UPDATE: "Charlie Brown," who appears to be a fellow Hoya, also seems to feel Prof. Kang might not be on target with his WaPo piece.
ORIGINAL POST: In the WaPo a couple of days ago, Prof. David Kang argued for a new Korea strategy that would "widen the ‘North Korea problem’ from one of nuclear weapons to one of unification." Now, I like Kang’s work–usually disagree with many of his conclusions, but I respect where he’s coming from, and he definitely knows his shit. Having said that, his latest op-ed leaves me somewhat puzzled:
Controversy over the fraying U.S.-South Korea alliance focuses almost exclusively on cultural or emotional issues. In the United States there are some who feel that South Koreans are insufficiently grateful for the steadfast U.S. support to South Korea, particularly for the American lives lost in defense of the South during the Korean War of 1950-53 and for the extensive economic and military aid since. Others feel that rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea reveals the naivete of a younger generation of Koreans who are insufficiently worried about the North Korean threat.
But the problems in the alliance are not a result of emotion, naivete or ingratitude. Indeed, even if none of those emotional and cultural issues existed, the alliance would still be in dire need of revision. To find the best path forward for both the United States and South Korea, we need to focus on the real issues.
Amen, brother. Everyone’s got emotionally charged grievances. Many Koreans think Americans are arrogant bullies. Many Americans think Koreans are ungrateful bastards. Fine. But the last thing in the world you want to do is make foreign policy based on such sentiment. What you want to do is, as Kang suggest, focus on the real issues. Cooly examine your interests and ask whether your bilateral and multilateral relationships effectively maximize those interests.
The main factor straining the alliance is the unresolved Korean War and the continued division of the peninsula. This has created differing long-term strategic concerns for the United States and South Korea.
For South Korea, the key issue is not North Korean nuclear weapons — it never was. South Korea’s overriding concern is how to resolve the issue of national unification and integrate North Korea back into the world’s most dynamic region, whether or not there are nuclear weapons. All other South Korean foreign policy issues take second place.
In contrast to Korea’s regional issues, U.S. concerns are global and military. For at least the next several years, the United States will be mainly concerned with countering potential terrorist threats. Distracted by the overwhelming focus on anti-terrorism, homeland security and other issues, the United States has viewed its Korea policy as a narrow extension of its anti-terrorism policy, focusing almost exclusively on denuclearizing the North. These different strategic priorities have led to severe strains between the two allies, despite the desire of both to maintain a close relationship.
Well, OK–I can’t really argue with these observations. Seem like a pretty decent summary of how both parties currently view their interests vis-a-vis North Korea.
The United States can improve its position in East Asia, as well as solidify its alliance with South Korea, by widening its focus beyond North Korean denuclearization and coming out strongly and enthusiastically in favor of Korean unification. Although the United States rhetorically supports unification, it has been noticeably passive in pursuing policy to that end.
Such a policy shift would achieve many U.S. goals and would strengthen our alliance with South Korea in the process.
This is where Kang starts loosing me. If such a policy shift really could achieve U.S. goals in the region, I could dig it. But it seems to me what’s really happening is that he’s put the cart before the horse, so to speak–rather than looking at our interests and determining whether the alliance is worth preserving, it appears he has already determined that the alliance is worth maintaining and is redefining U.S. interests to conform with that alliance. But allow me to continue:
First and foremost, denuclearization is far more likely to occur with a change in North Korea’s regime and a resolution to the Korean War than it is without resolving that larger issue. Until now the United States has put denuclearization first, without making much progress. Folding the nuclear issue into the larger issue would provide far more leverage on both questions and potentially create new or broader areas for progress.
Few will argue against the supposition that the denuclearization of North Korea would probably be a lot easier with a change in the North Korean regime. But how "actively supporting Korean unification" would encourage change in Pyongyang is not exactly clear. Granted, malicious neglect hasn’t worked wonders, but neither has active engagement. North Korea’s much vaulted 2002 economic "reforms" may well have been a non-starter, and after three years, the country has very little to show for them. Engagement is predicated on the belief that Pyongyang can change, a belief that at present requires something akin to a leap of faith. Moreover, while it’s perfectly reasonable to suggest that engagement will give the aid donors increased leverage over North Korea, in practice, this has not been the case. In fact, quite the opposite has been true–South Korea has at time bent over backwards so North Korea would honor it with accepting its money. Engagement works only when it becomes a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Again, this is not to say that the approach is conceptually flawed, but rather that for it to work would require both Seoul and Washington to grow bigger sets of cajones than currently swing between their legs.
