By SHELTON BUMGARNER
Marmot’s Hole Guest Blogger
Dr. Andrew Scobell of the Army War College has written a must read write up (available using Adobe’s Acrobat software) of North Korea’s strategic intentions.
Anything with sentences like this gets our juices flowing:
This monograph analyzes North Korea?????s strategic intentions
and motivations. First, the views of leading analysts of North
Korea regarding Pyongyang?????s strategic intentions are surveyed and
examined. All of the analysts concur on a number of conclusions: (1)
that the North Korean regime is not irrational; (2) this rationality leaves
North Korea?????s leadership with a heightened sense of insecurity; (3)
North Korea?????s rulers????or at least some of them????appear to be acutely
aware of the reform dilemma they face.This third conclusion is particularly significant. Because North
Korea?????s leaders fear that they would be undermining their positions
if the regime adopts comprehensive reforms, they are reluctant
to move down this slippery slope. However, without significant
reform, North Korea?????s leaders realize they are probably condemning
their regime to the ash heap of history. Pyongyang is probably more
fearful of initiating change that it fears will spiral out of control than
it is of doing little or nothing.
The issues addressed in the monograph may become exceeding important should the six-party talks ultimately fail.
23 Comments
I agree with their findings. The pressure to open up his country is mounting every day and KJI is being pushed into a corner. Eventually, he may go berserk and order a limited war, just to protect his regime.
This is why I think SK should just leave NK where it is. The more contact SK has with NK, KJI will become more threatened. The actions designed to reduce tension in the peninsula such as KumKang mountain tourism, Gaesung project etc may actually heighten the possibility of a war.
Let the sleeping dog lie.
SK may be better off by doing nothing with NK. If Kim DaeJoong had not supplied money to NK, the regime may have been imploded by now. No more money or aids to NK!
Baduk with all the military hardware here, is there such thing as a “limited war” in this neck of the woods?
Yes. NK shoots some cannons to Kangnam and there may be some limited fights along the border. But, neither side will be able to advance.
China and the U.S. will quickly draw up a peace treaty. Two weeks war with about 10,000 casualties on each side. All conventional weapons and only along the border. No missiles and no air attacks.
Just conventional war with reservation on each side to end quickly.
Baduk, that would not happen. If any side felt the need to actually go to war, they know the only way they could reach their goal in going to war would be by going all-out in a hope of somehow crippling the other side.
Massive death and destruction. Maybe even some people on this blog.
“Massive death and destruction. Maybe even some people on this blog.” I know I’ll be doing my part
KJI is the geek on the outside looking in; how does one abandon their hardline policies and embrace the technology that could make the NORKs welcome in the UN ‘Party House’ without losing face? IT CAN’T BE DONE.
This may take awhile
Kushibo,
Korean people are not so grown up. Even tomorrow, some SK fishing boats get shot by invading NK battle boats, a war can happen.
War happens by accident, not by design.
Once a war starts, both sides will try to minimize the size of the war. And, both China and the U.S. will try to mediate the peace treaty. And, knowing this, both sides will try to minimize the size of attack. A tit for a tat(did I write this correctly?)type of war.
This is why I think the limited warfare is not only possible, but will happen. And, soon. At least once before the collapse of KJI regime, which is only the matter of time.
Actually got a strong sense of deja vu with Scobell’s conclusions–Mr. Marmot posted something similar a while back. Maybe it came out before the so-called “important proposal” from S.K., which if it goes through, with all the free electricity, Hyundai sweatshops, cash, etc. will prop up the regime for many years, so that they won’t have to reform anything. This analysis leaves that out.
Leave out the second “a”, Baduk, if you want to be scrupulously correct.
