The NIS also revealed a little about North Korea’s chemical and biological warfare capabilities. The spy agency said it believes the Chongsu Chemical Plant in Sakje, North Pyongan Province, is capable of producing 4,000 tons of all sorts of chemical agents a year. It said North Korea began development of chemical weapons after late North Korean leader Kim Il-dung stressed the nation’s need for chemical warfare capabilities during a KWP congress in 1961. Amoung the goodies North Korea has cooked up, according to the NIS, are nerve agents VX and sarin, asphyxiating gas phosgene, and other blistering and blood agents. In particular, the intelligence agency said 50~60 percent of North Korea’s ballistic missiles and 10 percent of its artillery shells are armed with chemical warheads. Fun.
NIS also said it believes North Korea has developed about 10 kinds of biological agents, including anthrax and smallpox, and that Factory No. 25 in Chongju, North Pyongan Province, has the facilities to produce biological agents. More about North Korea’ suspected biological warfare capabilities here.
The agency also reported that about 4,00~5,000 North Korea defectors are repatriated from China back to North Korea annually. It noted that in the early 1990s, defectors were usually executed as traitors, but from the mid-1990s, defectors fleeing to China due to food shortages were often released when they were returned to North Korea or sentenced to three to six months of forced labor.
15 Comments
Obviously, any military or other action that could invite a biological response is out of the question for Bush (I hope). But unfortunately that doesnt leave many good options, seeing as how the Chinese and the SKers are not on-side for anything other than appeasement.
As for those who insist that the US deal with the Norks, I’m not sure what that would ultimately accomplish. Any ‘deal’ will be worthless and if Bush went ahead and made extensive deals in terms of diplomatic relations and business deals as a way of subverting KJI through engagement, again, I don’t see that working, certainly not in the short term.
What good did all the dealing do from 1994-2000? Very little. At that rate, the Norks might fall in 20-30 years. Maybe. Unless with all the free goodies theyve managed to build themselves up into something sustainable.
Snow wrote:But unfortunately that doesnt leave many good options, seeing as how the Chinese and the SKers are not on-side for anything other than appeasement.It’s a bit specious to paint it in such simple terms. All this rhetorical posturing for such-and-such government or against such-and-such government ignores several realities.
The Chinese do not want “appeasement.” They want their ideological brothers-in-arms in Pyongyang to remain in power, and to act like a buffer against democracy and unbridled capitalism. That’s not appeasement; that’s their design.
And the Chinese would never be given a chance to vote for appeasement anyway, would they? Would Washington actually consult Beijing regarding an attack on North Korea? If Washington had such a cozy relationship with Beijing that they could get the latter to allow the bombing of their ally, wouldn’t Beijing first be putting a hell of a lot of pressure on Pyongyang first?
If there is ever an attack on North Korea, it will not likely involve consultation with or permission from Beijing. So as “appeasers,” they are out.
As for Seoul, the current government wants a chance for Sunshine to work, which is a bit more complex than saying appeasement (although I do agree that some of their missteps could count as such). Is Washington “appeasing” Beijing and Hanoi by economic engagement while turning a blind eye to all the atrocities that go on there? No, they are simply hoping that the infusion of outside forces will cause a change from within.
It hasn’t happened in Pyongyang yet, but it hasn’t exactly happened in Beijing, either; nevertheless, Washington continues with such a policy vis-a-vis Beijing, so why not Seoul with Pyongyang? Having much further to go doesn’t mean it has failed.
And is Tokyo really on board with a military attack on Pyongyang? I doubt that. They are pissed off about the kidnapees (and they should be), but does that translate into support for military action?
No, if it came down to a pre-emptive attack, the Japanese would side with the South Koreans against it, because a military attack could easily convert into retaliation against Japanese civilians. If it really looked like it was going to go that far, watch the Japanese public, and the LDP itself, turn toward “appeasement.”
North Korea has been working hard since the Reagan administration to get nukes. With our good buddy China’s acquiescence, it has succeeded. It’s a screwed-up situation, but the best we can probably do is:
(a)accept that North Korea has nukes and make damn well sure that they don’t export them, for which we need Beijing’s, Moscow’s, Seoul’s, and even Tokyo’s help;
(b) make clear to the Pyongyang regime that they will be destroyed if North Korean nukes are ever used against the US or its allies anywhere; and
(c) be ready to retrieve those nukes if North Korea does collapse.
