I was hoping to give Unification Minister Chung Dong-young a longer reprieve, since I was truly impressed by some of his recent work handling the intra-Korean relationship, but this — THIS — needs to be noted:
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young said Tuesday the Gwangju Democratic Uprising of 1980 was thwarted by an “invisible hand.” The minister was telling an Uri Party policy committee how the destiny of the Korean Peninsula has been controlled by outside forces for the last 100 years.
“A hundred years ago, the Philippines became a U.S. colony and the Korean Peninsula a Japanese one owing to the Taft-Katsura Agreement” of 1905, Chung said. “The division of the nation and Korean War were not our will either,” nor was the failure of the Gwangju Uprising. A century later, Chung promised “a hot summer in which our fate will be decided not by North Korea, China, the United States, Japan or Russia, but by our own pride and self-determination.”
Chung later asked that the “invisible hand” be understood within the context of his statement, and that he wasn’t referring to any particular nation (see Korean-language report).
Now, I have no idea why Chung — either as unification minister or chairman of the National Security Council — would be making statements like that, but he did. And if I were the U.S. embassy right now, I’d publicly ask Chung to clarify his statement. No need to throw a hissy fit, which is what Chung would do, but no need to let a comment like that just slide, either. If he’s going to take a pot shot like that, the least the embassy can do is make him stand up and explain it.
Another thing that galls me about historiography like this is its very selective nature — the national division, Korean War and Gwangju all get blamed on “outside powers” (in the case of the division, obviously with good reason), yet South Korea’s remarkable development and its transformation into a vibrant democracy, well, those are “our” accomplishments. Or so proponents of this view seem to believe. Granted, I agree that Korea’s rise as an economic power and its democratization were primarily the result of decisions and efforts on the part of Koreans themselves — U.S. help not withstanding — but so were the Korean War and Gwangju — U.S. intervention (or, in the case of Gwangju, non-intervention) not withstanding. If you’re going to take collective credit for the good, you need to take credit for the bad as well — something that obviously applies to the United States as well. Likewise, if you’re going to make it seem like Koreans had no control over their own fate for the last 100 years of Korean history — including the post-liberation era — I don’t see how its possible to claim credit for the remarkable transformations that did take place during that period.
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What I don’t get is why he was talking about this at all. It’s hard to gather from the context, and so far, the only report on it I can find is in the Chosun Ilbo. As for the Gwangju reference, well, as Kushibo points out, he could have made the same point without mentioning it, and if you’re going to mention the “invisible hand,” you might has well point out how the same invisible hand pressured Chun Doo-hwan to call off his attack dogs in 1987 and saved Kim Dae-jung not once, but twice. History tends to be complicated that way, which is one of the reasons I found the comments so unhelpful.
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I have been so busy hating the mayor in Incheon I almost forgot about my first love here.
I loathe politicians who promote an us-versus-them mindset.
The only possible positive spin I can think of for this would be that he is trying to emphasize that, despite “outsiders” having been largely responsible for many of Korea’s biggest problems, a failure NOW would primarily be the fault of South Koreans: “our fate will be decided not by North Korea, China, the United States, Japan, or Russia, but by our own pride and self-determination.”
Still, I think he could have made the same point without the Kwangju reference. While the Taft-Katsura agreement may be a fair criticism, as the division of the peninsula may also be, it is unfair to cite those without also mentioning that the U.S. later stepped up and defended the Republic of Korea with its own blood, and has continued to do so for fifty years, which in my book outweighs the trouble it contributed to.
[Japan or Russia almost certainly have taken over Korea with or without American acquiescence in 1905; the 1905 agreement does not demonstrate American culpability for Korea's colonization as much as it does implicate America as a territory-hungry imperialist power. And in 1945, the "temporary" division was necessary to make sure Korea didn't fall under communist domination, and even if the country had been left whole, there is certainly a possibility that the former colony would have devolved into near civil war-like conditions.]
Where as the Taft-Katsura agreement was pretty lousy, anytime a politician start to invoke that ‘national pride’ thing, I get the hibby jibbies.
i.e. “Versaille Treaty was unfair! (True) For our glorious fatherland’s national glory and pride, blah blah blah”
We all know if America stuck its foot in its mouth, Korea would be asking for “clarification”. I think the US has been a punching bag too long and thus more and more people feel it is OK to throw punches as a bobbing doll that will never defend itself. China never takes crap and thus hardly anyone criticizes China. It is time the US starts to stand up for itself and stop taking irresponsible statement like the one Chung just made. Whenever a statement like this comes out, the US has to ask for clarification and even denounce the statement.