Main Entry: tit for tat
Pronunciation: “tit-fr-’tat
Etymology: alteration of earlier tip for tap, from tip (blow) + for + tap
Date: 1556
: an equivalent given in return (as for an injury) : retaliation in kind
- tit-for-tat adjective
I have gotten a heads up that some readers outside the U.S. are unable to access the PDF ’cause it’s on a .mil server. Why it is that *I* am able to access it and I live in Korea is one of the mysteries of the ages.
I can’t imagine that through some magical mystery that U.S. spooks would know to let my specific IP address access .mil information, so something else must be up.
I hope.
If you want the PDF, I got it and I’ll email it to you. Just don’t, like, be a DPRK or PRC spy or nuthin.
“Some readers outside the US” would be me, and Shelton is as good as his word and kindly emailed me the pdf. Thanks, Shelton. I wouldn’t be too worried about the NSA. My guess is that my local ISP 9or some intermediary it uses) is on some sort of blacklist because of the documented incidence of spam and hacks originating from it. I’ve run across this before both on .mil sites and civvie sites.
On conclusion #3; of course NK is reluctant - reform of any value would mean that, eventually, the population would be exposed to information, and finally the truth. It would be like finding out the truth about the wizard in the Wizard of Oz. More (hopefully) after reading the rest…
I wonder how people can be confident about predicting the course and scale of an armed conflict. The one predictable thing about war is surely that it’s nigh impossible to predict its outcome, course and consequences. That’s just the nature of massive violence. Nobody knows exactly what will happen. It’s a pity that this rarely seems to give pause to those who wield power.
Alex (#13), you’re absolutely right. Baduk was once predicting somewhere that fewer than 100,000 casualties would occur if Bush did a “surgical” attack on North Korea’s nuke facilities, and that was acceptable because it would prevent the use of North Korean nukes on American soil that was almost sure to happen.
Okay, this is Baduk, so we might all blow it off as nuts, but I fear there are some people in the Bush Administration who are promoting this view and who do think 100,000 deaths now are the best course.
So, among other points to glean from this, is the relevant point here that they’re predictions may fall far short of the actual casualties.
I like my apartment. And I don’t have reduced-to-rubble insurance.
Well, one thing I wish both conservatives and liberals would do in regular public discourse would be to give specific numbers–as some are doing here–on how many casualties would be acceptable or not acceptable.
How many N. Korean deaths? How many South Korean? American?
It quickly exposes weaknesses (or maybe I should say biases) in arguments. It would show that deaths of some people are more important than others. It would show whether deaths in wartime are worse than deaths from famine. or whether economic instability would be worse than the deaths.
Although it brings to mind the Stalin quote about one death being a tragedy (or two deaths in the case of the schoolgirls and the US military vehicle) and a million deaths being a statistic (NK famine, gulags).
3 quotes from just above:
1) “…I wonder how people can be confident about predicting the course and scale of an armed conflict….”
2) “…we might all blow it off as nuts, but I fear there are some people in the Bush Administration who are promoting this view and who do think 100,000 deaths now are the best course….I like my apartment. And I don?€™t have reduced-to-rubble insurance.”
3) “…Well, one thing I wish both conservatives and liberals would do in regular public discourse would be to give specific numbers?€“as some are doing here?€“on how many casualties would be acceptable or not acceptable…”
In answer to the question posed in #3: for me it’s zero Americans. And the decision as to how many Korean lives to risk should clearly be a matter for only Koreans to decide.
How many is it for you Kushibo? Probably you’ll say the same as me, so let’s bring the abstract discussion of “limited” war down to earth with a specific “for-instance”: assume a repetition of the USN EC-121 reconnaissance plane shootdown of April 1969 by North Korean MIGs (31 Americans killed; Nixon decided to do nothing as a specific retaliation, due to US involvement in Vietnam (he did continue the missions this time with US fighter protection)).
