By SHELTON BUMGARNER
Marmot’s Hole Guest Blogger
Leave it to the DPRK to cut the Gordian Knot that is the statue of U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Incheon’s Freedom Park.
Sphere: Related ContentSEOUL — Calling U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur a “war criminal,” North Korea on Tuesday said a statue of him in the South should be blown up.
“The statue of MacArthur, the sworn enemy of the Korean people, must be blown up at once,” the North’s state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper wrote in an editorial, according to the Korean Central News Agency.
27 Comments
Well, this might settle it then: a good word from the Rodong Shinmun might mean it gets saved.
By the way, Shelton, don’t you think it’s a tad overboard to provide a link to the meaning of cutting a/the Gordian knot? Here or at migukin.com, it does distract from an otherwise decent effort.
I don’t know about that — many readers often see a term like that but don’t understand exactly what the heck it means.
I will be more aware of your thoughts in the future, however.
To me, though, that’s kinda the point of reading stuff online — you have the chance to learn a bit more than you would otherwise.
And, besides, I thought it was cool.
Shelltown, the only person that’s allowed to know things.
From http://www.geocities.com/~jlha.....llery3.htm
“…Another oracle declared that anyone who succeeded in untying the knot would be the conqueror of all Asia. The knot stayed tied until the arrival of Alexander. Then, as everybody knows, he cheated on the oracle by cutting the knot with his [Alexander's] sword instead of untying it. Zeus honored [Alexander's] initiative by making the prophecy come true….”
So, Shelton, do you mean to suggest that the two Koreas can come together (after the destruction of MacArthur’s statue) on their way to becoming the conqueror of all Asia?
Let’s hope your rather inexact use of this analogy doesn’t turn the heads of the Korean nationalist readers here. I don’t think the US is a “colossus with feet of clay” as was the Persian empire of Darius. (Nor Japan, nor China…)
I say that the statues that have the most to fear from future explosive charges are the innumerable ones of KIS, and that his “empire” is the one that should be fearful. “Cutting the Gordian knot” in regards to the present Korean situation would consist of regime change up north, resulting in the downfall of Communist rule and its threat to the world
Not “blowing up MacArthur’s statue”, which will only irritate Americans like me even more (if that’s possible). (On the other hand, where is the ROK political equivalent of “Alexander” who will bring down KIS’s legacy of oppression? Nowhere in evidence, at least from where I sit….)
In defense of Shelton (and thereby, it would seem, become the enemy of the general commentators of this blog), I think the link to the wiki can be helpful. Not all us netizens are well versed in the Classics. Just today, I learend what the heck a “Chewbaca Defense” was having led by a wiki link. And how many of us have comedy central? (kinda makes you think, if South Park will become a required reading for 21st century drama)
Also, I have no idea what Shelton’s political tastes are like, but I really didn’t get the vibe that he was suggesting anything by the news.
Thirdly, I think that Korean people could have honored the Korean veterans better than erecting a statue of MacArthur. Having talked to a US marine during WWII, he was rather upset that Mac gets all the credit for what he and his comrades on the beaches accomplished. He went onto mention that he was the kind of guy to abandon his men in the phillippines. In hindsight, something like the current US vietnam memorial would have been better, and more to the point…
If you want to get the actual facts about MacArthur and his conduct in WWII, try the excellent biography by William Manchester. Manchester was also a WWII Marine (he died recently) with extensive combat experience (probably equal to that of your Marine friend), and he gives a balanced view of both MacArthur’s great virtues and great flaws, with the balance coming down on the side of his contributions.
In most cases I would agree with you that a “nonspecific” soldier memorial statue is to be preferred over one of an individual, yet in this case I don’t think the tribute is misplaced. The concept of the Inchon landing was completely MacArthur’s and he insisted that the daring landing be carried out against the recommendations of almost all of his staff and of the JCS. Only MacArthur’s vast experience of success in carrying out similar amphibious operations during WWII gave him the confidence to do this; instrumental to his success was his insistence upon the very swift execution of the plan (too swiftly according to the “consensus” of opinion, but it enabled the US to get ashore and completely unhinge the totality of the North Korean invasion of the ROK, before the North Koreans could “get set” to defend Inchon harbor).
The amphibious landing at Inchon probably saved tens of thousands of American and Korean lives, lives that would have been lost in a long grinding counteroffensive back up through the Korean pensinsula (supported by less bold amphibious operations).
