I also don’t buy the argument that the USFK presence strait-jackets US action. If there were no US troops on the peninsula, the North Koreans would simply point more of there retaliatory weapons in the direction of Okinawa and the Japanese home islands (if not Guam, the Northern Marianas, Hawaii, and Alaska). I believe that the US presence on the ground is utter assurance to the North Koreans that an attack on South Korea WILL lead to their destruction by an absolutely superior force. There is no way that South Korea could ever reach that level of capability. A pull-out (even with the Defense Treaty intact) would embolden North Korea to do things it now can only dream of, much as China would be emboldened by even a mere discussion of scrapping or altering the Taiwan defense act.

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The array of relationships with Korea, Japan, and Taiwan is not broken. There are dents and scratches, but it ain’t broke. A paint job is in order sometimes.I totally agree with your a, b, and c above.It needs to be on the table that this kind of thinking is the most realistic (and, happily, probably the least death-inducing) way to look at it.And I could even agree with your last paragraph even as long as US troops are ?€œout from under?€?. Events in London today (7 July) are a reminder of why we need to consolidate our own resources, and stop subsidizing the ground defense of allies who are perfectly capable of the ground defense of their own countries.I don’t agree that South Korea is perfectly capable of the kind of ground defense a joint US-ROK organization can provide. Neither, is Taiwan. These powerful joint forces deter aggression. That is a major part of their value.I think it?€™s only a matter of time before our own rails and subways (here in US) are attacked in a similar manner. I waited all morning to see if these London attacks were ?€œdirty?€? (radiological) bombs; I?€™m surprised they weren?€™t, but I think it?€™s only a matter of time before such ?€œdirty?€? attacks occur.

What do you think would have been the political and military ramifications if the London attacks had been ?€œdirty?€?, and we eventually found out that NorK had supplied the radioactive material?

(Assume uneqivocal proof of this for argument?€™s sake; I grant you that such proof would be unlikely, as the North would use plenty of cut-outs to screen the audit trail).I think the reaction would be much like with Afghanistan: we would invade and we would eliminate the regime that caused this or allowed this to happen.

Would the world support the US? I don’t know. It would depend on the credibility of the information. The world was mostly supportive or at least acquiescent to US actions in Afghanistan. Not so with Iraq. I do think that the lack of WMD in Iraq has seriously hurt US credibility around the world, even now when the US claims North Korea may export nukes or whatever. That is one of the unspoken costs of our adventurism there (incidentally, I sincerely hope democracy eventually succeeds there and I don’t think troops should be removed anytime soon). Just look at the difference in world reaction to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq.

A major component of anti-Bush sentiment (which is a different animal from lingering anti-American sentiemnt around the world, which is largely jealousy of the richest and most powerful) is that most people around the world don’t believe the reasons to invade Iraq were legitimate or sound. (By the way, the fact that even someone like Roh who thinks this way would send troops is a testament to his own thinking that the US-ROK alliance is a valuable thing).

Now having said all that, I think it’s important to point out that I don’t think North Korea would do something like that. Yes, they need hard currency, but they are finding other ways to do that (including selling drugs). Simply put, North Korea probably is aware that if Americans on American soil (or, probably, American allies on their own soil) were to be killed by North Korean nukes or radioactive material, it would mean the end of them. This is M.A.D. as it applies to the inchoate nuclear situation here. Making that clear to them (and any others who might possess such weapons and sell them) is an extremely important aspect of deterrence.

Anyway, while I think it’s important to prepare for that possibility to do what is possible to prevent it, I don’t think we should assume this is the most likely scenario. I am more worried about our “allies,” such as Pakistan or Israel, selling weaponry that will eventually end up in enemy hands. Even our good friend and economic partner China, which I have serious reservations about because of their willing and necessary culpability in keeping the murderous Pyongyang regime alive, is probably less likely than Pakistan, Israel, or even France to sell things that will eventually hurt us.Do you think ROK (and Japanese) publics would change their attitudes in that event, when it comes to a possible military retaliation by the US against the North (for a terrorist attack elsewhere in the world)?They would be scared out of their minds of what would happen if the US (or the US and ROK together) attacked North Korea, but if they were convinced that the evidence was real and that North Korea was really a new kind of threat, they would think it best to take them out now.

