The Korea Herald takes a decent look at some of the debate surrounding the much discussed statue of Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Incheon. It does a good job of pointing out something very important to remember in this story, namely, the extent to which MacArthur has been virtually deified (and, to a lesser extent, President Truman vilified) in South Korea for his role in saving the country from a North Korean takeover. To some extent, this is quite natural, given what he did at Incheon and, in some circles, his willingness to risk WW III to unify the Korean Peninsula. I might also hazzard a guess that the good general’s flair for theatrics and his skill at playing the public probably went down well with many Koreans, who tend to like their leaders to look and behave like leaders (part of the reason the public has a problem warming up to President Roh). There has never been anywhere near the kind of critical analysis of the man in South Korea as there has been in the United States, as OhMyNews elaborated on Sunday.
For Korean speakers, the Myungji University professor Kang Kyu-hyung wrote a very thoughtful column on this issue for the Chosun Ilbo.
Couple of other goofy Dougie M notes:
- Does the movie “Welcome to Dongmakgol” make people want to pull down the statue? Some GNP lawmakers seem to think so.
- Former Hanyang U professor Park Hyeon-so, a member of the committee putting together an encyclopedia on Japanese collaborators, said that to Koreans, MacArthur should not be seen as a liberator, but a target of emnity, citing mostly his failures as commander of the Allied occupation force in Japan:
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Note to Prof. Park — I’ll grant many of your points. But not for nothing, at least MacArthur is on record as actually having fought against the Japanese.
43 Comments
Why dig up more history and turn them into controversy? Let them be!
How much more stuff is there left? How much longer? What else? Turn the clock backwards and count the calandars backwards and still people won’t be satisfied.
Marmot,
I am curious as to which of Prof. Park’s points you would grant? That Korea were the greatest victim of Japanese militarism, instead of her greatest Asian ally? That the US had the responsibility to transport her enemies, wherever they may be, including those in Soviet-held Sakhalin, to wherever they wished to go? That the US should have eliminated discrimination in Japan while she was occupying the country? That the US had no right to decide whether to try Hirohito as a war criminal, even it was the US who won victory over Japan? Or would you grant his point that MacArthur was the primemover for making sure Korea stayed divided?
Baduk, just some food for thought regarding the MacArthur-Truman equation. Truman was a line battery commander in France during the First World War, back when artillery was still deployed close to the front lines and the art of indirect fire was under development. Douggie Mac was the Chief of Staff of the 42nd Inf Division, whose duties, among others, included deciding which awards would go to whom. Every time that MacArthur approached the front line, he managed to have himself written up for the Army’s new valour awards, i.e. the Silver Star and Distinguished Service Cross. I have NOT researched the point, but I suspect that if someone did, they would find that Truman’s distaste for MacArthur went all the way back to 1917-18, when Truman was taking his share of risks up near the trenches but Douggie Mac was well back in the rear (what my generation would have termed a “staff faggot”), showing up in the trenches only to get his ticket punched and collect another award for valour. Certainly there was no love lost between MacArthur and COL Bill Donovan, who won the medal of Honor as a regimental commander in the same division, and later headed up the OSS in WWII. An organization that MacArthur banned from his theater.
Still, I agree with many of your basic points.
A couple of points:
1) From the Korea Herald article (the link cited above):
“He [MacArthur] is a very controversial figure in the United States, But the Korean government and education have hammered home to its people and students that he is a hero,” said Hong Seuk-ryule, a history professor at Sungshin Woman’s University in Seoul.
“People have never thought properly about the work of MacArthur. In particular, conservative groups hold him as sacred. They denounce those who criticize him as truth denying and betrayers of the nation,” Hong said.
“But given that he greatly affected the Korean War, there could be positive and negative evaluation about him.”
1) Continued from last post:
This professor is out of touch. Nobody other than historians is talking about MacArthur in the US anymore. MacArthur isn’t a “controversial” figure in the US anymore, in the way he was 50 years ago. Most average younger Americans wouldn’t even know who he is if you asked them. Only history buffs like me are interested.
Contemporary US political discussion about the Korean issue is almost framed in terms of contemporary politics. In its own way, ROK politics (like that of the DPRK) is still structured in a time warp from 50 years ago. I suppose this is to be expected since the Cold War hasn’t ended there.
2) Quote from Marmot: “…the good general?s [MacArthur's] flair for theatrics and his skill at playing the public probably went down well with many Koreans, who tend to like their leaders to look and behave like leaders…”
This is the exact same point made by MacArthur’s biographer Manchester in the concluding paragraphs of his book (American Caesar). I wish I had my copy handy so I could quote it exactly.
Paraphrase: “The Filipinos, the post-WWII Japanese (and also presumably 1950’s ROK Koreans) appreciated MacArthur’s great reserve, ego and sense of dignity. These qualities, so readily mocked and caricatured by MacArthur’s fellow Americans, were more appreciated in the Orient. Asians had a better sense than Americans that the image a man uses to screen himself can hide great strength as well as great weakness.”
What Koreans remember about McArthur are:
1) His Pipe
2) His Sun glass
3) His Hat (Army officer hat)
The general represented the US for Koreans. His image stood for strength, resolve and determination.
Even Pres. Park wore a sun glass to imitate McArthur.
If England can remember Churchill as their hero, why can’t Americans look at Mac with the same deference? I guess VietNam changed all that.
Americans still love Chruchill though….
Baduk: MacArthur returned home to America in 1951 to enormous public acclaim after his relief from command by Truman. Manchester makes the point that the overwhelming public anger against Truman for his relief of MacArthur made an enormous impression on politicians (in particular Lyndon Johnson who I think was majority leader in the US Senate at the time).
In Manchester’s opinion the memory of this anger was a big part of the reason that LBJ later felt he had no choice but to persevere with US efforts in Vietnam even into 1968 (though a comparison of the US involvement in the Korean and then Vietnam wars shows the two situations to be very different ones).
Read the American Caesar biography carefully. The acclaim afforded MacArthur in 1951 did not translate into political popularity for MacArthur with the US voters in 1952, when MacArthur made an attempt to seek the Republican nomination for President. An attempt which rather pathetically failed; he was a great general but a terrible politician.
