Maybe the North Koreans are serious about wanting Pakistan-like treatment after all — from Reuters:
North Korea will give up its missiles if the United States establishes diplomatic ties, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told a South Korean minister last week, an official in the South said on Monday.
Unification Minister Chung Dong-young met Kim in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, last Friday and the communist leader told him the North was ready to end its year-long boycott of talks on its nuclear weapons if the United States showed it respect.
Chung briefed the South Korean cabinet on Monday.
“If North Korea normalizes diplomatic ties with the United States and Washington becomes an ally with Pyongyang, then North Korea would give up all of its missiles,” a senior government official quoted Chung as telling ministers.
The official, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters Kim had been referring to long-, medium- and short-range missiles, some of which can reach Japan as well as South Korea.
OK, a translation note — the Korean term used was ubang, which sometimes means allies, but usually — and especially in this case, one would presume — means “a friendly nation.” Still, I don’t think I’ve ever recalled seeing the term Miguk (U.S.) and ubang (friendly state) ever used in a single sentence attributed to a North Korean official. I can only wonder if Chung was quoting Kim verbatim, or whether the unification minister was substituting his own vocabulary. Interesting either way, I suppose.
I guess the first thing that popped into mind was soju-addled “Unofficial Spokesman for Kim Jong-il” Kim Myong-chol’s essay “USA Will End Up in Shot-Gun Marriage with DPRK,” which is still absolutely hilarious despite the fact that Kim was apparently dead serious (although of questionable sobriety) when he wrote it:
Most Americans deny that they are in love with the North Korean regime of Kim Jong Il. However, sooner or later Uncle Sam will find himself left with no other option than to accept a shot-gun marriage with the North Korean girl and eventually desert his long-standing South Korean mistress. Once married, the American man will be totally fascinated by the feudalisticly loyal, sexy North Korean wife. No additional extramarital relationships will be tolerated.
…
The successive South Korean mistresses have been poor bedfellows for the Americans, far below American dignity and character. Syngman Rhee met a miserable death in Hawaii, after being toppled in a student uprising. Park Chung Hee was shot to death by his intelligence chief while dining with women at a secret retreat. Chon Du Hwan was once a death-row inmate. Roh Tae Woo was sentenced to life imprisonment. Kim Yong Sam was deeply implicated in a financial scandal.It has taken the American gentleman more than 55 years to consider seeking the hand of the North Korean girl, who he has realized is glamorous, tough and consistent enough to be given legal wedlock
Anyway, back to Kim’s reported offer. OK, one can blow this off as just more in a long line of North Korean rhetoric. I wouldn’t blame anyone for doing so. But this, along with the Dear Leader’s other supposed comments, while seemingly bizarre, got me thinking about something Selig Harrison wrote last week:
There is a strong mood of wounded pride and angry nationalism in Pyongyang that cuts across both “dealers” and hard-liners. It is particularly galling to North Korean leaders that the United States, oblivious to the sensitivity of Chinese-Korean relations throughout history, is attempting to apply pressure through China and to use it as a diplomatic intermediary.
“This is not the 19th century,” one North Korean official commented, an allusion to the servile posture of Korean monarchs toward China during the closing decades of the Yi dynasty, which provoked a strong nationalist reaction. The Kim regime consistently appeals to Korean national pride and has sought friendship with the United States in part as an offset to excessive dependence on its giant neighbor. Thus, attempting to use China to pressure Pyongyang only strengthens the hard-liners.
When Harrison writes something, I usually blow it off as ludicrous, as I did when I first read the above. Now I’m not so sure. On a purely theoretical level, I guess it is possible that KJI realizes:
a) even without the U.S. in the way, the DPRK is in no position to unify the peninsula by force, and;
b) despite their apparent reluctance — for now — to actual tighten the screws, the Chinese have his balls in a vice grip that they might eventually find it in their interests to use.
Of course, there are those who might argue that without a U.S. bogeyman, the North Korean state couldn’t survive, and what’s more, none of us have heard Kim Jong-il actually say the things he’s said to have said — we are hearing them through South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, who has a definite interest in putting as rosy a spin on his meeting with the North Korean leader as humanly possible. One friend of mine also pointed out that Kim might have had a very real interest in making Chung look good, knowing full well that seeing Chung in Cheong Wa Dae after Roh is a lot more appealing as far as he is concerned that seeing Park Geun-hye, Sohn Hak-kyu or anyone else the GNP might run. All these are duly noted.
There is also the question of why the U.S. would want to be friends with the North Koreans in the first place. I mean, China’s friends with North Korea, and look at all they get out of that relationship. It seems to me we have enough scumbag allies like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Uzbekstan that are at least geopolitically useful without having to add another one, especially a gulag state that’ll likely reward our massive outlays of foreign aid “friendship” by telling us to fuck off whenever we ask it to do something. I guess if North Korea were willing to define “friendship” as a U.S. embassy in Pyongyang and U.S. trade and aid while understanding full well we would continue to take in defectors and press for change, I might take that deal, just to see how it works. If, however, the North Koreans intend to define “friendship” as reviving their nuclear program each time a defector crashes the U.S. embassy in Beijing or the State Department issues a report condemning human rights abuses in North Korea, well, they can keep their nukes sans a U.S. embassy (or aid) and see how far that gets them.