The incident followed soon after the much more famous Pueblo seizure of 1968 (Johnson administration); unlike the Pueblo, there was no doubt that the EC-121 was “in” (over) international waters. I remember both of these incidents well, but this particular plane’s shootdown has been almost completely forgotten (except perhaps by their fellows in the “fraternity” of aviators and flight crews who fly these missions; I believe some of them set up this web site as a memorial to their memory: http://www.willyvictor.com/His.....Korea.html
The question of a possible repeat performance is not merely an academic exercise. Sometime in the last 3 (?) years the North Koreans tried a similar intercept off their coast (can’t remember when, I can’t find a link yet, it was certainly during the first administration of “W”).
As I recall the account the North Koreans got within missile firing range, but unlike 1969 they did not fire. So the reconnaissance plane (this time a jet so I think a USAF aircraft) lived to “commit its imperialist depredations” another day; the story was only a short-lived one, so I can’t remember the exact date.
I suspect KJI of a lack of nerve compared to his father; or maybe he naively thought he could intercept it and force it down in a “surrender” similar to the April 2001 forced landing of the USN EC-3 on Hainan after being “bumped” by the Chinese fighter jet.
So, the question: if a future such mission gets attacked and this time Americans die, what would you all suggest as an appropriate US response?
(I’m quite sure the majority of South Koreans would not approve of any US military measures in retaliation whatsoever; like Kushibo, they will also be concerned for the safety of their homes within artillery range of the DMZ. And of course some will quietly or even openly welcome such a public humiliation for the US).
So, the question: if a future such mission gets attacked and this time Americans die, what would you all suggest as an appropriate US response?
(I?€™m quite sure the majority of South Koreans would not approve of any US military measures in retaliation whatsoever; like Kushibo, they will also be concerned for the safety of their homes within artillery range of the DMZ.My reference to 100,000 dying per Baduk’s suggestion was specifically his proposal that Bush just go in now and bomb Yongbyon.
I don’t feel comfortable responding to your hypothetical because, unless something like that really happens (again), there are just too many hypotheticals. You’re also creating a hypothetical that assumes an action occurring that might not actually occur in real life. On the other hand, Baduk was expressing a specific unilateral action based on a specific idea that 100,000 lost lives would be the only results and that would be okay.
I would want to know what purpose attacking North Korea in this case is to serve. There certainly is value in showing North Korea that they can’t get away with something like that. And if North Korea knows that this attack is a response for taking down a U.S. plane, they might react different than if they thought a full-scale attack were being launched. Like I said, too many hypotheticals. But to tie it in with the original point, I think killing 100,000 North Koreans (or 100,000 North Korean, South Korean, and American deaths combined) would be an inappropriate response.And of course some will quietly or even openly welcome such a public humiliation for the US).I feel very uncomfortable with criticizing people for something they haven’t even done, based on someone else’s speculation, but I do think that there would be a lot of people who would be pointing out the importance of a measured response to your hypothetical. Even the leftist president recognized that Korean troops should not withdraw in response to killing a Korean civilian in Iraq because backing down in such situations invite further attacks.
I work in news with a large group of people who run the political spectrum from conservative to practically North Korea-loving, and no one there expressed such glee at America’s “public humiliation.” When 9/11 occurred, even the anti-American ones were extremely sympathetic about everything. So I really don’t think it’s right to assume as a done-deal such a reaction to something that hasn’t happened and probably won’t happen.
I work in news with a large group of people who run the political spectrum from conservative to practically North Korea-loving, and no one there expressed such glee at America?€™s ?€œpublic humiliation.”… during the Hainan Island incident. (I accidentally snipped that).
I think KDJ sunshine policy made sense at the time it was offered, because at that time, there was at least a glimmer of hope that we could negotiate with the DPRK. It makes a lot less sense now, hindsight being 20/20.
