UPDATE: Also alliance-related, a researcher with the Defense Ministry’s Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) warned that Seoul shouldn’t automatically expect the calvary to arrive if the shit were to hit the fan.
ORIGINAL POST: The Christian Science Monitor reports that while the upcoming Roh-Bush summit is unlikely to address it, the 50-year-old Korea-U.S. alliance may be on seriously shaky ground:
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions may be the marquee source of agitation in the US-South Korea alliance. But other factors are also behind the relationship’s rough waters. Among them: China’s emergence as an Asian power, Japan’s more prominent role in security issues, signs of a US rethink of its defense role in South Korea, and Seoul’s desire for a more equal-partner relationship.
“The core of the US-South Korea alliance is North Korea, and the fact that [the two countries] see the issue very differently is what stands out,” says Derek Mitchell, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “But beyond North Korea are other sources of tension…. The US is questioning what it is getting out of the alliance, and that makes South Korea nervous.”
Indeed, some Pentagon officials and regional experts consider the alliance “ripe” for review. But largely because long-term trends are pulling the two countries apart, the two presidents are likely to focus on the immediate picture, experts say. Mr. Bush will thank Mr. Roh for the participation of South Korean troops in Iraq, and they will discuss prospects for the six-party talks. But the big issues are likely to be left alone.
Of course, the Koreans have there own beefs:
Gi-Wook Shin, an expert in Northeast Asian issues at the Stanford Institute for International Studies, says South Koreans’ concerns about US “arrogance” color how the South views two factors: China’s emergence as an economic and security power, and Japan’s higher profile in security issues. “Many South Koreans are favorable” to a rising China, “but they are concerned about Japan expanding its security role by working more closely with the US,” he says.
Experts also say South Koreans increasingly feel a sense of “entrapment” from a close association with US foreign policy. “The US used to fear it could be trapped into a war [on the Korean peninsula],” says Richard Bush, an Asian expert at the Brookings Institution. “Now it’s the South Koreans who fear they could get entrapped in a conflict they don’t want” - either with the North, or someday with China over Taiwan.
If reports in today’s Hankyoreh and Seoul Shimun are true — and the Korean government officially says they aren’t — Washington isn’t exactly being subtle about airing its grievances, with U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard “Lawless” Lawless threatening to pull out USFK if Seoul didn’t accept U.S. demands for “strategic flexibility” for U.S. forces in Korea. The Chosun ran an English translation of what was reportedly said:
Reports said U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless threatened Korea during a visit to Seoul on Sunday to Monday, saying the country’s strategic value was finished, and if it failed to accept American demands, the U.S. forces in Korea could be withdrawn. Reports also have Lawless visiting the Korean Embassy in Washington on May 31 and telling Korean ambassador Hong Seok-hyun, “Korea’s Northeast Asian balancer role is a concept that cannot coexist with the Korea-U.S. alliance. If you’d like to change the alliance, say so anytime. We’ll do as you like.”
Don’t beat around the bush, Mr. Lawless — tell us how you really feel. Of course, Lawless has never been shy about bitching. Although to be fair, Seoul denies he said what he is reported to have said, and the papers that reported the comments haven’t exactly been Washington’s best friends. Still, not everyone was disappointed in Lawless’s USFK withdrawal threat, as the Hani’s photo album would attest.
30 Comments
I agree with Marmot. I don’t think the think tank people and others are basing it on a misconception about anti-Americanism in Korea. That is why I don’t think the trend will reverse.
(I also disagree that anti-Americanism is limited in South Korea. Yes. The vast majority of Koreans don’t want USFK out. But that doesn’t mean the vast majority of Koreans don’t have a negative view of the US-SK relationship (now and in the past)).
But, again, that isn’t the point to me.
Like Marmot, I believe the major changes that are coming from the US side on USFK are NOT a result of anti-Americanism.
For one thing, the US military seems to be not only fine with the changes announced, they seem to be pushing them. That is something new. The military has dealt with anti-US attitudes in Korea for decades. It was also THE number one supporter of the US-SK security alliance.
But, times have changed….
and that’s the point.