I’m just waiting for the next election (hopefully a decent and realistic agreement will be in place with the North by then) when Roh and his cronies are turfed out into the street. Clean house of these hack leftist politicians (unfortunately, the only replacement will probably be hack rightist ones).
Likewise, if you?re going to make it seem like Koreans had no control over their own fate for the last 100 years of Korean history ? including the post-liberation era ? I don?t see how its possible to claim credit for the remarkable transformations that did take place during that period.
This is what I’ve always wondered as well. If bad things happen to Koreans it’s the fault of other people, while if good things happen it’s due to the Koreans’ own effort. Hey, it seems to work.
Marmot and Dogbert, two points. First, even in the West there is plenty of precedent for giving a lot of credit to someone who took a bad situation and worked hard to make good.
But more important to this situation is the fact that many Koreans, especially on the left, do in fact blame plenty of Koreans for the sorry state the country often found itself in. Self-serving yangban, pro-Japanese collaborators, corrupt business elite, and human rights-violating administrators and military brass.
Maybe by “invisible hand” he was referring to Adam Smith
Actually, I hope Chung keeps blabbing away with his “old people can stay home and not vote” comments so people see his true colors.
The Taft-Katsura “agreement” isn’t as clear cut as most like to believe. It certainly wasn’t a treaty staging Japan had rights to colonize Korea while the US was given the right to take the Philippines.
Did Japan own the Philippines? Did the US own Korea? And they just swapped?
Was it a formal treaty? Was it a formal international agreement?
The biggest flaw in the common wisdom of the Taft agreement is that the US had no obligation to defend Korea from Japanese aggression. People talk about this “agreement” as if it was up to the United States to determine Korea’s future — as if we were - say - cuttig a deal on something like the Territory of Alaska - which was like a US state, and we were giving it to Japan in exchange for something that didn’t belong to Japan at the time either — the Philippines.
The US was not in a position to go to war with Japan over Korea or other Japanese expansion in Asia. Nor did we own Korea and could trade it as we wished.
If we want to attack Roosevelt’s disdain for Korea as a weak nation, America’s desire to have colonies like the European powers, or Roosevelt’s somewhat cautious evaluation of Japan as a modernizing force in Asia
Well, with the recent morph of Nosamo into a taciturn, maybe Chung decided that it was his turn to carry the “open mouth - insert foot” torch.
The Adam Smith “invisible hand” comment was great by the way.
Thanks Rob–Chung’s a commie
so that just came to mind, not that he is capable of such an allusion….
Also, on the subject of “selective historiography”:
“Foreign economic assistance was essential to the country’s recovery from the Korean War in the 1950s and to economic growth in the 1960s because it saved Seoul from having to devote scarce foreign exchange to the import of food and other necessary goods, such as cement. It also freed South Korea from the burden of heavy international debts during the initial phase of growth and enabled the government to allocate credit in accordance with planning goals. From 1953 to 1974, when grant assistance dwindled to a negligible amount, the nation received some US$4 billion of grant aid. About US$3 billion was received before 1968, forming an average of 60 percent of all investment in South Korea. As Park’s policies took effect, however, the dependence on foreign grant assistance lessened. During the 1966-74 period, foreign assistance constituted about 4.5 percent of GNP and less than 20 percent of all investment. Before 1965 the United States was the largest single aid contributor, but thereafter Japan and other international sponsors played an increasingly important role.”
http://www.country-studies.com.....tions.html
The hand that Chung and his cronies pretend not to see is the helping hand the U.S. has extended to Korea for 60 years now.
Also from the Chosun: “A high-ranking South Korean official said there were ?differences between the solutions conceived by South Korea and the United States… During this round of talks, we will give up on seeking a joint offer between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan and propose an independent solution of our own.”
This may have been what Commie Chung meant when he said, ?a hot summer in which our fate will be decided not by North Korea, China, the United States, Japan or Russia, but by our own pride and self-determination.??
Another thing that galls me about historiography like this is its very selective nature ? the national division, Korean War and Gwangju all get blamed on ?outside powers?? (in the case of the division, obviously with good reason), yet South Korea?s remarkable development and its transformation into a vibrant democracy, well, those are ?our?? accomplishments.
