Discovery Institute senior fellow James Na, the man behind Guns and Butter, recalls the lessons of Gwangju 5.18 and argues that if you talk the talk, you best walk the walk:
The recent news reports from Andijan, Uzbekistan, were troubling. The arrest and trial of local businessmen in the region sparked riots where there had been continuing civil unrest. The government of Islam Karimov, an ostensible U.S. ally in the war on terror, blamed “Islamist” incitement and launched a crackdown on the protests, killing many, possibly hundreds, of civilians.
The situation revealed a fundamental difficulty in reconciling the parallel policies of pursuing democratization while seeking allies against radical Islamists, particularly in nations where governments lack popular legitimacy.
But Andijan was not the first time a massacre exposed the potential inconsistency of advocating freedom (and criticizing repression) while seeking accommodation to achieve a pragmatic end. Before Andijan, and even before Tiananmen Square had become a household name for bloody repression, there was the Gwangju massacre.
Read the rest on your own.
21 Comments
Hmm… Like most Op-Ed columns, it provides important, but unfortunately not very useful information.
Author writes, “President Bush seems to have understood this clearly. We toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baathist dictatorship in Iraq, then pushed for the subsequent, historic elections in both countries, demonstrating that the U.S. is on the right side of the struggle for liberty.”
I think that President Bush is genuinely interested in building Democracy, but idealism and intent alone isn’t winning us hearts and minds. I think we blew our chances when Rumsfeld decided to boot Shinseki after he blew the whistle on the number of troops needed. Since then the administration changed it’s tunes and says stuff like, “of course we ALWAYS need more military resources, but we must do with what we’ve got” this from the beginning of the war when they said, “we don’t need more troops and if they need them, they will get them.” My point is that despite our good intention, things are falling apart and our good intentions when we dissolved the Iraqi army is now back firing on us. We need to be more practical in our approach, even if that sounds machiavellian.
If intentions alone would make good presidents, Jimmy Carter, whom the author blames for colluding with the Kwanju perpetrators, would be one of the best American presidents–he is largely responsible for making human rights an issue in international politics. But I’d hardly say he made Americans more popular abroad. As I remember, even Korean conservatives hated him for threatening to reduce US forces in Korea. And today, how many Koreans give him credit for pressuring Korean dictatorship? The author certainly remembers him for colluding with Chun Doo Hwan however.
Take current day Iran for example. Iranians hated us for supporting the corrupt Shah. But today we are getting more and more popular there, simply because we represent everything that the Ayatollah is not. The point is, it’s too difficult to look into the crystal ball and forecast American popularity based on American policy initiatives.
The author doesn’t really give us any policy suggestions but a warning that sleeping with naughty people makes us look bad. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure that out. Even though Musharaff loves gang rapists, what choice do we have but to work with Pakistan? Same things with Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and all the other ad nauseum nations that end with “stan”.
All we’ve got is nuanced diplomacy and crossed fingers.
And they don’t want to dig at the truth either. US forien policy has not always been perfect or even moral/ethical. It has stains on it as any nation’s would. But, South Korea would not have been a democracy without the US-SK relationship. And they won’t admit Iraq has a real chance of achieving democracy that they would not have had before. Nor Afghanistan. That doesn’t mean those nations will succeed with it just because America is there. I’m not even suggesting the US could not do some things to make the progression of democracy faster.
But, how many nations have there been in recent memory who have been given a hand’s off approach by American foreign policy who have grown into shining examples of democracy?
I’ll have to think about that for a little while, because right now, with the talk of Iraq and Afghanistan and then President Carter, I keep thinking about Iran.
Maybe there have been nations where the US has backed out and democracy flurished. But none come to mind right away. And I haven’t heard any of these guys explain in a convincing way how the US can change its foreign policy course dramatically and have nations like Saudia Arabia or Pakistan suddenly take giant steps toward democracy…..
Sometimes we don’t really have much choice but to hold hands with some nashty people.
I’m a fan of the “War Nerd”. Look at his Iraq Victory Plan he wrote back when Allawi was the guy in charge”
http://www.exile.ru/2004-November-13/war_nerd.html
In his satire, I think we can draw the conclusion, sometimes we really don’t have much options, just like we have very little options with the DPRK.
First of all, thanks for the plug for my piece!
“Hmm?€? Like most Op-Ed columns, it provides important, but unfortunately not very useful information.”
