The narrow waist or thereabouts was indeed the place where Mac had the opportunity literally to annihilate what was left of the NORK armed forces. He failed to do so because instead of making an enveloping attack on them when they were in disarray and flight, he turned his columns north. What was left of the NORKS made it into the hills, regrouped and joined the Chinese. I don’t think this is at all controversial. Bevan Alexander has it this way, as does Fehrenbach and Goulden, I believe.

I did not mean to suggest, though, that the Allied advance should have stopped there. It IS pretty indefensible terrain - at least in the lowlands of the west - as the ROKS discovered when they got overrun at Kaesong in the opening hours of the war. They were heavily outnumberd and outgunned, too, but they folded because they were spread across relatively flat land, If they had been further south in the hills above the Han, they would have done much better, even with the bad odds. Look what the even more put upon Glosters did the next year.

On the other hand, it’s pretty obvious that, if Mac had been more thorough in mopping up the Norks, more cauttious about moving north, and more cognizant that the terrain did not really lend itself to another coup d’main like Incheon, especially one that involved splitting his forces, the Allies would have stood a much better chance when the Chinese offensive jumped off.

Moreover, if anyone had heeded CHou En Lai’s remarks, and after demolishing what was left of the NORKS, the Allied advance had stopped in the vicinity of Pyeongyang or a little to the north where there is more defensible terrain, and the ROKS alone had been detailed to move up to the Yalu, perhaps the Chinese would not have attacked at all. What the Chinese were worried about - with good reason given Mac’s belligerence towards them and his close relationship with and championing of the Nationalists - was a large Allied, i.e., American, army on their frontier, whe they still were consolidating their power.

As for my reading of Mac’s intentions, I’m not sure there’s anything out there that comes out and says what I believe in so many words - except perhaps the fellow who wrote the book with the tile something like “MacArthur’s War”, but there’s plenty of evidence for it. Maybe I should sit down pull it all together and write it up. Well, on the other hand I’m not retired quite yet.

And I’m not saying the Mac was actually planning an immediate move into China across the Yalu - althoug he did want to nuke the parts of China immediately adjacent to Korea, the famous cobalt line, as a sort of radioactive prophylactic. I think what he had in mind, at least at the outset, was something more like tying up significant Chicom forces at the Korean border in order to faciliate a Nationalist invasion, liberally backed with American arms, money, logsitical support and likely air and naval assets. If that then set the stage for direct American involvement in a CHinese ground war, I think he was game. I don’t think he really uibscribed to the idea of avoiding an Asian land war, as long as there also was a reliable proxy involved to do the really dirty work. He was something of an “Orientalist”; he believed in such currently politically incorrect ideas such as the “Oriental mind”. And he clearly thought he was the man to bitch slap the Orientals into line.

Pretty good post, most of which I find it hard to argue. Makes me want to go read some more sources, about time I did so.

I’d be particularly interested in any proof for your following (and jaw-dropping) assertion:

Quote: “…I think Mac was so blinded by his determination to put US troops on the Chinese border in the service of his overall desire to then move onto the re-conquest of China…”

I find this utterly astonishing. I can sure agree with what you said about his driving blindly to the border instead of consolidating his position further south (is that area you desribe the narrow “neck” in the middle of North Korea? As I recall, Manchester stated that this area was “untenable” (or words to that effect) as a stopping point for the UN offensive).

Presumably Manchester was agreeing with something he may have read (or heard from a primary source) that MacArthur said about stopping the offensive well south of the Yalu. But Manchester didn’t explain this any further; I remember it because I made a mental note of it when reading.

I can agree that MacArthur was anxious for political reasons to quickly win an absolute victory and completely conquer the North. But surely you can’t believe that even his vast ego extended to thoughts of leading American forces across the Yalu!

MacArthur had had a birds-eye view of the 1945-49 developments of the Chinese Civil War. He may have been a supreme egoist but was also a realist.

You’ll have to document this assertion of yours further to convince me. But I’d be happy to learn of any other sources you’ve read so I can check them out for myself (eventually).

Thanks for an interesting reply.

An addendum: Not only was Philby involved, in his capacity as British intelligence liaison to the newly-minted CIA, but also his Cambridge 5 buddy and co-conspirator Guy Burgess, who was Second Secretary at the British Embassy in DC at the time and lived with Philby.