A lot of the convincing, though, would be harder to do since much of the world thinks the Bush administration has a faulty “sixth sense” about who is causing a WMD threat, thanks to the situation with Iraq.I don?€™t think they would; I agree both publics would be incredibly fearful and diametrically opposed to any military retaliation (can?€™t say I would blame them either). So the question is, would the US listen to their concerns and refrain from any strong action (remember, DPRK constantly emphasizes that a blockade would be seen as an act of war).If the US really believed it, I think they would go ahead. I think they would try hard to convince both South Korea and Japan, but even if they couldn’t, they would probably go ahead.I think the withdrawal of US troops from ROK would help to prevent DPRK from possibly supplying such material, as the DPRK would be even more fearful then of a possible US retaliation (from offshore, not from the soil of ROK or Japan) in the event of their supplying nuclear materials to terrorist groups.I disagree. Even without the US forces in Korea as a “target,” there are still US forces nearby in Japan. Iraq bombed Israel during the Gulf War, and North Korea would attack Japan, even if the US-ROK alliance were toast. Pulling forces out of Korea does not send a signal to North Korea that the US would be more willing to retaliante against North Korea because USFJ would still be vulnerable, as would the allied populations of Japan and South Korea.If the US forces are gone from ROK, I would have no problem in supporting whatever ?€œappeasement?€? (carrots) the ROK wants to continue supplying to the North. What “appeasement” the ROK (the ROK government) supplies will change with the next administration in a couple years, probably to include more sticks if a right-wing regime or a less ideological and more pragmatic regime is elected and replaces the unpopular and incompetent-perceived Roh administration. Their engagement shouldn’t be considered all that different from Taiwan’s engagement with mainland China; it is certainly not a reason to drastically alter the alliance. And the ?€œstick?€? of military retaliation would still remain as a tool just as effectively, indeed even more so.

Currently the remaing US troops are as much ?€œhostages?€? for ?€œgood behavior?€? to the South as they are to the North. And I?€™ve got a big problem with our troops remaining as ?€œtrip-wire?€? hostages, especially now that we have withdrawn most of the infantry for needed duties elsewhere.With the move south of the Han, the “tripwire” idea is far less the case. Their powerful and certain retaliation is a powerful deterrent that has kept an often irrational North at bay (not to mention China). The basic formula as it stands now works and has probably saved many, many lives.

Paul, don’t kid yourself, there are other “hostages” besides the USFK, including the USFJ and the Japanese and Korean populations. Plus the hundreds of thousands of Americans who live in the area.

And when you get people thinking the unthinkable, the threshold for action might end up getting lowered. We have people talking about “acceptable casualties” even though we’re talking about millions of South Koreans and Japanese who could get killed by the right kind of North Korean attack with the weapons they have now. Especially if they have already convinced themselves that North Korea is going to export a nuke that will get detonated in NYC. Baduk has already stated it’s better to incur 100,000 deaths now and prevent millions of dying in a nuclear attack he is certain is going to come.

Another thing that worries me about Bush is that he seems to like doing the bold thing that others are not willing to try, simply because it is the bold thing. He doesn’t always seem to recognize that there are real negatives involved that others before him weighed and found to be too serious a sacrifice; they are gutless and he is a true visionary for trying the bold thing. Bush41 and Clinton didn’t have the guts to take Saddam out, but he did, the consequences be damned!