It is probabably a good idea to work with everyone to transform North Korea into an entity that wouldn’t sell its nukes and doesn’t harm its own people or its neighbors. Instead of arguing which is better, carrot or stick, acknowledging that both are needed to do the trick is probably in order. Some Sunshine, some hardline, but probably not too much of either.
But unfortunately that doesnt leave many good options, seeing as how the Chinese and the SKers are not on-side for anything other than appeasement.
Call it appeasement, but at the present situation it is safer for the (Chinese, NK, SK, J) populations in the region to avoid military conflicts in regard to North Korea. As long as the regime there is strong enough to control its people as well as hold everybody else at bay there’s not much that’s going to happen anytime soon. China doesn’t want the U.S. in North Korea, Kushibo is right - the best solution would be an uprising in North Korea, the repressive government is not only bad for regional security, but also for the people who have to live under such harsh living conditions.
This quote by snow should have come immediately after “snow wrote” in the above response:Well, admittedly I did go a bit over the top to say blanket condemn China and SK as appeasers. I do think alot of what SK has done is appeasement or worse, less so, China. At the same time, Kushibo and Grendel, you seem to assume that I am making a case for military intervention. Not at all. I pointed out that Bush has no room to move in that area and that I hope he doesnt consider military action.Marmot, I know I’m in the doghouse for being so, um, frank with Shelton, but if you consider my advice valuable, a preview function would be a nice thing to work into the next redo of your wonderful, informative, invaluable blog.
Well, Kushibo, I’m certainly more sceptical than you as to what the US would achieve with increased engagement, but I agree that diplomatic and other steps might be worth trying (maybe the best option amongst many poor ones), as long as there are definite and verifiable benefits. The problem with what SK is currently doing is that they are handing over plenty of cash and other goodies without seeing any tangible results. If the US goes the engagement route to whatever degree, I would certainly hope that they manage it so that tangible results are seen in step with benefits given.
Interesting points about removing the troops and how it could destabilize the region to some degree. I’m not sure I agree that the effect would be as great as you say, but you certainly make some good points, as usual.
I did say in post #6 that the US could sign a peace treaty for the Korean War (and then take the troops out) and I do agree that the US shouldnt get in a mudslinging match with the Norks, as they can never win at that game (the Norks always dish out far more over the top crap than does Bush et al, and yet the US seems to get all the criticism for it).
But in order to gain more benefits, tangible results need to be seen.
One thing that nobody has mentioned here is that the US is (I think) currently engaged in a multi-year process of destroying all of its current inventory of lethal chemical weapons.
I wish I had links to hand, I’ll have to look when I have more time, maybe some of you can provide them more readily.
But if I’m right, this also means that any use of lethal chemical agents by the North means that the US can no longer retaliate “in kind”. I have no idea what the ROK has in terms of any offensive chemical warfare capability, but I would guess “not much” if any.
So if the feared NorK massive artillery barrage takes place and they use chemicals, the possible US responses will be limited to conventional — or nuclear. I’m not sure a conventional response would be seen by the US as adequate; to me this implies one more good reason for the US to leave.
Kushibo, I always enjoy your well-written postings. I can’t find anything to disagree with in so much of what you write, but somehow we sure come to different conclusions.
I totally agree with your a, b, and c above.
And I could even agree with your last paragraph even as long as US troops are “out from under”. Events in London today (7 July) are a reminder of why we need to consolidate our own resources, and stop subsidizing the ground defense of allies who are perfectly capable of the ground defense of their own countries.
I think it’s only a matter of time before our own rails and subways (here in US) are attacked in a similar manner. I waited all morning to see if these London attacks were “dirty” (radiological) bombs; I’m surprised they weren’t, but I think it’s only a matter of time before such “dirty” attacks occur.
What do you think would have been the political and military ramifications if the London attacks had been “dirty”, and we eventually found out that NorK had supplied the radioactive material?
(Assume uneqivocal proof of this for argument’s sake; I grant you that such proof would be unlikely, as the North would use plenty of cut-outs to screen the audit trail).