Marmot, great remark! Ande very correct. How many young Koreans know that in per capita real dollars the US spent on Korea more than on nearly alll other countries, except Israel? Generally, the difference between a real historian and a propaganda monger pretending to be a historian? Real historian sees full picture, including those parts which s/he is not happy about and which do not fit well into his/her personal world view. A pseudo-historian, normally politically motivated, sees only the things which serve his/her agenda. Re Chung… well, I’d better be silent…
“…to claim credit for the remarkable transformations that did take place during that period.”
When did Chung do that? And if he did, would the “invisible hand” statement be okay and properly balanced?
Let Chung tonguewag on, if it helps speed his transition to political has-been status.
Well… it’s true, we all tend to lump people together in groups…
Damn! usinkorea and foreigner snatched away my chance to appear erudite today. (Remove hat, deep bow!) Peter Duus’s history (The Abacus and the Sword) also mentions an earlier similar agreement between Russia and Japan, and quotes Japanese statesmen referring to Japan and Korea as close as “teeth and lips”. I came to Korea after a 30 year career in Latin America, where the intellectual climate, often referred to as “third-worldism” has best been summarized by three Latin authors in their seminal “Manual of the Perfect Latin-American Idiot” (Vargas Llosa, Montaner, and Arguello?). I found the parallels in thought between the Korean left and their Latin counterparts to be instructive, and in some ways disappointing, as I had expected more balanced and enlightened views. But then, what I see on both the American left and their far right likewise discourages.
Paul H., just an aside, in the archives of the 1st Cavalry Division we had a photo of a Japanese Army liaison officer (then termed an “observer”) taken at Fort Bliss, Texas, in the mid-20s. Although we were already war-gaming a Pacific War in the Naval War College, our approach to the Japanese was even-handed. I’m not sure the U.S. Navy could have taken the Japanese fleet on in 1905.
????????ด ?????? ????ด?ณ? ????????ด ?กฐ??? (????? ??จ)??? ????ด??ค is the Korean expression that comes to mind. As the marmot and others have pointed out, Chung is too willing to show how much of an idiot he is by trying to claim that all good that has happened to Korea has been by virtue of the hard work and diligence of the Korean people and the root cause of all bad that happens to Koreans is the actions of non-Koreans working to repress that innocent, clean and hard working Korean people (this is starting to sound like something that we might hear come out of the North??). The thing that is so maddening about it is that the Korean people seem willing enough to accept comments like this at face value with out questioning who made them, why they would have made such a statement, where they got their information, is it credible, could they have any ulterior motives for making such a statement and what are the ramifications just for starters.
Lirelou:
I hope that my sarcasm wasn’t too subtle for you, and that you are being equally subtle “right back at me”.
I’m inclined to agree with you — I don’t think we would have wanted our US Pacific fleet to take on Admiral Togo, not even just after Togo’s ships’ ammo was depleted, immediately following his sinking of the Russian Baltic fleet.
If Togo’s ships had had ammo left at the end of the battle(?), his sailors would have been very confident in the immediate flush of victory; “in the zone” and “on target”.
Given the results of the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942, the 1905 Japanese fleet would certainly have proved a formidable adversary, especially operating so close to their home waters (while the US fleet would have been hundreds of miles from its nearest base).
I think that coaling stations had to be fairly close by, for the ships of that era. For a hypothetical US fleet, operating against both Japanese and Russian interests in 1905 in Korean waters, I’m not sure where we would have gotten the coal (European Power ports in North China? Maybe not, not even from the Brits; they had a formal treaty of alliance with Japan at the time (1901 through 1921)).
A coaling station for the US Navy was the original purpose of Guantanamo, by the way; acquired by perpetual lease from Cuba right around this particular time period (1905 or 06).
I don’t have an exact comparison of 1905 US and Japanese navy ship strengths in my “brain housing group”, nor do I know offhand where where I can find one. I suspect the advent in 1906 of the Dreadnought class meant that very soon thereafter, all of the world’s pre-1906 designs went to the scrap yard, and thus became a subject for only the most obscure of abstruse historical interests.
(The only thing you ever hear about the US “Great White Fleet” of this era (the US Atlantic fleet, much of which was new construction?) is that TR sent it on the famous 8-month world tour in 1908).
US Arizona class was 1914-era construction if I remember correctly. I imagine the US Congress in 1910-15 was plenty steamed about having spent all that money on new battleships in the “00’s”, and then having to do it all again just a few years later. But then again maybe not; new construction did mean jobs for constituents (unlike US Army appropriations of the era).
