
Bluejives, yes you are missing the point. The ball is not in the US’s court on this one. What NK needs to do to be integrated into the global network is clear. It needs to comply with absolute minimum global standards of decency. It’s neither difficult nor unreasonable for Kim to just stop govt.-directed illegal activities.
What SK needs to do for its future is equally clear (except to Chong Se Hyeon and the other fair weather allies. For them, false pride overrides national interest. Unfortunately, they’re taking us all down with them.
I agree that Jeong Se Hyeon’s rhetoric is a bit regretable.
But looking past the showmanship, there seems to be a real conflict of priorities. SK is concerned that fussing over a relatively minor issue like the counterfeit bills can potentially jeopardize the 6-way talks. I think this concern is legitimate.
What kind of perverse fuck stakes national pride on defending widespread criminal behavior simply based on shared ethnicity? This kind of thinking by cabinet-level officials should get Korea kicked out of the OECD.
Speaking of getting kicked out, when did the Marmot list his ban (2003?) on Bluejives for stupid racist remarks?
“SK is concerned that fussing over a relatively minor issue like the counterfeit bills can potentially jeopardize the 6-way talks. I think this concern is legitimate.”
No, it is not a legitimate concern amd the real problem has been SK’s willingness to negotiate from a position of weakness.
The continual setback to progress has been nothing other than SK’s tendency to capitulate to the North and allowing it to place a wedge between it and its ally.
It is clear that Roh and co. are determined to derail both the negotiations and the alliance, making us double losers.
The root of this flaw is irrational faith in a single, flawed economic strategy - unification as the means of making Korea a global power. Meanwhile the real issues - the hollowing out of Korean industrial base by China, declining global competitiveness and lack of any stratgic direction has turned the obsession with NK into a losing proposition.
Roh’s 5 targets for elimination have been described as Han Nara Party, Seoul National University, Samsung Group, The Prosecutor’s Office and the media. While his incompetence has limited his effectiveness here, he has managed to begin to dismantle enemey #6 - the US alliance. The irony is that it is all based on a flawed perception that the US is somehow a hindrance to a united Korea. In other words, Roh has turned a winning hand into a losing hand by trhowing away his aces. He has made SK its own worst enemy.
Mizar, the US wants SK to “participate” by punishing NK with financial sanctions. Basically, that means stuff like halting trade across the DMZ, such as the Kaesong Joint Project, which is a principal element of the Sunshine Policy.
Please explain to me how such punitive measures is supposed to help anything, including the counterfeiting of US bills? I would think sanctioning NK will make them even more determined to produce fake money or peddle arms to other rogue states to generate hard cash.
Any attempts to police the flow of fake money is a lost cause anyway. It’s like the “War on Drugs” or trying to stop the flow of illegal aliens across the southern border in the US; it aint gonna happen.
The reason why NK enjoys so much leverage in dealing with SK or the US is precisely because it is a cornered rat. There is a certain power in having little or nothing to lose.
The US demands on SK also smacks of arrogance. It is an attempt to shore up the broader “Coalition against Terror”, which is a farce for the rest of the world, not just SK.
If North Korea’s government presses were pumping out fake South Korean won, would it be “arrogant” if Seoul were to ask for U.S. help in stopping it? No — it would be arrogant to 1) pretend it’s not happening, 2) claim that “non-governmental North Korean entities” were doing it or 3) to say that as a member of the OECD we don’t have to follow international law. Logic ALWAYS trumps emotional nationalism, bluejives, at least outside of Korea.
North Korea has everything to lose (from the point of view of its leadership), which is why it can’t address the nuclear issuie seriously, won’t allow food aid monitoring, won’t reform its economy, only allows interaction with South Korea at fenced-off enclaves like Kaesong and plays the “uri minjok ggiri” card — sadly, with great success on jokers like Jeong Se-hyun.
For its next ploy, look to North Korea to ask the South to compensate it for the $1 billion a year it makes from counterfeiting, drug trafficking and other assorted crimes.
Ah yes…logic. So what your logic tells you is that NK FUNNY MONEY BUSINESS (estimated at ~$45 million over a decade, a paltry sum compared to the $12+ TRILLION US GDP 2005) is so damn important that it is worth jeopardizing SK rapproachment initiatives and the pain-staking groundwork laid by prior dialogues thus far, the ultimate purpose of which is to eliminate the threat of NK NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
What a noble brainfart of a thought.
Bluejives; so how much would it have to be in order for the U.S. to stop ignoring it? Just wondering.
Also, if this instance of North Korea breaking international law is not important enough to address since it would risk upsetting North Korea, what is?
I’d *really* like answers, genius.
The other side of this coin is that if the issue is dealt with AFTER any hypothetical “deal,” it would be a ready-made excuse for NK to bow out.
- The fake money issue has been around for decades. Why all of a sudden now?
- Inter-Korea trade has reached a record $1.1 billion last year. Applying economic sanction to NK as a punitive action for a measely amount of fake money doesnt make any sense, esp when there’s so much more at stake.
- SK’s strategy for dealing with NK is to slowly and painstakingly integrate NK’s economy with the rest of the world and bring it up to parity. This takes discipline, consistency, long-term thinking, and patience. NK has been the way it is for more than 50 years. It could take at least that long to achieve this goal. The US wants a total collapse and regime-change before the current Administration is over. But unfortunately NK is not Iraq.
- NK’s main point of contention was economic sanctions. To them that is a prelude to war or regime-change. Once that happens, you can kiss any further hope of dialogue good-bye.
- Expecting NK to comply with international laws before any reasonable level of normalization has been reached is akin to putting the cart before the horse.
- If the US continues to indulge in strong-arm tactics with allies such as SK into adopting policies that are more conducsive to war than peace, it takes an already bad impression to worse in the world community and the US risks alienating itself even further.
Why now? Recent evidence (remember the IRA?) over the past few months ? the case is there now. If it?? brought up later the cry foul will be, ??hy did you wait.??
Inter-Korea trade has absolutely zilch to do with counterfeiting, unless you??e implying that they could use the extra fake greenbacks for better purchasing power?
Again, South Korea?? long-term strategy of appeasement and apologetics ? which has been a trainwreck ? is not a reason to not call the North out on blatantly illegal international activities.
The sanctions are directly tied to the institutions North Korea used to launder money/pass counterfeit dollar at/with, and by the way the massive government sponsored counterfeiting of another nations currently IS considered an act of war.
You think you reward North Korea before they stop counterfeiting and drug smuggling? That explains a lot.
I?? going to ask again, since you didn?? answer;
(1) HOW MUCH money does a country need to counterfeit before the U.S. should do something about it???