But I also don’t buy the story that if ROK stopped “funding” the DPRK government, somehow KJI would put a bullet through his head, DPRK will become reformed, the Worker’s Party will all commit a mass suicide following the Dear Leader’s example, and NK will join SK in a peaceful fashion, giving up nukes and proclaiming solidarity with the international hippie movement. Oh yea, and the bloggers will say, “I told you so~~”
When Dr. Lankov simply talked about the mere possibility of offering amnesty to DPRK leadership, a great battle cry was called for no such a thing to be made. It is unreasonable to assume that DPRK will go out with a wimper if it stopped receiving oil from China. Afterall, if I was KJI, and I was given a general sanction, then I would know that my days were numbered. If I don’t have another option, then I might as well attack SK, and cross my fingers.
The story, “KJI won’t attack, because he knows he will lose.” doesn’t make any sense in this context, when he is already about to die.
There is obvious no simple solution, and the simple bashing of political analysts along partisan lines is sorta juvenile.
Let’s say tomorrow, US leaves the Korean peninula and signs a general peace treaty with KJI. Who’s to say KJI will stop making nukes and missiles? Why should he? Oh because as the result of the peace treaty, he is going to receive a lot of tributes from SK/Japan/US? Does the United States of America seem like a country which will make massive investment with DPRK government just because we sign a peace treaty with them? I mean, it just seems to me that it’s in KJI’s best interests that all the muslim fanatics hold some nukes, because that might keep America busy. Afterall, KJI imperial ambition ends witht he Korean peninsula, and world nuclear proliferation is none of his concerns. And let’s be quite honest. Let’s say KJI sells weapons grade uranium to Al Qaeda. And what kind of “proof” would we have? Oh, we have the technology to trace uranium, so they say. Or really? And let’s say New York City goes poof and Osama goes on Al-Jazeera saying, “ha ha~~ you wankers, DIE!(i would be one of the wankers dead in this scenario)” Does the United States of America seem like the kind of country that would say, “screw it, we are going to commit genocide against everyone who lives above the 38th parallel.” If KJI is “rational” then he’s going to assume that US is a pushover, a peacenik, easily manipulated by his whims and desires. As a side note I want to add that we went into Iraq under the belief of WMD, and we are not in a position to use “excessive” violence to flush out the terrorist/guerillas. things are not turning out the way it was pitched to us.
America’s own success has been it’s own downfall. We produce food cheaply so we all grow fat and die from heart attack. And now, we grew so powerful that we have supplanted Israel as the terrorism lightning rod of the world. (althought currently the islamo-fascists seem to assume that the UK is the 51st state of the union.)
I mean, we are really in a damned if we do, damned if we don’t situation. Some people say we can safely ignore DPRK. This is a lot easier said then done, but alas, that is exactly what we are doing.
IMHO US-ROK alliance is optimal with a conservative ROK president and a liberal US president. but ahh shucks, noone wants to listen to the contrarian. Afterall, it’s not like I’m a political analyst with a magic bullet solution.
My Magic Eight Ball seem grim, but it just seems like President Bush has opted for the same decision that President Clinton made, which is to say, they are both hoping that DPRK has less time than we do.
I suppose you’re smart not to be drawn into hypotheticals, Kushibo. I agree that’s the problem with them; I can pose one, you come back with another, and pretty soon we’re way out in left field. VW’s succeeding post shows how that can go.
However, you choose earlier in this thread to put your oar in on a “hypothetical”, ie the problem of limited war on the Korean peninsula, and such a war wouldn’t just start out of the blue. There would have to be an immediate cause as “tinder” to light up the fuel of underlying causes.
And my “hypothetical” is modeled on very real incidents, both past and current, so in this case I think you’re avoiding a fair question. You can have some fun bashing Bush over on your web site, but those who indulge in such gratuitous criticism are just begging to be placed in his shoes and asked to do a little contingency “planning” of their own.
Especially for something as real as the possibility of a future incident of North Korean local surprise attack(s) on some outpost, patrol, or aircraft, one that actually kills some Americans. There’s certainly a long enough history of this over the last 52 years.