One more note on this — According to the Korea Times, Chung told GNP chairwoman Park Geun-hye that there are “three secrets” from his meeting with Kim that have yet to be made public. Frankly, some of these things coming out of the meeting are so wacky, it wouldn’t surprise me if KJI — having read novelist’s Kim Jin-myung’s suggestion — offered to send combat troops to Iraq.
17 Comments
All this wounded pride stuff and speak nicely and respect and all is a crock of poo and a tactical distraction — which NK is good at getting outsiders to follow.
But, above all, the regime in NK has shown a good sense of pragmaticism — not for the nation as a whole, but for the regime itself. Kim Il Sung didn’t like it when men of importance and average Koreans seemed to be too favorable to Stalin and the Soviet Union. He also didn’t like those leaning toward China’s communists. So, he culled them.
Whether the leadership really believed in juche or not, a key to the idea was keeping North Korea for Koreans (a selected group of them — the regime).
And that has not changed and will not change under the current regime.
North Korea doesn’t want to be too dependant on China. It sees the US and then Japan as large cash cows.
But it wants to limit exposure to one and all. Regardless of what name you might call them — friend or foe — ally or enemy —- North Korea’s guidelines are to accept what they can get from others with the least amount of “interference” — and their threashold for when “interference” is too much is very, very small.
Let me put it this way
It has taken the American gentleman more than 55 years to consider seeking the hand of the North Korean girl, who he has realized is glamorous, tough and consistent enough to be given legal wedlock.
Now there’s a marriage made in Hell if I ever saw one. I don’t think South Korea would allow anyone to marry her comfort woman, though.
I read the “three secrets” article at the Hankooi.com site and it is really amusing how, for one to post a response to an article, they stipulate that:2. Restriction on User Application
. . .
2-4. Applying for the purposes of undermining the well-being, order, or public morals of the society; . . . I love that. This is the same society that has allowed a well-known dancer to be publically humiliated and slandered, thus harming his ability to even earn a living, all because they would not (could not!?) do something about it! (see this link for the article about the 60?€™s Korean movie star Kim Han-sub and his problem with internet poachers
Interesting revelation:
“According to the Korea Times, Chung told GNP chairwoman Park Geun-hye that there are ‘three secrets’ from his meeting with Kim that have yet to be made public.”
Weren’t there also “three secrets of Fatima” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Our_Lady_of_Fatima)?
Along these lines, the North once did write a hagiography titled “Kim Il-sung is God” (http://www.aidanfc.net/a_year_in_pyongyang.html), so maybe the “Beloved Leader” has inherited some divine attributes of the “Great Leader.”
Anyway, the post is interesting. The U.S. ought to sound out Kim Jong-il on this to see if he’s serious.
But maybe the North just wants to play the role of ‘balancer’ in Northeast Asia.
hilarious… i guess kji just got around to watching the lord of the rings. i think that hodges might be on to something with kji now prepared to enlighten the world with some kind of divine vision received from baekdu mountain. who knows what a man of his pluck can do.
General Kim Jong Il is a rare great man of Baekdu type who was born at Mt. Baekdu, the sacred mountain of our nation, and made an unusual growth amidst the special revolutionary education of his parents, brilliant commanders of Baekdu, as well as the practical training of the revolutionary struggle. He personifies the revolutionary spirit, trait and nature of Mt. Baekdu.
The revolutionary spirit of Mt. Baekdu personified by him is the spirit of independence associated with the soul of Baekdu, the spirit of gun inheriting the linage of Baekdu, the indefatigable revolutionary spirit replete with the mettle of Baekdu and the optimistic spirit consistent with cheerfulness of Baekdu.
The revolutionary trait of Mt. Baekdu possessed by him is pluck and courage of Baekdu-style giant, ever-victorious sagacity of the brilliant commander of Baekdu, broadmindness befitting a heroic man, organizing ability of leading millions of people, indefatigable attacking spirit, strong ability of execution.
http://www.geocities.com/songu.....aekdu.html
A lot of what Chung had been saying sounds bogus, and the “three secrets” BS clinches it. The guy is angling for the presidency and playing the public.
I could see Harrison being correct that the Chinese-Korean unequal history could make “attempting to use China to pressure Pyongyang only strengthen the hard-liners.” But one of the main reasons Pyongyang would want “friendship” is to play the US off of the Chinese for concessions, just like it played the Soviets off of the Chinese for concessions before the fall of the Soviet Empire.
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I truly believe that NK and KJI wants to be America’s friend.