(2) If North Korea breaking international law is not important enough to address since it would risk upsetting North Korea, WHAT IS?
Again, I ask, how much say does the former Unification Minister actually have? [Please note: this is not a rhetorical question; I am in no way saying he has no influence, but rather I am asking how much, if any, does he have? Too bad I have to waste time spelling things like this out.]
If, say, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich were to make some pronouncement that the United States doesn’t need to follow this or that international norm, how much sway would it have?
Jeong is a nationalistic firebrand. He thinks “national pride” means standing up to bullies who try to push you around (in his mind) rather than “national pride” meaning doing the right thing.
I do think Bluejives has some point about the small scale of this actual program seeming to be made a far bigger deal, to the point that it could hinder progress on a much more serious problem, but even if one were to accept that notion… that’s not what Jeong is really getting at:
Again, South Korea?? long-term strategy of appeasement and apologetics ? which has been a trainwreck ? is not a reason to not call the North out on blatantly illegal international activities.
That’s your opinion. It’s really been less than 10 years. Complicated by much outside interference also.
(1) HOW MUCH money does a country need to counterfeit before the U.S. should do something about it???
I dunno. I have a suggestion, why dont you come up with a number?
(2) If North Korea breaking international law is not important enough to address since it would risk upsetting North Korea, WHAT IS?
NK breaking the international law is the least of our worries right now. But I’ll admit, it makes a convenient excuse to stir some shit up.
Of course the dazzling failure of the Sunshine Policy isn’t either of the Korea’s fault, no, it has to be blamed on someone… not Korean. No way can North Korea be responsible for what it does! I understand. Gotcha
Well, you said that what they were doing was not enough to warrant going after, but you can’t say how much is enough? But your real answer is clear; no amount is enough, when it comes to North Korea.
And apparently North Korea can do anything with no fear of being called out on it, since it might ‘upset’ them. Sure, ok.
That kind of thinking in South Korea continues to enable the North. Pathetic.
Jeong’s power is debatable, but other than the military-industrial complex claptrap, he didn’t sound a whole lot different than what the Roh administration is saying about the counterfeiting case. (In fact, compared to his successors Chung and Lee, he was a relative hard-liner on North Korea.)
If the counterfeiting issue was of little consequence, then North Korea would not make a fuss about it, but instead we had KCNA, in an unwitting act of confession, talking about the U.S. strangling the life blood of the nation. To me, that makes it doubly worth pursuing.
Vershbow recently reminded us that the last regime to conduct state-sponsored currency counterfeiting was the one in Berlin from 1933-45.
The U.S. hardball is mostly a figment of the Korean media’s imagination and flows from a bad old Seoul government habit of using a nationalistic press and public to score negotiating points with Uncle Sam. Ask the USFK base negotiators how that works.
When South Koreans and their minjok-minded sympathizers get all touchy-feely about the Sunshine Policy, North Korea already has them by the short and curlies.
Apparently the ROK gov’t is now out of step even with N. Korea, because according to Christopher Hill: North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan at a meeting in Beijing last week “indicated they would be prepared to subscribe to international norms with respect to money laundering and would want to cooperate internationally on these issues.”
http://english.chosun.com/w21d.....60006.html
Maybe the U.S. should switch alliance partners
“Mizar, the US wants SK to “participate” by punishing NK with financial sanctions. Basically, that means stuff like halting trade across the DMZ, such as the Kaesong Joint Project, which is a principal element of the Sunshine Policy.”
You are misinformed on this point. The U.S. does not oppose the Sunshine Policy but is asking only for specific cooperation and support, not a sweeping ban on Intra-Korean trade.
“Please explain to me how such punitive measures is supposed to help anything, including the counterfeiting of US bills? I would think sanctioning NK will make them even more determined to produce fake money or peddle arms to other rogue states to generate hard cash.”
Gladly. Your assumption that counterfeiting is a means to “generate hard cash” is flawed as it can hardly be expected to be a major revenue generator. Kim can raise revenues in any number of ways that do not threaten the survival of his regime.
The reason couterfeiting cannot be countenainced is that it is in fact, a criminal act of destabilization perpetated against a foreign government - in other words, an act of aggression that any government would and should address. The effectiveness of sanctions lies in the clear message that the world has standards of civilized behavior that any nation needs to adhere to to attain the legitimacy and recognition Kim seeks.
“Any attempts to police the flow of fake money is a lost cause anyway. It’s like the “War on Drugs” or trying to stop the flow of illegal aliens across the southern border in the US; it aint gonna happen.”
The war on drugs in the US has been judged a success. Today, the US violent crime rate is half that of England, for example. Crime, which began to grow in the 1960s has now fallen 50% since the 1990s to a 30 year low - even while it has risen in every other advanced nation, reaching record levels in European cities. The US is now, aside from the 3% of counties that contain 70% of the serious crime, one of the safest nations in the world.
Counterfeiting is not nearly as difficult an issue to deal with, and you would be foolish to count out the ability of law enforcement to contain it.
“The reason why NK enjoys so much leverage in dealing with SK or the US is precisely because it is a cornered rat. There is a certain power in having little or nothing to lose.”
No, any credible analyst will tell you that their isolation is not the result of any international pressures, but rather self-imposed because of internal fear and control issues. They win no international friends because they refuse to adhere to minimal global ethical standards, are deceiptful, duplicitous, untrustworthy, menacing and their chief negotiation tactic is threats.
For instance, they lost the light water reaction project that the US had provided the initiative for via the Agreed Framework by willfully violating its conditions and unilaterally dropping out of the Nonproliferation Non-Proliferation Treaty.
“The US demands on SK also smacks of arrogance. It is an attempt to shore up the broader “Coalition against Terror”, which is a farce for the rest of the world, not just SK.”
What is arrogant or farcical in asking a long-term ally who has benefited quite one-sidedly from US largesse for 50 years to cooperate in enforcing international law? Cooperation can be provided in many forms that do not compromise the Sunshine Policy. SK has a moral obligation to its ally, its own citizens, and, yes, our brothers in the North who are suffering the effects of a brutal regime while we silently assent.
“Again, South Korea?? long-term strategy of appeasement and apologetics ? which has been a trainwreck ? is not a reason to not call the North out on blatantly illegal international activities.”
“That’s your opinion. It’s really been less than 10 years. Complicated by much outside interference also.”
Interference with what, specifically? North Korean regime stability? The Sunshine Policy? The Six-Way Talks?
And can you name any particular instance of such outside interference? I can name nmerous cooperative initiatives, such as the US’s light water reactor initiative, which Seoul gladly embraced. The Six-Way Talks are another such example of the US acting to include regional nations in talks when NK had long insisted on direct one-on-one talks with the US.
