June 09, 2005 ????? Fresh from a weekend meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, South Korea’s defense minister, Yoon Kwang-ung, said yesterday that the chance of a preemptive strike on North Korea by the United States is remote.
“At the current point there is no such possibility,” the minister said in a radio interview. “When the United States conducts military actions on the Korean Peninsula, prior consultation with the Korean government is required.”
Despite the continuing statements to the contrary on the part of members of the ROK goverment, I would not put it pass the U.S. to preemptively bomb nuclear sites in the DPRK…without telling the ROK beforehand.
The reason being, the United States has a long history of screwing over the Koreans. A prime example of this being the event that helped spark the 6.25 (Korean) War.
On January 12, 1950 United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the National Press Club that America’s Pacific defence perimeter was made up of the Aleutians, Ryukyu, Japan, and the Philippines implying that the U.S. would not fight over Korea, and that the country was outside of American concern in the Pacific. This omission, which was not deliberate, encouraged the North and the Soviets.
As an American, I always cringe whenever I read that — even though much more than that was going on at the time.
But this quote, found over at Harvard Magazine, sums up what I’m talking about, although it’s my impression the ROK goverment today says they were cool with this plan.
The second looming disaster, involving North Korea, had a far more ambiguous and temporary resolution. In the spring of 1994, as in the fall of 2002, North Korea was planning to take fuel rods out of its research reactor at Yongbyon to extract the six or so bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium they contained. The United States was trying to deal diplomatically with this threat, but in the Pentagon I was also exploring military options???what in today’s exaggerated rhetoric would be called “preemption.” Secretary of Defense William J. Perry ordered preparation of a plan to eliminate Yongbyon with an airstrike using conventional precision weapons. After very careful planning, we were confident that such a strike would collapse the reactor and entomb the plutonium as well as eliminate the other facilities at Yongbyon that were part of North Korea’s plutonium infrastructure. In particular, we were confident that we could destroy a nuclear reactor of this kind, even while it was operating, without causing any Chernobyl-type radioactive plume to be emitted downwind???obviously an important consideration. Such a strike would effectively set back North Korea’s nuclear ambitions many years.
And, add to that, this quote from The Marmot:
He also noted that if the U.S. military were to drop a nuclear warhead on North Korea, it would choose a time when the winds were blowing toward South Korea, not toward China or Russia.
…and do you really think the ROK is all that safe if U.S. President George W. Bush thinks it’s in the vital interest of the United States to preemptively strike the DPRK?
Who knows, maybe all of this is simply a confusion over kitty litter.
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8 Comments
The reason being, the United States has a long history of screwing over the Koreans
Not sure if I’d put it that way, exactly, especially considering how we paid for the “screwing” you cite with 36,576 American lives, to be followed with very real security committments over the next 50 years.
I generally agree that the U.S., like any country, will act to protect its interests, even if they clash with those of an ally like South Korea’s. The thing is, if the U.S. had intended to launch air strikes against North Korean nuclear sites, it seems to me that it would have done so a long time ago. The real North Korean deterrent isn’t nuclear, but rather its artillery pointed at Seoul. Yes, if Pyongyang were to get caught exporting nukes to terrorist elements or other shady characters and it appeared to Washington that it was a choice between possibly losing Seoul or possibly loosing a major U.S. city, well, that not really a choice, as far as the U.S. is concerned. Prior to evidence of that, however, I don’t see the U.S. doing something really dramatic like bombing Yongbyon.
That being said, I could see a scenario by which the U.S. launches air strikes simply to prove to the North Koreans that their deterrent is fairly useless unless they want to risk actions that would ultimately lead to the end of the North Korean regime. In that case, air strikes would be kind of like a North Korean negotiating tactic — you might not like Yongbyon getting bombed, but there’s nothing you can do about it without risking your own destruction. In theory, it could work, but it’s extremely risky and potentially catostrophic politically, especially if we don’t warn our allies before hand.
Assuming such an event were to take place, I can see the need to warn China, Russia, Japan and theoretically SK but isn?€™t it a foregone conclusion that SK would not take this lying down? Wouldn?€™t they scream and shout about this? I agree that while extremely risky, a ?€?surgical?€™ air strike might be carried out but I think that there is too much to loose for this to happen unless, like the marmot notes, there is reasonable evidence to believe that NK is selling nukes to terrorists or other such shady groups. Even that, I fear, would be a pretty hard sell to the SK public.
Marmot, I will be more careful with my wording in the future.
I should have written, “The reason being, the United States has a long history of screwing over the Koreans when it felt it had to for geopolitical reasons.”
I am used to Ahssa! where I sometimes slip into “say it that way to be provocative” mode because I’m just writing for myself.
I don’t disagree with anything you said in response to my post. By “screwing over” I meant that from what I gather from Miguk-Hanguk relations America views ROK as a “little brother” it can humor while things are good and ignore when need be.
I did not mean to belittle the sacrifices of the UN forces during the 6.25 War.
Wasn’t it on another link of Marmot’s from yesterday that basically said that Acheson’s leaving out Korea from the East Asian perimeter, did not play an important part in leading the North to invade the South in 1950? I think it was the usenet link that said that according to Soviet documents, the perimeter speech was of minor importance to Stalin and KIS’s thinking.
Isn’t the opinion of the SK public a lost cause?
“I am used to Ahssa!….”
What does that mean and why does it make me feel like I’m watching a private conversation?
(I know what “assa” means in Korean, if that’s what you mean, but I don’t know what being used to it means. Thanks for the help.)
Did I miss something…who is shelton bumgarner and is he guest hosting for the Marmot?
“I am used to Ahssa! where I sometimes slip into ?€œsay it that way to be provocative?€? mode because I?€™m just writing for myself.”
I’ve always thought the Marmot was above such antics.
BTW…
“I did not mean to belittle the sacrifices of the UN forces during the 6.25 War.”
Marmot’s reference was to US KIA. Did you intentionally avoid responding directly to US KIA. You sound like the type who hates himself for being American.
Aprox 3,200 KIA - UN Forces (UK,TR,CA,AU,FR,GR,CO,ET,NL,TH,PH)
Aprox 33,000 KIA - US (also “UN”)
Savoy — Yes, Shelton Bumgarner is guest blogging here. His style and take on things is a bit different from mine. I’d appreciate it if readers gave him a chance to get himself settled here.