Part of this was that the investigation in the US Congress of the reasons for his relief tended to bear out President Truman. There was no more appetite in the US for a wider war against China back then than there is now.
He is remembered with deference by many Americans who honor his military victories. He is also criticized (justly) for his enormous ego and for being very selfish about publicity, “hogging” it to the detriment of very deserving subordinates.
Big men make big mistakes and his two biggest were allowing his aircraft to be caught on the ground by Japanese air attack in the Phillippines on Dec 7 1941 (hours after Pearl Harbor), and also his ignoring the warnings of the Chinese coming into the war in Nov-Dec 1950. Many at the time of his relief (to include some of his capable US military peers) privately made a comparison of the two events.
The surprise Chinese attack ranks among the biggest setbacks in US military history, and I think the Chinese consider it among their biggest military victories ever against an outside power.
Paul H.,
I heard it before; Korea was a mistake. VietNam was an even bigger mistake.
However, these wars has got the US where she is at right now. If the U.S. had retreated from these two challenges, the US might not be what she is now, the top dog.
China and USSR may be running the show. And, we may be speaking Russian as the world standard language.
I guess you were against the Clinton’s move of placing the 7th fleet before Chinese battleships heading toward Taiwan circa 2000, since you are so afraid of confrontation with Red China.
How do you feel about Bush’s Iraq invasion?
Baduk. I enjoy your posts but I do not see where you could paraphrase Paul’s comments as: Korea was a mistake. Rather, Paul points out that MacArthur committed a major blunder in Korea by appointing himself as his own chief intelligence officer and accepting no one else’s judgement of what the Chinese were going to do. To paraphrase a comment about lawyers: A commander who acts as his own intelligence officer is a fool. MacArthur’s judgment of Chinese intentions at that moment borders on the criminally incompetent! He should have been relieved for that alone. That detracts from, but does not erase, MacArthur’s many significant contributions both to the U.S. Army as an institution and its victory over Japan in WWII. The Korean War was a necessary one, and came at a crucial moment in the Cold War. That was not the case with Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh was no better than Kim Il-sung, only more clever in choosing his disguise. But that was no justification for waging an all-out (albeit limited) war. The fractures in the communist world were plainly visible then, and American planners were aware of them. Vietnam should have remained an advisory effort fought by regulars attached to the Vietnamese armed forces, backed up by small contingents of Regular Army forces and Marines. Not the all-out draftee fueled war it became.
I am challenging not only Paul but modern history thinkers who downplay the role of military. The world was not always like these days.
There was Russian Bear who ate up many countries in Europe and Chinese Threat that moved down to Korea and VietNam. Draft dodgers and hippies move into the universities and revised the history of the US. They say these were stupid moves. They are clamoring for the US to pull out of Korea and Iraq even now.
They just want to justify their action. Meanwhile, they are downplaying heroes like McArthur and all others who fought in these “unnecessary” wars.
I disagree. As I wrote before, the world would have been a quite different place if the US just cowered.
And, Mac might have known that the Chinese might get involved. He just did not want Pres. Truman, Mr. Faintheart, losing his sleep worrying about it.
lirelou: You are correct both about Dougie being a REMF, my era’s term for it, and Truman disliking him for it. Truman disliked him even more, though, for the way in which MacArthur rather openly flouted the notion of civilian control of the military and openly tried to manipulate policy. Manchaster’s biography was not entitled American Caesar for nothing. Truman, on the other hand, got it. He wasn;t personally offended; he recognized MacArthur’s affronts as affronts to the office of the President and the Constitution.
I also happen to think MacArthur wasn’t the great strategist that he’s cracked up to be. It’s been well-documented, e.g., that he got the idea from Chromite from unnamed and unsung others.
His gift, learned from his mopther who was his very own PR agent from the time he was a plebe, was as a communicator. The only real accomplishment of MacArthur in connection with Chromite - not an insignificant one — is that he sold it to a JC that went into the meeting utterly opposed to it and came out believing in it. He even won over the Navy and Marine guys who had to actually carry it out and who were adamantly opposed at the outset of the planning process for technical reasons.
As a battlefield strategist/commander, he was a disaster in Korea, A lot of good men lost their lives because of his willful refusal to believe field intelligence reports about the Chiinese build-up in Korea in the fall and winter of 1950, his decision to put his pet martinet Ned Almond in charge of X Corps, and his blunder of directing 8th Army and X Corps to operate effectively independently.
Baduk: Just so you know, I don’t consider myself a “dove” or an isolationist. And yes, I am in favor of continuing to fight on in Iraq in support of our country’s objectives there. (I say “our” because I gather you are an American citizen like me).
I would say my overriding interest here is to see the essential “truth” of things represented as they actually exist (and formerly existed). Like the two previous commenters, I know something about US military history and so stick my oar in here occasionally to ensure that (as far as possible) the facts about such history are correctly represented.
I’m a former US Army officer; as such I like to think that I am capable of putting on many different “hats” (to include a “non-partisan” one, my obligation when I was on active duty).
As far as the Clinton administration goes, yes I was glad that he sent the carrier groups in to cruise off Taiwan during the PRC’s 1996 military war games (which included the firing of a PRC ballistic missile over the island if I remember correctly. BTW, I suspect this may have given the North Koreans the idea for their missile “test” in 98 when they fired a ballistic missile in a similar manner over Japan).
And I note that a similar cruise of US carrier battle groups near Taiwan hasn’t been necessary in the successor administration to Clinton’s (at least so far). A fact which speaks for itself IMO.
I also noted in an earlier thread that the head of the Kuomintang party in Taiwan (currently out of political power there) recently made a state visit to Beijing! And that Taiwanese defense spending (or rather, the lack of it) has been criticized by US commenters lately.
So I’m beginning to look at the US-Taiwan relationship a little more skeptically as well. My point being that the US should not be doing for others (ie the citizens of Taiwan and the ROK) what they are unwilling to do for themselves.