In the final analysis, is this argument framed entirely in rhetoric and unbutressed by any body of evidential support?
It’s a fantasy that anyone can consider N.K., a military-led dictatorship with a nominal communist ideology and the perpetrator of genocide against its own population to be capable of “normalization” in the first place. Its regime is inherently against all international norms, most people’s ethics and the tenets of all major religions. It has not made one single gesture of any real importance vis-a-vis the hundreds of millions of dollars and food aid S.K. has given it–and that money is just a payoff to a bully, because as Roh has said several times, he wants reunification to happen over a span of many, many years. In fact, one of the main points of the “sunshine” policy is a pledge not to absorb North Korea, creating a Waiting for Godot situation of hoping in vain that Kim Jongil or his successor changes the entire makeup of N.K.’s power structure and its core ideology to suit international norms, which is precisely what cannot happen with those people in power. Meanwhile, it flaunts international laws, continues to oppress its people, refuses to release people it kidnapped (including dozens of S. Koreans), and so on.
A sense of urgency about N.K.’s continuing internal oppression, military threat to the region and interference in other countries’ economies is not inappropriate.
US: Stick to Diplomacy with North Korea, Even If Talks Fail
By Nina Hachigian, Center for Asia Pacific Policy, RAND Corporation
[excerpted article to highlight the most salient points]
…
But we must separate our short-term needs from the long-term vision. To resolve the immediate problem of the North’s nuclear program, diplomacy is the only path, and the US should pursue it wholeheartedly, despite its inherent messiness and difficulty. Though a breakthrough at the next round of talks should not be expected, negotiations with North Korea can work because each side clearly wants something. The North Koreans want aid and a security guarantee; the US, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and Australia are united in demanding a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Reaching a compromise will not be easy, but it is far from impossible.
If talks fail to produce visible progress, there are some inside (and outside) the Bush administration who will renew their calls for a strategy of economic pressures instead of diplomacy. They have argued that a better government in North Korea is the right goal, and that measures the United States can take to hasten that end are all to the good. They advocate a short-term strategy of increased economic pressures??uch as drug-sale interdictions recently carried out by Australia to stop illegal sources of cash, inspections of North Korean ships for illegal weapons by Japan, and even some form of blockade??hat fits a broader strategy of isolating and undermining the government in Pyongyang.
This approach confuses the short- and long-term problems. As a complement to sincere, rigorous and determined diplomacy, such economic measures can demonstrate that the US and its partners are very serious and that the consequences of not reaching a deal will be severe. But without continuing talks, ratcheting up economic pressure would dangerously compromise our urgent short-term goal of halting North Korea’s nascent nuclear program.
…
Moreover, Chinese and South Koreans have asserted, economic pressure is unlikely to have the desired effect of forcing the North to end its weapons program. Juche, or self-reliance, is the proclaimed national ideology, and North Korea has survived under dire economic conditions for decades. If anything, South Korea and China argue, economic pressure will only serve to harden the North’s position that it must have a nuclear weapons program to protect it from hostile forces.
BJ: ??izar, the US wants SK to ??articipate??by punishing NK with financial sanctions. Basically, that means stuff like halting trade across the DMZ, such as the Kaesong Joint Project, which is a principal element of the Sunshine Policy.??n
Mizar: You are misinformed on this point. The U.S. does not oppose the Sunshine Policy but is asking only for specific cooperation and support, not a sweeping ban on Intra-Korean trade.
Have you read today’s front page article in the Chosun Ilbo?
U.S. in Sweeping Plan to Strangle N.Korea’s Cash Flow
The U.S. is readying fresh sanctions against North Korea over the regime?? alleged financial crimes that will be significantly more severe than the ones already in place.
…
That will mean all banks, brokerage houses and insurance firms and refers not only to illegal transactions but to any financial deals with the North.
..
under the draft order, almost all finance companies would be effectively prohibited from doing business with North Korea. That would also affect international financial institutions outside the U.S. and thus deal a heavy blow to North Korea?? overseas trade.
Summary: sounds like a sweeping ban to me.
Thanks for the link to the good news, bluejives.
Maybe North Korea will find it less painful to stop all the crime, begin to get serious about resolving the nuclear problem and take its first ever steps in reciprocating Sunshine Policy largesse. Win-Win (for all who deserve such an outcome).
Richardson: Of course the dazzling failure of the Sunshine Policy isn?? either of the Korea?? fault, no, it has to be blamed on someone??not Korean. No way can North Korea be responsible for what it does! I understand. Gotcha
Sigh, I hate regurgitating what I consider basic stuff. Try doing a google search on “axis of evil” and see what you find.
Slim: The U.S. hardball is mostly a figment of the Korean media?? imagination and flows from a bad old Seoul government habit of using a nationalistic press and public to score negotiating points with Uncle Sam.
Ah, yes, only Korea and like much of the rest of the world. Ask an average German, Russian, or even a Japanese what they think, or are they also unduly influenced by the bad, bad Korean media?
You might want to play the “Korean Nationalism” card a little less. After like the umpteenth time, it gives a rather unpleasant, eye-rolling, whiny sensation to the Expat Group-Think dynamic I sense around these parts. Remember, cool logical rationalism over emotionalism…
Korean nationalism is a redundant expression.
Your sarcasm is particularly inappropriate for someone on the losing end of most of these arguments.
Based on a cursory read, I will say bluejives is utterly sensible and reasonable on his own blog. I don’t see why he takes a different tack here. Could it stem from the “issues” that got him banned by the Marmot a few years back?
Slim wrote:
Korean nationalism is a redundant expression.
Your sarcasm is particularly inappropriate for someone on the losing end of most of these arguments.
And then wrote:
Based on a cursory read, I will say bluejives is utterly sensible and reasonable on his own blog. I don?? see why he takes a different tack here. Could it stem from the ??ssues??that got him banned by the Marmot a few years back?
This is going to sound like I’m picking on Slim, which I’m not, it’s just that what he wrote stands out as an example of what I’m going to say.
I find the way so many of these discussions deteriorate into a battle against persons rather than any meaningful dialogue to be highly counterproductive.
If Bluejives or some commenter is saying something wrong, go ahead and point that out. But how does it bolster your argument by saying he’s “on the losing end of most of these arguments” or brining up that he was once banned from Marmot’s?
None of that really addresses what he’s saying right now, and it just comes across as a gratuitous attack. In fact, in this case, it’s all you have to say on the matter. What does that contribute?
Of course, there are times when criticism of a poster’s tactics are relevant and even necessary, but I don’t think that’s happening here.