In the early 1990s, some key government people looked at the end of the Cold War and called for a change in US committments, and USFK was slated to end, but that tied with the 1994 crisis.
9/11 just brought America out of its peaceful slumber. We were content and let things slide. 9/11 woke us up, and once awake, serious people started taking a serious look at what might be done.
And rightly or wrongly, USFK is viewed as a relic of the Cold War more and more in the US.
What I mean is, things like the fact South Korea is economically and demographically strong enough to defeat North Korea on its own if the North invades - if South Korea just had the mind-set to put its resources into such a defense - are hard to ignore if the United States decides to look more closely at the alliance.
There are plenty of things like that floating around the SK-US alliance that have nothing to do with anti-US attitudes.
Anyway, I do want to ask about a change in administration in Korea.
I’m no longer in Korea teaching Korean adults, so I don’t get the chance to guage their thoughts.
But from afar, I wonder if the GNP wins the next election, can they really reverse the Sunshine Policy even if they want to?
It seems to me Korean society is split on how much sunshine is too much, but is there really enough consensus (a high enough percentage) to reverse the sunshine policy?
Can a GNP president apply economic sanctions on North Korea? Can it cut out the mountain tours and curtail the Kaesong project” Can it take a tough line along side the US if it comes to that?
It seems to me, from this far away, the GNP would not have enough public support for such things to put them into policy even if it won the next election.
usinkorea,
I’ve made this point on two separate op-eds, but the present incarnation of anti-Americanism in Korea is largely due to government propaganda. In spite of its facade of liberal democracy, South Korea still has a lot of undemocratic residues, and one of them is the degree which the government controls information (and the degree which the press self-censors). I suspect that if the GNP wins, South Koreans will hear a lot more reverse propaganda about how evil N.K. is and how vital the relationship with the U.S. is to them.
I am also not if I agree with Mr. Lawless about the strategic value or the lack thereof S.K. I don’t have the time to get into it but the U.S. also benefits a lot by being in S.K. and it will also incur negative externalities by leaving (e.g. perhaps putting pressure on its Japanese commitments as well).
This stuff hits at one of the key problems — these days, if you dig below the surface emotional issues (anti-Americanism), there is much that doesn’t make sense. The more you dig, the more likely you are to find things that call continuing the relationship into question.
The US clearly wants flexibility. It wants to be able to use USFK units in spots that are hotter than Korea at the moment, and USFK has always been a static, locked in force whenever the US has got involved elsewhere - from Iraq to Bosnia.
South Korea hates the idea for good reason - it might encourage the North to believe it can attack. SK also doesn’t want to spend the massive amounts of tax money to build up Korean forces to give more security if USFK moves units out.
And no matter how the US feels about the US-SK strategic alliance, whether today they say we have flexibility or not, it had been be clear to the people in DC that South Korea can always do what Turkey did in Iraq War II — anytime they really don’t want USFK units to move in and out of the South for operations in another places, South Korea can exercise its rights as a nation and close its air and sea space to the US military. Then the only option would be to remove the USFK units altogether. South Korea can prevent the US from using Korea as a staging area anytime it sees fit, and it has more reason to not allow flexibility when the need arises.
The US is worried about what effect China’s rising power will have if it approaches anything like so many experts predict. They worry about it from many angles including military and economic security.
Meanwhile, South Korea, government and society, sits back praying for China to fullfill the predictions. They can’t seem to wait for “Chaina to replace America as the #1 superpower!!” South Korea worries about China hurting Korea by out competing it in key industries, but it seems clear the fears are dwarfed by the hope for the great yellow hope. (play on great white hope)
Take that issue alone — Why should the US spend so many resources to save Korean money for defending itself — when Korea is waiting very impatiently for China to challenge the US on massive scale across the board?
But, there is also Japan. Japan is the US’ best ally along side the UK. It is the best ally in Asia. It has the most economic strength coupled with good strategic defense position (an island). The US clearly wants Japan to be more engage in regional and world affairs. But, South Korea (among other asian nations) absolutely rejects and hates this idea with a passion.