Do you think ROK (and Japanese) publics would change their attitudes in that event, when it comes to a possible military retaliation by the US against the North (for a terrorist attack elsewhere in the world)?
I don’t think they would; I agree both publics would be incredibly fearful and diametrically opposed to any military retaliation (can’t say I would blame them either). So the question is, would the US listen to their concerns and refrain from any strong action (remember, DPRK constantly emphasizes that a blockade would be seen as an act of war).
I think the withdrawal of US troops from ROK would help to prevent DPRK from possibly supplying such material, as the DPRK would be even more fearful then of a possible US retaliation (from offshore, not from the soil of ROK or Japan) in the event of their supplying nuclear materials to terrorist groups.
If the US forces are gone from ROK, I would have no problem in supporting whatever “appeasement” (carrots) the ROK wants to continue supplying to the North. And the “stick” of military retaliation would still remain as a tool just as effectively, indeed even more so.
Currently the remaing US troops are as much “hostages” for “good behavior” to the South as they are to the North. And I’ve got a big problem with our troops remaining as “trip-wire” hostages, especially now that we have withdrawn most of the infantry for needed duties elsewhere.
Once again we see that Kushibo has done his homework and has his facts in order. I couldn?t agree more with his A, B, C premises, I think they are very realistic, straightforward and set forth very clear objectives all the while not rewarding NK or resuming armed conflict with them. Regretfully, it is probably too straightforward for any politician to accept.
Assuming the London bombings were ??dirty? and it were proven beyond reasonable doubt that the radioactive material came from NK I do not think that would be enough of a push for either SK or Japan to accept any sort of military option, it is not close enough to home. Looking at things from the terrorist side of things though, it would be strategically brilliant if they could pull off an attack like that in the US. The US forces are spread thin and soldiers are having to serve two and maybe three tours in Iraq or Afghanistan. The sheer manpower that it would take for the US to effectively police its self internally and guard against another of these attacks would be staggering but the manpower demands of retaliating against NK (again, assuming it was proven they were the suppliers of the radioactive material) with the goal of regime change would be very difficult to swing I suspect under current circumstances.
Well, admittedly I did go a bit over the top to say blanket condemn China and SK as appeasers. I do think alot of what SK has done is appeasement or worse, less so, China. At the same time, Kushibo and Grendel, you seem to assume that I am making a case for military intervention. Not at all. I pointed out that Bush has no room to move in that area and that I hope he doesnt consider military action.
What I didnt make clear in my complaints about those who have been criticizing the US for supposedly not doing anything (I’m not saying that you two said this) was that I’m very sceptical as to what gains the US would ever see from strongly engaging the Norks. I’m not dead set against it, but I wouldn’t expect to gain much. I’m with Paul H. on the removal of troops from the South and let SK and China deal with the propping up of the North on their own.
The US could sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War and then ‘oversee’ the situation from bases in Okinawa and Guam while SK pays the bills for NK. The US could even make some forays in terms of business or diplomacy with the Norks, if positive steps are seen.
The problem with the US suddenly turning around and going for all-out engagement is that it would signal to KJI that his blustering tactics and threats had worked in saving his hide. I see no reason why he wouldnt soon use those same tactics at every opportunity in the future, even while the US and others were helping out with generous aid packages. I just can’t see what’s in it for the US to engage and hand over lots of cash. Let SK and China do that for all the good it might do.
Technically, engaging and handing over lots of cash don’t necessarily have to go together, but I think that if they did engage, the end result would be lots of free goodies for the Norks with little in return.
I also agree with Kushibo’s three points. And interesting comments from other posters, too.
paul h wrote:I totally agree with your a, b, and c above. snow wrote:I also agree with Kushibo?s three points. And interesting comments from other posters, too. Just so everyone’s clear: a, b, and c should all be taken together. It’s not a pick-and-choose kind of situation.
snow wrote:Fair enough. But one thing that really worries me about the Bush administration is that there is a bit too much speculative talk about some things that were once considered unthinkable.
And when you get people thinking the unthinkable, the threshold for action might end up getting lowered. We have people talking about “acceptable casualties” even though we’re talking about millions of South Koreans and Japanese who could get killed by the right kind of North Korean attack with the weapons they have now. Especially if they have already convinced themselves that North Korea is going to export a nuke that will get detonated in NYC. Baduk has already stated it’s better to incur 100,000 deaths now and prevent millions of dying in a nuclear attack he is certain is going to come.