Mizar said:
“The war on drugs in the US has been judged a success. Today, the US violent crime rate is half that of England, for example. Crime, which began to grow in the 1960s has now fallen 50% since the 1990s to a 30 year low - even while it has risen in every other advanced nation, reaching record levels in European cities”
So less crime overall means the War of Drugs was a success? Here’s another statistic for you, cocaine and heroin have dropped dramatically in price over the last 20 years while purity levels have skyrocketed.
Yes, I’d judge that a success too.
Does the War on Drugs make those who are convicted on drug charges POWs?
Just asking.
Yeah, after seeing the paragraph starting with “the war on drugs in the US has been judged a success,” I pretty much stopped reading the rest.
But in all fairness, it is a success for prison construction, the corrections industry, lawyers I suppose, etc.
And I guess for all Americans, too, because narcotics have been wiped away from our streets and drug use has gone down to negligible levels. And Clinton and Dubya have reportedly both stopped snorting coke.
Re War on Drugs: A rhetorical generalization that ignores documented success in the war on drugs is just that - a rhetorical generalization.
Furthermore, it is both a red herring argument and a hasty generalization compare counterfeiting control to drug control without demonstrating why the analogy is supposedly apt.
I pointed out the fact that the war on drugs has been judged a success by many on several merits. But remember that a debate is such that you can find arguments on either side of the argument. There are notable failures and successes in the drug war.
“Crops of coca, the main ingredient in cocaine, were reduced in Colombia by 16 percent in 2003, to 213,000 acres, according to the United Nations. That’s a 47 percent decline over three years, from a high of 403,000 acres in 2000. US figures, which rely on different methodology, are slightly less optimistic but still significant - a 33 percent decline since 2001. Production of poppies, the source of heroin, is down by 33 percent in the past two years, the US government says. With US help - to the tune of $3.3 billion…The drop in drug production is largely due to the aggressive coca fumigation program, mostly executed by US planes and pilots. In 2003 they sprayed 328,500 acres, the UN says. So far in 2004, according to the Colombian government, 310,600 acres have been sprayed, a slight drop from this time last year.”
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/.....-woam.html
The following site will provide info and arguments on both sides:
http://www.csdp.org/news/news/drugtruth.htm
What you need is a well-balanced approach to a subject, however, and to avoid overgeneralizing to support an argument.
Whatever you judge the success and failures of current policies, to simply shrug off the problem as insoluble based on an emotional response to the issue does no good.
Blue ??I said the Sunshine Policy was a failure. You responded with Google ??xis of Evil???? Although I consider this to be fairly ??asic stuff,??it?? sort of customary to respond with, you know, something related. Sunshine Policy Axis of Evil? Nope.
I?? still like an answer on how much counterfeiting a country has to do before the U.S. should care. Have you worked up a GDP percentage, or perhaps dollar amounts (on a progressive scale, of course)?
And finally, I am still interested in hearing what North Korea would have to do before anyone should dare to upset them.
The problem with blanket statements like Blue’s is that it is actually difficult to tell how well the war on counterfeiting is really going. But there the US takes this quite seriously and points to numerous efforts that have paid off so far.
According to a US State Dept fact sheet, despite counterfeiters’ increasing use of technology, advanced
counterfeit deterrence on the part of the authorities has keptcounterfeiting at low levels with current estimates of counterfeit notes in circulation worldwide at between 0.01 and 0.02 percent, or about 1-2 notes in every 10,000. It is claimed that through aggressive law enforcement, authorities seize the vast majority of known counterfeit U.S. dollars before they are passed into circulation. The fact sheet states that in 2002, authorities worldwide seized three counterfeit notes for every counterfeit note passed into circulation.In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. Secret Service and international authorities seized $130 million in counterfeit notes before they ever made it into circulation, and another $44.3 million in counterfeit U.S.currency that had been passed into circulation was detected and removed worldwide.
One reason this is an international effort is that about 60 percent of the counterfeit notes detected being passed in the U.S. in fiscal year 2002 originated outside the U.S. Another is that those counterfeit notes are
being passed to victims worldwide.
A notable factoid:
“While only about one or two in 10,000 notes is a counterfeit, if you get stuck with that rare fake, you will lose your hard-earned money. Counterfeit bills cannot be turned in for genuine ones, and knowingly passing along a counterfeit is illegal.”
Slim: is mostly a figment of the Korean media?? imagination and flows from a bad old Seoul government habit of using a nationalistic press and public to score negotiating points with Uncle Sam.
Bluejives: Ah, yes, only Korea and like much of the rest of the world. Ask an average German, Russian, or even a Japanese what they think, or are they also unduly influenced by the bad, bad Korean media?
Hate to burst your bubble here, Bluejives, but ironically you’re right here. The average German or Russion can’t even find Korea on the map, no less be influenced by the jingoist Korean media’s whine about the U.S. hardball against North Korea. But even those who do read the Korean media, the average European expats I talk to in Seoul are not influenced by it either; they invariably seen to take the U.S.’s side against North Korea on the issue. You see, they’re not apologists for the race.
While only about one or two in 10,000 notes is a counterfeit, if you get stuck with that rare fake, you will lose your hard-earned money. Counterfeit bills cannot be turned in for genuine ones, and knowingly passing along a counterfeit is illegal.
Ha ha. You will be stuck with it until you find an appropriate dupe to pass it on to. Try a store without camera surveillance and do so while buying legitimate stuff that you would normally buy. That’s how I’ve passed along the several counterfeit bills that ended up in my hands.
If one or two bills out of 10,000 are counterfeit, that means there are probably a million or so fake bills out there, and it’s a good bet many of them are being passed along undetected.
OK, you obviously didn’t make the cognitive leap. Furthermore, you even forgot (or left out) part of your own original statement, which was this:
(sarcastically, of course)
First of all, the Sunshine Policy is not a failure. It is still a work in progress. It also got off to a very bad start. When GW Bush came to power and met with Kim Dae Jung in 01, Bush indicated that the US was not interested in “Sunshine diplomacy” but wished to aggressively confront NK. Bush’s stance was affirmed by neocons such as John Bolton, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, who actually stated in plain words “the end of North Korea is our policy”. And yes, GW Bush labelled NK as “axis of evil” in his first State of the Union speech.
So basically, the Bush Administration’s advocacy of “Firestorm Policy” threw a huge, friggin monkey wrench into SK’s fledgling Sunshine Policy. That’s what I meant by “complications due to outside interference” and that’s why I said to google “axis of evil”. Do you have capished this now?
This is akin to a hostage situation where in the midst of negotiations the cops start accusing him of other crimes he has on his record. It is disingenuous. Therefore, your question is a moot point.
