For example, in the current debate over North Korea’s nuclear program, don’t you think it is valid to raise the issue of the US’ history of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula?”

How do those two go together? How is the one a “for example” of the other?

Cumings does next to nothing to broaden the debate on Korea to make it more balanced or closer to the truth.

He has been nothing more than a hack and a rallying point for people who don’t want to look at reality.

He is the Noam Chompsky of Korean studies.

And you will never convince me that is a good thing….

It is like one day when I watched Jesse Jackson talking to a couple of reporters who had followed up on the story about how the CIA had started the crack epidemic in the US to fund anti-Communist groups in Central America.

That story was huge in the US, gained a good number of followers (to this day), but when other news outlets like these two reporters went to jump on the bandwagon, they started to find inexcusable problems with the story.

Jackson’s reasoning was, “Don’t you think when you have a group like the CIA that is funding dictators around the world and doing bad things around the world like trying to assassinate the leader of another country, in Cuba, it facilitates belief in such a story as this (that the CIA caused the crack problem in America’s urban areas)?”

The reporters responded exactly as I would have

For example, in the current debate over North Korea’s nuclear program, don’t you think it is valid to raise the issue of the US’ history of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula? This will at least help people understand where the North’s paranoia has some roots in reality, and where it is just plain insanity.

North Korea’s horrible government gives the Korean right a blank check to make up whatever nutty conspiracies they want. Cumings, and similar works, at least force people to think more deeply and abandon simplistic, feel-good illusions about history. Just like in everyday life, history is rarely a conflict of good versus bad, but usually one of bad versus worse.

By the way, Bulgasari posted a review of Cumings’ book. This review was written by B.R. Myers, who is a very extraordinary fellow. He was born in the US and studied in Germany before coming to Korea, where he did his PhD on North Korean literature. There’s an interesting article about B.R. MYERS in the JoongAng Daily:

The Remarkable B.R. Myers Revealed

Actually, my comment above should be seen as questioning the phrase “A couple of the leaders of the Gwangju uprising were working for North Korea….”, or specifically “leaders”. With the chaotic nature of those 4 days and the fact so many student leaders were arrested or hiding, I don’t see how pro NK ‘leaders’ could have had a big influence at that time, which is what that sentence seems to suggest - that some of the people ‘calling the shots’ during the uprising were pro NK or agents. The idea of someone directing the the early days of the uprising on some grand scale seems, well, impossible, but that’s what I feel is implied by applying the term ‘leader’ to the first four days of the uprising, which was the most radical/rebellious part. That North Korean spies or those they influenced were present in Kwangju before, during and after the uprising would be of no surprise to me - I’m only questioning the ability of anyone to lead at that time. ‘Instigate’, on the other hand, is a different matter. There were numerous situations where a handful of people might have been able to suggest certain courses of action, which many angry citizens would have followed.

I agree that the drivers’ protest was an unlikely candidate for instigation, which is ironic when you consider that it was one of the more radical moves made by citizens - the buses created instant barricades and were excellent for occupying public space, and, I think, played a large part in allowing citizens to control the streets. Unfortunately, it left the army with the choice of giving in to the people or becoming even more violent, which is when they loaded their rifles.

Oh, and my comment about the troops only acting brutally in Kwangju was only in reference to the May 17 crackdown. Prior to that there had been violence elsewhere, like the Sabuk strike, a steel mill strike in Pusan that left one dead, and the May 15 protests in Seoul that left a police officer dead. But, as far as I know, in all those cases it was riot police who were involved, not the army. Special Forces often patrolled in Seoul at night, and had been put on stand-by during the Sabuk strike, but other than standing on the sidelines during the May 15 protest in Seoul, they had not been used against protesters since Park Chung-hee died.

By the way, this is well worth reading (though I’ve posted this link before and it stopped working soon afterward).

“These guys are in it for the long haul. They don’t just burn out like a comment. They ploy the field month to month for decades.”

like a comet and plow the field…..dumbass

I have trouble seeing this point — that because things were not centralized, the idea of NK operatives or pro-North Korea group leaders (whether spies or misguided individuals) is unlikely. Student groups were the most fertile ground for direct North Korean operatives in the past and even today. And having them in the lead of the protests during the start of the crack down and the bloodiest attacks of the Paratroopers should mean during those days would have been the time these long term operatives would have seen the best flowering of their effort - before it became diluted when large segments of the average people became outraged at the murderous excesses of the Special Forces enough to risk their own lives to fight back. I would think the efforts of the taxi and bus drivers were probably the least likely to have been influenced by people tied to the North one way or another more directly — but it is anybody’s reasonable guess.

“Troops were sent to universities across the nation, but it was only in Kwangju that they acted brutally”

I don’t think that is actually true. It is true in the sense that the level of violence in Kwangju was murderous and shocking even in a time of violence going on around the nation, but there was violence beyond Seoul. The miners strike in the Wonju area comes to mind, but my general sense on reading some of these books is that violent demonstrations were frequent — and by violent I mean not far from what we see today and what we saw in the late 1980s — violent but not wholly unusual in Korea’s protest culture. But in Kwangju, the Special Forces took it to whole new levels that shocked even Korea’s jaded protest culture.