I find it very interesting that in the last few years there hasn’t been such an incident; in fact I think there’s been nothing since the Bush administration invaded Iraq. Big Daddy KIS certainly took advantage of the Vietnam war to make such attacks, and there have been “incidents” between North Korean and ROK forces in the last 3 years.
If you (and others here) think that the US should not respond at all (in any military way) to any such future incident, then I think you should say so openly. I think the American military in and around Korea are entitled to know where they stand with the people they are defending; so I think you should tell us just exactly what level of provocation on North Korea’s part would cause you to agree that it is “time” to risk the “security” of your apartment.
If you genuinely fear for your personal security under the Bush administration then what are you still doing in Korea? And if in fact you don’t really have such fear, then your rhetoric along these lines (ah, those dangerous but unnamed “neocons”) is just posturing on your part, for which you deserve to be called.
Especially since someone like you is undoubtedly in a position to be a key influence on the ROK citizens amongst whom you live and work.
Do you really think that the “neocons” would be anxious to kill so many thousands? I also think a “measured” response would be appropriate but I suspect that you and I might disagree on what “measured” constitutes, since any US military response risks a “counter escalation” on the part of those crazy NorKs that might indeed take things up to the level of “hundreds of thousands” of deaths.
My own response to a “hypothetical” shootdown by North Korea of a US reconnaissance plane out to sea would be to mount a coordinated US air campaign to “take out” the airfield base and the MIG squadron that had conducted the shootdown. This would probably also involve the extensive striking of various North Korean air defense installations, but I would stay away from targeting anything else (especially the nuclear reactors). Also I would avoid possible nuclear weapons storage sites (unless our reconnaissance spotted some missiles being rolled out from caves and fueled up for launch…)
I have little hope that the ROK would agree to allow US bases on their soil to be used in such a campaign(much less having the ROK air force participate). So such a campaign would have to be mounted from Japan and/or US carriers and/or other US bases (ie B2’s coming all the way from CONUS).
Such a campaign would take some time to prepare, and meanwhile the prospect of it would scare the hell out of everyone in Asia and indeed around the world. And there would be enormous political pressure brought to bear against the US administration to just “let it go”, oh excuse me, I mean to “substitute” various forms of non-military “stern measures” and tough-sounding “rhetoric” instead.
And such an effort would probably succeed. And this, in turn, is why I want to bring our forces out of there — because I have no confidence that we (meaning all of us, but especially the current ROK government) are willing to “go to the wall” to protect such US forces.
Especially when the measures needed to do so mean the assumption of any measure of personal risk to those resident in the ROK — by that I mean risk “above and beyond” the vague and relatively low-level one which currently exists for you over there.
IMHO the military forces of the ROK are more than adequate to simply secure your apartment, especially if you genuinely believe that a “neocon” US administration is what is putting it at risk.
Paul H wrote:I suppose you?€™re smart not to be drawn into hypotheticals, Kushibo. I agree that?€™s the problem with them; I can pose one, you come back with another, and pretty soon we?€™re way out in left field. VW?€™s succeeding post shows how that can go.
However, you choose earlier in this thread to put your oar in on a ?€œhypothetical?€?, ie the problem of limited war on the Korean peninsula, and such a war wouldn?€™t just start out of the blue. There would have to be an immediate cause as ?€œtinder?€? to light up the fuel of underlying causes.I don’t disagree with your point here, except that I wasn’t really bringing up a hypothetical (I cited one made by Baduk on another thread, maybe on another blog). Rather, I was suggesting that these expected death tolls could get really out of hand.And my ?€œhypothetical?€? is modeled on very real incidents, both past and current, so in this case I think you?€™re avoiding a fair question.Yes, it really happened like that before, and I answered how I thought it should be dealth with.
