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	<title>Comments on: Lessons of Gwangju for U.S. foreign policy</title>
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		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/06/24/lessons-of-gwangju-for-us-foreign-policy/#comment-19259</link>
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		<title>By: usinkorea</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/06/24/lessons-of-gwangju-for-us-foreign-policy/#comment-19252</link>
		<dc:creator>usinkorea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Jul 2005 13:51:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I believe the unit talked about (if it isn't the special forces one) was a regular frontline Korean army unit that was under the chain of command of the US military.  

Anyway, the US was aware and OKed sending in the regular army unit after the worst couple of days in Kwangju, because they felt order had to be restored, and that it was a good idea to replace the special forces guys who had done the most damage.

The move in by the regular army also led to deaths but on a much smaller scale.

And, if I remember correctly, I would guess from what you wrote, one of your Peace Corps friends is the guy who wrote a book about Kwangju.  I remember better an article onthe Kwanj that brought up the book, and that writer said the Peace Corps worker was unhappy about the deaths that resulted from the retaking of the city -- that one death was too much -- but in general, the US knowledge about the regular army unit being sent in and the rationale was accepted if debatable.

I do agree that the debate about what the US knew and did seems to go astray from basic understanding ---

----which is that any of these Korean units were not under direct control by the US.  US field officers or NCOs were not members of these units.  US soldiers were not giving the orders.

And nobody has ever shown, and most don't even imply, that the US military authorities gave an order fot the Korean units to move into the city and kill innocent people.

The majority of the people who blame the US use guilt by association. 

But, in Korean society, unless you press them to get into more detail about the event, a good number of people do think on the surface USFK was directly guilty in the Kwangju Massacre.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I believe the unit talked about (if it isn&#8217;t the special forces one) was a regular frontline Korean army unit that was under the chain of command of the US military.  </p>
<p>Anyway, the US was aware and OKed sending in the regular army unit after the worst couple of days in Kwangju, because they felt order had to be restored, and that it was a good idea to replace the special forces guys who had done the most damage.</p>
<p>The move in by the regular army also led to deaths but on a much smaller scale.</p>
<p>And, if I remember correctly, I would guess from what you wrote, one of your Peace Corps friends is the guy who wrote a book about Kwangju.  I remember better an article onthe Kwanj that brought up the book, and that writer said the Peace Corps worker was unhappy about the deaths that resulted from the retaking of the city &#8212; that one death was too much &#8212; but in general, the US knowledge about the regular army unit being sent in and the rationale was accepted if debatable.</p>
<p>I do agree that the debate about what the US knew and did seems to go astray from basic understanding &#8212;</p>
<p>&#8212;-which is that any of these Korean units were not under direct control by the US.  US field officers or NCOs were not members of these units.  US soldiers were not giving the orders.</p>
<p>And nobody has ever shown, and most don&#8217;t even imply, that the US military authorities gave an order fot the Korean units to move into the city and kill innocent people.</p>
<p>The majority of the people who blame the US use guilt by association. </p>
<p>But, in Korean society, unless you press them to get into more detail about the event, a good number of people do think on the surface USFK was directly guilty in the Kwangju Massacre.</p>
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		<title>By: mizar5</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/06/24/lessons-of-gwangju-for-us-foreign-policy/#comment-19251</link>
		<dc:creator>mizar5</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 03 Jul 2005 16:19:19 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>bulgasari: "The unit in question was given permission from the Joint Command to be deployed in Seoul to deal with possible unrest. After removed from the joint command, the South Korean military was free to use them however they wanted, yet when they were asked for permission to redeploy them in Kwangju (permission which was not necessary once they were removed from Joint Command) the Joint Command gave permission anyways."

I'm curious where you got this information. 

To me the bottom line is that by to treaty the Joint Commmand had no operational authority over troops used for anything other than foreign attack by a Communist nation. The US bears no responsibility for dispatching troops to Kwangju, which was Chun's move, nor for acquiescing, since there was no operational authority to begin with.

Additionally, the US's intelligence on the events in Kwangju was not great and it is fair to say that the US did not understand what was transpiring in Kwangju. US authorities relied too uch on the USIS in Kwangju. The USIS director was not that well informed himself. He fearfully misinterpreted the actions of the students. An American friend of mine was with the students at the time. When he contacted the US embassy about the atrocities, he was disbelieved, since he was just a peace corps volunteer and not a USIS director. He was later ejected from Peace Corps Korea since the Peace Corps could not guarantee his safety. Another one of my US friends who was on the scene (there were three) recieved threats from the Korean government upon his repatriation to the US).

So the US government was basically in the dark about what was really happening and so its basic failure was ignorance, not ignominity.

Once Chun was firmly in control and the facts of the massacre were known, the US government was incensed and clearly said so- both publically and directly to the Korean government, making it abundantly clear that democratization needed to proceed. The Chun-controlled media, however, published their own erroneous account, falsely alledging US support when none had been given.