Another thing that worries me about Bush is that he seems to like doing the bold thing that others are not willing to try, simply because it is the bold thing. He doesn’t always seem to recognize that there are real negatives involved that others before him weighed and found to be too serious a sacrifice; they are gutless and he is a true visionary for trying the bold thing. Bush41 and Clinton didn’t have the guts to take Saddam out, but he did, the consequences be damned!
Anyway, that’s why this “hypothetical” talk about attacks makes me very, very, very nervous. I have misjudged Bush before: I did NOT think he would ultimately invade Iraq, but he did.What I didnt make clear in my complaints about those who have been criticizing the US for supposedly not doing anything (I?m not saying that you two said this) was that I?m very sceptical as to what gains the US would ever see from strongly engaging the Norks. I?m not dead set against it, but I wouldn?t expect to gain much. I?m with Paul H. on the removal of troops from the South and let SK and China deal with the propping up of the North on their own.Leftist protestors notwithstanding, South Koreans in general do not want USFK gone. Japan ultimately does not want them gone from here. Having them gone would embolden North Korea to do a lot of things it now can’t. It would also lead to a series of actions by China, Japan, Russia, and possibly Taiwan that would make Northeast Asia a very, very heavily armed and very, very tense place. The Pax Americana, with the US playing the role of certain and capable defender of South Korea and Taiwan, and holder-in-place of Japan, has been what has kept the region war-free for a very, very, very long time. It is an equation that works, and messing with it will likely have severe consequences.The US could sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War and then ??oversee? the situation from bases in Okinawa and Guam while SK pays the bills for NK.If USFK leaves Korea, it will embolden the groups that want to see USFJ vacate Okinawa. A very bad move.
And South Korea is not interested in propping up North Korea but in infusing it with enough doses of enterprise that it becomes addicted. Don’t believe the hype. Besides, you are talking about something that most South Koreans do not want and would be a politically inviable political proposition for the current ruling party.The US could even make some forays in terms of business or diplomacy with the Norks, if positive steps are seen.They should be offering that as a carrot now, after verifiable measures are taken by Pyongyang. Diplomatic recognition by Tokyo and Washington as an incentive for certain verifiable concessions by the North (South Korea can’t diplomatically recognize the North, so it does not have this as an option).The problem with the US suddenly turning around and going for all-out engagement is that it would signal to KJI that his blustering tactics and threats had worked in saving his hide. I see no reason why he wouldnt soon use those same tactics at every opportunity in the future, even while the US and others were helping out with generous aid packages.I don’t think the US should do a 180 and start engaging. If anything, I think the Roh government should be a bit more selective about its engagement. Right now the US is in a position to play good cop-bad cop with South Korea, so it needs to be selective about what engagement it does. Hold diplomatic recognition as a carrot only if North Korea gets to the $64,000 question on the pyramid.I just can?t see what?s in it for the US to engage and hand over lots of cash. Let SK and China do that for all the good it might do.The US should not blindly engage. It needs to provide clearly defined carrots and sticks. And without the gratuitous insults (what is there to be gained by calling Kim Jong-il names? Or, for that matter, taunting terrorists to “bring it on”?).
Anyway, I really take exception to lumping China and South Korea together. Not just as appeasers but pretty much anything else. Beijing’s and Seoul’s goals vis-??-vis Pyongyang are very different. As I have mentioned, their goals are very, very different. Seoul is taking a soft-line approach of engagement to end the Pyongyang regime sooner rather than later in order to soften the inevitably painful experience of reunification. Beijing, on the other hand, does not want Seoul and Pyongyang to reunify at all, except as a full ideological ally of Beijing. South Korean voters will not allow that to happen.