That is what I mean by the instability that was going on across the country. That is why the US Amb. didn’t grasp the full extent of what was going on in Kwangju until fairly late.

Also, in talking about what North Korean operative influence might have had in relation to the Kwangju Massacre, you can’t compartmentalize the time too much.

Look at the anti-US civic group leaders — some of whom can now openly cream their pants when the North sends a handpicked delegation down South or when they go up North to pay omage at the tomb of the Great Leader. These guys are in it for the long haul. They don’t just burn out like a comment. They ploy the field month to month for decades.

It would seem obvious it was the same in South Korea for decades before Kwangju. You can’t just count the heads or speeches given by someone who might have been a pro-Pyongyang leader in Kwangju in the days of what we know of as the Kwangju Massacre today and get an adequate picture of what influence such men might have had on the event and on other events taking place across Korea at the time.

Really, I don’t see how you (the generic “you”) can look back at the full of South Korean history — and the number of known North Korean provocations and infiltrations, and the known number of South Korean unversity students and others who went to West Germany specficially to make contact with more direct North Korean operatives, and come away with an ability to still dismiss the idea that such efforts by the North had next to nothing to do with more periods of unrest in South Korea than just the Kwangju Massacre.

But, that is what the oppressive nature of the South Korean regime for decades has done.

South Korean society (and influencing those beyond) has boomeranged.

Now, it is offensive to suggest perhaps some elements in the Cheju Massacre or the Kwangju Massacre were not pure peace loving activists for true democracy….

The money quote in the link above was:

“About 30% of the people involved in the South Korean democracy movement were either North Korean agents or under their influence of North Korean agents. A couple of the leaders of the Gwangju uprising were working for North Korea….”

But we might want to examine the phrase “were working for North Korea.” Does that mean they were North Korean agents? That they were South Koreans who had met with North Korean agents? That they were members of a group that was influenced by North Korea, but they themselves did not know that?

During the Yushin period and under Chun, numerous people became part of anti-government, pro-democratic groups without often even knowing who the other members of the group were. In this situation numerous people might be part of a group manipulated by North Korea but not even realize it.

That there were North Korea agents in Kwangju during the uprising is likely, but to what degree they would have been able to ‘lead’ it is questionable. For much of the uprising, specifically during much of the first four days when students and citizens demonstrated and fought the paratroopers and forced them to retreat from the city, much of the fighting was decentralized and protests and points of conflict were spread throughout the city.

For the most part,’central leaders’ did not appear until after the army was expelled from the city, when the settlement committee formed (mostly from prominent citizens). In some moments prior to this a ‘couple of leaders’ might have been able to sway the uprising, such as the protest by taxi and bus drivers (thought to be spontaneous, in response to military brutality directed at taxi drivers helping students and injured protesters), the decision to requisition military vehicles from a nearby factory, and the decision to get guns to defend themselves (after the military opened fire on crowds in the early afternoon of the 21st). Some of the people involved in, say, requisitioning military vehicles, appear in Bradley Martin’s article about Yun Sang-won (who essentially became leader of the militants during the time the city was free of the army).

The point is, the part of the uprising which was ‘radical’ and threatening to the military authorities was precisely the part where ‘a couple’ North Korean agents wouldn’t have had much influence on events, as they were too decentralized. It was only after the army left that any recognizable leaders appeared, at a time when the violent aspect of the rebellion was essentially over.

Also, there were numerous agents among the citizens of Kwangju - of the South Korean military - who were spreading rumours of North Korean spies. One even pretended to be stung by a poison dart (which the rumours said were weapons carried by North Koreans), but when taken to the hospital was found to have not been stung by anything.

“The special forces troops were sent down to Kwangju because instability had already arisen. Kim Dae Jung’s arrest was a trigger in Kwangju, but violent protests and strikes had been going on in the entire nation for a good period of time.”

That sounds a little muddled. Instability was certainly there, due to, on the one hand, Chun’s control of the government and refusal to move towards political liberalization that had been promised by president Choi months earlier, and on the other, to many long-term anti-Yushin radicals having a chance to organize against the government, at least in US ambassador Glysteen’s view. Sending troops around the country was done as part of the political crackdown, in which universities were closed and dissidents were arrested (one other reason it’s difficult to speak of leaders during the Kwangju uprising is because so many were in prison or in hiding).

Worth also noting is that, unlike the violent student protests in Seoul (which did not attract citizen participation), protests taking place in Kwangju before the May 17th crackdown were peaceful (partly due to cooperation between students and police) and attracted citizen participation. Compared to Seoul, Kwangju was rather quiet. Troops were sent to universities across the nation, but it was only in Kwangju that they acted brutally (by beating all students found on campus late on the night of the 17th). I think it was these stories of brutality (which continued in the early morning of the 18th against unassuming students walking to campus), and the fact of the crackdown itself that motivated students to demonstrate, rather than just Kim Dae-jung’s arrest.