Whatever, dude.
For the record, I’m no big fan of Dear Leader or the NK regime. But neither am I of overly simplistic thinking.
I have already proved you wrong on the nature and extent of the US anti-counterfeiting mandate, which looks like it will happen anyway whether SK agrees with it or not. So now the ball is in NK’s court about whether or not the talks will continue. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. We’ll see what happens.
Cogitative leap? No, not apt. More like your leap of logic.
Tsk, tsk, Blue; DJ made promises to KJI about what the U.S. would do/would not do that he had absolutely no right making. DJ created that situation. Too bad the half billion dollars he paid to meet KJI didn?? get him more. But it did get him a Nobel.
W didn?? label NK as the Axis of Evil, but as a part of it. Do you want to put yourself in the position of saying that the NK regime is *not* evil? Go for it.
And you sort of leave out the part where NK resumed its illegal (by agreement) nuclear programs in 1998 or so, long before W was pres. You should have a terminal case of cognitive dissonance by this time.
In the end, you??e still attempted to blame the U.S. for North Korean actions. Again, tsk, tsk.
The Sunshine Policy WILL NEVER WORK because North Korea has staked its internal claim to legitimacy on a CULT REGIME with an alternate reality. The sooner you and the rest of the left realize that, the sooner you??l get a grip on reality. Kissing KJI?? arse will never solve the situation, yet that remains the ROK policy. As I said, they gotta blame someone else, and evidently you??e in with the ??hey.??
You said what NK was doing was not enough to bother with, but you cannot answer the very simple question; how much IS enough. It is not moot; it?? key.
I have no sympathy for clueless apologists.
W didn?? label NK as the Axis of Evil, but as a part of it. Do you want to put yourself in the position of saying that the NK regime is *not* evil? Go for it.
Well, when he said it, there was pretty much no “axis.” Maybe he meant to say asses of evil, and he got all subliminibabable on us.
Saddam-led Iraq in cahoots with the Iranians?! And North Korea partnered up with them? The Japanese do far more business with the North Koreans than Iraq or Iran ever did.
Lots of country’s have an evil leadership. China’s leadership is evil; that they’ve simply got a more pragmatic economic grasp than Pyongyang doesn’t make them less evil. But there we (the United States of America) are, they’re #1 export partner, taking in over one-fifth of the stuff they send abroad.
Burma’s military junta is evil. Why aren’t they a part of the axis of evil?
It’s quite amazing that the comments of Jeong Se-hyun could generate this much interest.
But his career and the current state of his thinking demonstrate how the Sunshine Policy has been a nearly unqualified success for NORTH KOREA in furthering its core goals of maintaining the Kim regime in power on its own terms and eroding if not sundering the US-ROK alliance. (There is irony here in that the term “Sunshine Policy” is no longer used, having been dropped — on Jeong’s watch — in defernce to the objections of North Korea, which undertsood the Aesop’s fable that spawned it and hated the implications.)
For North Korea, the Sunshine Policy has been surprisingly good for a work in progress. The policy has:
-Helped the North diversify its sources of cash (which will be useful if the world gets serious about stopping various DPRK rackets like counterfeiting, bootlegging, crystal meth and heroin running, fake Marlboros….) away from a possibly revanchist China and as the zainichi North Korean population in Japan increasingly disavows the regime.
-Ultimately helped undermine the integrity of the international relief effort in North Korea despite ongoing dire needs, allowing the North to kick out those who who uphold that integrity in favor of no-questions-asked largesse from “understanding” neighbors.
-Won the DPRK carte blanche treatment from South Korea on everything from the above mentioned transnational crimes and aid policies, to human rights, to failures to adhere to the terms of the 6.15 declaration to violation of the 1991 North-South nuclear agreement. As the counterfeiting issue demonstrates, South Korea is far more likely to apologize for North Korea on the international stage than it is to take issue. Washington MIGHT well be testing Seoul on this issue, but Pyongyang is DEFINITELY doing that, and with more confidence of success than the Americans are right to have. This South Korean deference to North Korean sensibilities has made the South’s National Commission on Human Rights a dysfunctional laughingstock and taken the issue of the 500 or more South Korean POWs and kidnap victims off the table in North-South relations.
-Strained the US-ROK alliance (as Jeong’s comments, though ill-conceived,illustrate) and created a false illusion of peace that has eroded public support for the alliance. As a practical matter , could a US policymaker safely share important intelligence on North Korean with a South Korean government run by men of Jeong’s ilk?
-Made the idea of a USFK pullout (which would have inevitably happened one day) emerge as a real possibility at an earlier stage in South Korea’s military modernization than experts say is advisable or even safe as long as the DPRK exists unchanged. The illusion of peace will make it hard for future South Korean governments to ask taxpayers to pay for the forces and capabilities the ROK will lose when the Yanks depart, or to maintain mandatory military service. I doubt North Korea has a word yet for “conscientious objector”. (Perhaps Roh’s manufactured crises with Japan are a way of offsetting this?)
-Created an atmosphere where it is politically incorrect to publicly advocate a hard-headed view of North Korea (let alone hard-line policies), not only among South Koreans but increasingly among the Korean diaspora — even on a blog, sometimes. In a more serious vein, the legal troubles of the ChoJongDong newspapers and the “reform” pressures they face are not unrelated to their stances on North-South ties (whatever the many real legal and political sins of those publications). It appears many would rather see North Korean refugees go home to their fate than have them be taken anywhere by, God forbid, Christians and conservatives.
-Inculcated and spread (admittedly, in a fertile South) the “uriminjokggiri” ideology of xenophoblic nationalism that is the true essence of Juche. We see it in the teacher’s union politics, the VANKs, the new-look KBS, the candle-holding masses, protests against James Bond movies (!!!) and right here in Jeong’s rhetoric.
-Fostered in South Korea an indulgent, hope-over-experience mindset that can border on amnesia, allowing North Korea to cast disputes in its terms and count on a solid audience for its mostly preposterous positions. Too many forget that North Korean nuclear cheating in violation of the spirit of the Agreed Framework and the letter of the North-South nuclear agreement began 5-6 YEARS before Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. Whatever the shortcomings of Bush’s choice of words (which were well-received among exiled North dissidents, I note), they pale next to 58 years of the bloodcurdling North Korean rhetoric that has stood as the North’s only public statement of its policies. North Korean backsliding on Sunshine Commitments began soon after June 2000 summit (perhaps as soon as the $500 million was used up?). Jeong’s predecessor, once removed, Lim Dong-won was dismissed over South Korean indulgence North Korean political chicanery at an 8.15.01 minjok love/hate fest. North Korea’s tantrum diplomacy with the South picked up after 9.11, allowing the North to pocket concessions on family reunions and cross-border projects. (Richardson’s account of the unfortunate first Kim-Bush meeting is spot-on. DJ should have waited a few months, at the very least.)