Reagon later came to terms with Chun in exchange for sparing Kim Dae Joong's life and an agreement to proceed with democratization. One might see this as a mistake, and yet, one also wonders what kind of martyr KDJ might have become had the US just left him to hang instead of interveneing on his behalf. Either way, there would be risks.In retrospect, we can all second guess the wisdom of decisions made. But we cannot pin the blame on deliberate efforts by the US government for anything that transpired.

I might have done things differently in retrospect. I would have strongly advised immediate US troop pullouts. But given that no one had the benefit of hindsight at the time, and the infuences of the cold war and the bitter expereince of the political debacle that had ensued from Carter's threats to remove the troops in protest of Park Chung Hee's dictatorial rule, my advice would probably not have had impact. 

The principle of Occam's Razor would simply lead to the conclusion that the US did its best to muddle through a situation where there was no best solution.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>bulgasari: &#8220;The unit in question was given permission from the Joint Command to be deployed in Seoul to deal with possible unrest. After removed from the joint command, the South Korean military was free to use them however they wanted, yet when they were asked for permission to redeploy them in Kwangju (permission which was not necessary once they were removed from Joint Command) the Joint Command gave permission anyways.&#8221;</p>
<p>I&#8217;m curious where you got this information. </p>
<p>To me the bottom line is that by to treaty the Joint Commmand had no operational authority over troops used for anything other than foreign attack by a Communist nation. The US bears no responsibility for dispatching troops to Kwangju, which was Chun&#8217;s move, nor for acquiescing, since there was no operational authority to begin with.</p>
<p>Additionally, the US&#8217;s intelligence on the events in Kwangju was not great and it is fair to say that the US did not understand what was transpiring in Kwangju. US authorities relied too uch on the USIS in Kwangju. The USIS director was not that well informed himself. He fearfully misinterpreted the actions of the students. An American friend of mine was with the students at the time. When he contacted the US embassy about the atrocities, he was disbelieved, since he was just a peace corps volunteer and not a USIS director. He was later ejected from Peace Corps Korea since the Peace Corps could not guarantee his safety. Another one of my US friends who was on the scene (there were three) recieved threats from the Korean government upon his repatriation to the US).</p>
<p>So the US government was basically in the dark about what was really happening and so its basic failure was ignorance, not ignominity.</p>
<p>Once Chun was firmly in control and the facts of the massacre were known, the US government was incensed and clearly said so- both publically and directly to the Korean government, making it abundantly clear that democratization needed to proceed. The Chun-controlled media, however, published their own erroneous account, falsely alledging US support when none had been given.</p>
<p>Reagon later came to terms with Chun in exchange for sparing Kim Dae Joong&#8217;s life and an agreement to proceed with democratization. One might see this as a mistake, and yet, one also wonders what kind of martyr KDJ might have become had the US just left him to hang instead of interveneing on his behalf. Either way, there would be risks.In retrospect, we can all second guess the wisdom of decisions made. But we cannot pin the blame on deliberate efforts by the US government for anything that transpired.</p>
<p>I might have done things differently in retrospect. I would have strongly advised immediate US troop pullouts. But given that no one had the benefit of hindsight at the time, and the infuences of the cold war and the bitter expereince of the political debacle that had ensued from Carter&#8217;s threats to remove the troops in protest of Park Chung Hee&#8217;s dictatorial rule, my advice would probably not have had impact. </p>
<p>The principle of Occam&#8217;s Razor would simply lead to the conclusion that the US did its best to muddle through a situation where there was no best solution.</p>
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		<title>By: usinkorea</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/06/24/lessons-of-gwangju-for-us-foreign-policy/#comment-19250</link>
		<dc:creator>usinkorea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 02 Jul 2005 14:47:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>"By the way, we do not have to disengage or topple autocratic regimes. We can continue to cooperate on security issues, but make clear our public displeasure with oppression and also engage publicly with opposition figures. We certainly should not give tacit endorsement to troop deployments to crush dissent and other oppressive measures by host governments."

But, isn't that what happened with Kwangju?  First, I'd say this --- there will always be ideas in hindsight about how we could have done this better or used these words instead of those or pushed harder here or less there --- in short, there is always room to improve.  So, I am sure the  US could have done some things better in the Kwangju period and after, but we can never know if difference A or X would have actually produced a better result.  And if we can't come up with clear, definative alternative, it should be hard to use Kwangju as a solid foundation (legitimate) for anti-US thought.

Another point on Kwangju is that the US government was not in control of the Korean press but the Chun regime was.  The US sometimes expressed displeasure publically, sometimes held their tongue out of fear of total collapse in South Korea, but their ability to reach out quickly to a wide audience was hampered by the control of the press.  In fact, one of the reasons guilt for Kwangju has fallen on the US in the Korean mind is the fact the Chun group put out disinformation that the US was in complete support of its actions.

On Taiwan, I'll have to guess wildly, because it is not my area.  In East Asia, Taiwan is especially something I don't know much about.

Anway, we don't have troops in Taiwan.  Whether is is natural and understandable or natural and racists, large numbers of foreign troops in a nation cause a certain amount of ill will.  It is also a daily reminder that the nation can't defend itself completely (a potential point of shame).

