The NYT gives us the low-down on the debate within the intelligence community over May’s “North Korean nuke test rumors.” It’s a fascinating look at the difficulties faced by analysts and policy makers in interpreting intelligence on North Korea:
North Korea’s true intentions on testing - whether the activity in the mountainous Kilju region was genuine or an attempt to deceive the world - may never be known. But a review of this spring’s divergent assessments, based on interviews with officials from Congress, the administration, American intelligence agencies and foreign governments, reveals how the process of assessing North Korea’s weapons is vulnerable to politics and to the imprecision of intelligence. Most of the officials and analysts spoke on the condition of anonymity because the subject concerned classified information and issues of political sensitivity.
The limitations of intelligence-gathering are particularly acute with North Korea, which one former senior State Department official described as the blackest of black holes. The West has few, if any, spies there and the North Koreans are famous for their strategy of deception. Most of the intelligence driving the two assessments was obtained by satellite, leaving it open to conflicting interpretations, or agendas.
Be sure to read the rest on your own.