But my bigger concern is not how the U.S. should react to a limited North Korean attack, but rather that the Bush administration might launch a major attack on the North based on highly suspect estimates of deaths on all sides (including Americans and Japanese) that they have decided is acceptable.You can have some fun bashing Bush over on your web site,Hey, I said some nice things about the guy, too. but those who indulge in such gratuitous criticism are just begging to be placed in his shoes and asked to do a little contingency ?€œplanning?€? of their own. Especially for something as real as the possibility of a future incident of North Korean local surprise attack(s) on some outpost, patrol, or aircraft, one that actually kills some Americans. There?€™s certainly a long enough history of this over the last 52 years.Paul, I did answer how I thought your hypothetical could be dealt with.If you (and others here) think that the US should not respond at all (in any military way) to any such future incident, then I think you should say so openly.I never said the U.S. should not respond at all. I did say that “there certainly is value in showing North Korea that they can?€™t get away with something like that. And if North Korea knows that this attack is a response for taking down a U.S. plane, they might react different than if they thought a full-scale attack were being launched.” I also warned that “killing 100,000 North Koreans (or 100,000 North Korean, South Korean, and American deaths combined) would be an inappropriate response” to several dozen American personnel deaths.
In hindsight, I can see why that might be somewhat vague. With too many hypotheticals, I don’t know how to answer because I don’t know the details. Maybe take out the air base or battery from which the American planes were taken out, but, yes, I think some measured and serious response would be necessary because, as I said, “there certainly is value in showing North Korea that they can?€™t get away with something like that,” and they would know that the U.S. attack is in retaliation, which means lesser likelihood of a full-scale war erupting.I think the American military in and around Korea are entitled to know where they stand with the people they are defending; so I think you should tell us just exactly what level of provocation on North Korea?€™s part would cause you to agree that it is ?€œtime?€? to risk the ?€œsecurity?€? of your apartment.The death of U.S. or ROK military or civilians (or allied Japanese) requires a measured military response. (At the same time, though, I think speculations about what hypothetically could be done but hasn’t happened may unduly affect perceptions of the “enemy” and lead to real-world, non-hypothetical problems).If you genuinely fear for your personal security under the Bush administration then what are you still doing in Korea?I don’t fear the president reacting to a North Korean military provocation if it were to happen, no more than I did under Clinton or Bush41. What I fear is that certain chickenhawks in the Bush administration may have simultaneously lowered the threshold for certain allied carnage while exaggerating the threat of the enemy.
And by the way, I will probably be leaving next year. That’s the earliest I could get out of here. And if in fact you don?€™t really have such fear, then your rhetoric along these lines (ah, those dangerous but unnamed ?€œneocons?€?) is just posturing on your part, for which you deserve to be called.Right now you are implying I’m a hypocrite based on unsubstantiated assumptions.
I really do have such a fear that Bush might decide the best thing to do is to take out the North Korean leadership, just as he thought an invasion of Iraq would be simpler and cleaner than it has turned out to be.
I came back to Korea after graduating from college, intending to stay for only one year followed by a year in Japan, but I ended up in a very interesting job so I have stayed for over ten years. In that time, I always felt assured that the deterrent of the combined strong ROK military and the strong US military provided adequate protection. I felt reasonably secure. And I felt this way up until George Bush really went ahead and invaded Iraq and then kept on and on about North Korea (I did not feel insecure about Bush even when he first mentioned the “Axis of Evil”). Right now, I’m resting a little easier, but I’ll have to see.Especially since someone like you is undoubtedly in a position to be a key influence on the ROK citizens amongst whom you live and work.I use my powers for good, not evil. When people have complained of my bias, it has been that I am too pro-Bush (I got complaints when I was first trying to objectively explain the reasons behind Bush’s “Axis of Evil” comment).Do you really think that the ?€œneocons?€? would be anxious to kill so many thousands?Anxious? Probably not (God, I hope not). Willing? Yes.