Seoul is trying to make things like Kaes??ng work, while China arrested the would-be governor of Pyongyang’s similar project at Shin?iju. South Korea wants to build up North Korea’s economic infrastructure now so that it won’t have as much to do later, while China just wants to throw money at the regime to make it survive for the sake of having it survive. Japan, too, if the kidnapee issue gets satisfactorily resolved, will follow Seoul’s behavior much more closely than it does Washington’s behavior.Technically, engaging and handing over lots of cash don?t necessarily have to go together, but I think that if they did engage, the end result would be lots of free goodies for the Norks with little in return.I don’t think so. Diplomatic relations are not a free goodie. The face-saving toning-down of rhetoric is not a free goodie. Convincing Pyongyang that it will not be arbitrarily invaded is not a free goodie.
Paul H. wrote:So if the feared NorK massive artillery barrage takes place and they use chemicals, the possible US responses will be limited to conventional ? or nuclear. I?m not sure a conventional response would be seen by the US as adequate; to me this implies one more good reason for the US to leave.Would those limits be any less limited if the US were off the Korean coast or in Okinawa or mainland Japan? That would just end up drawing chemical attacks there. Japan has a lot of coastline for North Korean subs to ply.Kushibo, I always enjoy your well-written postings. I can?t find anything to disagree with in so much of what you write, but somehow we sure come to different conclusions.Well, I appreciate the kind words. I do think the difference may be that (a) you and I have different levels of comfort about America making the world safe for its commerce and ideals (I don’t mean that in an offensive way; I think there can be legitimate disagreement on such things), and (b) based on my knowledge of the Northeast Asian region, I appreciate the powerful benefits of the Pax Americana that pacifies the region and feel that a pull-out from Korea would lead to a series of paranoid-driven, very bad events that would eventually lead to a major war here, which would in turn draw in the US and/or also cause serious detriment to the US economy.
I also don’t buy the argument that the USFK presence strait-jackets US action. If there were no US troops on the peninsula, the North Koreans would simply point more of there retaliatory weapons in the direction of Okinawa and the Japanese home islands (if not Guam, the Northern Marianas, Hawaii, and Alaska). I believe that the US presence on the ground is utter assurance to the North Koreans that an attack on South Korea WILL lead to their destruction by an absolutely superior force. There is no way that South Korea could ever reach that level of capability. A pull-out (even with the Defense Treaty intact) would embolden North Korea to do things it now can only dream of, much as China would be emboldened by even a mere discussion of scrapping or altering the Taiwan defense act.
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The array of relationships with Korea, Japan, and Taiwan is not broken. There are dents and scratches, but it ain’t broke. A paint job is in order sometimes.I totally agree with your a, b, and c above.It needs to be on the table that this kind of thinking is the most realistic (and, happily, probably the least death-inducing) way to look at it.And I could even agree with your last paragraph even as long as US troops are ?out from under??. Events in London today (7 July) are a reminder of why we need to consolidate our own resources, and stop subsidizing the ground defense of allies who are perfectly capable of the ground defense of their own countries.I don’t agree that South Korea is perfectly capable of the kind of ground defense a joint US-ROK organization can provide. Neither, is Taiwan. These powerful joint forces deter aggression. That is a major part of their value.I think it?s only a matter of time before our own rails and subways (here in US) are attacked in a similar manner. I waited all morning to see if these London attacks were ?dirty?? (radiological) bombs; I?m surprised they weren?t, but I think it?s only a matter of time before such ?dirty?? attacks occur.
What do you think would have been the political and military ramifications if the London attacks had been ?dirty??, and we eventually found out that NorK had supplied the radioactive material?
(Assume uneqivocal proof of this for argument?s sake; I grant you that such proof would be unlikely, as the North would use plenty of cut-outs to screen the audit trail).I think the reaction would be much like with Afghanistan: we would invade and we would eliminate the regime that caused this or allowed this to happen.
Would the world support the US? I don’t know. It would depend on the credibility of the information. The world was mostly supportive or at least acquiescent to US actions in Afghanistan. Not so with Iraq. I do think that the lack of WMD in Iraq has seriously hurt US credibility around the world, even now when the US claims North Korea may export nukes or whatever. That is one of the unspoken costs of our adventurism there (incidentally, I sincerely hope democracy eventually succeeds there and I don’t think troops should be removed anytime soon). Just look at the difference in world reaction to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq.
A major component of anti-Bush sentiment (which is a different animal from lingering anti-American sentiemnt around the world, which is largely jealousy of the richest and most powerful) is that most people around the world don’t believe the reasons to invade Iraq were legitimate or sound. (By the way, the fact that even someone like Roh who thinks this way would send troops is a testament to his own thinking that the US-ROK alliance is a valuable thing).