I except you from this criticism of mine, Baduk (I suspect you used to be an ROK citizen before you became a US one?) If the time ever comes when the balloon goes up in Korea, I hope our troops there have got ROK soldiers with your single-minded attitude fighting alongside them.
Even better if the ROK troops are capable of doing the job themselves (with US air and naval support from offshore). That way we can bring our troops home, ending the inevitable friction their presence there is causing (and will continue to cause, regardless of which ROK political party happens to be in office).
As a followup to a comment of Lirelou’s (in his #9), I want to point out that MacArthur was definitely NOT relieved by Truman because of the defeat suffered by US forces in Nov-Dec 1950 (which led to the UN forces having to evacuate North Korea).
From http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/pd-c-20.htm :
Although it may have been a contributing factor, General MacArthur’s conduct of the campaign, from a purely military standpoint, did not bring about the President’s decision. His inability to anticipate the Chinese attack in late November and the subsequent withdrawal of the United Nations forces in December apparently did not cause his dismissal from command. [3]
[footnote 3]: President Truman later stated that he did not blame General MacArthur for the failure of his November offensive. The President felt that MacArthur was no more to be blamed for the fact that he was outnumbered than was General Eisenhower for his heavy losses in the Battle of the Bulge. The difference, as the President saw it, between Eisenhower in 1944 and MacArthur in 1950 was the manner in which MacArthur tried to excuse his failure. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 381-82. [end of footnote 3]
Immediately after MacArthur’s relief, President Truman stated publicly that MacArthur was unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the U.S. Government in matters pertaining to his official duties. He pointed out that while full debate on matters of national policy was a vital element of any true democracy, military commanders had to be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by U.S. laws and the Constitution. Hence, General MacArthur’s removal from command seems to have stemmed from his official protestations and public expressions of dissatisfaction with United States Far Eastern military and political policies made by him between August 1950 and April 1951.
from my previous post:
…between August 1950 and April 1951.
1) Mr. President, just shut up. Just shut up and do Korea a favor.
President Roh Warns of Big Power Centrism
http://times.hankooki.com/lpag.....911950.htm
2) Finally a lefty that’s a bit sensible.
Thoughts on the MacArthur Debate
http://english.chosun.com/w21d.....50005.html
3) All the anti-Americanism in ROK hasn’t effected the American views of Korea - which is they don’t know anything about Korea while many confuse South Korea with North Korea.
Americans Rank S.Korea Eighth Among Allies
http://english.chosun.com/w21d.....50007.html
From NY Times
Memory of Gen. MacArthur Exposes Divide in S.Korea
By REUTERS
Published: September 15, 2005
Filed at 6:19 a.m. ET
INCHON, South Korea (Reuters) - Hundreds of people marched peacefully through this port city on Thursday to back U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, whose statue commemorates an amphibious assault that began 55 years ago and ultimately helped turn the tide of the Korean War.
Skip to next paragraph Reuters
Last weekend, the scene was less calm. Those for and against the statue — and the campaign the late general led — had exchanged blows and tossed rocks and bottles at each other.
It exposed a divide between those who lived through the war and younger people more critical of the United States.
The city erected the statue in the late 1950s to honor a man whose supporters say repelled North Korean invaders and saved South Korea in the 1950-1953 conflict.
On the anniversary of the start of the September 15, 1950 landing, about 600 South Koreans marched through Inchon, west of Seoul on the Yellow Sea, to show their support for MacArthur and offer appreciation for the U.N. troops who defended South Korea.
Yet, these days, a few vocal groups want the statue to come down, saying Korean blood is on MacArthur’s hands and the statue is a symbol of South Korean subservience to the U.S. military.
“The statue itself symbolizes the unequal relation between South Korea and the United States,” said Kim Seung-kyo, a member of Solidarity for Practice of the South-North Joint Declaration, a group that wants the statue torn down.
MacArthur, who died in 1964, has become a generational flashpoint among some in South.
Some older South Koreans who lived through the war revere him. Some younger South Koreans see him as a symbol of thwarted efforts to reunite the peninsula, split since the war, and of an overbearing U.S. military. There are more than 30,000 U.S. troops in South Korea to deter the communist North.
DECISIVE BLOW
“Many of the younger generation of South Koreans do not know what exactly happened during the Korean War,” said Choi Hong-jae, director of Liberty Union, a conservative group. ”Hasty action regarding the statue without full consideration could hurt South Korea-U.S. relations.”
Recent surveys show about three in four South Koreans favor keeping the statue as it is.
In 1950, North Korean troops occupied all of the peninsula except for an area in the southeast around another port, Pusan. MacArthur planned for a huge amphibious assault at Inchon, the closest port to the capital, Seoul, then held by North Koreans.
Inchon presented enormous difficulties because of tides that can change water levels by as much as 30 feet and leave large areas as mud flats to trap navy vessels. MacArthur said landing at Inchon would deal a decisive blow to the enemy.
He was proved right when, within weeks of his arrival in Inchon, North Korea’s military was in disarray and many units had retreated to their side of the peninsula.
MacArthur’s troops pursued North Korea toward the Chinese border. China entered the war and the tide turned again before U.N forces eventually fought back and the sides battled to a standstill where the North-South border still runs.
The two Koreas are technically still at war because a peace treaty has never been signed, only a truce.
Chang Keum-suk, director of Inchon Solidarity for Peace and Participation, a civic group among the first to call for the statue to go, said MacArthur had prolonged the war by taking the battle to the Chinese border and cost more Koreans their lives.
“We need to seriously consider and review the hero-worship surrounding the general,” Chang said.
South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, a progressive who is supported by some leftists groups, said the statue must stay.
“Such illegal attempts to remove the statue are not only negative for Korea-U.S. ties, but also go against our society’s view of history,” Roh said in a statement on Monday.
Kimbob:
I’m waiting for the knock-on from Roh’s UN speech. I think he’s going to nominate North Korea to join those other stalwart defenders of human rights, such as libya, sudan and myanmar, on the UN Human Rights Commission. and propose that the UN take lessons from the Korean “political ciurcles” on anti-corruption reform.