The Chinese indeed had sent warnings via the Indian Ambassador to China, Panniker (Spelling?). Moreover, the Chinese had spken out on the matter at the UN. The Russians also had weighed in. All of this took place before the Wake Island meeting. In some cases, just days before.

So one could reasonably conclude that Truman was aware of the possible risk of provoking the Chinese. On the other hand, Chinese remonstrations were discounted, partly because they did come from Panniker, who was thought to be a fellow-traveller and hence personally not a reliable interlocutor even though India was officially a neutral nation at the time. Moreover, Chou En Lai. at one point made it clear that the Chinese would not object to South Korean forces rolling right up to the northern border, suggesting that Chinese objections could be finessed. Most Importantly, though, Truman and the JCS relied on Mac’s assurances that the Chinese would not intervene. And Mac’s orders were to defeat the NORKS in detail, for which he was authorized to advance beyong Pyongyang, but no to attack or provoke China.

Ina fundamental way, all that is irrelevant to my take on this, which is not that, if he and Willoughby had been honest about evalauting the field intelleigence about actual Chinese troop movements into Korea. they would have desisted from advancing into NK - - but that he would have been less reckless about driving to the border and and instead focused on finishing off the NORK army north of Wonju and south of Pyoongyang, which was a very realistic opportunity that the drive to the Yalu undermined (permitting many thousand sof NORKS to escape. In other words, for purely military reasons, he would have been more strategically and tactically circumspect and thereby likely avoided the defeat of 8th Army in the NorthWest and X Corps in the NorthEast, and perhaps - a very big perhaps - even avoided actual engagement by the Chinese in the conflict at all. I think Mac was so blinded by his determination to put US troops on the Chinese border in the service of his overall desire to then move onto the re-conquest of China that he just ignored the facts on the ground.

You’re right about Philby, but I doubt that he really passed along any info that could not be gleaned from reading the papers. I think much more dispositive a factor in Truman’s decision to continue to allow Mac a long leash was the domestic political scene, the rampant over the top anti-communism and the upcoming election in which Truman wanted to make sure that a move against Mcc wouldn’t be counted against the Dems under the rubric of being soft on the reds.

A politician also fights dirty. That is why he is called a politician. A military man does not. Pres. Carter was a military man to the end of his presidency.

“…In fact Truman did NOT have any alternative sources of reliable information at the Wake Island meeting since Mac had a strangehold on FEC and the chain of command. All he got was Mac?€™s gloss on Willoughby?€™s deliberately deceptive summaries…”

I’m talking about strategic intelligence about Chinese Communist intentions (from CIA, diplomatic contacts, etc).

Of course it’s well-known how the witch hunt over the loss of China had crippled the Foreign Service members who had had contacts with the Communist Chinese, but that wasn’t something that MacArthur was responsible for in any way.

I think the Communist Chinese sent a diplomatic warning (through India) for the US to not allow its troops to enter North Korea; don’t remember if this was before or after Wake, but the point is that Truman let MacArthur have his head far too long and as a result had to then finally pull the reins too hard, to the ultimate detriment of both men (and, more importantly (as you point out) — their country’s cause and the lives of their soldiers).

I thought Manchester was pretty good on this; he explored the whole relief issue thoroughly (since it was the culminating one of MacArthur’s career). I read it repeatedly since the immediate issues that caused the relief were rather nuanced (before my time).

I grew up not really understanding the relief, though of course I heard about it, read about it, even studied it in history classes. It was only from the perspective of full adulthood and military service of my own that I finally came to more fully grasp it.

I wish I had my copy of A.C., handy, it’s elsewhere right now. But I think Manchester properly detected the faults on both sides. It’s interesting to compare and contrast the MacArthur relief with more current situations (ie the end of Gulf War I and the almost complete lack of political and diplomatic supervision of Schwarzkopf at this time by the first Bush administration — something else that ended up costing our country in ways that we are still paying for).

(BTW, there’s an interesting and extensive footnote in one of the A.C. chapters, about the probable involvement of one of the notorious “moles” of British intelligence (I think it was Philby, if I recall correctly he was in the British embassy in Washington at the time). Manchester thinks it highly likely that he was passing on everything he saw to the Russians who in turn gave it to the Chinese.
Very likely the Communists were reading all the US diplomatic mail and the Administration’s thoughts/intentions about the situation in Korea; again, not something that MacArthur can be faulted for in any way).