Op-eds generally have to run within 600 words, up to 750 if the editor is generous and trusting (WSJ is a rare exception). It is difficult to put a lot of “useful,” that is to say, detailed and specific policy recommendations, in that space. I usually start out with about a 1200-1500 word piece. I then have to take a couple of days to whittle that down by at least 50%. A lot of detailed ideas get cut.
“Sometimes we don?€™t really have much choice but to hold hands with some nashty people.”
As a one-time Paleocon, I believed it. Under the paradigm of the Treaty of Westphalia, this was absolutely true. Even “nasty” regimes claimed national sovereignty and thus had to treated as such and certainly dealt with as such in practice. And everyone knows the tired old adage “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.”
As the alway prescient Martin van Creveld predicted, there has been a steady decline in the state monopoly of the means of organized violence (war). But this was “under the radar” of most policy makers. 9/11 changed that complacency, of course. We learned what it cost to coddle some enemies of our enemies.
Salameh Nematt has helpfully pointed out that we have given billions to Egypt yet 90+ percent of Egyptians hate our country while a great majority of Iranians think very positively of us precisely because we oppose the stifling Iranian theocracy. In other words, words and the accompanying policies matter more than money. Egyptians hate us because we support their (repressive) government no matter how much money we give. Iranians like us because we criticize their (repressive) government. How’s that for an irony of sorts.
The short-term urge — and the traditional conservative inclination — is always to get in bed with nasty people if it means helping to fight even nastier folks.
What I am saying in the piece, as a one-time Paleoncon, is that such policies sometimes create even worse long-term consequences than the short-term benefits warrant.
Sometimes our enemy’s enemy is still an enemy… or at least a pariah from whom we should keep our distance, lest we dirty our own image and name with the association.
I should make it clear, however, that this does mean flowers-and-candies-for-our-enemies approach in foreign and national security policy (to see how *I* think the INITIAL post-war pacification should have been conducted, read: We Must Teach The Insurgents To Respect US Power (Seattle Times)
Lastly, in my view, as far as foreign policy was concerned, the Carter administration’s problem was neither its human right-oriented rhetoric nor its closet realpolitik policies. The problem was that it retreated from the former in public and bungled the latter with utter incompetence (we can argue that Iraq may or may not a quagmire — I side with those who say it is not — but everyone agrees that Operation Eagle Claw was a gigantic FUBAR).
Ooops! I meant:
“I should make it clear, however, that this does NOT mean flowers-and-candies-for-our-enemies approach in foreign and national security policy.”
Forgot the put the all-important “NOT” in the original.
Sorry, again. I mean “Forgot TO put,” not “Forgot the put…”
Time to take my meds again.
I’m not sure Iran and Egypt are templates for the norm. I’ll have to think about it. But, in the Korean context, the repression of the regime and the antagonism of the US to it has not created a lot of pro-American feeling among the North Korean population. In China too, Chinese nationalism is strong regardless of bad feelings toward the government. China is not Iran or North Korea, but US pressure on China for democratic reform frequently fuels “China Can Say No” type hatred.
In relation to the US being in bed with dictators in South Korea and related to the Kwangju Massacre, when Carter moved to pull US troops out, more than just the conservatives in his administration and the military opposed him.
Leaders in South Korea’s opposition movements led signiture drives for petitions and sent members to DC to ask Carter to reconsider. Their argument was that the US should be doing a lot more to promote democracy, but….if the US pulled out its military, the Park Chung Hee government would have no leverage on it to reform and oppression would be worse.
Then consider the difference between the type of control during the Park Chung Hee regime, particularly in the 1970s with the repressive reforms of the early 70s, and the rule in the 1980s - after the Kwangju Massacre and its impact on Korean society and Korea’s image abroad.
We can debate what kind of pressure — what measures —- the US could have put in place in this nation or that one at this time or that time, or we can talk about how the US should have gotten out altogether from a place like South Korea in the 1970s or before — or that we should engage with a nation like North Korea or Cuba —- But if there are any sure answers out there, I haven’t seen them yet….
Would South Korea have become a democracy faster or at all without US pressure or support?
Does pressure come with support?
Does Iran have a growing grassroots anti-state phenomenon because the US refuses to fuse with it and applies geopolitical pressure on it? Or, would that grassroots movement gain more power (and hope) if the US was partially involved inside Iran — had some for of relationship closer to the norm we have with every other nation?