Paul H.,
And yes, I am in favor of continuing to fight on in Iraq in support of our country?s objectives there.
I am so glad to hear this. Because many people outside the US think popular opinion has shifted and Mr. Bush is carrying on Iraq campaign alone, which is a lie generated by foreign media. The same exaggeration about anti-American attitude in Korea exist in foreign media. The real Commie is only about 5% of SKs.
I?m a former US Army officer; as such I like to think that I am capable of putting on many different ?hats?? (to include a ?non-partisan?? one, my obligation when I was on active duty).
I have guessed you were. You are too knowledgeable for a civilian. I have served four years as a US Naval officer, one year in Korea. I am strongly biased in favor of military in international affairs, but for national policies, I am a Democrat.
And I note that a similar cruise of US carrier battle groups near Taiwan hasn?t been necessary in the successor administration to Clinton?s (at least so far). A fact which speaks for itself IMO.
I think this challenge will come again very soon. Especially when the US seems weak to the Chinese, when backing down against NK or deciding to pull out of SK.
I also noted in an earlier thread that the head of the Kuomintang party in Taiwan (currently out of political power there) recently made a state visit to Beijing!
In Cold War times, both sides, the US and the USSR exchanged ambassadors and made trips. That exchange by no means indicated that two countries were about to merge. The same thing here.
My point being that the US should not be doing for others (ie the citizens of Taiwan and the ROK) what they are unwilling to do for themselves.
The US must do its part. Like New Orleans debacle, the U.S. president must be smarter than the local politicians. He cannot play dead, just because others are not doing the right thing. Eventually, the consequence of failure will hit home; Bush appologized. Failure in China and Korea will come in the form of massive attacks to the U.S. soil, possible missle attacks with nuclear warhead.
I except you from this criticism of mine, Baduk (I suspect you used to be an ROK citizen before you became a US one?) If the time ever comes when the balloon goes up in Korea, I hope our troops there have got ROK soldiers with your single-minded attitude fighting alongside them.
Yes, I was. And, yes, Koreans will fight alongside of the US soldiers, same as back in 1950. Do not believe the polls; they are media manipulations. 90% of Koreans will gladly take up arms against KJI. The proof is that all three major newspapers in Korea exhibit strong anti-Communist attitude and yet people buy them every day. If the whole country went South as you imagine, then a new newspaper with strong North-bent should’ve appeared by now. Rho tried, but people are adament. The Korean majority is still strongly anti-KJI.
Even better if the ROK troops are capable of doing the job themselves (with US air and naval support from offshore). That way we can bring our troops home, ending the inevitable friction their presence there is causing (and will continue to cause, regardless of which ROK political party happens to be in office).
Total withdrawal of ground troops will have deep impact on the psyche of Korean people. Many will feel betryed and may decide to join China camp. I am afraid that action may trigger a war, as the Atchinson line did by tipping the balance. Are you willing to pay for a war? Or, are you in fact advocating serving up Korea to China?
I think the best policy is what is being done today. Just decrease the troop size slowly, while reaffirming the US commitment in the peninsula through frequent speeches. The USFK is no problem now and has been no problem for average Koreans; only the Commies make exaggerations. 70% of Koreans still welcome the US ground troop presence in Korea. Considerable number of Korean civilians make their living off the USFK. When this amateur pro-North administration leaves and a new administration comes in, the true attitude of SK people will be revealed. It will change like night and day. Korean people had enough of Rho. He must go.
MacArthur was not only the chief of staff of the 42nd Infantry(the Rainbow Division) BUT also the commander of the 82nd Infantry Brigade during WWI. Like Paul H. I don’t have a copy of American Caesar close at hand but I remember quite clearly Manchester endorsing the notion that MacArthur’s actions in France as commander of the 82nd were far more deserving of the MOH than what he eventually (to his eternal disgust) got it for. Mac was a REMF? Please, do explain.
CorpyCarly:
I believe that the record shows that MacArthur demonstrated not only impressive organizational skills in WWI but great physical courage in leading from the front, unarmed, helmetless and sans gas mask. At some of the 4 Silver Stars he was awarded in WWI undoubtedly were well-deserved, whatever thinks of the very studied theatrics.
I think that if MacArthur had been less of a self-promoting showman he would have declined the MOH he received for fleeing the Phliippines - unless Roosevelt order him toaccept it for morale reasons, as he had ordered MacArthur’s flight.
When you get to Korea, though. The spectacle of MacArthur and his little band of martinets constantly awarding themselves medals for valor in connection with campaigns that they supervised by remote control from the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, so that among other things MacArthur could try to establsih and maintain the title of most decorated soldier, it seems to me that the term REMF is really the only award that is merited. Doubly so, when you take into account the battlefield cost in blood that their blunders in intelligence analysis, strategy and tactics produced while they were busy palying pin the ribbon on the donkey. Not every RE is necessarily an MF, but at that time and place. these guys were
Quote: “I think that if MacArthur had been less of a self-promoting showman he would have declined the MOH he received for fleeing the Phliippines - unless Roosevelt order him toaccept it for morale reasons, as he had ordered MacArthur?s flight.” (unquote)
As I recall, Manchester wrote that George MarshalL advised President Roosevelt that the MOH should be awarded in this case to counter intensive Japanese propaganda being put out about MacArthur “abandoning” his troops in the Phillippines.
One can be skeptical of some of MacArthur’s other actions; I suspend judgement on your particular allegations about his staff actions ref awards during Korea (MacArthur indeed had too much tolerance for sycophants on his staff which served him very ill at times) .
But I am without doubt that MacArthur rather grimly accepted the award of the MOH after his escape from Corregidor, realizing the wartime propaganda necessity for it. I believe he also expressed at the time of the award that it was really for all the troops left behind on Bataan and Corregidor.
BTW, he was ordered repeatedly to leave Corregidor by Marshall; Manchester says he delayed obeying this order for several days, concerned about how it would look (to Marshall’s alarm).
Marshall (whose judgment I suspect you would implicitly trust) considered it essential that MacArthur’s services not be lost to the US war effort.