Fortunately, not all Republicans are neocons. Nor are all military people who advise the president.I also think a ?€œmeasured?€? response would be appropriate but I suspect that you and I might disagree on what ?€œmeasured?€? constitutes, since any US military response risks a ?€œcounter escalation?€? on the part of those crazy NorKs that might indeed take things up to the level of ?€œhundreds of thousands?€? of deaths.Well, at this point I have already provided what I think would be a clear answer, without having first read yours, which I can see by the first sentence below you appear to have answered.
Yes, there is a risk of escalation, but not the same kind of risk involved in pre-emptively attacking the North, which is what I was referring to in the first place, re Baduk’s suggestion. North Korea would be less fearful of a measured response being an all-out war and would be less likely (though not completely unlikely) to react in a way that would lead to massive South Korean and Japanese casualties along with their own destruction.My own response to a ?€œhypothetical?€? shootdown by North Korea of a US reconnaissance plane out to sea would be to mount a coordinated US air campaign to ?€œtake out?€? the airfield base and the MIG squadron that had conducted the shootdown. This would probably also involve the extensive striking of various North Korean air defense installations, but I would stay away from targeting anything else (especially the nuclear reactors).Well, it looks like we basically agree, your assumptions of my point-of-view notwithstanding.Also I would avoid possible nuclear weapons storage sites (unless our reconnaissance spotted some missiles being rolled out from caves and fueled up for launch?€?)Agreed.I have little hope that the ROK would agree to allow US bases on their soil to be used in such a campaign(much less having the ROK air force participate). So such a campaign would have to be mounted from Japan and/or US carriers and/or other US bases (ie B2?€™s coming all the way from CONUS).I think Japan would be just as unlikely. That’s what Guam and aircraft carriers are for.Such a campaign would take some time to prepare, and meanwhile the prospect of it would scare the hell out of everyone in Asia and indeed around the world. And there would be enormous political pressure brought to bear against the US administration to just ?€œlet it go?€?, oh excuse me, I mean to ?€œsubstitute?€? various forms of non-military ?€œstern measures?€? and tough-sounding ?€œrhetoric?€? instead.I would think/hope that we are already prepared for such things. I think doing it swiftly would be the better course. A major point in doing this is to prevent such actions in the future, show them that the deterrent is swift and clear (unless there really were a question as to whether this was deliberate or not).And such an effort would probably succeed. And this, in turn, is why I want to bring our forces out of there ?€” because I have no confidence that we (meaning all of us, but especially the current ROK government) are willing to ?€œgo to the wall?€? to protect such US forces.Well, Paul, since you are making several assumptions that don’t entirely pan out (about my own view of what to do and about how willing our Japanese allies would be to let an attack occur from their soil), I don’t reach the same conclusion. Certainly not enough to remove the one piece of the puzzle that has all but guaranteed peace in an important region that has previously been a site of major warfare.Especially when the measures needed to do so mean the assumption of any measure of personal risk to those resident in the ROK ?€” by that I mean risk ?€œabove and beyond?€? the vague and relatively low-level one which currently exists for you over there.Paul, South Korea and Japan are geographic hostages. With or without USFK presence on the ground in South Korea, they would likely be targets in a major conflict between North Korea and Washington.IMHO the military forces of the ROK are more than adequate to simply secure your apartment, especially if you genuinely believe that a ?€œneocon?€? US administration is what is putting it at risk.Since you grossly misinterpreted my willingness to have the U.S. respond with a show of force to your hypothetical, I suppose you’ll be taking back this comment.
I don’t recall specifically when I advocated the death of 100,000. It may something to do with the estimate based on “nuclear cloud” and the “dirty bomb effect” arising from the attacks on nuclear plants at Youngbyuen.
I don’t think 100,000 NK men will die if the U.S. does a surprise attack on YoungByuen facility. The realitic number may be around 10,000. A squadron of stealth bombers can drop conventional bombs on several suspected NK facilities.
Why not? KJI may just lie down and take it. Especially, if he does not have enough oil.
Kick Chinese asses and cut oil shipment to NK.