Now having said all that, I think it’s important to point out that I don’t think North Korea would do something like that. Yes, they need hard currency, but they are finding other ways to do that (including selling drugs). Simply put, North Korea probably is aware that if Americans on American soil (or, probably, American allies on their own soil) were to be killed by North Korean nukes or radioactive material, it would mean the end of them. This is M.A.D. as it applies to the inchoate nuclear situation here. Making that clear to them (and any others who might possess such weapons and sell them) is an extremely important aspect of deterrence.
Anyway, while I think it’s important to prepare for that possibility to do what is possible to prevent it, I don’t think we should assume this is the most likely scenario. I am more worried about our “allies,” such as Pakistan or Israel, selling weaponry that will eventually end up in enemy hands. Even our good friend and economic partner China, which I have serious reservations about because of their willing and necessary culpability in keeping the murderous Pyongyang regime alive, is probably less likely than Pakistan, Israel, or even France to sell things that will eventually hurt us.Do you think ROK (and Japanese) publics would change their attitudes in that event, when it comes to a possible military retaliation by the US against the North (for a terrorist attack elsewhere in the world)?They would be scared out of their minds of what would happen if the US (or the US and ROK together) attacked North Korea, but if they were convinced that the evidence was real and that North Korea was really a new kind of threat, they would think it best to take them out now.
A lot of the convincing, though, would be harder to do since much of the world thinks the Bush administration has a faulty “sixth sense” about who is causing a WMD threat, thanks to the situation with Iraq.I don?t think they would; I agree both publics would be incredibly fearful and diametrically opposed to any military retaliation (can?t say I would blame them either). So the question is, would the US listen to their concerns and refrain from any strong action (remember, DPRK constantly emphasizes that a blockade would be seen as an act of war).If the US really believed it, I think they would go ahead. I think they would try hard to convince both South Korea and Japan, but even if they couldn’t, they would probably go ahead.I think the withdrawal of US troops from ROK would help to prevent DPRK from possibly supplying such material, as the DPRK would be even more fearful then of a possible US retaliation (from offshore, not from the soil of ROK or Japan) in the event of their supplying nuclear materials to terrorist groups.I disagree. Even without the US forces in Korea as a “target,” there are still US forces nearby in Japan. Iraq bombed Israel during the Gulf War, and North Korea would attack Japan, even if the US-ROK alliance were toast. Pulling forces out of Korea does not send a signal to North Korea that the US would be more willing to retaliante against North Korea because USFJ would still be vulnerable, as would the allied populations of Japan and South Korea.If the US forces are gone from ROK, I would have no problem in supporting whatever ?appeasement?? (carrots) the ROK wants to continue supplying to the North. What “appeasement” the ROK (the ROK government) supplies will change with the next administration in a couple years, probably to include more sticks if a right-wing regime or a less ideological and more pragmatic regime is elected and replaces the unpopular and incompetent-perceived Roh administration. Their engagement shouldn’t be considered all that different from Taiwan’s engagement with mainland China; it is certainly not a reason to drastically alter the alliance. And the ?stick?? of military retaliation would still remain as a tool just as effectively, indeed even more so.
Currently the remaing US troops are as much ?hostages?? for ?good behavior?? to the South as they are to the North. And I?ve got a big problem with our troops remaining as ?trip-wire?? hostages, especially now that we have withdrawn most of the infantry for needed duties elsewhere.With the move south of the Han, the “tripwire” idea is far less the case. Their powerful and certain retaliation is a powerful deterrent that has kept an often irrational North at bay (not to mention China). The basic formula as it stands now works and has probably saved many, many lives.
Paul, don’t kid yourself, there are other “hostages” besides the USFK, including the USFJ and the Japanese and Korean populations. Plus the hundreds of thousands of Americans who live in the area.
In the second to the last paragraph above, the following should have been attributed to Paul, not me:Currently the remaing US troops are as much ?hostages?? for ?good behavior?? to the South as they are to the North. And I?ve got a big problem with our troops remaining as ?trip-wire?? hostages, especially now that we have withdrawn most of the infantry for needed duties elsewhere.
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