Paul H.
Thanks for reminding me of all that. I put in the qualifier because I suspected that in fact the MOH had more or less been forced on MacArthur, like (as I indicated) his escape from Corregidor, but I’d forgotten the details and didn’t have access to my copy of Manchester to check up. It’s not really the issue, though, which for me are MacArthur’s gross lapses in attention and judgment and personnel decisions, both e.g., in allowing the destruction of allied air resources in the Philippines, and otherwise not preparing much of a defense, and much more seriously, in Korea as already adverted to. I lost family in both places thanks in part to his carelessness, so my characterization of his lapses in Korea as being more culpable doesn’t represent a personal judgment (although my distatse for the man generally is). I just think the balance of the circumstances, his actions and the results in the ‘ppines and Korea made his conduct in Korea worse. I’d like to say that MacArthur had no business continuing to conduct military campaigns anymore after 1945 - he should have (been constrained to) serve(d) out the remiander of his active aceer as pro-consul in Japan, where his organizational skills shone as usual — but he did sway the Chiefs to go with the Incheon landing with his rhetoric (even if he wasn’t really the architect of it), and it likely would not have happened otherwise, probably with disastrous results.So in the end, I’m for giving the man his due, but with all the warts noted. Pity significant elements of “our gracious Korean hosts” can’t do the same.
Sperwer: I think it’s worth noting that you lost family because of Imperial Japanese aggressiveness and later Communist North Korean and/or Communist Chinese aggressiveness. MacArthur was not the proximate cause of either war.
Had the US prepared properly in terms of overall national defense status in the 1930’s (and also during the period 1945 to 1950), the resources could have been in place to allow the US military to be able to compensate for the inevitable reverses that are bound to occur in any war when the enemy gets to prepare carefully and then strike first.
One example of such resources would be the lack of long range aircraft available to Phillippines and Hawaii US commanders in December 1941 (either specific patrol designs, or just long-range bombers with the ability to do such patrols).
Enough acft so that commanders in both places could have maintained 24/7 continuous 360-degree search patterns well out to sea. When this particular resource was available 6 months later (May-June 42), the results of the naval battle of Midway were in marked contrast to that of Pearl Harbor earlier.
I could cite similar examples for the Phillippine campaign of 41-42. If you ever have access to the official US Army history volume on this campaign, it makes for fascinating (and depressing) reading (it may be on-line at the CMH site; I haven’t checked. I used to use the “hard copy” to teach from).
Paul H.
Paul H.
I really don’t think you want to get into an argument with a lawyer about “proximate cause”.
In this particular case, I don’t think the Japanese derserve any blame for our faimly losses. The guys involved actually survived serving for the whole of the War in the Pacific. Of course, the NORKS and the Chicoms, along with the Russians, do make up part of the proximate cause nexus, though. So does the lack of US military preparedness to which you advert. But Mac is part of the equation as well and, take my word for it, his responsibility was very direct as well as immediate. As I said, I don’t mean to deny the man his due, but it includes serious criticism as well as praise.
I’ll be careful to confine any argument as to proximate causes to non-legal issues, believe me.
Well you’ve got me curious, I’m always interested in veteran’s stories. This is not the place of course. But if you’re referring to a “MacArthur went left when he should have gone right” type of critique (Papua campaign perhaps), just about every famous commander is subject to such critiques after the fact (for that matter every commander who has to make life and death decisions under pressure).
One of Manchester’s big points is how MacArthur was a commander who preferred “maneuver” to “head-on” and how this made him (arguably, of all the major US commanders of WWII) the most “economical”, in terms of results achieved for US casualties expended.
I started reading a lot of recently-written Pacific war (and WWII) history about 15 years ago when I had to teach ROTC military history class and it’s a subject of endless interest. Many of these authors excoriate (sp?) MacArthur as you do but if you read carefully, usually they end up making grudging acknowledgements of his achievements.
Manchester writes about how MacArthur as Chief of Staff of the Army fought with the Congress and the first Roosevelt administration to try and preserve (mostly unsuccessfully) funding. In one case he even told off FDR personally, in a breathtakingly insubordinate manner (paraphrased quote from memory: “in the next war, when an American GI lies dying with an enemy bayonet in his belly his last curse will include the name of Roosevelt”). The GI’s never knew about stuff like this, of course, so it’s a sad irony of history when MacArthur got berated by them for some of his other personal traits.
And it’s not surprising that historians reading about this type of thing would be unsympathetic; FDR has “aged” well with historians and MacArthur hasn’t.
But in looking back at the actual facts of the situation who was right about things in the long run? We lost a lot of people in 1941-42 because we weren’t prepared.
And, here we are 54 years later and there’s still no resolution for us in Korea either, indeed I would argue that the situation is deteriorating. As Manchester writes, Truman prevailed and almost everyone acknowledges that he was Truman was correct to do what he did. Yet decades later, the essential question posed by MacArthur (summarized by “there is no substitute for victory”) remains unresolved.
America lost “courage” as value. In this day of “group decision” and “political correctness”, the old generation’s courage is looked at as “recklessness”.
McArthur became a victim of this “fight only if you can win” policy advocated by desk jockeys ever since VietNam.
Soon, these cowards will say the Cuban missle crisis was mishandled as well. They will criticize Kenedy for putting the country in unnecessary risks (they prefer to live with missles in Cuba. They will say Cuba having missles does not mean the Cuba will use them. F***ing cowards!) and the president should have made a group decision; Kennedy should not have made that dangerous decision of resisting Russian fleet, initiating the WWIII, and possible total destruction of America with nuclear bombs.
Courage is obsolete.
Paul:
Naw, it’s not just a case of he should have run a fullback draw instead of the end aroound; but it truly isn’t for this forum.