Some of these would be only minor quibbles if there was evidence of serious change in North Korea — and not mere tactical adjustments to keep the aid flowing. I would cheerfully embrace bluejives’ hopeful thinking once incontrovertible evidence starts rolling in.
Vile as Kim Jong-il is, it is wrong to think of him as a loser or a fool. I fear I’ve only scatched the surface of his subversive powers and the rich pickings he’s enjoying at the very expense of his enablers.
‘the sunshine policy has been a failure!’
who says? some right wing expat who demands south korea behave like a well trained dog? the sunshine policy is a long term strategy of intergration and maintenance of peace in ne asia. to that end, there must be dialogue. 50 years of no talk between the koreas has been replaced with comunication between the two. those who say that the sunshine policy has failed have failed to grasp that the policy is indeed progressing as planned.
‘how much?’
i don’t know but i know 200 million in ten years is not worth the price of korea engaging in activities that will cause the north to shut off dialoque and return to the cave maintained by china.
’south koreans want unification for the economic benefits.’
yeah so? the economic benefits will be for ALL koreans. you don’t get that?
good day.
pawi kirogi aka nulji
It was $186 million exactly. Aside from conservative opposition forces, history has not yet passed its verdict on that particular matter. Until then, it remains a gesture of goodwill and a small price made for a chance for laying the foundation for genuine intra-Korea cooperation and peace.
Is this a silly nit-picking of semantics?
If not then consider this: KJI and NK are evil. But they certainly dont hide it. The Bush Administration does their own evil but passes it off as “spreading freedom and democracy”. They lied to the world about Iraq. Since then we have experienced Patriot Act, Homeland Security, Halliburton, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Graib, torture, death, illegal detainment of innocent people, and so on. Which is more evil?
From Wikipedia regarding the Agreed Framework:
Look up “cause and effect” while you’re at it.
please don’t quote from wikipedia. it’s open-source, and although has a lot of great info, isn’t accountable to verifiable sources.
as for the rok and dprk’s relationship, it’s like seeing a guy beating up his wife on the street and no one intervening, because “they’re husband and wife.” it makes no sense and is wrong, but no one will get involved to stop it. so it is with rok collaborating with dprk’s torture, murder and repression of 22 million souls. supporting this in the name of a “sunshine policy” is sick and wrong, but no one wants to get involved.
Actually, it was a lot more, perhaps much as $1.7 billion, but at any rate the number you quote is a fantasy;
http://www.upi.com/inc/view.ph.....2621-6903r
That depends of what you meant to say. Your ??oogle axis of evil??answer??would have me believe that you may have meant what you wrote. I guess wrong you can claim I?? taking you out of context, I guess right I?? ??it-picking.??Whatever.
Further up above you wrote this, ??emember, cool logical rationalism over emotionalism????/i> yet directly above you write, ??The Bush administration] lied to the world about Iraq.?? The truth is that not only our intel agencies, but our allies intel agencies thought the same thing about Iraq, and so did the U.S. legislative branch.
Attempting to portray a mistake as a lie is exactly the type of illogical emotionalism you cautioned others against; that?? plain old-fashioned hypocrisy on your part. Even more so for one babbling about what history will judge; the Sunshine policy is more history than the Iraq issue.
Wikipedia is a great source for a lot of things, but they are not North Korea experts. The agreement did NOT specify to what extent sanctions were to be scaled back, and some sanctions were indeed lifted in November and December of 1994, and talks for concerning liaison offices were started between the U.S. and North Korea.
http://www.dprkstudies.org/doc.....-apdx1.pdf (PDF, 500kb, scroll to date)
I said exactly what I meant about the Sunshine Policy: it will never work. I thought my language was clear. I did support the policy for the first couple of years, but it quickly became apparent that it would not work. North Korea is incapable of true engagement. What part of the ??ult??problem do you not get?
At this point it is clear that North Korea has had it?? chance, but the regime would rather see vast numbers starve than to engage, as engagement is a sure path to its failure. North Korea leadership is responsible for those deaths, and any in the South, or anywhere else, who support the policy of enabling the Northern regime share some of that blame. Take that as you will, history will judge the South?? policy of appeasement to be just that.
South Koreans, and anyone else, who continues to support that policy are more than kissing Kim Jong-il?? ass, their tossing his salad (look it up). More momentum? Thanks for the laugh. What you will see in months and years to come is South Korea bending over even further backwards to appease North Korea, while gaining practically nothing, all the while gulags, etc. will continue to exist in the North. Do yourself a favor and go to OneFreeKorea.net.
And you cannot close w/o blaming the mess on someone else besides Koreans ??that is such a typical (leftist) South Korean position it?? become clich?. Any logical, non-emotional look at the situation invalidates such a view. It?? pretty clear that you are way emotional on this; you should take your own council.
From today’s NYT:
North Korean Counterfeiting Complicates Nuclear Crisis
Once again, it doesn’t take genius to understand that resolving the nuke issue is far far far more important than quiveling about some fake money. The timing of this just really sucks.
There’s a pattern here:
In the 90s, US and NK agreed to the Agreed Framework. The US clearly dragged their feet on their part of the bargain. As a result, NK backs out and continues nuke program. Then you say NK is incapable of engagement.
In 2000, Kim Dae Jung introduces Sunshine Policy. W told KDJ the US wont support Sunshine Policy. W further sabotages the Sunshine Policy by trying to act tough with NK. Then you say, Sunshine Policy: it will never work.
Today, I say the fake money trouble is not worth risking the next round of talks. If NK decides to screw the talks because of this, then later I’m sure you say something to the effect of “See, look at them Norks! Incapable of engagement…”
If you introduce an element of self-fulfilling clusterfuck as a predicate to presuppose that a proposition will be a clusterfuck, then yeah, it will be a clusterfuck.
So if the Sunshine Policy is wrong, then what is your idea of a solution then? I’d like to hear you back it up with something other than your own non-empirical intuition or one of your patented “Because I simply said so’s…”
I think KCNA has settled this issue for us:
“The nature and mission of (North Korea) do not allow such things as bad treatment of the people, counterfeiting and drug trafficking to happen in it,” KCNA said.
I can guess who on this board will be convinced by this.
Once again, it doesn?? take genius to understand that resolving the nuke issue is far far far more important than quiveling about some fake money.