I suppose you could argue that Inchon was “too successful” in that it gave MacArthur a case of “victory disease”, ie making him too confident vs a vs the pending Chinese counteroffensive that was almost as equally disastrous as the intial North Korean invasion. But this argument can only be made with the benefit of hindsight; nobody else foresaw the Chinese attack either, and it was as much Washington’s responsibility to predict it as it was MacArthur’s.
After the US withdrawl into the Bataan peninsula in Dec 1941 and the beginning of the 3 month siege there, MacArthur only visited the troops on Bataan once (early January).
The rest of the time he remained on the island fortress of Corregidor (at the entrance to Manila Bay). This is the origin of the old derogatory nickname “Dugout Doug” which is probably what is in the mind of your Marine friend.
Nobody really knows why he only visited once, but I’m inclined to agree with Manchester’s speculation on the subject. MacArthur had probably come to intuitively understand before anyone else that the US fleet and the rest of the US military would not be coming to the rescue of the Phillippines (as all -prewar contingency planning called for)
This terrible truth could not be uttered or admitted openly. Nor, in the face of this understanding, could MacArthur bring himself to face the starving troops on Bataan and their questions about when relief would be coming.
MacArthur was ordered to leave Corregidor by Army Chief of Staff, with Roosevelt’s concurrence. Prior to this order, MacArthur fully expected to remain there until the end, and to die fighting the inevitable Japanese attack on Corregidor; indeed he initially contemplated disobeying the order, and was very slow to leave, which prompted more than one concerned message from Marshall.
He was finally persuaded by his staff to leave, as he was the one who best knew the situation and the enemy, and so would be the best one to lead a relief effort (a belief justified by subsequent events IMO). Also he was influenced by the presence of his wife and 4 year old son; his wife absolutely refused to leave without him, though I believe all the other military families of US personnel had previously been evacuated.
MacArthur’s personal bravery had been proved many times over in WWI when he several times personally led the troops of his division in “over the top” assaults on German trenches, in the closing weeks of the war.
I suppose this calumny against MacArthur will live on forever, but its persistence is as inversely proportional to the actual truth of the matter as it is possible for any “scuttlebutt” to be.
If your Marine friend wants to indulge in slighting WWII “brass” for failure, suggest the almost completely forgotten figure of Vice Admiral William Pye. Pye was the temporary successor to command of the Pacific fleet following Admiral Kimmel (who was relieved after Pearl Harbor); Pye served for a few weeks prior to the arrival of Nimitz.
It was Pye’s decision to order back the Wake Island relief force when they were just two days away from the island, thus dooming the Marine defense force there to inevitable surrender after one of the most heroic defensive efforts of the first 6 months of the Pacific war (when the Japanese were everywhere initially triumphant — except against Wake Island and the Bataan/Corregidor defense).
Also, during WWII the Marines remained almost entirely under the control of the Navy and its own South Pacific and Central Pacific theaters (Nimitz was theater commander).
MacArthur accomplished the majority of his amphibious operations in his own Southwest Pacific theater with Army troops, trained in amphibous operations (as in Europe, where there were no major USMC units; all of them (Marine divisions) were in the Pacific, and even there the theater was so large that the USMC could never be big enough to do all the amphibious operations that were needed).
If NKs promise to blow up all KimIlSung statues, then the McArthur statue may be given up in exchange.
Thanks Paul H. for an enlightening post. I hope you don’t think I was trying to slight the General, since I have about zero knowledge on military affairs. But I was just thinking that, and this is purely on my sophomoric understanig of events from the History channel and the Military channel, had the inchon landing failed, it would have been a disaster and well, I don’t think General MacArthur would have gone the way of Vice Admiral Pye (indeed, i must do some wiki searching on who that is), but he probably wouldn’t have gotten a statue either. But I don’t think those men who died would have gotten statues either.
I mean, he might have been a very brave, very dedicated, very sincere, and very intelligent man who took a calculated decision and took a gamble–and since this is war, the gamble have dire win/loss event outcomes. I probably had a very biased view from just one soldier’s (a friend’s) commentary. But I can’t help but think that most of these marines were all very sincere, dedicated, and brave–maybe not as smart and organized as Douglas MacArthur, but certainly does not lag in the sincerity and bravery department.
I don’t mean to make less of MacArthur’s personal sacrifices, but I still can’t help but think that maybe, somewhere, someplace, somebody should have just taken a lottery of all the soldiers in the war, and the lucky winner gets a statue of himself–as a representative of the entire military force. I guess that would get complicated, but I think it still would be more fair and more to the point.