As for the remainder, I heartily agree with the idea that there is no substitute for victory. Mac MAY HAVE made his own bed in Korea in that regard, though. It’s one thing to be subordinate to your commander in chief to his face in private. It’s something else again publicly to undermine the authority of the President by presuming to make contradictory pronouncements on national policy to the press and otherwise presuming to carry on like a pro-consul for Asia. If Mac hadn’t wanted to push and pushed the edges of the envelope re China, perhaps he would have restrained himself from dissing Truman and not have so readily (I believe, deliberately and “criminally”) failed to take account of the abundant field intelligence about the Chinese presence in the hills north of 8th Army and X Corps and been in a position to fend off the Chicom offensive of the Winter of 50-51, maintain his command and preserve all or substantially all of the gains of the Incheon landing. As it is, Truman made the right decision to strangle Mac’s Ceasarism by publicly removing him form command, a decision that was endorsed by the American electorate when it later turned a cold shoulder to Mac’s presidential bid. It’s a tragedy that so many good men died in the meantime ostensibly defending Korea — I mean that in some respects, they were also paying the price to defend the constitution against a far more immediate clear and present danger - MacArthur Imperator– than what was going on in Korea.
And, I am of the belief that if the US follow Mac’s lead and A-bombed (or used a lot of conventional bombs) Manchuria then there would have been no VietNam. Maybe even no Communist China. I am not the only one. There are some scholars who believe this, too.
Sometimes, when you have the unique strengh like A-bombs, you have flaunt it. I can think of no reason not to use the best weapon available when troops are dying on the ground. Truman wanted to save the bombs, maybe. Or, he just got tired? In any case, he was weak. America paid for his inaptitude in VietNam.
Deliberately and criminally? Goodness, that’s what they say about Bush going into Iraq.
Seems like over-the-top to me. MacArthur just thought he knew better and that the Chinese wouldn’t dare to oppose the US outright with a major commitment of their forces. Truman accepted his judgement at Wake and that was his mistake; he should have listened to other, independent sources and been more aggressive in controlling MacArthur earlier.
It’s not as if this tendency by MacArthur to swing a big stick a little too liberally was totally new.
Speaking of swining, Baduk, you’re swinging so wildly now that you are undermining your own arguments. Do what you like, but my suggestion is that you take a deep breath and relax.
An example: you said “McArthur became a victim of this ?fight only if you can win?? policy advocated by desk jockeys ever since VietNam.”
MacArthur died in 1964, before US combat forces were first committed to Vietnam (1965). Yes, I know that there were US advisors and Special Forces there before that.
President Kennedy visited MacArthur to ask for his advice after he became President (1961). I can’t remember exactly what was said but I think MacArthur advised him to be very cautious there (a famous post-Korea quote from MacArthur: “The US should never again fight a land war in Asia”).
What happens with Korea and the US is not going to be decided on this forum. All of us here are pretty stubborn in sticking to our viewpoints, me perhaps as much as anyone. For example, I can see that I’m not going to change Sperwer’s mind (about his being more negative about MacArthur’s faults than I am).
So accept it and move on.
I should mention several things about ANTI-America in Korea.
First,
The Anti-America is a sort of ANTI-BUSH regime rather than ANTI-US. For example, I like US and I want to pursue my life here US. But I really hate the policies of the BUSH regime to North Korea. Especially “Axis of Devil” is just the stupid itself. This is nothing but raising tense on East North Asia, so that US can take advantage of it.
It should be noticed that, both South and North Korean never thought we are enemy to each other. But we were forced to be the worst enemies agains ourself by WHOME?
Idealism? No! that is by the people who took advantage of that for e.g. US/Japan/Chinna/Dictators of both Korea.
2nd,
I give a short answer to The Yankees who don’t understand why ANTI-America.
They thought US save them from poverty and planted Democracy, so US should be a hero to Koreans or else. But this is not TRUE. Ironically, US has supported dictators, for e.g. Park JeongHee, Jeon DooHwan, No TaeWoo even Sadam Husein in Iraque, Noriega in Panama etc.
3rd,
ANTI-America in Korea was totally burnt up by the severl stupid US soldiers in Korea. Some of them just raped a Korean women (e.g. Lee, KumHee) and killed so cruely. But they’ve never been purnished by Korean Law. This kind of miserables can happen in US? Is that happen by the US soldiers resides in Okinawa? Further worse, The US army authority never apology to this officially.
3 years ago, US tank just crushed 2 poor Korean girls on the road (HyoSoon and Misoon). This is just the Son of Beach. The soldiers who drived the tank, had a enough time and enough eyesight to avoid the crush. But they didn’t why???? They just wanna see what happen?? It turns out that in fact, the two girls were trying to run away from the tank, but the tank push them to the hill of the road and just crushed them over.
But not really Anti-America, it should be called actually ANTI-Bush and ANTI-US Army.
I really hate those people, who raise issues without thinking and considering why that is happened.
Even some of them think, they must be and always be the best in the world so that, nobody is supposed to be against to them.
First, I dislike Bush too, but will never burn an American flag in protest. This is an important distinction. As far as Koreans being enemies, don’t pretend that all Koreans are puppets. Plenty Koreans were motivated enough by ideology (perhaps masking other things) to kill each other without being forced or encouraged to by others.
Second, look how many Koreans today continue to revere Park Jung-hee and don’t blame the U.S. for that.
Third, the facts of this have been stated over and over, yet so many Koreans willfully refuse to acknowledge them. If your anti-Americanism is based on a lie, at least admit that.
I really hate those people, who raise issues without thinking and considering why that is happened.
Re-read your post.
Paul H.,
An example: you said ?McArthur became a victim of this ?fight only if you can win?? policy advocated by desk jockeys ever since VietNam.??
I meant the memory or the achievement of McArthur got tainted by historical revisionists. If the US had been victorious in VietNam, many would have approved Mac’s push to Yalu river. With the defeat in Nam, pres. Truman suddenly gained so much supports. All draft dodgers were looking for their spokesman and they found him, the strong advocate of isolationist policy.
a famous post-Korea quote from MacArthur: ?The US should never again fight a land war in Asia??
Hmm…I have heard it was Truman who said “the US should not engage in a prolonged land war in Asia”. And,he acted on his words during Korean War. If Mac said that, then he was not happy with the US support he got during the war.