Second, such a policy would provide grounds for agreement between U.S. and South Korean policymakers from which they could cooperate and work together, rather than against each other. Exploring the best path toward unification will require both economic and military changes in the North — changes that will provide the United States with more flexibility to rebalance its own forces in the region.
I’m sorry, but as long as North Korea exists, "exploring the best path toward unification" seems to me a rather pointless endeavor, unless it meant finding ways to make North Korea give up the holy ghost. Exploring ways to integrate North Korea into the region? Perhaps, although I’ve yet to see signs that North Korea actually wants to be integrated in any real sense. But unification? Rhetoric aside, South Koreans don’t really want unification (or more precisely, they don’t want to pay the economic, social and political costs that would accompany unification), and together with the Chinese, they seem intent on pursuing policies designed to keep unification as distant as possible. What we are really talking about here is not "unification," but "talking about unification" while we help Seoul and Beijing to bankroll Pyongyang. One can argue that this is a much cheaper option than paying the cost of cleaning up the mess that would result from a North Korean collapse, but let’s at least be frank about what we’re talking about. And I’m not convinced that propping up a dying regime with a propensity for nuclear weapons development, nuclear proliferation and missile sales to parties that don’t exactly share our world view will further either our regional or global interests, regardless of how willing Pyongyang is to take our food and money.
Finally, it would put the United States in a solid position to retain goodwill and influence in Korea after unification — something that is far from ensured today, when many South Koreans are skeptical about U.S. attitudes and policies toward the region. If the United States is seen as a major source of help for unification, it is far more likely that the post-unification orientation of Korea will be favorable to Washington.
I’m all in favor of retaining goodwill and influence in Korea after unification. What I’m NOT in favor of, however, is doing so by pretending that our interests coincide when they don’t. And that goes both ways–if South Korea (or a unified Korea) views U.S. initiatives in the region as contrary to its own interests, there would be no reason for Seoul to maintain an alliance with Washington for posterity’s sake. As Doug Bandow pointed out (see previous post), U.S. security interests in the region are not what they were during the Cold War, and South Korea is a strong player in the region fully capable of providing for its own defense (including the development of an independent nuclear deterrent to keep its neighbors honest). The issues that will make or break the Korea-U.S. alliance do not involve North Korea. No, the key issues are whether Korean and U.S. initiatives regarding China, Japan and Russia coincide, and whether Korea and the U.S. view it in their interests to work together in global initiatives. Now, those initiatives need not go hand in hand 100 percent of the time–currently, it looks like Korea will balk if the U.S. tries to "contain" China (although this may change), but Korea may be willing to tag along for the ride on U.S. actions outside the Northeast Asian theater, for example, peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, Africa or Southeast Asia. The biggest task facing the Korea-U.S. alliance is not trying to get on the same page on North Korea–that’s just a short-term pain-in-the-ass, albeit it a nasty one. The big task is a) trying to figure out whether there’s enough mutual interest beyond North Korea to warrant a full-blown military alliance worthy the costs of maintenance, and b) building a rational cost-sharing regime that both takes into account Korea’s formidable economic strength and potential military clout and keeps both sides reasonably satisfied (or at least equally dissatisfied).
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31 Comments
How can the US help two Koreas to unify? Give massive aid to North? KJI will use that money to buy weapons. Stop mentioning NK’s nuke? NK will build more. Trust NK’s promise? Been there and done that.
Then, how?
This idea of reunification is so ridiculous. KJI only wants reunification under his terms. SKs are so stupid. They keep talking about reunification as if KJI wants it too. So funny.
It is like a lovesick boy “assumes” the girl is interested. He asks everyone he knows to help him prepare for wedding. He says once his brother approves of wedding the girl will come around and marry him, even though the girl is not interested. Sick as a lovepuppy can get!
“No” is “No”. If KJI wanted the reunification, he would have opened up the country long, long time ago. He does not want reunification. Period. Instead, he wants to eat up SK and make SKs his slaves.
“South Korea’s overriding concern is how to resolve the issue of national unification and integrate North Korea back into the world’s most dynamic region, whether or not there are nuclear weapons. All other South Korean foreign policy issues take second place.”
AAAAAAAIIIINNNT!! Wrong answer.
South Korea, at least the government and policy thinking type people, have in mind keeping unification in the distant future as long as North Korea is an economic basketcase. To think otherwise either shows a gap in understanding about South Korean society today, or someone wanting cotton candy for the brain.