On Iran and Egypt vs. North Korea:
The difference is that Iranians and Egyptian have satellite TV and Internet access. North Koreans, by and large, do not. Still, North Korea’s regime itself rates only 1/3 of its population as being political reliable (and I think they are being generous to themselves).
On China:
China is an interesting case. Currently the communist party is doing a marvelous job of redirecting popular anger and discontent (the big three seem to be 1) lack of political rights 2) extortionate taxation in rural area and 3) job losses in the state enterprise sector) toward the United States. But I predict that there will be a time when the act will crumble.
“But if there are any sure answers out there, I haven?€™t seen them yet?€?.”
Oh, there are answers. I think you just don’t like some of them. There is ALWAYS opportunity cost in different policies. Being critical of a “crackdown” will result in the unfortunate loss of “influence,” at least temporarily. Too there will be little effectiveness with “cold shoulders” where domestic stakes are so high for the actors.
But we Americans have downplayed the perception issue too long. We tend to be very rational and result-oriented (”Hey, we’re giving you $2 billion a year so your daughter can attend school, so you should like us”). What matters more in public diplomacy is how we behave at a “critical moment” that (to borrow Senator Kerry’s verbiage) “sears” memories or perceptions into popular imagination. And I am arguing that Kwangju was one of those moments.
“Would South Korea have become a democracy faster or at all without US pressure or support?”
Unquestionably, American tutelage helped ROK in many ways (not the least its survival and subsequent prosperity). But whether or not American policy accelerated or retarded democratization is not something that can be answered definitively.
What we do know is that South Korea today is free and largely democratic. This could not have happened without the US. What is also true, however, is that there is a strong and persistent strain of anti-Americanism, particularly among young, educated Koreans. That is also, to some extent, a consequence of our policies.
On Iran:
The crazy thing is that even left-of-center journalists keep relating stories from Iranian street markets (”When are you coming to invade?” “Why aren’t you doing with us what you did with Iraq?”) — apparently Iranian really get chatty when minders are not about.
Remember, one of the best ways to develop one’s otherwise unpromising country (and bring democracy, prosperity and all that good stuff) is to declare war on the US and lose badly.
This is a little long, but I think it was necessary to explore the topic….
After this latest comment, and thinking back to this –
“The situation revealed a fundamental difficulty in reconciling the parallel policies of pursuing democratization while seeking allies against radical Islamists, particularly in nations where governments lack popular legitimacy.
But Andijan was not the first time a massacre exposed the potential inconsistency of advocating freedom (and criticizing repression) while seeking accommodation to achieve a pragmatic end. Before Andijan, and even before Tiananmen Square had become a household name for bloody repression, there was the Gwangju massacre.”
I’m confused.
Are you simply trying to point out the conflicting nature of things often involved in our foreign policy when the US is engaged with nations like Korea in the 1970s-early 1980s and Uzbekistan today?
Or, are you pointing to an alternative program?
I read the article, but I still have questions.
“All the good will generated by billions in economic aid and lives lost in defending South Korea from communist aggression was lost in one incident, in which America’s “nuanced” public position was viewed as hypocrisy ?€” talking up human rights and democracy while condoning bloody repression.”
I think this is both mostly correct and somewhat wrong at the same time. Kwangju became a focul point, yes. But, as opposition politics grew in Korea in the late 1960s through 70s, anti-US government feelings also grew. We’ll never know what the 1980s and 90s would have been without a Kwangju Massacre, but I don’t believe the image of the US in South Korean society would have been overly posisitive. Even Park Chung Hee used nationalism and US pressure on his government to create anti-US feeling at times when he wanted to put pressure back on the US government.
“Instead, the real long-term risk for the policy is found in nations like Egypt, Pakistan and now Uzbekistan, where the U.S. is seen to be collusive with dictatorial regimes in the name of fighting Islamic terrorists. Radical Islamists point to America’s support for these autocracies as a sign of duplicity ?€” that America is only interested in domination and influence, not spreading liberty.
Although nuanced support for these regimes may suffice ?€” or even be necessary ?€” in dealing with short-term exigencies of war, the long-term consequence for such an association means lending credence to the claims of anti-American radicals with a corresponding, almost irretrievable, erosion of our own credibility.”
This I don’t have a whole lot of faith in.
I doubt very much that the level of anti-US feeling in Egypt and Pakistan is directly related in a fundamental way to how the US government worked with their own government. I can’t imagine a situation where the US had no contact with the Pakistani and Egyptian government over the last 20 to 30 years with the result being the people of those nations ended up less anti-American.