Also, we can’t ignore the fact this sorta encourages the certain false notions about the Korean War in the minds of a lot of people, least of which, is the DPRK. I.E. the principal actor of the Korean War was U.S. leadership, not U.S. volunteer servicemen.
Paul H. wrote:So, Shelton, do you mean to suggest that the two Koreas can come together (after the destruction of MacArthur?s statue) on their way to becoming the conqueror of all Asia?No disrespect intended, but I think you’re reading too much into Shelton’s comment.
The MacArthur statue is the Gordian knot. “Cutting the Gordian knot” in this case would be resolving the conundrum between maintaining this statue of a military genius whose efforts are directly to thank for the South Korea being free, thus allowing it to eventually become prosperous and democratic, and removing the statue of the one the far-leftists call an imperialist criminal, thereby leaving open some space to put in plastic Little Tykes toys that allow your children to experience what it’s like to be a gerbil and/or hamster.
In defense of Shelton (and thereby, it would seem, become the enemy of the general commentators of this blog), I think the link to the wiki can be helpful. Not all us netizens are well versed in the Classics. Just today, I learend what the heck a ?Chewbaca Defense?? was having led by a wiki link.Again, I’m not trying to dogpile on the ShelFish, but I think he just needs to learn the fine art when to link and when not to. “Gordian knot” is one of those things that anyone with education beyond college would know (I hope), whereas “Chewbacca Defense” is a far less-known cultural reference. This is why I don’t splatter my posts with Simpsonisms. I also find it distracting that he links common phrases with movie titles of the same name, even when the movie has no connection to the topic. It’s a little distracting.Also, I have no idea what Shelton?s political tastes are like,He doesn’t seem fond of Bush.but I really didn?t get the vibe that he was suggesting anything by the news.I concur.Thirdly, I think that Korean people could have honored the Korean veterans better than erecting a statue of MacArthur.Well, actually, the do. The War Memorial near Samgakchi Station (just down the street from my house) is a major place honoring them. It’s very poignant.Having talked to a US marine during WWII, he was rather upset that Mac gets all the credit for what he and his comrades on the beaches accomplished. He went onto mention that he was the kind of guy to abandon his men in the phillippines.I think this point needs to be made about Koreans and MacArthur. The South Koreans are not honoring him for what he did in World War II; reasonably so, they’re love of him (or their American historian Bruce Cumings-inspired loathing of him) is about what he did for Korea in 1950. Thank goodness MacArthur wasn’t a genocidist or something in another war, but even if he were, he may still have been revered in South Korea for what he did here (note the flag below).In hindsight, something like the current US vietnam memorial would have been better, and more to the point?? The Korean War Memorial in Samgakchi, right smack in the middle of the city. Honors Korean War veterans and the foreign troops who fought in the Korean War.
Re Paul’s comments on MacArthur (#7), the man does deserve credit for the Inchon Landing. As much as anything accurate can be said about a woulda/coulda/shoulda situation about past military actions, I am as certain as I can be about anything that without MacArthur’s genius, South Korea would not exist today as a free state.
Even if it can be demonstrated that he made major mistakes due to overambition or cockiness about his power versus the enemy he faced after that, it pales in comparison to what he did, and he still deserves immense credit for ensuring that the Republic of Korea did not fall under the influence of Kim Ilsung-style communism.
Kushibo:
As to your #10: No, I deliberately “misread” his use of Gordian knot in this context very literally, just to have a little fun with the Gordian knot analogy and the angry Korean ethnocentrists. Maybe this was a mistake and I should just let sleeping dragons lie…
There’s no “conumdrum” about the statue to be resolved as far as I’m concerned, so no drastic Gordian knot-cutting operation is needed. As per my post above, the statue should be decently removed in the dead of night, if removed it must be (rather than a spectacular explosion along the lines of the Taliban destruction of the ancient statues of the Buddha in Afghanistan)
Also, reference your #11:
“…MacArthur. The South Koreans are not honoring him for what he did in World War II; reasonably so, their love of him (or their American historian Bruce Cumings-inspired loathing of him) is about what he did for Korea in 1950. Thank goodness MacArthur wasn?t a genocidist or something in another war…”
I keep seeing references here (Marmot blog) to this Cumings fellow, so I suppose it will eventually be my disagreeable duty to take a dose of castor oil and become familiar with what must be his “revisionist” historical exposure of the US as the true villain of the Korean war, to include our role as “genocidists”.