Then the nukes and North Korea. South Korea’s primary fear is of a collapse up North that will hurt its economy. They fear the nukes a distant 2nd, and a good chunk of South Korea doesn’t fear the nukes at all. Not at all. While the US is very concerned about North Korea’s nukes, ability to sale nukes, and ability to put a nuke on an ICBM.
And, these days, it is clear South Korea is more willing to lend its ear to Pyongyang and come out with pressure against the United States to get an agreement favorable to the Kim Jong Il regime than it is willing to help the United States do something about the North’s nukes and nuclear programs.
The best thing the alliance has going for it is some hypothetical fear of an economic depression spinning out of control — if the US pulls out and North Korea attacks the South.
That and the ever powerful status quo.
In the recent past, before the nuke crisis, there was talk about the future of the alliance that said USFK would remain a key part of security for South Korea and the region long after NK goes away. You still hear that from time to time. I always considered it horseshit. China might be paranoid about a united Korea with massive US troop presense, but South Korean society isn’t going to see a reason to keep US troops once the North Korea threat is completely removed.
The only thread holding the alliance together for real now is the North Korea threat. There is no more global cold war. This is a localized one. And it is a localized one where one of the two primary sides (South Korea) doesn’t believe it is in a cold war. They like to say war is impossible and now they say the North is more a brother than the US is a friend.
So, all things considered, it really isn’t much wonder why people think the US-SK summit will leave a ton of stuff undiscusses when it meets.
Everything below the surface stinks.
South Koreans who currently possess unfriendly sentiments towards the United States will not react differently to China’s growing influence. Great power influence is something the South Korean left-wing cannot cope with, although it is almost impossible to ward off.
South Koreans may view a “rising” China favorably (I don’t think they do) in light of current American influence on the peninsula. However, South Koreans, especially the America-hating left-wing, will not welcome a “risen” China.
Korean dislike for its regional neighbors are far more deeply ingrained in their hearts than towards a country that didn’t even exist when Koreans were already having problems with China and Japan.
usinkorea, don’t believe the hype.
South Korea’s current president is a left-wing nutjob with low popularity ratings and who doesn’t fully grasp the gravity of IR. In two years there will be an election in which a more left-wing candidate will not be elected. Either a conservative will be elected, the result of which will be the new ruling party making damn well sure that Washington knows how much the new Seoul government loves them. Or a pragmatic moderate to somewhat liberal will get elected, but they will clearly know how badly Roh has hurt the US-ROK alliance and they will be looking to patch things up.
Anyway, a quiz in the meantime:
In terms of overall dollar expenditures on military (2004), South Korea is ranked where?
A) #5
B) #10
C) #20
D) #30
E) #50
F) No one knows. It’s a secret.
“Korean dislike for its regional neighbors are far more deeply ingrained in their hearts than towards a country that didn?€™t even exist when Koreans were already having problems with China and Japan.”
This doesn’t match my experience. Japan, sure. China? No.
The conversations almost always went something like this — usually prompted by some news story about China’s economy growing or sometimes some tiff between the US and China –
The Korean would say how China was becoming the next #1 superpower, and there was a touch of pride usually in the comments. It was either unspoken, or just as often directly spoken, that the people I was talking to saw China rising to challenge the US as a good thing — a very good thing.
Once the discussion was taken up further, then some concerns about how the rise will actually effect Korea, espcially competition in key industries, would surface, but usually after I led the conversation in that direction. Then again, the idea that Korea could milk the new cash cow was also common — just as it is among American investers and companies when looking at China.
There is some worry about negative influence from China’s rise, but by far the dominant trend I saw again and again, was much pride and hope in China rising to a position not just to challenge the US, but very often, virtually always, stated as China “replacing” the US.
Korean’s don’t invision becoming a vassal state, but they do dream of an Asian world champion (that isn’t Japan).
On defense spending — I don’t know the answer to the question, but I have heard several times South Korea spends less per GNP than most of the other OECD members, even though it is the last cold war front for any of the OECD nations….
I think the key points I made are still not in the discussion.
I don’t doubt South Korea doesn’t want changes in the US-SK security alliance. They don’t want 1/3rd of USFK to leave. They don’t want flexibility. At times, they don’t seem to want them to move off the DMZ. They surely don’t want all USFK out, because of the potential for war and especially because of the costs to build up ROK forces.