Anyway, that’s why this “hypothetical” talk about attacks makes me very, very, very nervous. I have misjudged Bush before: I did NOT think he would ultimately invade Iraq, but he did.What I didnt make clear in my complaints about those who have been criticizing the US for supposedly not doing anything (I?€™m not saying that you two said this) was that I?€™m very sceptical as to what gains the US would ever see from strongly engaging the Norks. I?€™m not dead set against it, but I wouldn?€™t expect to gain much. I?€™m with Paul H. on the removal of troops from the South and let SK and China deal with the propping up of the North on their own.Leftist protestors notwithstanding, South Koreans in general do not want USFK gone. Japan ultimately does not want them gone from here. Having them gone would embolden North Korea to do a lot of things it now can’t. It would also lead to a series of actions by China, Japan, Russia, and possibly Taiwan that would make Northeast Asia a very, very heavily armed and very, very tense place. The Pax Americana, with the US playing the role of certain and capable defender of South Korea and Taiwan, and holder-in-place of Japan, has been what has kept the region war-free for a very, very, very long time. It is an equation that works, and messing with it will likely have severe consequences.The US could sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War and then ?€?oversee?€™ the situation from bases in Okinawa and Guam while SK pays the bills for NK.If USFK leaves Korea, it will embolden the groups that want to see USFJ vacate Okinawa. A very bad move.

And South Korea is not interested in propping up North Korea but in infusing it with enough doses of enterprise that it becomes addicted. Don’t believe the hype. Besides, you are talking about something that most South Koreans do not want and would be a politically inviable political proposition for the current ruling party.The US could even make some forays in terms of business or diplomacy with the Norks, if positive steps are seen.They should be offering that as a carrot now, after verifiable measures are taken by Pyongyang. Diplomatic recognition by Tokyo and Washington as an incentive for certain verifiable concessions by the North (South Korea can’t diplomatically recognize the North, so it does not have this as an option).The problem with the US suddenly turning around and going for all-out engagement is that it would signal to KJI that his blustering tactics and threats had worked in saving his hide. I see no reason why he wouldnt soon use those same tactics at every opportunity in the future, even while the US and others were helping out with generous aid packages.I don’t think the US should do a 180 and start engaging. If anything, I think the Roh government should be a bit more selective about its engagement. Right now the US is in a position to play good cop-bad cop with South Korea, so it needs to be selective about what engagement it does. Hold diplomatic recognition as a carrot only if North Korea gets to the $64,000 question on the pyramid.I just can?€™t see what?€™s in it for the US to engage and hand over lots of cash. Let SK and China do that for all the good it might do.The US should not blindly engage. It needs to provide clearly defined carrots and sticks. And without the gratuitous insults (what is there to be gained by calling Kim Jong-il names? Or, for that matter, taunting terrorists to “bring it on”?).

Anyway, I really take exception to lumping China and South Korea together. Not just as appeasers but pretty much anything else. Beijing’s and Seoul’s goals vis-??-vis Pyongyang are very different. As I have mentioned, their goals are very, very different. Seoul is taking a soft-line approach of engagement to end the Pyongyang regime sooner rather than later in order to soften the inevitably painful experience of reunification. Beijing, on the other hand, does not want Seoul and Pyongyang to reunify at all, except as a full ideological ally of Beijing. South Korean voters will not allow that to happen.

Seoul is trying to make things like Kaes??ng work, while China arrested the would-be governor of Pyongyang’s similar project at Shin?­iju. South Korea wants to build up North Korea’s economic infrastructure now so that it won’t have as much to do later, while China just wants to throw money at the regime to make it survive for the sake of having it survive. Japan, too, if the kidnapee issue gets satisfactorily resolved, will follow Seoul’s behavior much more closely than it does Washington’s behavior.Technically, engaging and handing over lots of cash don?€™t necessarily have to go together, but I think that if they did engage, the end result would be lots of free goodies for the Norks with little in return.I don’t think so. Diplomatic relations are not a free goodie. The face-saving toning-down of rhetoric is not a free goodie. Convincing Pyongyang that it will not be arbitrarily invaded is not a free goodie.

What I didnt make clear in my complaints about those who have been criticizing the US for supposedly not doing anything (I’m not saying that you two said this) was that I’m very sceptical as to what gains the US would ever see from strongly engaging the Norks. I’m not dead set against it, but I wouldn’t expect to gain much. I’m with Paul H. on the removal of troops from the South and let SK and China deal with the propping up of the North on their own.