Of course, some people today who want to point at American rhetoric post-9/11 and the relationship between Pakistan or Egypt or Uzbekistan since then, and say it is rife with hypocrisy, can use that as a (renewed) cry for anti-Americanism.
But it is stretching that point too much to then conclude that anti-Americanism is largely based in those societies on the hypocrisy of the moment.
And the question still hangs out there — what do you recommend as a change?
What would have been the outcome if 9/11 had not happened and the US had maintained its hands off policy with Pakistan that came about because of its nuclear weapons testing?
Would Pakistan have become less anti-American or more democratic or less democratic if that policy had been allowed to continue?
Or does it stand a better chance of becoming more democratic with the US involved in some way in Pakistan?
Or, should the US be doing a whole lot more to push the Pakistani government? How hard can it push without being thrown out? What are the chances that if it pushes too much, the government will collapse, and in its place, fanatically anti-American leaders from the radical Islamic schools in country will come to power and the US will be closed out? (Perhaps something like along the lines of Iran in the late 1970s?)
Would you advocate the US putting in place resources then toppling the government in Pakistan and Uzbekistan? And doing the same in Egypt? And elsewhere?
Should the US remain unconnected with North Korea to prevent hypocrisy? Or, should it engage with the intention of either overthrowing the government or pushing it to reform or else?
What about South Korea post-Kwangju? Should the US have disengaged from South Korea — pulled US troops out, put an end to any developmental aid, and/or applied trade sanctions until the Chun regime was taken out of power? In either the US Ambassador or USFK commander’s book about that time, it is reported that a high level military person in the ROK approached the US government with a planned counter-coup, and they wanted to know what kind of support the US would give them, and the US authorities poured cold water on the idea, and no counter-coup took place. Should the US have backed such a coup? Would South Korea’s younger generations of today feel more or less pro-American if the US had taken part in such a coup?
“Oh, there are answers. I think you just don?€™t like some of them.”
Yes and no. I haven’t heard many answers to questions like this that are convincing.
North Korea is a great example. There are no solutions that enough people find acceptable. Engage or destory or status quo?
It is easy to say “something” could surely have been done to make the past have turned out better.
What lesson did we learn in Kwangju that we should apply today in Uzbekistan? We are no where close to as engaged with that nation as we were with South Korea. How much leverage do we have on it? If we use that leverage to topple the regime, will pro-Americanism sprout massively? Will it win people over beyond the region? Will citizens of Palestine, Eygpt, Chechnya start thinking the US is perhaps a power for good in the world?
If the US pulls out what limited forms of engagement it has with Uzbekistan due to the unrest, will democracy grow there? Will its citizens thank America for pulling out? Will the citizens of Egypt and Pakistan feel better about the US government if we pull out of Uzbekistan?
Where are the clear cut guidelines?
I don’t see any.
What would I recommend?
Status quo with North Korea. Tighten up on its illegal exports and illegal activities abroad as much as possible. Put more pressure on South Korea and China for keeping the North alive and supporting it even geopolitically. Don’t give significant amounts of material aid to the regime beyond basic humanitarian supplies, and put more pressure on verification those supplies reach the starving masses.
Egypt — cut back the amount of money the US sends it and put more pressure on democratic reform. Neither of which do I believe will make the US more popular in that country or in the region.
Saudi Arabia — status quo. We put some pressure on them, mostly behind closed doors, to become more democratic, but when push comes to shove, we need oil. It’s wonderful to believe we can live on principles alone and everyone in the democractic world would support pressure for reform in Saudi Arabia even after a return to oil embargos, but that’s a crock of poo. And nobody is going to support invading it to take over the oil.
Iran — status quo. More engagement isn’t going to make the regime topple. And there is not enough support for invasion. If there is a middle way that will accomplish much, I have yet to hear it. US forces are spread too thin and we took a huge load on when we went into Iraq, and most of all, success in Iraq is still questionable long term. We must succeed there before we start thinking about taking on an Iran.
Uzbekistan — don’t know enough about it to say. In general, we should push for democratic reforms across the board in many nations, but what kind of pressure, how much, to what extent, and what will the likely outcomes be is unclear and applicable to each country individually.
Having published a few op-eds myself, I can understand Mr. Na’s point that one can only say so much in the limited 600-800 word space allotted to a newspaper column (though as Mr. Na notes, the Wall Street Journal gives you 1000 or more words, and you can also write 1500-2000 word pieces on Sunday opinion sections of many newspapers).