To return to the topic at hand, there’s a good review of Cumings book (as well as Martin’s and 2 others) here.

Looking back at the comments, I see this isn’t how it actually went down. I assumed the reference to people saying North Korea agents were in Kwangju was to the quote last week, but the original comment was much more general than that, but I think the discussion is still on the same track.

freekorea.blogspot.com/2005/12/north-korean-is-not-socialist-state.html

http://www.freerepublic.com/fo.....9847/posts

Scroll down at the second link for a brief bio of the guy.

You can continue to believe there were nothing but peace loving democrats down in Kwangju if you wish, but more than just Chun have said otherwise. I am not defending the extreme actions of the Chun government or the hard core right who refuse to believe what the Special Forces did in Kwangju or who believe all the protesters were rabid communists, but the exaggerated thinking in the other direction, which you seem to accept fully, is also misguied.

To believe there were no influencial pro-Pyongyang activists, and those working closely with direction and funding from the North, not only in Kwangju but elsewhere in Korean society at that time (and beyond) is to display a strong desire to believe in fantasy.

Again, that does not excuse the South Korean government from its actions before, during, and after.

“I don’t think any North Korean agents were needed to cause instability in Kwangju after their native son Kim Dae Jung was arrested, martial law declared, and special forces dispatched to open fire unprovoked on crowds of demonstrators.”

You kind of condensed that timeline to the detriment of historical reality, didn’t you?

The special forces troops were sent down to Kwangju because instability had already arise. Kim Dae Jung’s arrest was a trigger in Kwangju, but violent protests and strikes had been going on in the entire nation for a good period of time. Kwangju was just the most extreme event in scale. Also, Chun’s power at the time was not as absolute as you seem to make it (though you haven’t made this any special point). His coup was not of the Park Chung Hee variety in the 1960s. He had not emerged fully as the head of the South Korean government at the time. There were a lot of instability and uncertainty still going on throughout Korea and in the central government following the death of Park Chung Hee.

And it is simply a pipe dream to believe North Korean money and agents and South Koreans gullible enough to seek to secretly make contact with the North and follow its directions were not involved across South Korea at this time (and before and since).

Let me put it this way, in the civil rights movment in the US, it would be foolish to dismiss absolutely the idea that the Soviets did not seek to actively exploit the opportunity through covert funding — like setting up fronts to where the civil rights groups didn’t really know where the money was origninally coming from — or putting in moles into civil rights orgs.

You don’t have to be a friend of Joseph MacArthy and his communist witch hunts to accept these facts.

In South Korea, even more, we know student movement leaders and others made trips to Germany and elsewhere and even to Pyongyang to meet directly with North Korean agents. You have true believers in the North Korean state and the North Korean idea of unification today despite the overwhelming knowledge of what the North is and has always been.

In the past, when South Korea’s own government was oppressive, the North’s influence was much easier to spread.

But, you are tossing his claims out of hand?

usinkorea, sorry, but you’re going to have to be more specific (the guy’s name, perhaps?) if you wish to make such wild charges. Only the most extreme right-wingers in Korea, or people who bought the Chun regime’s line and haven’t bothered to learn the truth when it was later revealed (because the Chun version fit with their regional stereotypes), still think that the Kwangju Uprising was orchestrated by North Korean agents. (Oh yeah, and then there’s our own lovable Baduk.) I believe it is an ugly idea that has no basis in fact.

“Bring[ing] down the South Korean government after the assassination of Park Chung Hee”… hmm, undermining that paragon of legitimacy, Chun Doo Hwan, who had already brought down the South Korean government with his own coup in December 1979? An interesting turn of phrase. I don’t think any North Korean agents were needed to cause instability in Kwangju after their native son Kim Dae Jung was arrested, martial law declared, and special forces dispatched to open fire unprovoked on crowds of demonstrators.

Five years ago, there was practically nothing available in English about the uprising, but now there are abundant materials. If you read any of the excellent recent books on the subject (Kwangju Diary, The Kwangju Uprising, Contentious Kwangju, Laying Claim to the Memory of May - I would particularly recommend the last one for its valuable firsthand account and analysis of the uprising’s legacy), I think you would be convinced that the communist plot theory is ludicrous.

Please remember when thinking about the Kwangju Uprising that there is a difference between the event itself, and the way in which the event has been eulogized and incorporated into a Grand National Narrative. Just because Hanchongryun happens to gather in Kwangju every May to exploit the memory of the fallen, or that the Rodong Sinmun writes bombastic editorials about Kwangju every May 18, doesn’t mean that they represent the spirit of the 1980 movement.

Again, if you have a name for this guy, or a source for where you heard about him, I’d be happy to check him out. It’s been a while since I’ve done research on the uprising, but if I remember correctly. the one guy who was repeatedly touted as a “North Korean agent” by the Chun regime turned out to be a fraud.

Enough already.

I agree. That man wasted enough of my life as a student. In my opinion, “MUST READ!!!” and “Cumings” only go in the same sentence thusly: “I’m so angry Prof. Palais says I MUST READ more of this queef’s dribble for my grad school seminar!!!”