I truly believe that doesn’t mean much at a practical level.
Meanwhile:A lot of what Chung had been saying sounds bogus, and the ?€œthree secrets?€? BS clinches it. The guy is angling for the presidency and playing the public.
I’m not especially a Chung fan but that is not fair. It is not Chung who is going around running his head off. What he said to the public was very little and rather limited. He then reported the rest to Cheong Wa Dae, NSC, etc, as he should; thing is, everyone who has heard of what he reported in private is talking to the press about it, getting Chung accused of “playing the public.” MichaelMichael isn’t alone in doing so, of course, and it would be hard to keep up with the Chosun on something like that.
Pure art reminiscent of those Communist Chinese propaganda posters, Kim Myong Chol’s anachronistic rabid anti-American rhetoric gives cause to marvel at how completely a mind can be sealed from historical fact for over four decades. You truly have to travel back to the Kennedy era to fully appreciate how perfectly he has captured the sense of preserving the brain of a Communist aparatchek in a jar. The US invasion of Korea, division of Korea along the 38th parallel and subsequent instalation of today’s puppet government - none of the outmoded, romanticized notions of the old left are left out. A wonderful trip down memory lane to a much simpler era when, to quote Mel Brooks “things were rotten.”
Oranckay–have you been reading about other “leaks”? I’m curious about what people make of Kim’s apparent conversion to America-lover. Chung’s quotes sound like Kim has joined AMCHAM. Hope you get your site back up.
MichaelMichael: Thanks for your concern. Promise to be fixed in a day or two.
Good to hear–cheers.
Can somebody define friendship for me? Oranckay brings it up clearly, it seems, by showing how muddled, nonsense, it is.
“I truly believe that NK and KJI wants to be America?€™s friend. I truly believe that doesn?€™t mean much at a practical level.”
What does NK want in the friendship? Does it want friendship so it can cut back on its defense spending? If the US is a friend, will it shift forces off the DMZ, do away with much of its artillery systems, scrap development as well as exporting of missiles? Will it open the doors to American government officials and businessmen and tourists and the news media?
Does North Korea currently not do these things because it isn’t a friend with America?
If America plays nice, is North Korea really just chopping at the bit to become Switzerland?
This really makes no sense to me.
If there is nothing practicle involved in the idea of being friends, and I agree with Oranckay that there isn’t, then why talk about it?
I think it is a tactical distraction. I think the regime in North Korea sees that it gets play out of rhetoric like “end the hardline policy” and “America doesn’t want friendship” and such. Through well placed use of such phrases, it successfully gets influencial elements in the world, like the press and sometimes think tank people or politicians in South Korea, to focus on the words rather than anything practicle they are connected to (or not connected too).
It kind of works like this. Kim says he wants to be “America’s friend.” After so long recognizing the main line from North Korea is way over the top rhetoric about turning South Korea into a sea of fire and George Bush Jr. is the devil and America is the worst imperialistic bastard nation in the history of humanity, and such……some people in the public eye leap at the chance Kim means what he says —- after so much of the doom and gloom and war of words, a happy note rings true for some reason in the ear —- and some people want it to be true so much, they lose sight of the practicle application.
So, North Korea gets some of the pressure taking off of it. It can keep enough divide and conquer going not only between South Korea and the US, but elements within the US as well to some extent, it can keep the outsiders from agreeing on implimentation of sanctions or toughers against it.
I believe North Korea wants “friendship” with the US, if by friendship we mean a sharp change in the relationship to the US giving North Korea significant amounts of regime supporting material aid. If by friendship we mean instead of coordinating efforts to limit North Korea’s econmic gains with other nations (like the EU nations), the US starts actively pumping material aid into North Korea and encouraging others to do the same.
And if we mean by friendship that, in return, North Korea does virtually nothing. Except maybe cutting down to nothing the amount of anti-US rhetoric it puts out for international consumption.
Friendship with America, as defined by North Korea, will not include political or geopolitical reform. It will not include opening Korean society up to the outside world. I doubt very much it would even include any significant changes in North Korea’s military structure or military economy. And I don’t believe it would include a stop in missile development or exportation, nor include getting rid of the nuclear bombs it currently has or a stop in all forms of nuclear bomb making programs.
“implimentation of sanctions or toughers against it.”
Even I have no idea what I meant to come after the “or”?
Perhaps “tougher measures”?
Actually, KJI’s ‘nice talk’ could be another brilliant tactical move. After all the bluster and ratcheting up of the tension, he can whisper sweet nothings and just as happened at the summit back in 2000(?) when people fell all over themselves saying how ‘charming’ the guy was, he may be aiming for the same effect. It seems like a PR stunt, to get Southerners and others to then put all the blame on the US (again) for not being ‘fair and generous’.
KJI raises the temperature sky high and then deflates it, it’s a classic case of manipulation.
You would almost suspect that he has hired a PR consultant to help him spin these things…