“Engagement is predicated on the belief that Pyongyang can change, a belief that at present requires something akin to a leap of faith.”
Amen. (pun intended)
Looking at what Marmot quoted, I think the writer has in mind 1 of 2 things
1. Intellectual masturbation. It feels so good, for yourself, to talk like this. Just join hands and hug and all the problems in the world will melt away. If we just click our heels together hard and fast enough, and keep saying, “There’s no place like unification, there’s no place like unifiction” it will magically happen…
or
2. He has in mind what baduk mentioned. Trying to sell the US on bankrolling North Korea — with the idea that if the US pumps massive amounts of money and material aid into the North, reform will happen, all Koreans North and South will love us, and unification will be a walk in the park.
Whether he believes that or not, if that is part of his point in writing this fantasy piece, I don’t know.
I think most of the people in the known in South Korea don’t really believe it.
But, they see selling the idea as key to getting enough support (domestically and internationally) for their effort to accomplish the immediate policy - prevent unification as long as the North is not far from collapse.
If they build the North up to the point it grows a heart and decides to unify pretty much on the South’s global standards, that is a great side benefit, but it is not the primary aim.
It might have been with Kim Dae Jung at the start of the Sunshine policy, but I believe even there, Kim was only successful in getting so much done in the Sunshine policy in Korea’s split democracy because of 2 things —- the mega economic collapse in North Korea beginning around 1990 and the meltdown of the Asian economies in 1997-98 - the exact same time frame in which Kim was elected and pushed his new North Korea policy.
I read Kang’s article too, and it seemed a little thin on specifics–why should the U.S. start “coming out strongly and enthusiastically in favor of Korean unification” when the S.K. gov’t is neither strong nor enthusiastic about it? Roh goes on about a “very, very slow” process, but even that is a farce, it’s a one-way street of the S.K. supplying the nork regime with money and rice, which keeps it in power. Baduk’s right, KJI doesn’t want reunification, and it’s absurd to even consider it while he’s in power. First remove Kim and his cronies, then talk about reunification.
The indefinite (billion dollar?) yearly costs of propping up NK add up to being greater than the costs of getting unification done and over with. Wish the ROK would get out a calculator and do the math.
From the start, American policy towards North Korea was to treat it as an enemy and shun it. As a result, North Korea feels threatened and is hostile to America.
David Kang is suggesting a new approach — encouraging steps toward reunification in order to improve North Korea and ensure peace in Asia. If America sends a message of supporting reunification, that can help end the Cold War between the Koreas.
Ummm, Mi-hwa, from the start, N.K. was the enemy, and still is. It’s a military dictatorship cloaked in communist rhetoric–how exactly was/is the U.S. to treat it? If anything — and I’m no fan of the current gov’t — the U.S. is finally moving to condemn and rein in N.K., as it should. Also, why should America send a message supporting reunification when Stalinist N.K. never indicates how it will “reunify” with the democratic South? How do you think N.K. can reunify anyway? Wouldn’t Kim Jongil, an unelected dictator probably responsible for the genocide of millions of Koreans, just possibly be a greater hurdle to reunification than U.S. policy? I’m just wondering.
From the start, American policy towards North Korea was to treat it as an enemy and shun it. As a result, North Korea feels threatened and is hostile to America.
I’m sorry, but this is simply not the case. The hostility part is true enough, but for most of its history, North Korea was a confident actor enjoying the support of both the USSR and China. Only recently did it start playing the “poor little weak state getting picked on by the big bully Americans” role. As recently as the 1980s, North Korea was engaging in behavior that sought confrontation, not avoid it.
David Kang is suggesting a new approach — encouraging steps toward reunification in order to improve North Korea and ensure peace in Asia. If America sends a message of supporting reunification, that can help end the Cold War between the Koreas.
Sure, but neither Kang nor the Roh administration policies he would seem to support constitute “steps toward reunification in order to improve North Korea and ensure peace in Asia.” Not anymore than U.S. support for Pinoche in Chile or Chun in South Korea was designed to facilitate democratic rule in those nations. Heck, at least in the case of Chile and South Korea, both regimes could–and eventually did-make successful transformations. So far, nothing suggests North Korea can “better itself” under its current leadership, or that the belief that Pyongyang will somehow emulate Chinese reforms is anything other than a deluded pipe dream.
When Hu Jin Tao visited South Korea last month, he told the South Korean assembly that China supported a peaceful reunification between the Koreas. That is a big signal of things to come, because China has great influence over North Korea.