I think offhand that the battle of Tsushima was the only major world battle between these “first generation” all-ironclad battleships (post-sail but pre-Dreadnought). Unless you count the pretty one-sided encounters between the US Atlantic and Pacific fleets, and their Spanish counterparts, in 1898.
(Interestingly, here’s a link to another fellow, one who makes a speculative comment on this subject (ie the US fleet possibly going to the rescure of Korea in the 00’s). See his final paragraph at his link http://www.geocities.com/Athen.....korea.html.
I would have laughed and called his interest in this subject “eccentric”, yet of course here I am looking into the subject with equal interest.
I found it earlier today, while doing some web research on Taft-Katsura, Russo-Japanese war, and the 1882 “Chemulpo” treaty between US and Korea.
“The Chemulpo treaty…From April to May 1882 Korea and the United States negotiated and approved the 14 article treaty, which established ‘mutual friendship and defense in case of attack’ etc … [!]
(link at http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiShinmiyangyo, scroll down).
Exclamation point, because evidently this “mutual defense” interpretation of one of the treaty’s proviso comes from a Korean Ph.D. (http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/1462.html)
I find the idea that the US would enter into a “mutual defense pact” with any foreign country at this point in its history (19th century) an incredible assertion, given the normal US attitude toward “entangling alliances” in that era.
But, it’s another interesting topic for more research; for that matter, maybe the Marmot has commented on the Chemulpo Treaty somewhere in his previous postings.
I’m reading Roosevelt and the Russo-Japan War which was written in 1925.
The idea that the treaty with the US was a military alliance comes from, it seems to me, two primary sources — the Korean government at the time and American missionaries who were a main element of US involvment in Korea at the time.
The Korean king showed often enough he thought the term “good offices” in the treaty which the US extended to Korea if faced with an outside threat meant the US would fight a war for Korea. And I’ve heard Korean scholars say the same thing today, and it even infects some in the US, but it is a pathetically weak argument.
Good offices was, as far as I’ve been able to tell, a willingness to play the middle man for Korea when facing a problem with a third nation, but it was not meant to make Korea an allied nation (mutal defence treaty) or a protectorate.
Hanging guilt on the US for the colonization of Korea based on the “good offices” clause makes no sense.
On the coal ports issue, a guy from West Point I knew told me in detail about this item some years ago. I forget the details for the most part. The jist was that the US did not have the infastructure to fight Japan in this time period even if had wanted to.
Which it didn’t. Roosevelt didn’t like Korea. And he thought Japan’s taking it over was better (than Russia getting it).
But not shedding a tear for the colonization of Korea is a far cry from being a primary cause for it…
Hmmm, it may not have been a “mutual defence pact”, but it was a treaty of freindship. Strange idea of friendship, to secretly ignore that treaty and sign another with the Japanese. Then there’s the American “turncoats” who supposedly started assisting the Japanese.
On the Gwangju issue. At best, the US stood by and did nothing while a pro democracy uprising was brutally crushed. Bit hypocritical for a nation that’s always trumpeting “spreading freedom and democrecy” to justify their actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There’s a common saying in the diplomatic world that “countries don’t have friends, they have interests.” It is the same with all countries.
And again, the question of what the US should have done is left out…
And selective understanding of the historical reality…
The Taft memorandum was not a treaty or not even an agreement. Japan was established in Korea thanks to two wars it fought. The US was not obligated by friendship or treaty to go to war for Korea. The Taft coversation did not open the door into Korea by Japan. They were already inside. It did not give permission for Japan to take Korea. They had already taken it. The US was not in a position either to keep Japan out in 1905, because Japan was already in, or to force Japan out with anything short of war and even war would have been an uphill struggle with no clear reason to believe the US would have won and saved Korea in the end.
But, some people will continue to use the Taft conversation to blame the US for the colonization.
And now to Kwangju. The pro-democracy uprising was crushed in a matter of days. What lightening moves should the US Embassy and military have taken to stop it?
But, let’s forget how quickly the events unfolded.
If the US had the time, what should it have done?
Send US troops to fight the South Korean troops heading for Kwangju?
After the fact, should the US have pulled troops out in protest over Kwangju? Imposed economic sanctions? Supported a counter-coup?
On that last note, one was offered to US authorities by some in the Korean military who wanted to overthrow the newly risen Chun regime. Should the US have given political and/or military support to such a counter-coup?
As for Iraq and Afghanistan. That’s actually pretty interesting.
US intentions and behavior in 1980 Kwangju is illuminated by contempoary action in Iraq and Afghanistan. You could have picked South and Central America from 1950 to 1990 to fit your point without making so obvious all that matters is a shallow blame game.
