Chung Dong-young and G…

Chun suddenly played the north Korean card, telling Wickham that Pyongyang was the “hidden hand” behind the students and that the decisive moment for a north Korean attack on the south might have arrived. Wickham reported to Washington that Chun’s stress on danger from the north appeared to be a pretext for a move into the Blue House. American scrutiny of its intelligence turned up no sign of preparations for attack, and the State Department, concerned about rumors in Seoul, made a public statement to that effect. Years later, a Korean intelligence officer said he had been ordered by officals close to Chun to fabricate the supposed threat.

With respect to American expats’ Korean-language skills: I have attended language institutes here, and the student population varies depending on the type of program. In one program that I attended, young Japanese ‘language tourists’ predominated; in another, dependants of those working for various embassies or companies were the majority. However, among those who have come here for work, Americans seem to be no different than any others in terms of their efforts to learn Korean. You’ll find them studying - from friends, at institutes or universities, or at work - just as any others do (or, alteratively, you won’t find them doing it, to the same degree that others don’t). In short, I don’t see any real distinction between them and any other group in this area, so why make one? It’s not necessary to your main point.

Me too.

I suspect that Americans tend to underestimate how unpopular they have become here. Few of the US ex-pats speak Korean and hence most of them necessarily interact only with English-speaking crowd, largely the Korean graduates of the US universities or people who have been overseas for a long time. Another group are American Gyopo. Both these groups tend to be pro-American, but they are not really representative of the majority here. A lot of anti-US stereotypes and myths, some of which are true and some are false, have become commonly accepted in Korean society, especially among younger and better educated people. This perception is not going to change any time soon. The US has become - and will remain - a target of choice for all sorts of Korean demagogues, and intense Korean nationalism has found in the US another target (at earlier eras, their only pastime was Japan-bashing).

At the same time, the military and strategic significance of Korea has declined. The Cold War is over. North Korea is a threat, but a grossly overrated threat. Of course, we now have a developing imperial competition between China and US. But this clash of ambitions is very unlikely to develop into a military conflict, and if it ever does, it will not be an old style land warfare (even in the worst case scenario, I cannot imagine the US infantry divisions rolling across Manchuria to Beijing). Thus, bases in Korea, while somewhat useful to the US as a minor irritant against China, are far less important than it was during the earlier decades.

The situation is made more complicated by the fact that Korean public - unlike that of Japan - does not perceive China as a threat, and hence is not going to be too supportive of the US in case it has frictions with China. As long as the current climate continues, the Korean authorities will do everything to prevent the US from using its bases and forces in Korea against China ?�� and this means that Korea has even less value in the US global strategy. All these are products of long developments, and not a result of some ?��emotional outbursts?�? because of some incidents, as many Americans want to believe. For GIs, it?��s time to start packing, actually. And Koreans will learn a lesson or two about strategy when they see their great eastern neighbor a bit closer ?�� but I do not see why it should be an American problem.

There’s a Korean proverb that goes something like this, “when whales fight many small fish die.” Koreans liken the whales to the US and the Soviet Union, and consider themselves as the small fish. The same can be said for the many other small countries who suffered dramatic changes, some good and some bad, during the Cold War.

The School of the Americas is long gone, thankfully, but you have to put its existence into the proper historical perspective, don’t ya? It’s easy to say that America did this, or didn’t do that, and make us look bad, but when you put those things into their proper perspective they make more sense.

Hindsight is 20/20. It would be nice to have a crystal ball so that we could evaluate the consequences of our actions in advance, but unfortunately that is not the case.

And Paul, I totally agree with this statement: “When you get to the point that you are wrong no matter what you do, it?��s time to think about a radical change in the entirety of the situation.”

As far as the US’ involvement in other countries, some of you Americans are in deep denial. I am not naive or stupid enough to want the US to play global saint. The US did actively train and arm the torturers, secret police and dictators in the 3rd world during the Cold War. Today it’s doing the same in the “global struggle against extremism” (the new official title for the “war on terror”). What I would propose is that US foreign policy seek to use legal and decent means to achieve its aims, while staying out of other nations’ internal affairs in all but the most extraordinary situations. In Gwangju, some claim the US actively cooperated and approved of the massacre.

The choice for a giant such as the US is not whether it should act or not act. The US is a key player no matter what. The US should stay away from any more “Operation Phoenix” activities and torture training camps like the School of Americas. If it respects other nations, and doesn’t get involved in their internal politics, it will in turn earn their respect and lose its status as global pin-cushion.

If they say nothing it will be seen as weakness and a reason to pile on even more by other Koreans, since such anti-US rhetoric has beccome an easy way to score points in the battles of domestic ROK politics.

When you get to the point that you are wrong no matter what you do, it’s time to think about a radical change in the entirety of the situation.