And,
You mentioned really dumb things that are not TRUE in Korea.
Check belows your comments:

1. DogBert mentioned:
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First, I dislike Bush too, but will never burn an American flag in protest. This is an important distinction. As far as Koreans being enemies, don?€™t pretend that all Koreans are puppets. Plenty Koreans were motivated enough by ideology (perhaps masking other things) to kill each other without being forced or encouraged to by others.
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I admit that plenty koreans were stucked on the stupid IDEOLOGIES(COMM. VS. DEMO.) at that time. But most of the Korean killed are innocent. They don’t know anything about Comm. You can find some example of that. Just check at yahoo.co.kr with “NoGeunRi”, “?…¸?·¼???”, or “??œ??¼ 4.3 ??­???”.

I saw the BURNT Union Jack on demonstrations on the TV several times. But the guys who burnt the flag are few. even I agree to what they insist, I don’t like the way they express. I feel sorry about that, But do not drive all the people in ANTI-BUSH/US army demonstration into the same kind of the few guys.

2. DogBert mentioned:
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Second, look how many Koreans today continue to revere Park Jung-hee and don?€™t blame the U.S. for that.

Third, the facts of this have been stated over and over, yet so many Koreans willfully refuse to acknowledge them. If your anti-Americanism is based on a lie, at least admit that.
Re-read your post.
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Most of the people who respect the horrible Dick. Park are from Eastern side of Korea. I don’t have to look at them because, I know why they support the Dick. Ask any Korean young people on a street, whether they really want the Dick rules about Korea again. And ask WHO drived South Korean into two horrible antagonistic Parochialist (localism) “Eastern” VS “Western”. Ask for WHAT and WHY he drived Koreans to that stupid.

For what reason, you say I am telling a LIE??
I suggested where the korean’s ANTI-US really came from.
And you said, I am telling a lie?

When arguing something, I saw, most of US are very like the PROS and CON’s with a bunch of respects on their hands.
But I can see only “???” and “?“°????¸°” on your hands to argue with me.

I put “criminally” in quotes to indicate that I don;t believe that Mac is actually criminally liable in a legal sesne but that the degree of his culpability is very great. Mac didnb;t cross his Rubicon, whioch would have made him criminally liable in the strict sesne, but he came awfully damn close in a very calculated effort to see how far he could push Truman. The old redleg proved he could push back.

I also don’t think that Iraq 2 is a matter of conduct that rises to the criminal level - although having known Wolfowitz at school, I think he at any rate was more than a little disingenuous.. In fact I think the war wholly justified,but just not on the specious WMD ground. In any event, I donl;t think what “they” say about Iraq 2 has any bearing on the merits of any historical indictment of Mac’s conduct in Korea.

Back to the matter at hand, In fact Truman did NOT have any alternative sources of reliable information at the Wake Island meeting since Mac had a strangehold on FEC and the chain of command. All he got was Mac’s gloss on Willoughby’s deliberately deceptive summaries.

An example: you said ?€œMcArthur became a victim of this ?€œfight only if you can win?€? policy advocated by desk jockeys ever since VietNam.?€?

I meant the memory or the achievement of McArthur got tainted by historical revisionists. If the US had been victorious in VietNam, many would have approved Mac’s push to Yalu river. With the defeat in Nam, pres. Truman suddenly gained so much supports. All draft dodgers were looking for their spokesman and they found him, the strong advocate of isolationist policy.

a famous post-Korea quote from MacArthur: ?€œThe US should never again fight a land war in Asia?€?

Hmm…I have heard it was Truman who said “the US should not engage in a prolonged land war in Asia”. And,he acted on his words during Korean War. If Mac said that, then he was not happy with the US support he got during the war.

Second, look how many Koreans today continue to revere Park Jung-hee and don’t blame the U.S. for that.

Third, the facts of this have been stated over and over, yet so many Koreans willfully refuse to acknowledge them. If your anti-Americanism is based on a lie, at least admit that.

I really hate those people, who raise issues without thinking and considering why that is happened.

Re-read your post.