Bluejives, you are wrong. North Korea has circulated $50 billion since 1989, which is an amount that should be taken seriously. In sixteen years, that’s 1/1600 the amount for the war in Iraq.
In other words, if we do nothing, in 25,600 years??y the year 27606??orth Korea’s counterfeiting will cost us the same as this major war. It’s not fair to push this off onto some future Bush presidency two and a half decimillennia into the future.
We must act now, even if it means derailing other issues, such as ending nukes, pushing for human rights, and trying to get Pyongyang to end its tight-fisted control over the economy. The only thing more serious would be the fake cigarettes, which take money out of the hands of hard-working tobacco executives and the lobbyists they hire.
By the way, the Korea Exchange Bank said that the number of counterfeit U.S. dollars uncovered in South Korea increased last year:
That’s the cost of an Equus. This is serious business.
Blue: I don?? think it takes a genius to understand that North Korea was not going to deal before the counterfeiting/money laundering/drug smuggling issue was forced (again, with new evidence), and that a real threat is what the North will understand.
You should take a long hard look at what happened before both the 1994 Agreed Framework and after, since you don?? seem to have a grip on what actually happened, but what someone else said happened. You should READ the agreement, and then look at what each side did. Any ??ool, logical??evaluation, rejecting ??motionalism??(you really stuck both feet in with that one), will show that the North completely blew this.
If the North was really telling the truth, and they really only wanted nuclear power, then they should have stopped screwing the pooch with their actions at every turn and they would have gotten it, and oil the whole time they were waiting.
W did not ??abotage??the Sunshine Policy; what he did do was not let KDJ speak on behalf the POTUS w/o POTUS approval, which is what he did in June 2000. W should have bitch slapped KDJ for what he did. Well at least we know how much it costs to buy a Nobel Peace Prize: $1.7 billion.
And you obviously understand why I?? saying the North is incapable of true engagement (rather than the, ??ou give we take??deal with the South): it is the cult regime. It?? like the Oz behind the machine, but in this case an evil Oz. If you don?? get this, there?? not much you can do to actually understand why the Sunshine Policy has not worked, except to illogically blame someone else. Oh yeah, that?? what you??e been doing.
Kushibo: maybe you can answer some questions that Blue refuses to; a) how much money would the North have to counterfeit before it was worth sanctions, and b) if that?? not important enough to bother with, then what is?
There is a group of people in the South that fully understand that engagement with North Korea won?? work; North Korean defectors. I had the chance to debrief many over the summer of 2005. Among those who had been in the South for a few months there was an overwhelming desire to see the Kim Jong-il regime come down, by any means necessary, including immediate war.
When I countered to one older man that a war would devastate Seoul and perhaps a million or more would die, he responded that he felt that many might die in the North, but slowly, and that the price was worth freeing those ??risoners.??
The vast majority of defectors openly scoff at the South?? ??unshine Policy,??because they have seen the effect.
Jeong Se-hyun and others that defend the South?? apologist/appeasement policy are KJI?? useful idiots to the core. You can blame in on the U.S., but it?? the two Koreas that are doing this to each other.
My blog comment reading habits have hardened into a policy of ignoring nulji in all his various k-troll guises, fast-forwarding through usinkorea when that thoughful commenter starts to meander on-line and steering clear of the equally thoughtful kushibo when he goes all precious and cutesy on us with attempts at humor.
As for saving the engagement policy (Sunshine is a passe phrase), I’d say it needs to be carried out on South Korea’s originally envisioned terms — recalibrated so that North Korean misbehavior has an unmistakeable, immediate price, with attention paid to matters of reciprocity. North Korea should be offered “more for more” while at the same time being disabused of any notion that it can play patron against patron. (Actually this IS the offer that’s on the 6-party table, awaiting a show of that rare commodity - North Korean good faith.)
What would South Korea lose by, say, freezing Kaesong and Kumgang for 6 months until North Korea gets serious about denuclearization and commits to the 9.18 agreement? Let North Korea put its money where its mouth is when it talks about solving peninsula problems “by our nation itself”. Why should South Korean officials, famously prideful and prickly in their dealings with allies and trade partners, always have to grovel in Pyongyang everytime the North procrastinates or outright fails to deliver on a North-South agreement?
I fear that it is too late for this, because the North has already coopted key segments of South Korea or at least embroiled them in a classic abusive-enabler relationship.
This would take deft diplomacy from Washington and greater high-level attention (admittedly, these are not givens), smarter, bolder leadership with clear convictions in South Korea (which may take until 2008 to see) and (here’s where it gets especially unpromising), a China that is a far more decent world citizen, or at least an honest broker.
First you said it was half a billion dollars, now you say its $1.7 billion. The lack of consistency here is telling.
Actually, the article you linked said $50 million, not billion (take a look). The NYT article quoted $45 million. But other than that, your comic relief was hilarious and on cue.
OK, I’ll take a stab at this:
- Pork projects doled out by US Congress amount to $27 billion in 2005, or about 1% of the $2.5 trillion budget. Some of these projects: $6 million for “wood utilization research” and $25,000 to study mariachi music.
- Fiscal 2005’s total federal budget deficit was $318 billion, about equal to the GDP of Ukraine or Belgium. That’s equivalent to spending about $870 million a day.
Take your pick.
Shit, do they broadcast the FOX News Channel aka “The Most Powerful Smell in News” in Korea also??
Yeah, I read Sean Hannity’s “Deliver us from Evil” also.
It’s easy to talk tough and pursue “Firestorm Policy” as long as it’s not happening in your own backyard.
I wrote:
Bluejives, you are wrong. North Korea has circulated $50 billion since 1989, which is an amount that should be taken seriously. In sixteen years, that?? 1/1600 the amount for the war in Iraq.
That should have been $50 million, not $50 billion. The article I linked said the right figure, and I just was careless in repeating it, although the math ($50 million is in fact 1/1600 of $80 billion, a price tag once cited by the Bush Administration for the war in Iraq). 1/1600 of the cost of the war over sixteen years means, on average, North Korean counterfeit is about 1/256,000 of the cost of the war in Iraq annually.
And Slim, this is not a “precious and cutesy…attempt at humor.” It’s satire (employing irony and sarcasm). It was not an attempt at humor in any way. And anyone who reads my blog knows that I satirize viewpoints I am sympathetic to, as well.
But I guess I forgot the unspoken rules of which are the sacred cows at the Marmot’s all-purpose Korean blog. So, this is okay…
Wedge:
Why not open the floodgates? The U.S. could have a Korean massage parlor on every block.
judge judy:
i think wedge is right-we really could have a massage parlor on every block.