The US State Department has started a team that’s working on a possible peace treaty with North Korea, depending on the success of the 6-nations talk. Likewise, North Korea wants to have normalized relations with the US.
South Korean government is predicting an economic union with North Korea by 2020.
All these trends are pointing toward some form of reunification.
Mi-hwa, those are just words from Hu.
Beijing only supports reunification if it is on Beijing’s terms. They will help make unification happen only if they’re not paying for it AND they can get something out of the deal, like no U.S. troops anywhere in Korea and an end of the U.S. guarantee to defend Taiwan.
If they don’t get these concessions or something like it, they will stand in the way of unification. They may perhaps seek to occupy North Korea themselves, under the old idea that Chos?n is naturally a part of China. That is the subtext of the Kogury? debate.
I know I sound like Baduk, but you have to look at what China has done in the past, including just fifty years ago. Korea, at least the northern part, is their buffer agains the American sphere and democracy. They could not stand having a democratic country with a vibrant, open economy just across the bridge.
If there’s one option American policymakers should be thinking of is the sunshine policy - but on such a massive scale that to save face and any future diplomatic high ground they may have, North Korea would have but no choice to accept it. Call KJI’s bluff for development aid. This would mean a massive influx of (US) dollars and (US) people into the country, severely weakening the grip that the Rodong folks have on the country. Sort of like termites eating the foundations away from a house.
Three major obstacles though:
i) If the North Koreans don’t accept it (and quite possible they won’t - see termite analogy), this could put a frost on diplomacy for some time.
ii) Domestic resistance from the extremes of both American parties, and
iii) Practical monetary issues - with the burgeoning deficit, Congress may be reluctant to authorize such required expenditures.
This could be the bottom line for the “big reward” they’re seeking for their nukes - of course I am leery of setitng such a high precedent as well.
kushibo– The last thing China wants is a crazy and desperate North Korea that will start a nuclear war or flood China with refugees during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
That’s why China supports some form of reunification of Korea. That offers the best chance for peace, stability, and prosperity in Far East Asia.
2020? Maybe. If USFK totally withdraws and SK implodes and joins China camp.
Unification will come on KJI’s terms. See NK people dying of hunger? That is the future of Korea. You and your children’s future. If you escape to China, Chinese police will arrest you and bind your hands and feet and send you right back to Korea, by then also called Korean Gullag.
Welcome, comrade. Bow to the picture of Kim IlSung. You are not even worthy to breath air in the same room with the picture presence of this great Korean leader. And, memorize every ****** little words he ever spoke. That is your job. No food? Eat mice. No mice? You know what to do.
China loves to keep NK as it is. Poor, starving and powerless. The Chinese does not want NK to change and become a strong and vibrant nation. It will make them look bad.
However, the US leaves and SK crawls into its care wanting to be its underling, China will take all the brain and the wealthy out of Korea. Samsung and Hundai will move to Beizing under China’s orders. Chinese occupation forces, both military and civilians, will come and take SK’s wealth. After the Chinese get all they want, NK Commies will come down and take what is left.
After that, there is no problems in uniting two countries. Poor as hell. Under Communism. No difference. Just open up the border and let people travel back and forth on foot. No food anywhere, anyway. No gasoline. No resources. Nowhere to go, nothing to do. Just waiting to die.
Baduk, get real. Your scenario belongs in the dark ages, and not in the modern civilized world. You totally underestimate the strength of South Korea. North Korea is falling apart, and South Korea is going to pick up the pieces and rebuild a strong peninsula.
NK is not falling apart. China supplies it with gasoline. Sorry-ass SK Commies and so-called intellectuals are sending money and resources. KJI is doing well, buying up weapons with the money.
The more he starves/oppresses his population, the more money comes. Is it a racket, or what? Even oversea dumdums like Kang (maybe a brother of Jeongu?) is advising everyone to humor him.
With strong Chinese support, he is just waiting for the US to withdraw and Chinese influence to grow in SK. With a heavy gap between the rich and the poor, SK is going to explode soon. A typical SouthAmerican or African scenario.
SK military? It is only about 1/20th of China’s. When NK-Chinese army attacks, SK army will disappear. Soldiers will strip and run. This is what happened when VietNam fell.
use cut & paste. it’ll save you a lot of time.