But, what is holding the alliance together from the US side besides the status quo and some hypothetical fear of a world wide depression if the North is free to attack the South with no “tripwire” ???
Aren’t there more things tending to push the alliance apart than whatever is holding it together???
Kushibo took the words right out of my mouth. One of the biggest misconception about Korean politics that is propagated abroad is that South Korea somehow had an ideological realignment the last decade or so. Simple stories grip the reader better, but things are–as usual–far more complex. What elected DJ and Roh is not a Leftward lurch in the electorate but the failure of the conservatives to unify behind a single candidate. If Rhee In-Je didn’t bolt the conservative camp and run his own election in 1997, DJ and/or if Chung Mong-Jun didn’t throw his lot with Roh in 2002, no one would be talking about the 386-ers and anti-Americanism wouldn’t be so diffuse.
The fact that Roh and the Uri Party are wildly unpopular and have been walloped in the last 2 by-elections are also cases in point.
I do agree with Kushibo that barring another conservative crack-up, the conservatives win in 2007 and South Korean official stance and likely public opinion changes dramatically. But what I worry is that the conservatives still would fail to field a single candidate. Park Gun-Hye has already gone off on her own before; so who knows what will happen if she’s not nominated as the GNP candidate? And Lee Myung-Bak and Sohn hak-Kyu may have independent base to run their own campaigns outside the GNP structure as well.
Let’s talk about that healthy alliance
More than once, I’ve told my friends in Seoul not to start packing just yet for the
My main point isn’t concerned that much with South Korea’s viewpoint on the need for the alliance. I’m thinking of what the US hook is in the relationship. What is its reason for being and then compare it to South Korea’s social feeling on it.
Backseat Drivers
Marmot reports on the gloomy predictions surrounding the upcoming Roh-Bush summit in the US. Its a time for South Koreans to voice their concerns about the direction of the ROK-US alliance. And, there is where the problem begins. Korea, in…
Re #8. The US has a great deal to gain from the economic and politcal stability gained by staying here.
And the anti-American sentiment is misrepresented and misunderstood. Yes, there is a loud but very small minority that wants USFK out, but most people don’t feel that way.
Don’t believe the hype.
If the US waits until the end of the Roh administration, it will get most or all of what it wants for staying in South Korea, maybe more. That’s one good thing about scaring the bejeezus out of everyone including most of the leftists.
Won Joon Choe wrote:I do agree with Kushibo that barring another conservative crack-up, the conservatives win in 2007 and South Korean official stance and likely public opinion changes dramatically. But what I worry is that the conservatives still would fail to field a single candidate.I think the conservatives see much more at stake (losing a third election), so they will find some way to keep it together (open the files they’ve probably got on everybody) perhaps).
But I don’t think a more liberal candidate than Roh will be fielded on the left and win, so even if the liberal/progressive candidate wins, we will see more consistent and clear pragmatism on the issue of the US-ROK alliance.
The Korean press seems to find Roh’s idea of South Korea as a “balancer” as half-baked and silly. I think it’s probably just Roh’s little fantasy way to steal the next Nobel Peace Prize from Bono, and so when Roh is gone, so will that idea (which was probably the worst-explained (and therefore one of the most misinterpreted) IR ideas ever concocted by South Korea).
Even leftist Koreans know which side their bread is buttered on, and they don’t want USFK gone. I have never heard Koreans talk “a touch of pride” about China becoming a superpower. There’s economic anxiety to South Koreans as China overshadows them. Please remember that the Roh camp and the leftists beyond that are only one minority segment in Korea.
Kushibo,
I hope you are right but we have a lot of maverick-like characters in the GNP. I also think American patience is running out. Even Republicans who are traditionally staunch friends of Korea (e.g. Richard V. Allen) are demanding that the USFK pull out. So I worry if something will happen before the 2007 election.
As an aside, it’s just amazing how bad Western journalism of Korea (I guess this is true of East Asia in general but…) really is when you really examine how anti-Americanism and the what I’ve called the “myth of the generational shift” has been represented. Western journalism of Korea is all surface and no core.