… but satirizing the “success” of the hyper-zealously fought War on Drugs or the Bush Administration getting their underwear in a knot over the recently discovered sixteen-year-old North Korea counterfeit problem is not. Okay, got it. I shall never satirize again unless it is skewering the left: Current President Roh Moohyun, who has stocked his cabinet with government ministers who are so far left you can’t see them because of the curvature of the Earth.
Richardson, I will answer your question seriously later, but I need to get some work done (it’s not a holiday in other parts of the world). First I need to find some relevant data on counterfeiting in China, Colombia, Bulgaria, and elsewhere.
I am torn on this issue, though. Counterfeiting of any kind should be taken seriously, but on the other hand I do question the wisdom of doing a pile-on of the long laundry list of complaints about Pyongyang if getting them to end their nukes and possibly open up their society is really a goal. If this were a serious issue, it was a serious issue back in 2003, 2002, 2001, 1998, etc. Why is it so pressing now that it can’t wait until other far more important things are dealt with? Why can’t the usual Secret Service efforts (stopping the laundering in Macau, etc.) be enough for the time being? (Does the Bush Administration expect to see a mushroom cloud of superbills over Las Vegas?
The last couple sentences of my post got cut off.
Again, the “sunshine” policy was fatally flawed at the outset. It contains a pledge not to absorb North Korea, creating a situation of hoping in vain that Kim Jongil or his successor changes the entire makeup of N.K.’s power structure and its core ideology to suit international norms, which is precisely what cannot happen with Kim and his clique in power.
I think Roh is not stupid, he knows this is the case, and he’s basically throwing money at the North as Kim Dae-jung did, hoping to put off the inevitable for as long as possible. As Slim said, would it be too much to demand a bit of reciprocity from the North?
As much as I’m sympathetic to what I think Bluejives is getting at, he should recognize that in some ways Roh is as problematic as Bush and the “neocons” in that his words and actions show S. Korea as weak to the North, which they continually take advantage of, and send the message to the U.S. that S. Korea cannot handle the North, and is a hindrance. If the North were held to reciprocity–to real measures, not cosmetic ones, like drawing down troops at the DMZ–the U.S. would not be able to discount S. Korean policy.
S. Korea doesn’t have much of a case to make for the usefulness of its approach toward the North, and it can’t even claim “uri minjok” on the matter when N. Korean refugees feel massively unwelcome in the South:
http://english.yna.co.kr/Engne.....219E4.html
Blue,
On the figure in question ??you know, the BRIBE DJ gave to Kim Jong-il ??for a long time the estimated figure was at about half a billion. A search revealed the newer, more accurate, and incidentally more damning, figure of about $1.7 billion. Or about ten times the disproved figure you??e still emotionally clinging to. Someone who chooses to regurgitate old data in the face of the new that doesn?? fit with your political views??well, that?? kind of telling.
As for your answer on counterfeiting (although you still ignore the second) ??yeah, I thought so. Nothing North Korea does will justify action to??someone of your type.
Just the thing for you. Since you live close enough, why don?? you put some of these on;
http://www.cafepress.com/oneworldgear.36453484
and go greet His Excellency, Pak Gil Yon (DPRK Amb. to the UN). Good luck with that.
Kushibo,
The things that many seem to be ignoring with this particular counterfeiting operation is that (a) it actually (largely, at least) funds the very nuclear programs we want to see shut down. (b) And the evidence is new. c) And if it?? not dealt with now it would surely be a ??eal-breaker??for the North Koreans after, who would argue that any deal with in bad faith (I?? sure Bluejives would jump on that bandwagon as well). Finally, (d) if that counterfeiting isn?? enough, what is? Logic points to doing this now rather than later.
Kushibo,
The things that many seem to be ignoring with this particular counterfeiting operation is that (a) it actually (largely, at least) funds the very nuclear programs we want to see shut down.
$50 million over sixteen years is a drop in the bucket over what North Korea has put into its nuke program. The aid or trade Pyongyang gets directly from China (nearly half of its exports) or South Korea (1/5 of its exports) or Japan (its #3 export partner that takes in 1/8 of its exports and #3 import partner) provides far more money to play with.
(b) And the evidence is new.
The evidence may be new (itself something wave a red flag to people who have grown suspicious of the Bush Administration’s “slam dunks”) but the activity, if it is real (and I believe it probably is), is not. The United States economy nor the Vegas gambling industry did not crumble by the influx of $3 million per year of NK notes since 1989. It can survive keeping this on the back burner for a while longer (i.e., pursuing it as the Secret Service normally would, but without making it a contentious central feature of all dealings with North Korea by its allies and economic partners).
c) And if it?? not dealt with now it would surely be a ??eal-breaker??for the North Koreans after, who would argue that any deal with in bad faith (I?? sure Bluejives would jump on that bandwagon as well).
Any thing is going to be seen as a deal-breaker? Maybe, maybe not. North Korea, like any other entity, has to be convinced that doing some course of action (e.g., nuclear weapons dismantlement) is in their interest, in terms of benefits and costs. If a pile-on of new (and not directly related) issues always follows any development, what benefit is there to find any workable agreement?
I don’t agree that North Korea canNOT change (some people said the same of the PRC), even with its current leadership; but any change will be made with baby steps, sticking toes in the water, peeking over the edge before taking a bungee jump, etc., etc.
I think there’s a great argument against the Roh-Chung regime for worrying so much about offending North Korea. But the Bush Administration is equally remiss with their constant pile-on of new issues that must be dealt with NOW. After the superbills are dealt with, there’s the counterfeir cigarettes to be dealt with. And then, well, who knows?
Finally, (d) if that counterfeiting isn?? enough, what is? Logic points to doing this now rather than later.
It’s not that the counterfeiting is not enough. It’s that there are overwhelmingly more important issues to deal with. This is a distracting side show which would tie Korea’s and Japan’s (and China’s) hands in a multilateral approach. Japan, for example, may be able to wrest some changes out of Pyongyang in a normalization deal, but that could be impaired if Japan is forced to follow rules set by Washington. Similarly, how might Beijing’s attitude toward cooperation with Washington change if it feels it is being forced to make draconian rule changes that could be dealt with in a lower key, less in-your-face way.
I’m not saying I entirely disagree, but I am skeptical, not so much of the evidence, but the approach of suddenly making this a central issue. Slam dunk, you’re either for us or against us, new smoking guns, etc., etc.
The cost of North Korea?? nuclear program has different aspects. Internal costs it can handle much easier (it?? own resources, including slave labor) than external costs that require hard currency, i.e., what counterfeiting, money-laundering, and drug smuggling bring in for them. That income is vital to their programs.
The evidence is new ??the IRA mother lo