The article struck me as weird — very weird, since what David Kang argues is that a) no progress or change is likely with a limited approach in Korea and that b) the North Korean regime must necessarily be removed from power in the course of a proper attempt at resolution of political concerns on the peninsula (i.e. unification).
Given that the current North Korean regime has evinced no desire for reunification or removing itself from power, that rather suggests a more direct course of action. I’m pretty sure that’s not what Kang meant, but I wonder if his logic still applies …
Of course, it remains to be shown that such a dramatic change in the status quo is in America’s interest.
Kang is either wanting to stroke himself by being blind but saying what makes him feel good, or, he is using cottoncandy rhetoric to cloak the real strategy enough of the people of influence of South Korea have accepted since their own economy collapsed in 1996-1998 — to avoid unification through collapse or with a mortally poor North Korea.
His message might be full of holes and unworkable —
—-but, it sounds better than saying, “Unification with a poverty stricken North Korea will destroy the South Korean economy. The only choice we have to keep our standard of living, much less our economic growth, is to a) prevent a collapse of the North Korean regime and b) prevent unification until the North is built up economically. Maybe strengthening North Korea will only delay unification forever, but that is better than the alternative of seeing our #11 economy slip to #25 or #50. And maybe solidifying Kim Jong Il’s regime and pushing the North’s economy up a little will get him to reform….that would be nice, but it isn’t our main concern…..”
Mi-hwa wrote:
kushibo– The last thing China wants is a crazy and desperate North Korea that will start a nuclear war or flood China with refugees during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
If that is what their major concern was, they would have already flipped the switch on Pyongyang by now. They have the power to do it.
That’s why China supports some form of reunification of Korea.
They do want some sort of reunification. The sort of reunification they want is the sort where Korea/Chos?n is in China’s camp.
China is NOT a democracy. They are market socialists, still, which is only semi-capitalist. They feel threatened by Japan and the United States. They do NOT share the values of Seoul, T?ky?, Taipei, or Washington. Given that, why would they willingly let one of their buffer states go from the Beijing-led camp to the Washington-led camp?
They wouldn’t. I stand by my earlier post. If North Korea were to suddenly implode, PLA troops would be in downtown Pyongyang and at the DMZ within hours, holding the disintegrating DPRK hostage until the ROK adn the USA give them what they want, which might mean the ROC.
That offers the best chance for peace, stability, and prosperity in Far East Asia.
Mi-hwa, China defines stability and prosperity as satellites facing them and doing as their told.
?? is nicknamed ‘the middle kingdom’ for a reason.
I don’t care how cheap Haier refrigerators get, China is not your friend.
[Something disturbing: the Haier America website makes no mention of China at all.]
This I agree with Kushibo. The possiblity and probability of this scenario playing out in reality is very high in case of NK’s collaspe. SK has the mistaken notion that NK will automatically be absorbed to it when the collaspe happens. They are in for a huge surprise, as there are no international law that add support for SK claim on NK. SK is in for a rude awakening when they understand that the world does not see the situation in the same light as it does. People have been singing reunifications songs (literally) here too long that they think its something that will happen naturally. I hope they realize that they have their work set out for them. (BTW I am for reunification, just wanted to make that clear in case my words above make people think otherwise).
I think there are some UN resolutions dating back to 1948 or 1950 that support the notion of the Republic of Korea having a rightful claim to what is now DPRK. But even if I’m right (and I don’t know for sure that I am), would that stop China?
Now more than ever, South Korea needs to firmly remain in an alliance with the United States and Japan. But for it’s part, it would probably be wise of Washington suggest to Beijing that if North Korea implodes, it promises not to move any US military personnel into what is now DPRK territory. Remove some of Beijing’s fears so it will go along with what would be best for everyone.
Maybe strengthening North Korea will only delay unification forever, but that is better than the alternative of seeing our #11 economy slip to #25 or #50.
Korea’s #11 economy is in terms of overall size, right? How would this go down by absorbing North Korea?
Even if the absorbed North Korean economy were worth only 39 cents, Korea’s trillion-dollar economy would still be at least 11th in size.
I’ve heard lots of people worry about the cost of unification, the uncertainty of jobs as cheap North Korean labor floods the South, the worry of crime, etc., but never a worry that the GDP size rank would go down. Certainly not from an informed person (and hopefully it is informed people making government decisions, though sometimes I wonder).
Per capita GDP (currently around $19,200) would go down, certainly, but Korea is much further down the list on that anyway (around #45 if you don’t count the Isle of Man, Macau, Greenland, Guam, etc., as separate countries).