Marmot, you need to give us a function to edit the comment section. A native Korean with bad grasp of grammar cannot live without it
“A native Korean with [sic] bad grasp of grammar cannot live without it.”
I was referring to myself there and the sentence itself is indicative of what I am driving at
I still think Choe and Kushibo and I are talking from different ends of the stick.
There is the idea that South Korea under attack would send the world economy into a tizzy, but I think when people start thinking more closely about things, the rationale for the United States keeping such a committment to SK starts to unravel, and over the past year, we’ve seen more and more people changing their tune — which used to be a simple acceptance that the alliance would last forever. Think-tank people, the media, and politicians in the US are starting to ask some serious questions whose answers people who strongly favor the alliance will like to see these people reach.
My points (and Choe’s?) is that the think-tank people, politicians, and media are basing their conclusions on a faulty notion that Koreans “don’t want us there” and that the election of Roh represents an irreversible shift to the left. It also ignores the idea that there is a huge chunk of the population that is almost Republican in their outlook.
Kushibo — good points, and probably why one shouldn’t make sweeping changes in one’s relationship with a particular country based on the actions of one administration. I think, however, that the changes in the alliance reflect a more basic divergence of interests in the post-Cold War era, though, and the very different geopolitical situations in which South Korea and the U.S. find themselves. Things are still up in the air, though, as countries adjust to the new security environment, which is probably why this period is so tense.
The next election in Korea will be interesting. I spent a good bit of time in Korea and even more studying about it, but I admit I don’t have a finger on the pulse of Korean society. I think I get the anti-US picture very well, but when it comes to something like Korean politics and voters, I can’t predict and I’m lucky if I understand 60% of it.
On the Japan pressure, I’ve heard a good number of think-tank people in the US say the same thing, but I don’t buy it.
My guess is that if the US leaves Korea, it will tend to solidify the relationship with Japan.
Japan has zero friends in the area. That alone would work against more pressure on the US. Put that together with a nuclear North and the possibility with USFK gone, South Korea would cut a deal with the devil (Pyongyang) to lessen the threat of Korean War II, and Japan would probably decide it is absolutely crucial to have a strong strategic ally, and that means the US.
If the anti-US military forces in Korea succeed in getting rid of USFK, the anti-US military forces in Okinawa will step up their campaign until they succeed.
I have a piece in today’s Asian Wall St. Journal that elaborates what Kushibo and I’ve been saying. Take a look, if you have a chance.
Agree with Kushibo again on the Okinawa issue.
I like Kushibo’s suggestion of scaring the bejeezus out of the leftists by making it look like the alliance will disintegrate. After 12,000 are pulled out, try for another 12,000, see what the reaction is and then take it from there. For once, I’m in agreement with SK commies-yes, US troops out of SK. I like the idea!
Though I understand that in the bigger picture, maybe a full pullout might not be in the best interests of either, at least not yet, anyway. That being said, I say start moving in that direction and see what reactions come up.
I am mostly ignorant on the situation in Okinawa for real. I read a Japanese commentor on a board once say that you have to understand how the Okinawa anti-US military stuff works — he said it was like a cash cow for the island. He said when they throw a fuss about the US military there, Tokyo pays them off, and so over the years, protesting has become more of an economic game than real size of political pressure to get the soldiers out.
I have no way of telling if this is true or not.
However, over the years, I have not gotten the impression the freqency of sharp outbursts of hate in even Okinawa is anywhere close to what it is in South Korea.
I have also got the general impression that the Japanese are better at keeping their emtions guided by national interests, which I frankly think even Koreans know they are not so good at.
But, even if a USFK pull out spurs Okinawa to push very hard for the same thing on their island, I believe the rest of Japan would push hard to relocate the bases elsewhere in country. I remember reading not too long ago that Japan was already in the process of moving some of the bases.