But, you don’t consider that Afghanistan and Iraq have a much better chance at having democracy spread there now that the US fought a war in country?
Isn’t a “the ends do not justify the means” argument a better choice here?
Because regardless of what you might think of the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is absolutely clear they actually have a chance to see democracy thanks to that invasion than they ever would have the US had not gone to war with them.
usinkorea makes a good point, especially about the time aspect of Kwangju. During the Kwangju incident, what could the US do in such a time period? Is there anything that Koreans would have supported? Would they want a foreign power to interfere with Korean destiny? The examples of US possible intervention would not play out well and Koreans would probably be even more pissed that the US intervened in Korea. Chung argues Kwangju was thwarted by the invisible hand (America). How? The US did nothing. But then he argues the exact opposite that outside powers should let Korea decide its fate which is exactly what happened with the Kwangju incident. The US stood by letting Koreans decide their own fate. Talk about damned if you do and damned if you don’t. Excuse me Chung, Kwangju was thwarted by Koreans and its destiny was set by itself just the way you say you want things to be.
Anyone know if the US has responded to these statements yet?
I’m sure they would say, “Why respond? This is routine…”
If the US ambassador or the Far East section of the State Dept responds, they will be seen by many Koreans as overbearing and interfering with domestic Korean affairs.
If they say nothing it will be seen as weakness and a reason to pile on even more by other Koreans, since such anti-US rhetoric has beccome an easy way to score points in the battles of domestic ROK politics.
When you get to the point that you are wrong no matter what you do, it’s time to think about a radical change in the entirety of the situation.
It’s interesting to see how defensive so many Americans are about “the invisible hand” comments. It seems obvious that Korea, like many other small nations (Poland and Vietnam come to mind) become a battleground for global conflict in the 20th century. First colonialism and then the Cold War became the dominant factors in shaping nations’ destinies. That, as far as I see it, is the “invisible hand”. People were confronted with new, unstoppable forces from distant lands. The arrival of the “modern age” in Asia was as shocking and devastating as a sudden ice age.
As far as the US’ involvement in other countries, some of you Americans are in deep denial. I am not naive or stupid enough to want the US to play global saint. The US did actively train and arm the torturers, secret police and dictators in the 3rd world during the Cold War. Today it’s doing the same in the “global struggle against extremism” (the new official title for the “war on terror”). What I would propose is that US foreign policy seek to use legal and decent means to achieve its aims, while staying out of other nations’ internal affairs in all but the most extraordinary situations. In Gwangju, some claim the US actively cooperated and approved of the massacre.
The choice for a giant such as the US is not whether it should act or not act. The US is a key player no matter what. The US should stay away from any more “Operation Phoenix” activities and torture training camps like the School of Americas. If it respects other nations, and doesn’t get involved in their internal politics, it will in turn earn their respect and lose its status as global pin-cushion.
g_travan, true, the “invisible hand” that shaped many nation’s destinies in the 20th century was Colonialism and the Cold War, but the “invisible hand” that Mr. Chung was referring to was direct American involvement in the Gwangju uprising, which is nothing more than myth but believed to be true by the majority of Koreans. It has been the source of many problems and great strain in our bilateral relationship, which is why we get defensive about it.
There’s a Korean proverb that goes something like this, “when whales fight many small fish die.” Koreans liken the whales to the US and the Soviet Union, and consider themselves as the small fish. The same can be said for the many other small countries who suffered dramatic changes, some good and some bad, during the Cold War.
The School of the Americas is long gone, thankfully, but you have to put its existence into the proper historical perspective, don’t ya? It’s easy to say that America did this, or didn’t do that, and make us look bad, but when you put those things into their proper perspective they make more sense.
Hindsight is 20/20. It would be nice to have a crystal ball so that we could evaluate the consequences of our actions in advance, but unfortunately that is not the case.
And Paul, I totally agree with this statement: “When you get to the point that you are wrong no matter what you do, it?s time to think about a radical change in the entirety of the situation.”
Mr g_travan. As a tactical instructor in the School of the Americas in the 1970s (Patrolling, Commando operations, and general infantry subjects), I can assure you that we did not run any “torture training camps”. Second, if you really want to know what the Phoenix program was about, read Stuart Herrington’s “Silence was a weapon”. But why read anything that would destroy such carefully nurtured paradigms? No one in the Bush administration obviously has. Herrington describes his efforts to get the ARVN to stop mistreating prisoners at their interrogation centers, because it was simply counter-productive.