Still, I find it simplistic at best to blame South Korea’s anti-American turn (which itself is overblown by foreign media and the so-called “Korea experts,” as I have mentioned in my June 10 ASWJ op-ed and will explain at greater length in a longer piece) on Carter looking the other way during the Kwangju insurrection or even the longstanding American support for the military dictatorship of Park or Chun. Blaming big powers may indeed be hardwired into the Korean psyche, and there were other intervening endogenous and exogenous events since Kwangju that intensified anti-Americanism in South Korea. Above all, how can we ignore the propaganda campaign undertaken by Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun to buttress the “Sunshine Policy”? On the basis of Mr. Na’s thesis, we would have seen widespread hardcore anti-Americanism in 1987 (when the first genuine presidential election was permitted in a while) or in 1992 (when the first non-military president since Yun Po Sun assumed office) or in 1997 (when the first opposition politician won the presidency).
“I find it simplistic at best to blame South Korea?€™s anti-American turn.”
Absolutely. I in no way meant to suggest that Kwangju was solely responsible for the current strain of virulent anti-Americanism in ROK. When the ROK ambassador to the US (Han Sung-Joo at the time, I think) came to Seattle a couple of years back, he acknowledged in a speech that “There is a domestical political component to anti-Americanism in Korea today.”
Translation: the left-of-center government exploited the tragic events of the dead school girls and other “triggers” to generate more anti-Americanism for domestic political benefit.
I thought it was a remarkable admission.
By the way, we do not have to disengage or topple autocratic regimes. We can continue to cooperate on security issues, but make clear our public displeasure with oppression and also engage publicly with opposition figures. We certainly should not give tacit endorsement to troop deployments to crush dissent and other oppressive measures by host governments.
There are ways to make meaningful and symbolic gestures at “crucial” moments without endangering critical national relationships. It takes skill, of course, but it can be done and it has been in some cases.
Here’s an interesting (to me, anyway) rhetorical question: how is it that given some similar historical trends (democracy followed by dictatorship and repression) and diplomatic-strategic relationships that there is comparatively less anti-Americanism in Taiwan?
“By the way, we do not have to disengage or topple autocratic regimes. We can continue to cooperate on security issues, but make clear our public displeasure with oppression and also engage publicly with opposition figures. We certainly should not give tacit endorsement to troop deployments to crush dissent and other oppressive measures by host governments.”
But, isn’t that what happened with Kwangju? First, I’d say this — there will always be ideas in hindsight about how we could have done this better or used these words instead of those or pushed harder here or less there — in short, there is always room to improve. So, I am sure the US could have done some things better in the Kwangju period and after, but we can never know if difference A or X would have actually produced a better result. And if we can’t come up with clear, definative alternative, it should be hard to use Kwangju as a solid foundation (legitimate) for anti-US thought.
Another point on Kwangju is that the US government was not in control of the Korean press but the Chun regime was. The US sometimes expressed displeasure publically, sometimes held their tongue out of fear of total collapse in South Korea, but their ability to reach out quickly to a wide audience was hampered by the control of the press. In fact, one of the reasons guilt for Kwangju has fallen on the US in the Korean mind is the fact the Chun group put out disinformation that the US was in complete support of its actions.
On Taiwan, I’ll have to guess wildly, because it is not my area. In East Asia, Taiwan is especially something I don’t know much about.
Anway, we don’t have troops in Taiwan. Whether is is natural and understandable or natural and racists, large numbers of foreign troops in a nation cause a certain amount of ill will. It is also a daily reminder that the nation can’t defend itself completely (a potential point of shame).
Next, Taiwan wasn’t divided in large part due to outside forces. The best foundation for anti-Americanism in SK is the bare fact if the US had not gotten involved, it would be a unified country. Of course, I disagree on many of the points Koreans (and others) make about the division of Korea and what “good” would have come if the US had not stepped in, but the truth is that the division of Korea is a big reason why the US is disliked.
We don’t have that with Taiwan.
Taiwan is also a more isolated nation. I think that has a lot to do with it.
Korea has always been considered a strategic key point in east asia. And the tensions surrounding it’s geography cause heightened awareness. Korea has Japan next to it and a long, long history of dislike and confrontation with it. It is also connected directly to China — the east asian powerhouse, and it is right there with Russia too.
That kind of pressure coming from different sources and coming at a high level generates anxiety.