Paul:
I put “criminally” in quotes to indicate that I don;t believe that Mac is actually criminally liable in a legal sesne but that the degree of his culpability is very great. Mac didnb;t cross his Rubicon, whioch would have made him criminally liable in the strict sesne, but he came awfully damn close in a very calculated effort to see how far he could push Truman. The old redleg proved he could push back.
I also don’t think that Iraq 2 is a matter of conduct that rises to the criminal level - although having known Wolfowitz at school, I think he at any rate was more than a little disingenuous.. In fact I think the war wholly justified,but just not on the specious WMD ground. In any event, I donl;t think what “they” say about Iraq 2 has any bearing on the merits of any historical indictment of Mac’s conduct in Korea.
Back to the matter at hand, In fact Truman did NOT have any alternative sources of reliable information at the Wake Island meeting since Mac had a strangehold on FEC and the chain of command. All he got was Mac’s gloss on Willoughby’s deliberately deceptive summaries.
DogBert/
You are just out of my point.
Re-check what I mentioned okay?
I was emphasizing why it should be called ANTI-BUSH or ANTI-US army, instead of beging called “ANTI-US” in Korea.
Do not drag the point to the SigoongChang so that you and I would be treated as the same dirty-shame mouth on there.
And,
You mentioned really dumb things that are not TRUE in Korea.
Check belows your comments:
1. DogBert mentioned:
============================================================
First, I dislike Bush too, but will never burn an American flag in protest. This is an important distinction. As far as Koreans being enemies, don?t pretend that all Koreans are puppets. Plenty Koreans were motivated enough by ideology (perhaps masking other things) to kill each other without being forced or encouraged to by others.
============================================================
I admit that plenty koreans were stucked on the stupid IDEOLOGIES(COMM. VS. DEMO.) at that time. But most of the Korean killed are innocent. They don’t know anything about Comm. You can find some example of that. Just check at yahoo.co.kr with “NoGeunRi”, “? ธ?ทผ???”, or “????ผ 4.3 ??ญ???”.
I saw the BURNT Union Jack on demonstrations on the TV several times. But the guys who burnt the flag are few. even I agree to what they insist, I don’t like the way they express. I feel sorry about that, But do not drive all the people in ANTI-BUSH/US army demonstration into the same kind of the few guys.
2. DogBert mentioned:
============================================================
Second, look how many Koreans today continue to revere Park Jung-hee and don?t blame the U.S. for that.
Third, the facts of this have been stated over and over, yet so many Koreans willfully refuse to acknowledge them. If your anti-Americanism is based on a lie, at least admit that.
Re-read your post.
============================================================
Most of the people who respect the horrible Dick. Park are from Eastern side of Korea. I don’t have to look at them because, I know why they support the Dick. Ask any Korean young people on a street, whether they really want the Dick rules about Korea again. And ask WHO drived South Korean into two horrible antagonistic Parochialist (localism) “Eastern” VS “Western”. Ask for WHAT and WHY he drived Koreans to that stupid.
For what reason, you say I am telling a LIE??
I suggested where the korean’s ANTI-US really came from.
And you said, I am telling a lie?
When arguing something, I saw, most of US are very like the PROS and CON’s with a bunch of respects on their hands.
But I can see only “???” and “?ฐ????ธฐ” on your hands to argue with me.
Sperwer: you wrote:
“…In fact Truman did NOT have any alternative sources of reliable information at the Wake Island meeting since Mac had a strangehold on FEC and the chain of command. All he got was Mac?s gloss on Willoughby?s deliberately deceptive summaries…”
I’m talking about strategic intelligence about Chinese Communist intentions (from CIA, diplomatic contacts, etc).
Of course it’s well-known how the witch hunt over the loss of China had crippled the Foreign Service members who had had contacts with the Communist Chinese, but that wasn’t something that MacArthur was responsible for in any way.
I think the Communist Chinese sent a diplomatic warning (through India) for the US to not allow its troops to enter North Korea; don’t remember if this was before or after Wake, but the point is that Truman let MacArthur have his head far too long and as a result had to then finally pull the reins too hard, to the ultimate detriment of both men (and, more importantly (as you point out) — their country’s cause and the lives of their soldiers).
I thought Manchester was pretty good on this; he explored the whole relief issue thoroughly (since it was the culminating one of MacArthur’s career). I read it repeatedly since the immediate issues that caused the relief were rather nuanced (before my time).
I grew up not really understanding the relief, though of course I heard about it, read about it, even studied it in history classes. It was only from the perspective of full adulthood and military service of my own that I finally came to more fully grasp it.
I wish I had my copy of A.C., handy, it’s elsewhere right now. But I think Manchester properly detected the faults on both sides. It’s interesting to compare and contrast the MacArthur relief with more current situations (ie the end of Gulf War I and the almost complete lack of political and diplomatic supervision of Schwarzkopf at this time by the first Bush administration — something else that ended up costing our country in ways that we are still paying for).
(BTW, there’s an interesting and extensive footnote in one of the A.C. chapters, about the probable involvement of one of the notorious “moles” of British intelligence (I think it was Philby, if I recall correctly he was in the British embassy in Washington at the time). Manchester thinks it highly likely that he was passing on everything he saw to the Russians who in turn gave it to the Chinese.
Very likely the Communists were reading all the US diplomatic mail and the Administration’s thoughts/intentions about the situation in Korea; again, not something that MacArthur can be faulted for in any way).
When a military man and a politician butt their heads, who do you think is going to win? A military man only knows how to fight the war and has no knowledge about manipulating men through the press.
A politician also fights dirty. That is why he is called a politician. A military man does not. Pres. Carter was a military man to the end of his presidency.
Paul:
The Chinese indeed had sent warnings via the Indian Ambassador to China, Panniker (Spelling?). Moreover, the Chinese had spken out on the matter at the UN. The Russians also had weighed in. All of this took place before the Wake Island meeting. In some cases, just days before.