I like that word. I too give thanks everyday that we’re not really “genocidists”, in spite of the best efforts of chaps like Cumings to educate the world otherwise.
“thereby leaving open some space to put in plastic Little Tykes toys that allow your children to experience what it’s like to be a gerbil and/or hamster” That was the best line in this whole thing. I really despair about the Korean public’s knowledge of MacArthur and the Korean War when people like this:
http://times.hankooki.com/lpag.....711960.htm
are allowed to “teach” here.
Paul, if you really want to know what’s going on, read Bruce Cumings and understand why there is a dichotomized view toward America. If I had to simplify it, it is the fault of two men: Kim Ilsung and Bruce Cumings.
Bruce Cumings is a man who will forever hate his country because of the Vietnam War. That’s his right as an American, of course. But he has translated that hate into an academic career as a historian, where he makes the case that the Korean War was just a less-famous Vietnam War, and that America’s intent in Korea was selfish, imperialistic, etc., etc., and the South would have been better off if it had been left alone to make its own way with the North, which represented a greater expression of the will of the people. He made the case that the South was responsible for the Korean War.
The majority of people in Korea don’t buy those views outright, but the leftist reading groups in Korean colleges would pore over these banned books (I.F. Stone was also banned), and it informed their view today. This is Roh Moohyun’s circle. Although many of them have tempered their views and have come to believe information that counters Cumings, a few of Cumings’s claims still rattle around in their minds.
What is worse is that many came to the logical conclusion that because an American is writing this about America, then it must be fairly valid. Cumings’s claims and conclusions have been taken, repeated, and have become part of their lore.
Unequivocally, without Bruce Cumings’s works, the anti-American landscape of the left would be very, very, very different (and cover much less territory).
It’s very frustrating. Cumings has become a master U.S.-basher and North apologist. His ultimate goal is for the USFK to get out of Korea, and many, many, many in Korea who agree with him share that opinion because of his writings, directly or indirectly. Yes, there is leftist propaganda touting the same thing, but it is HIGHLY influenced by Bruce Cumings.
I wrote a scathing review of one of his recent books for a graduate course. If I can find it I’ll post a link.
This complaining about how it is was a group effort rather than MacArthur’s just seems a tad ridiculous. If you take this view, then any military hero that ever lived should have their statues removed and replaced with a memorial for all the soldiers who fought the battles. No more Napoleon or Churchill or any other individuals for that matter.
All war efforts are of course a group effort. What’s the point in having heros if we only celebrate or honor the group? MacArthur represents more than the achievements of just one man. I see nothing wrong in ‘appointing’ heros, it gives us someone and something to focus on. That’s why someone like Churchill is still an inspiration today.
I just wonder, is the blowing up of the statue going to be the key to getting the Norks to finally sign on to the agreement?
Blowing up Macarthur’s statue makes about as much sense as Americans blowing up the Statue of Liberty, or renaming all towns and schools named after Lafayette simply because of some present day disagreements on the part of the present administration with the French about certain issues.
Paul H., I can see you’re as big a fan of Manchester’s works as I am… do you happen to know whether he ever finished ‘The Last Lion’? I’d heard a number of stories after his stroke back in the mid-90’s about its eventual completion by friends and aides but since then I’ve heard nothing. What gives?
Paul H. As I understand it, MacArthur’s actual position in WWI was Chief of Staff of the 42nd Infantry Division. All his commands were temporary, primarily for getting “command” credit (no doubt with the post-war reductions in mind). Every time he went up to the line, he had his staff recommend him for an award. To be frank, his “bravery” was far from unquestionnable, but that is irrelevent. A lot of generals have been medal hunters. The fact is that he was a brilliant staff officer and one of the architects of the U.S. Army’s transition to modern divisional and higher combat operations. He was likewise a master politician. I would really like to dig into the background of the Incheon decision, as I suspect that MacArthur exaggerated the opposition to that plan to cast himself in a better light. As I understand it, the officer sent by the JCS out to Japan to argue against the plan was a mere Lieutenant Colonel. But, it was a great decision, and MacArthur deserves the credit. He likewise deserves an equal amount of blame for failing to foresee the Chinese intervention. China was definitely within his “area of interest”, but his main problem was that his most knowledgeable China analyst was himself.
CC: I’m about 99% positive that not only was Manchester unable to finish the last volume, but also that the attempt to help him find someone to assist him in completing it (or to complete it for him) was ultimately unsuccessful.