If North Korea were to suddenly implode, PLA troops would be in downtown Pyongyang and at the DMZ within hours, holding the disintegrating DPRK hostage until the ROK adn the USA give them what they want, which might mean the ROC.
This is true. Why, again, is it in the United States’ interest to remain in “alliance” with the Republic of Korea until this happens? So that American troops cities can get nuked when the South Korean president “cannot accept” the PRC’s demands?
Even if China were to takeover North Korea after its collapse, China has no claim over South Korea. South Korea is a member in very good standing at the UN, and is respected as a sovereign and independent nation. If China tries to threaten South Korea, there will be so much world outrage that China would not even dare. Plus, China wants to maintain friendly relations with South Korea for political, economic, cultural, and historic reasons.
Brendon,
Do not worry. Pseudo-intellectuals like Kang and others are slowly moving Korea away from the US influence and toward China’s sphere of influence.
Within ten year(?), SK will be more friendly toward China. China-SK-NK alliance will be born. Free travel in all three countries. No war and no headache for the US?
No. NK and SK will play “double trouble” for the US. Both countries will have nukes and missiles that can hit the continental USA. Under China’s guidance, both countries will play gangsters. They will demand payments from the US.
You know that NK is rather difficult to attack due to their troop strength and possibility of China entering the war. Multiply that by two.
“Penny wise and pound foolish”!
MiHwa,
When the US leaves, Korea will implode. The poor people in Korea will be incited by NK and China to rise up and kill the rich. Rich people will flee to other countries.
With no US influence, politicians will kowtow to China in major way. They know Korea cannot fight China. Slowly Chinese banks and Chinese companies will buy up Korean industries with these politicians help.
China’s GNP is 1/10 of Korea’s. The Chinese will sap the wealth out of Korea. Even down to the level of NK.
Kushibo,
After unification, there will be Russian style mob in Korea, composed of former NK military officers ruling Korea. They will blackmail and assassinate South Koreans till they gain the wealth of the country. They might even resurrect the Communist party and make the whole country a Communist nation. Maybe another Kim IlSung will appear, an absolute dictator.
One thing is clear. It will not be a smooth transition. Much confusion like in 1945. Mucho violence. Mucho death. In the end, people may welcome Chinese troops to come and restore order.
Unification is not good. After the collapse, giving NK to China is not a bad idea. Let the Chinese deal with them for a while. Educate them in market economy. Better than having those refugees come down and wrecking havoc(civil and military) in SK. They are more used to Chinese lifestyle anyway.
Bauk I do repect certain nuggets of insights that you do provice in your posts, but the above post reminds me of Yaron Ezrahi’s words, “The new system of diffusion -the Internet- is more likely to transmit irrationality than rationality, because irrationality is more emotionally loaded, it requires less knowledge, it explains more to more people, it goes down easier.”
Its just a great relief that most posters on Marmot’s Hole are are the inquisitive, rational type, not mentally lazy or prone to conspiracy theories.
When the USSR fell, very few people predicted what eventually happened. Many expected the country to go full steam into Democratic market economy.
What is taking place in Russia is a pseudo-market economy run by former military and KGB officers. They formed the Russian mob and this mob is running the country.
Why is it so difficult to see that this will happen in Korea? A similar mob/political organization happened in Korea in 1940’s as well, so I have two precedences to support my theory.
Why does everyone assume it will be like East and West Germany? NKs are more like Russians.
David Kang effectively endorses regime change in North Korea, which is arguably the only solution to the security, economic, crime and human rights problems posed by the DPRK.
There is no scenario for reunification that includes Kim Jongil or his retarded children, um, I mean heirs. Baduk overreaches a bit, but quite probably China will eventually cut a deal with some nork military figures and install a puppet gov’t in Pyongyang. There doesn’t have to be an outright war for this, and China is already preparing with huge investments in N.K., which has unexploited mineral resourcs China wants. S. Korea can do nothing about this on its own, especially the current idiots in charge, and if S.K. keeps pushing the U.S. away China will step in.
Actually China is the only country that can open up NK. But it won’t. Hugh investment in mineral mining? I doubt it. If China wanted it, it would have done it ten years ago.
China does not want a competitor. It wants NK to be poor and backward. It may even hamper SK’s move into NK.
After soaking in enough technology from SK, China may actually order KJI to attack SK because, with a competitor gone, China can sell more electronics and cars. But, it may be hoping SK Commies to bring the whole country in the platter. And, it may happen. And, maybe soon.