I would think Taiwan also has a type of anxiety due to the big threat from China, but South Korea is pulled in more and different ways.
And maybe there is simply something about Korean society itself that makes it more prone to anti-US activity.
I don’t say this as a definitive statement or firm conclusion, but Korean society is know for being hot blooded. A guy I knew from Taiwan said that about them when I first decided to go to Korea to teach.
And I have enough experience with Japanese and Koreans to have seen that the Japanese have a different way of reacting to things that displease them. The Japanese are more likely to swallow their emotions and avoid a public spectacle. Koreans, on the other hand, are prone to letting their emotions go.
I don’t know enough about the Chinese or Taiwanese character to know if this is a reason Taiwan is less anti-US or not, but it is a possibility I can guess.
bulgasari: “The unit in question was given permission from the Joint Command to be deployed in Seoul to deal with possible unrest. After removed from the joint command, the South Korean military was free to use them however they wanted, yet when they were asked for permission to redeploy them in Kwangju (permission which was not necessary once they were removed from Joint Command) the Joint Command gave permission anyways.”
I’m curious where you got this information.
To me the bottom line is that by to treaty the Joint Commmand had no operational authority over troops used for anything other than foreign attack by a Communist nation. The US bears no responsibility for dispatching troops to Kwangju, which was Chun’s move, nor for acquiescing, since there was no operational authority to begin with.
Additionally, the US’s intelligence on the events in Kwangju was not great and it is fair to say that the US did not understand what was transpiring in Kwangju. US authorities relied too uch on the USIS in Kwangju. The USIS director was not that well informed himself. He fearfully misinterpreted the actions of the students. An American friend of mine was with the students at the time. When he contacted the US embassy about the atrocities, he was disbelieved, since he was just a peace corps volunteer and not a USIS director. He was later ejected from Peace Corps Korea since the Peace Corps could not guarantee his safety. Another one of my US friends who was on the scene (there were three) recieved threats from the Korean government upon his repatriation to the US).
So the US government was basically in the dark about what was really happening and so its basic failure was ignorance, not ignominity.
Once Chun was firmly in control and the facts of the massacre were known, the US government was incensed and clearly said so- both publically and directly to the Korean government, making it abundantly clear that democratization needed to proceed. The Chun-controlled media, however, published their own erroneous account, falsely alledging US support when none had been given.
Reagon later came to terms with Chun in exchange for sparing Kim Dae Joong’s life and an agreement to proceed with democratization. One might see this as a mistake, and yet, one also wonders what kind of martyr KDJ might have become had the US just left him to hang instead of interveneing on his behalf. Either way, there would be risks.In retrospect, we can all second guess the wisdom of decisions made. But we cannot pin the blame on deliberate efforts by the US government for anything that transpired.
I might have done things differently in retrospect. I would have strongly advised immediate US troop pullouts. But given that no one had the benefit of hindsight at the time, and the infuences of the cold war and the bitter expereince of the political debacle that had ensued from Carter’s threats to remove the troops in protest of Park Chung Hee’s dictatorial rule, my advice would probably not have had impact.
The principle of Occam’s Razor would simply lead to the conclusion that the US did its best to muddle through a situation where there was no best solution.
I believe the unit talked about (if it isn’t the special forces one) was a regular frontline Korean army unit that was under the chain of command of the US military.
Anyway, the US was aware and OKed sending in the regular army unit after the worst couple of days in Kwangju, because they felt order had to be restored, and that it was a good idea to replace the special forces guys who had done the most damage.
The move in by the regular army also led to deaths but on a much smaller scale.
And, if I remember correctly, I would guess from what you wrote, one of your Peace Corps friends is the guy who wrote a book about Kwangju. I remember better an article onthe Kwanj that brought up the book, and that writer said the Peace Corps worker was unhappy about the deaths that resulted from the retaking of the city — that one death was too much — but in general, the US knowledge about the regular army unit being sent in and the rationale was accepted if debatable.
I do agree that the debate about what the US knew and did seems to go astray from basic understanding —
—-which is that any of these Korean units were not under direct control by the US. US field officers or NCOs were not members of these units. US soldiers were not giving the orders.
And nobody has ever shown, and most don’t even imply, that the US military authorities gave an order fot the Korean units to move into the city and kill innocent people.
The majority of the people who blame the US use guilt by association.
But, in Korean society, unless you press them to get into more detail about the event, a good number of people do think on the surface USFK was directly guilty in the Kwangju Massacre.
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