I think the finally fact is what I mentioned above — Japan seems better at reading its national interests and putting those first. I’m not saying Japan doesn’t make mistakes or puts its head up its butt sometimes. But in general, I think they are too pragmatic to push the US military out if the US doesn’t want to take them out.
kushibo wrote
If the anti-US military forces in Korea succeed in getting rid of USFK, the anti-US military forces in Okinawa will step up their campaign until they succeed.
i disagree.
as long as the japanese government respects its security treaty with the u.s.(and majority of japanese believes there is no other way to protect the national security), they will continue to have the u.s. military base there.
even at worst case when okinawa refuses to accept those soldiers being shifted from korea, japan will absorb them in other u.s. military bases within mainland japan.
there are anti-us military sentiment in okinawa, but i think it is mixed with anti-tokyo sentiment. not just hate america thing as in rok.
okinawa was not even a part of japan until 1871. before that it was an independent ryukyu-kindom having the first king around 12th century. then after WW2 until 1972, okinawa was a part of the u.s. so it is quite different from japanese in other part of japan.
Coming back to the main post, I think the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korean peninsula is the prelude to bombing NK nuke sites.
It has to be played out this way. When the U.S. troops are gone, NK will have no justification to attack SK even after their cities are hit.
However, no U.S. troops in the SK will bring about a shock to the people of Korea. The commies will blatantly call for unification in any means, even undr KJI. And, the right-wingers will plan for a military coup.
Would we see people fighting in the street?
I have talked with some Okinawans about this, and I see a lot of parallels. Also, the anti-USFK groups are working closely with the anti-USFJ groups to advise and organize. The anti-USFJ Okinawans will be emboldened by their ideological compatriots in Korea if the latter succeeds in getting USFK out.
And since a disproportionately high number of USFJ troops are on the tiny island of Okinawa, moving them could be a serious blow to efforts to use Japan as a strong base. It would be back to Guam and Hawaii, putting things farther and farther away from where they might be needed.
Vocal locals don’t want us in Korea, Okinawa, parts of mainland Japan, and even the US’s home turf of Puerto Rico (we closed Vieques Island over this) and Guam.
At some point the US should realize that closing up shop in area when it doesn’t have to, just because of some vocal locals, is not the wisest path. Give Roh a few verbal whacks to the head to knock some sense into him, and in the meantime keep quiet counsel with the Hannara people and the moderates in Roh’s party, and just wait it out until 2007.
It has to be played out this way. When the U.S. troops are gone, NK will have no justification to attack SK even after their cities are hit.Just like Saddam Hussein had no justification to attack Israel in Gulf War I?
And even if the US is out of Korea, wouldn’t North Korea have “justification” to attack Japan? Even without missiles, there’s a country with a very long coastline. It must not be that easy to keep it secure, given the number of Japanese who were kidnapped right off its beaches.
Getting the USFK out of Korea in order to bomb North Korea would just make Japan a more logical target for an attacked North Korea.
kushibo,
The anti-USFJ Okinawans will be emboldened by their ideological compatriots in Korea if the latter succeeds in getting USFK out.
sure anti-usfj people could be very encouraged, particularly because those people in okinawa may have different opinion about the national security. (nevertheless, i also know that they have been suffering more than any other part of japan in the past by the central government’s neglegence for the welfare of the area)
but afterall it is the central government to decide. and the japanese government will never ever let usfj out of japan, not to mention okinawa, whereas the roh administration may have different idea.
Getting the USFK out of Korea in order to bomb North Korea would just make Japan a more logical target for an attacked North Korea.
agree on this point.
I don’t know how much or how little Koizumi cares about the opinions of Okinawans, but another rape case there could cause things to boil over. At some point it might not be good politics to have USFJ remain in Okinawa, even if they move to another part of Japan. But Okinawa hosts a disproportionately high number of USFJ personnel, and moving them won’t be quite so easy, not to mention that they would be moving farther away from where they need to be.
The US also has central control over its territory, but it left Vieques (in Puerto Rico) after years of sustained pressure (Puerto Rico is part of the US). There are also some serious problems brewing on Guam, and as tourism becomes a greater source of income, the military may seem more and more like a less desirable thing (especially considering there are land issues involved).
My point is that it would be very unwise for the US to pull out of an established base unless they had to. Pulling out of Korea could have something of a domino effect in terms of organized anti-American sentiment among local communities elsewhere in Asia-Pacific, and that could in turn affect politics.