Somewhere I read a newspaper or magazine article about this specific subject (Manchester’s health and the completion of the last volume) but can’t remember when or where I saw it now. The article was based on a personal interview with Manchester during his incapacitation.
If I recall correctly, I think the main reason was that Manchester’s methods were too “old fashioned” (eclectic note-taking system, plus he wrote everything out longhand had no use for computers or automation? Something along these lines).
Although Manchester still had pretty much full possession of his mental thinking acuity for the interviewer, the particular conditions of his physical disability (nervous frustration due to inability to concentrate for long periods, and his own inability to modify his very individualistic work habits) had caused him to resign himself to the fact that the last volume would never be finished.
Wish I could remember where I saw the article, you would have found it interesting.
I don’t want to portray myself as a Manchester expert, I used American Caesar and Goodbye Darkness extensively years ago as a teaching resource but haven’t gotten into his other stuff. I will eventually; though I remember once trying to start on “The Arms of Krupp” and it was just too impenetrable. I have to have something to catalyze my interest in a subject first.
Your mention of the Churchill volumes is eerie as I was just thinking about how I need to check them out. I’m particularly interested in what Manchester had to say about some of the more sinister allegations surrounding Churchill’s role in the loss of the Lusitania (from the British author (Simpson?) who wrote the controversial book about the sinking, the one that first came out about 1971).
Caused a big stir in the press at the time. Finally a few years ago I picked up a used paperbook copy and got “into” it. Not too long but a hard read, but parts of it are so hair-raising that it became a object of re-reading interest to me.
Unlike a good mystery novel the mystery of what exactly caused it to sink has never been solved and probably never will (as well as the subject of just who knew exactly what about its cargo, routing, etc in the US and British governments).
LL: the Manchester bio was compelling for me and I re-read it repeatedly. But, I don’t have it handy right now to double check my recollections.
Manchester is an overall admiring biographer but I think he was very honest about covering MacArthur’s character flaws. Overwhelming self-promotion and vanity were among them but Manchester’s position on this is that MacArthur’s talents were (usually) of a match to justify them (in the military arena and the “politics” of the US military, however definitely not in the field of US electoral politics, though MacArthur fancied he knew this field too).
His flaws in this area were enhanced by his tendency to fill his staff up with self-important
sycophants. Fortunately there were many exceptions (his Air Ops Deputy Gen Kenney (sp?) in WWII being an outstanding example).
To me it looked like Manchester did the detailed research to justify his conclusions (ref: my post about Manchester, just prior). As I recall, Manchester wrote that in the closing days of WWI MacArthur participated in several night trench raids and also full scale day assaults (in his capacity as Asst Div Cdr; maybe by this time MacA had been promoted to ADC from his position as Division Chief of Staff (?) — can’t remember now for sure)).
Certainly the Div C of S should not be forward like this on the battlefield. But of course those were different days then, and I think that MacArthur was satisfied that the C of S office was being capably handled at this point by his own staff and so felt fully justified in going forward.
During the 42nd’s participation in the US portion (Argonne Forest) of the Allied offensive (Oct 1918), according to Manchester when MacA went forward, he dressed up in a dashing uniform with a scarf, carried a swagger stick (but not even a pistol) and was in as much danger from German fire as any doughboy.
Because of this type of thing, Manchester wrote that both during and after WWI, MacArthur was enormously popular with his former 42nd Division troops. Some of the stories about this came from MacArthur himself (as related to others who wrote them down or told them later to Manchester), but to me they seemed to have the ring of truth. (For example, during the interwar years supposedly MacArthur was always a good “touch” for a small “loan” for any former Rainbow division member he encountered who was down and out, and this was evidently pretty well known to a lot of people).
If Manchester got this right, I’d be inclined to trust the judgment of his WWI troops in deciding that MacArthur wasn’t just an “Iron Cross hound” (as the Wehrmacht saying went).
Such popularity was a great discrepancy as compared to what happened to him during WWII and may have been a cause of MacArthur’s seeming insensitivity later to the issue of his personal popularity with the troops (at heart he didn’t really credit the reports and so might have been inclined to “shoot the messenger” when someone attempted to tactfully put a flea in his ear about this particular subject).
As far as Inchon, if I recall correctly, the JCS repeatedly communicated by message with MacArthur their misgivings about the Inchon landing concept. Also, I’m almost certain that Manchester relates that a JCS delegation personally visited him at his HQ in Japan to discuss it (to include the CNO (?), or maybe it was another senior Navy flag officer). The tidal problems at Inchon were well-known and they were prepared to dispute him on this.