The US could sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War and then ‘oversee’ the situation from bases in Okinawa and Guam while SK pays the bills for NK. The US could even make some forays in terms of business or diplomacy with the Norks, if positive steps are seen.

The problem with the US suddenly turning around and going for all-out engagement is that it would signal to KJI that his blustering tactics and threats had worked in saving his hide. I see no reason why he wouldnt soon use those same tactics at every opportunity in the future, even while the US and others were helping out with generous aid packages. I just can’t see what’s in it for the US to engage and hand over lots of cash. Let SK and China do that for all the good it might do.

Technically, engaging and handing over lots of cash don’t necessarily have to go together, but I think that if they did engage, the end result would be lots of free goodies for the Norks with little in return.

Assuming the London bombings were ?€?dirty?€™ and it were proven beyond reasonable doubt that the radioactive material came from NK I do not think that would be enough of a push for either SK or Japan to accept any sort of military option, it is not close enough to home. Looking at things from the terrorist side of things though, it would be strategically brilliant if they could pull off an attack like that in the US. The US forces are spread thin and soldiers are having to serve two and maybe three tours in Iraq or Afghanistan. The sheer manpower that it would take for the US to effectively police its self internally and guard against another of these attacks would be staggering but the manpower demands of retaliating against NK (again, assuming it was proven they were the suppliers of the radioactive material) with the goal of regime change would be very difficult to swing I suspect under current circumstances.

I wish I had links to hand, I’ll have to look when I have more time, maybe some of you can provide them more readily.

But if I’m right, this also means that any use of lethal chemical agents by the North means that the US can no longer retaliate “in kind”. I have no idea what the ROK has in terms of any offensive chemical warfare capability, but I would guess “not much” if any.

So if the feared NorK massive artillery barrage takes place and they use chemicals, the possible US responses will be limited to conventional — or nuclear. I’m not sure a conventional response would be seen by the US as adequate; to me this implies one more good reason for the US to leave.

Kushibo, I always enjoy your well-written postings. I can’t find anything to disagree with in so much of what you write, but somehow we sure come to different conclusions.

I totally agree with your a, b, and c above.

And I could even agree with your last paragraph even as long as US troops are “out from under”. Events in London today (7 July) are a reminder of why we need to consolidate our own resources, and stop subsidizing the ground defense of allies who are perfectly capable of the ground defense of their own countries.

I think it’s only a matter of time before our own rails and subways (here in US) are attacked in a similar manner. I waited all morning to see if these London attacks were “dirty” (radiological) bombs; I’m surprised they weren’t, but I think it’s only a matter of time before such “dirty” attacks occur.

What do you think would have been the political and military ramifications if the London attacks had been “dirty”, and we eventually found out that NorK had supplied the radioactive material?

(Assume uneqivocal proof of this for argument’s sake; I grant you that such proof would be unlikely, as the North would use plenty of cut-outs to screen the audit trail).

Do you think ROK (and Japanese) publics would change their attitudes in that event, when it comes to a possible military retaliation by the US against the North (for a terrorist attack elsewhere in the world)?

I don’t think they would; I agree both publics would be incredibly fearful and diametrically opposed to any military retaliation (can’t say I would blame them either). So the question is, would the US listen to their concerns and refrain from any strong action (remember, DPRK constantly emphasizes that a blockade would be seen as an act of war).

I think the withdrawal of US troops from ROK would help to prevent DPRK from possibly supplying such material, as the DPRK would be even more fearful then of a possible US retaliation (from offshore, not from the soil of ROK or Japan) in the event of their supplying nuclear materials to terrorist groups.

If the US forces are gone from ROK, I would have no problem in supporting whatever “appeasement” (carrots) the ROK wants to continue supplying to the North. And the “stick” of military retaliation would still remain as a tool just as effectively, indeed even more so.

Currently the remaing US troops are as much “hostages” for “good behavior” to the South as they are to the North. And I’ve got a big problem with our troops remaining as “trip-wire” hostages, especially now that we have withdrawn most of the infantry for needed duties elsewhere.

But in order to gain more benefits, tangible results need to be seen.