Next, Taiwan wasn't divided in large part due to outside forces.  The best foundation for anti-Americanism in SK is the bare fact if the US had not gotten involved, it would be a unified country.   Of course, I disagree on many of the points Koreans (and others) make about the division of Korea and what "good" would have come if the US had not stepped in, but the truth is that the division of Korea is a big reason why the US is disliked.

We don't have that with Taiwan.

Taiwan is also a more isolated nation.  I think that has a lot to do with it.  

Korea has always been considered a strategic key point in east asia.  And the tensions surrounding it's geography cause heightened awareness.  Korea has Japan next to it and a long, long history of dislike and confrontation with it.  It is also connected directly to China --- the east asian powerhouse, and it is right there with Russia too.

That kind of pressure coming from different sources and coming at a high level generates anxiety.

I would think Taiwan also has a type of anxiety due to the big threat from China, but South Korea is pulled in more and different ways.

And maybe there is simply something about Korean society itself that makes it more prone to anti-US activity.

I don't say this as a definitive statement or firm conclusion, but Korean society is know for being hot blooded.  A guy I knew from Taiwan said that about them when I first decided to go to Korea to teach.

And I have enough experience with Japanese and Koreans to have seen that the Japanese have a different way of reacting to things that displease them.  The Japanese are more likely to swallow their emotions and avoid a public spectacle.  Koreans, on the other hand, are prone to letting their emotions go.

I don't know enough about the Chinese or Taiwanese character to know if this is a reason Taiwan is less anti-US or not, but it is a possibility I can guess.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;By the way, we do not have to disengage or topple autocratic regimes. We can continue to cooperate on security issues, but make clear our public displeasure with oppression and also engage publicly with opposition figures. We certainly should not give tacit endorsement to troop deployments to crush dissent and other oppressive measures by host governments.&#8221;</p>
<p>But, isn&#8217;t that what happened with Kwangju?  First, I&#8217;d say this &#8212; there will always be ideas in hindsight about how we could have done this better or used these words instead of those or pushed harder here or less there &#8212; in short, there is always room to improve.  So, I am sure the  US could have done some things better in the Kwangju period and after, but we can never know if difference A or X would have actually produced a better result.  And if we can&#8217;t come up with clear, definative alternative, it should be hard to use Kwangju as a solid foundation (legitimate) for anti-US thought.</p>
<p>Another point on Kwangju is that the US government was not in control of the Korean press but the Chun regime was.  The US sometimes expressed displeasure publically, sometimes held their tongue out of fear of total collapse in South Korea, but their ability to reach out quickly to a wide audience was hampered by the control of the press.  In fact, one of the reasons guilt for Kwangju has fallen on the US in the Korean mind is the fact the Chun group put out disinformation that the US was in complete support of its actions.</p>
<p>On Taiwan, I&#8217;ll have to guess wildly, because it is not my area.  In East Asia, Taiwan is especially something I don&#8217;t know much about.</p>
<p>Anway, we don&#8217;t have troops in Taiwan.  Whether is is natural and understandable or natural and racists, large numbers of foreign troops in a nation cause a certain amount of ill will.  It is also a daily reminder that the nation can&#8217;t defend itself completely (a potential point of shame).</p>
<p>Next, Taiwan wasn&#8217;t divided in large part due to outside forces.  The best foundation for anti-Americanism in SK is the bare fact if the US had not gotten involved, it would be a unified country.   Of course, I disagree on many of the points Koreans (and others) make about the division of Korea and what &#8220;good&#8221; would have come if the US had not stepped in, but the truth is that the division of Korea is a big reason why the US is disliked.</p>
<p>We don&#8217;t have that with Taiwan.</p>
<p>Taiwan is also a more isolated nation.  I think that has a lot to do with it.  </p>
<p>Korea has always been considered a strategic key point in east asia.  And the tensions surrounding it&#8217;s geography cause heightened awareness.  Korea has Japan next to it and a long, long history of dislike and confrontation with it.  It is also connected directly to China &#8212; the east asian powerhouse, and it is right there with Russia too.</p>
<p>That kind of pressure coming from different sources and coming at a high level generates anxiety.</p>
<p>I would think Taiwan also has a type of anxiety due to the big threat from China, but South Korea is pulled in more and different ways.</p>
<p>And maybe there is simply something about Korean society itself that makes it more prone to anti-US activity.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t say this as a definitive statement or firm conclusion, but Korean society is know for being hot blooded.  A guy I knew from Taiwan said that about them when I first decided to go to Korea to teach.</p>
<p>And I have enough experience with Japanese and Koreans to have seen that the Japanese have a different way of reacting to things that displease them.  The Japanese are more likely to swallow their emotions and avoid a public spectacle.  Koreans, on the other hand, are prone to letting their emotions go.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t know enough about the Chinese or Taiwanese character to know if this is a reason Taiwan is less anti-US or not, but it is a possibility I can guess.</p>
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