And Paul, I totally agree with this statement: ?When you get to the point that you are wrong no matter what you do, it?s time to think about a radical change in the entirety of the situation.??
Me too.
I suspect that Americans tend to underestimate how unpopular they have become here. Few of the US ex-pats speak Korean and hence most of them necessarily interact only with English-speaking crowd, largely the Korean graduates of the US universities or people who have been overseas for a long time. Another group are American Gyopo. Both these groups tend to be pro-American, but they are not really representative of the majority here. A lot of anti-US stereotypes and myths, some of which are true and some are false, have become commonly accepted in Korean society, especially among younger and better educated people. This perception is not going to change any time soon. The US has become - and will remain - a target of choice for all sorts of Korean demagogues, and intense Korean nationalism has found in the US another target (at earlier eras, their only pastime was Japan-bashing).
At the same time, the military and strategic significance of Korea has declined. The Cold War is over. North Korea is a threat, but a grossly overrated threat. Of course, we now have a developing imperial competition between China and US. But this clash of ambitions is very unlikely to develop into a military conflict, and if it ever does, it will not be an old style land warfare (even in the worst case scenario, I cannot imagine the US infantry divisions rolling across Manchuria to Beijing). Thus, bases in Korea, while somewhat useful to the US as a minor irritant against China, are far less important than it was during the earlier decades.
The situation is made more complicated by the fact that Korean public - unlike that of Japan - does not perceive China as a threat, and hence is not going to be too supportive of the US in case it has frictions with China. As long as the current climate continues, the Korean authorities will do everything to prevent the US from using its bases and forces in Korea against China ? and this means that Korea has even less value in the US global strategy. All these are products of long developments, and not a result of some ?emotional outbursts?? because of some incidents, as many Americans want to believe. For GIs, it?s time to start packing, actually. And Koreans will learn a lesson or two about strategy when they see their great eastern neighbor a bit closer ? but I do not see why it should be an American problem.
lankov, I’d say that your suspicions may be wrong. I cannot recall any great number of conversations with Americans in Korea in which they have voiced expressions of ease, relaxation and/or comfort with respect to Korean views of the US. I do not hear Americans in general expressing the view that they are ‘popular’ here; indeed, even in this blog, you’ll find few who espouse that view. Typically, Americans seem to take the view that they have provided great assistance to South Koreans, and so therefore that they should be more welcomed than they are. Perhaps, were you instead speaking of the views of Americans residing in the US? Regarding that, I couldn’t comment.
With respect to American expats’ Korean-language skills: I have attended language institutes here, and the student population varies depending on the type of program. In one program that I attended, young Japanese ‘language tourists’ predominated; in another, dependants of those working for various embassies or companies were the majority. However, among those who have come here for work, Americans seem to be no different than any others in terms of their efforts to learn Korean. You’ll find them studying - from friends, at institutes or universities, or at work - just as any others do (or, alteratively, you won’t find them doing it, to the same degree that others don’t). In short, I don’t see any real distinction between them and any other group in this area, so why make one? It’s not necessary to your main point.
Dr. Lankov. In regards to #33, Amen! The situation in regards to the U.S. presence here reminds me in some ways of Panama prior to our withdrawal. All of our local friends were telling us that the government was only pandering to the masses, but that in the final crunch they would want us to stay, if only for the economic value of our presence. Needless to say, we kept our base construction efforts going right up to the last minute, and then felt our pride injured when they did not even allow us to retain a small counter-narcotics operating base. But, gbnhj does bring up a good point in that a great many Americans here take a jaundiced view of how Koreans view the U.S. Sometimes, perhaps unfairly so.
It’s quite ironic that Chung invokes the “invisible hand” remark about the Kwangju reference. According to Oberdorfer’s “The Two Koreas,” that’s almost the same statement used as a pretext for student and dissident arrests by Chun on May 13th 1980:
Chun suddenly played the north Korean card, telling Wickham that Pyongyang was the “hidden hand” behind the students and that the decisive moment for a north Korean attack on the south might have arrived. Wickham reported to Washington that Chun’s stress on danger from the north appeared to be a pretext for a move into the Blue House. American scrutiny of its intelligence turned up no sign of preparations for attack, and the State Department, concerned about rumors in Seoul, made a public statement to that effect. Years later, a Korean intelligence officer said he had been ordered by officals close to Chun to fabricate the supposed threat.
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