So one could reasonably conclude that Truman was aware of the possible risk of provoking the Chinese. On the other hand, Chinese remonstrations were discounted, partly because they did come from Panniker, who was thought to be a fellow-traveller and hence personally not a reliable interlocutor even though India was officially a neutral nation at the time. Moreover, Chou En Lai. at one point made it clear that the Chinese would not object to South Korean forces rolling right up to the northern border, suggesting that Chinese objections could be finessed. Most Importantly, though, Truman and the JCS relied on Mac’s assurances that the Chinese would not intervene. And Mac’s orders were to defeat the NORKS in detail, for which he was authorized to advance beyong Pyongyang, but no to attack or provoke China.
Ina fundamental way, all that is irrelevant to my take on this, which is not that, if he and Willoughby had been honest about evalauting the field intelleigence about actual Chinese troop movements into Korea. they would have desisted from advancing into NK - - but that he would have been less reckless about driving to the border and and instead focused on finishing off the NORK army north of Wonju and south of Pyoongyang, which was a very realistic opportunity that the drive to the Yalu undermined (permitting many thousand sof NORKS to escape. In other words, for purely military reasons, he would have been more strategically and tactically circumspect and thereby likely avoided the defeat of 8th Army in the NorthWest and X Corps in the NorthEast, and perhaps - a very big perhaps - even avoided actual engagement by the Chinese in the conflict at all. I think Mac was so blinded by his determination to put US troops on the Chinese border in the service of his overall desire to then move onto the re-conquest of China that he just ignored the facts on the ground.
You’re right about Philby, but I doubt that he really passed along any info that could not be gleaned from reading the papers. I think much more dispositive a factor in Truman’s decision to continue to allow Mac a long leash was the domestic political scene, the rampant over the top anti-communism and the upcoming election in which Truman wanted to make sure that a move against Mcc wouldn’t be counted against the Dems under the rubric of being soft on the reds.
Paul:
An addendum: Not only was Philby involved, in his capacity as British intelligence liaison to the newly-minted CIA, but also his Cambridge 5 buddy and co-conspirator Guy Burgess, who was Second Secretary at the British Embassy in DC at the time and lived with Philby.
In case you’re still there, S:
Pretty good post, most of which I find it hard to argue. Makes me want to go read some more sources, about time I did so.
I’d be particularly interested in any proof for your following (and jaw-dropping) assertion:
Quote: “…I think Mac was so blinded by his determination to put US troops on the Chinese border in the service of his overall desire to then move onto the re-conquest of China…”
I find this utterly astonishing. I can sure agree with what you said about his driving blindly to the border instead of consolidating his position further south (is that area you desribe the narrow “neck” in the middle of North Korea? As I recall, Manchester stated that this area was “untenable” (or words to that effect) as a stopping point for the UN offensive).
Presumably Manchester was agreeing with something he may have read (or heard from a primary source) that MacArthur said about stopping the offensive well south of the Yalu. But Manchester didn’t explain this any further; I remember it because I made a mental note of it when reading.
I can agree that MacArthur was anxious for political reasons to quickly win an absolute victory and completely conquer the North. But surely you can’t believe that even his vast ego extended to thoughts of leading American forces across the Yalu!
MacArthur had had a birds-eye view of the 1945-49 developments of the Chinese Civil War. He may have been a supreme egoist but was also a realist.
You’ll have to document this assertion of yours further to convince me. But I’d be happy to learn of any other sources you’ve read so I can check them out for myself (eventually).
Thanks for an interesting reply.
Paul:
The narrow waist or thereabouts was indeed the place where Mac had the opportunity literally to annihilate what was left of the NORK armed forces. He failed to do so because instead of making an enveloping attack on them when they were in disarray and flight, he turned his columns north. What was left of the NORKS made it into the hills, regrouped and joined the Chinese. I don’t think this is at all controversial. Bevan Alexander has it this way, as does Fehrenbach and Goulden, I believe.
I did not mean to suggest, though, that the Allied advance should have stopped there. It IS pretty indefensible terrain - at least in the lowlands of the west - as the ROKS discovered when they got overrun at Kaesong in the opening hours of the war. They were heavily outnumberd and outgunned, too, but they folded because they were spread across relatively flat land, If they had been further south in the hills above the Han, they would have done much better, even with the bad odds. Look what the even more put upon Glosters did the next year.
On the other hand, it’s pretty obvious that, if Mac had been more thorough in mopping up the Norks, more cauttious about moving north, and more cognizant that the terrain did not really lend itself to another coup d’main like Incheon, especially one that involved splitting his forces, the Allies would have stood a much better chance when the Chinese offensive jumped off.
Moreover, if anyone had heeded CHou En Lai’s remarks, and after demolishing what was left of the NORKS, the Allied advance had stopped in the vicinity of Pyeongyang or a little to the north where there is more defensible terrain, and the ROKS alone had been detailed to move up to the Yalu, perhaps the Chinese would not have attacked at all. What the Chinese were worried about - with good reason given Mac’s belligerence towards them and his close relationship with and championing of the Nationalists - was a large Allied, i.e., American, army on their frontier, whe they still were consolidating their power.
As for my reading of Mac’s intentions, I’m not sure there’s anything out there that comes out and says what I believe in so many words - except perhaps the fellow who wrote the book with the tile something like “MacArthur’s War”, but there’s plenty of evidence for it. Maybe I should sit down pull it all together and write it up. Well, on the other hand I’m not retired quite yet.
And I’m not saying the Mac was actually planning an immediate move into China across the Yalu - althoug he did want to nuke the parts of China immediately adjacent to Korea, the famous cobalt line, as a sort of radioactive prophylactic. I think what he had in mind, at least at the outset, was something more like tying up significant Chicom forces at the Korean border in order to faciliate a Nationalist invasion, liberally backed with American arms, money, logsitical support and likely air and naval assets. If that then set the stage for direct American involvement in a CHinese ground war, I think he was game. I don’t think he really uibscribed to the idea of avoiding an Asian land war, as long as there also was a reliable proxy involved to do the really dirty work. He was something of an “Orientalist”; he believed in such currently politically incorrect ideas such as the “Oriental mind”. And he clearly thought he was the man to bitch slap the Orientals into line.