I’m almost positive it wasn’t just an 0-5 level staffer.
Remember such a visit would have been highly classifed at the time for reasons of OPSEC, and afterwards nobody would have had any particular interest in relating the story of it any further (maybe not even till Manchester went looking in the files, 30 or so years later).
Nobody was writing Woodward-type books (”The Commanders”) back in those days, something that may seem almost incomprehesible to those here who aren’t old enough to have been alive during the lifetimes of these people.
If I remember Manchester’s account, the CNO and the other members of the JCS delegation were personally briefed by MacArthur on the plan.
He assured them he would be personally present at the landing, and his compelling oratory, coupled with his enormous personal prestige, got them caught up with his enthusiasm. (Immediately afterwards, I think Manchester relates that the Navy flag officer (CNO?) made some wry remark along these lines, sort of like a man feeling his pockets to see if his wallet was still there).
Again, I’m just going from my memory of Manchester’s account here, so subject to verification. Can be easily checked though from the book at your convenience; book was well-footnoted, look for Inchon and then skim to see if you can find the appropriate passages.
Some more recent accounts of the Pacific war I have read (late 80’s) have been much more scornful about MacArthur’s vanity than Manchester was.
One author made the point that the memory of MacArthur’s WWII accomplishments has not “aged” well, due chiefly to his greatest flaw — his extreme control of all aspects of public relations (everything released about the Southwest Pacific theater had to say that “MacArthur” is doing this and “MacArthur” is doing that, etc).
Manchester makes the point about how the overwhelmingly successful campaign in the Southwest Pacific theater (less US casualties for most territory conquered compared to other US campaigns of WWII, particularly the head-on slugging of the Central Pacific theater) has been completely obscured due to MacArthur’s overwhelming ego at the time. The newspapermen couldn’t get in to get the “ground level” story of what the troops were doing, so they just repeated the HQ press releases and then went elsewhere for the “GI” level (Ernie Pyle-type) stories.
So in terms of the lasting historical memory of his accomplishments, MacArthur was often his own worst enemy.
“My comment is awaiting moderation”?
Not sure where that came from, but I always try to be moderate in all things (as the great Buddha counseled, may peace be upon him) and I hereby pledge to renew my commitment to moderation.
hahaa… Paul H, did you by any chance wrote terms like V1agra, h0t sxy t33ns, home m0r7gage? Those words seem to trigger the spam filters. Although I cannot possibly imagine how you could use those terms in the context of your discussions… I assume you were replying to Lirelou, I’m very eager to read it actually. Hope that spam thing disappears.
It just seem you both are military, so whenever you discuss military, commentaries are always interesting.
I’m referring to the little boldfaced note right after my name (beginning of comment #22).
So that’s it. Must have been the AOL “Insta-message” (?) that popped up while I was typing, inviting me to come visit a “cutie-pie” at her web site. Lately, a standard theme with these has been their assurance that they have seen my profile and are only a few miles away from where I live! Pretty exciting all right…
I try to block these but I still get a message asking me if I want to accept it. If I’m in the middle of quickly typing keystrokes when the “pop-up” happens, it will open before I can delete it.
Maybe that’s God’s way of trying to tell me that she “really” is the one for me…
Re: Bruce Cumings
I would like to quote from H.G. Underwood (of the family that founded Yonsei University) in his book ‘Korea in War, Revolution and Peace’ (p 130):
“Historian Bruce Cumings’ works, including his two-volume ‘The Origins of the Korean War’ … paint a highly unpleasant picture of South Korea under Rhee, while playing down or ignoring the atrocities and complete suppression of civil liberties in North Korea. Elegantly written and filled with information from a wide range of American, Korean, and Chinese sources, Cumings’ cleverly crafted chapters present Rhee Syngman as a mere dupe of the American occupation forces and Soviet agent Kim Il-sung as a true Korean patriot who, despite a tendency to act a little harshly once in a while towards landowners, merchants, Christians, and political opponents of any stripe, enjoyed wide popular support throughout both North and South Korea.”
For a short taste of Bruce Cumings and his sneaky revisionism, read the foreward (?) to I.F. Stone’s “The Hidden History of the Korean War.”
#28 was directed at Paul H, of course.
Paul, I really mean it, read Bruce Cumings’s books to get an idea where the far-left is coming from. They do read him. This will help you understand the nature of the anti-USFK group and the basis of their fervor.