It has steel frame, yes?

Robert at the Marmot’s hole is shocked that Incheon taxpayers will likely be forced to pay around $1 billion to fund the construction of Pyongyang’s empty white-elephant hotel.:When Incheon mayor Ahn Sang-soo came back from Pyongyang with an agreemen…

If you believe those workers from South Korea will be allowed to move around North Korea or the heart of NK with any kind of freedom, there is probably no use getting into a debate with you about it…

“First, this gradual influx of capital, infrastructure, and know-how will make things a hell of a lot easier when reunification does come. And second, the more and deeper these connections are, the harder it is for the regime to control thoughts and ideas, which helps build up a critical mass of perception of both the outside world and the inside world, which may become very crucial at some future crisis point in the regime?€™s existence, leading to an East German-style throwing-in-of-the-towel rather than a going-down-with-both-guns-blazing scenario from the military or some other ?€œleadership.?€?”

This is a nice idea, and I’ll accept giving it a small, small chance of working, but……..China and the Soviet Union built up North Korea’s infastructure and gave it technological know how and kept NK at a standard of development that led some scholars in the US and many South Koreans unhappy with their own government to say North Korea under Kim Il Sung was more developed than South Korea under Park Chung Hee……but when Kim Il Sung saw too many NKoreans fawning over Stalin and Russia, he nipped in the bud. North Korea didn’t have much of a problem keeping Russian and Chinese influence from disrupting the incredible brainwashing it has done to its people. So I don’t have much hope this initial stage of blindly pumping billions of dollars into North Korea by South Korea is going to take the next step of North Korea allowing non-cold cash items from getting in to an extent it will corrupt North Korean society. All the things I see, including what a few people outside Korea point to as great signs of “North Korea’s growing willingness to one day open up,” teach me just how unwilling North Korea is to open up, even if it has to let a significant portion of its people continue to starve to death.

“But then there?€™s the ugly idea that these ties are actually propping up the Pyongyang regime, forestalling the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime, thus prolonging the torture and death of many more.

But is this really true? Is South Korea?€™s ?€œSunshine Policy?€? really forestalling their collapse while a hard-line approach would hasten their demise? I don?€™t think the evidence is there, considering that nearly fifty years of the latter did NOTHING to lead to Pyongyang?€™s collapse, and perhaps the greatest number of famine-related deaths occurred as a result of policies and actions took during that time.”

This is off base for two reasons that I can think of off the top of my head.

1) as noted earlier, during the vast majority of the 50 years of hardline policy, North Korea had two major sponsors just like South Korea had the United States (but it would actually be interesting to compare how freely aid and material support flowed from Russia and China compared to the US. I’m not as familiar with the North Korean side, but you see a constant tug of war between the US and South Korea’s leadership over loans and grants and other forms of developmental aid in the period up to South Korea’s full flowering of economic power.)

When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia cut North Korea off from a free ride, China wasn’t long in doing the same. They began to demand a barter system or some form of economic exchange rather than pumping North Korea up for geopolitical purposes. And North Korea collapsed with amazing speed. That is when the massive starvation began. In the 1990s.

It had very little to do with a hard-line vs soft-line approach by South Korea.

2) Whether or not starvation deaths happened under a hardline approach and collapse still didn’t come, it does not erase any “moral” responsibility if South Korea and others decide to become Pyongyang’s new sponsors.

Whether or not cutting North Korea off results in the regime’s collapse or not, it doesn’t matter in consideration of whether I find it morally reprehensible that a nation is helping the Pyongyang regime and supporters live a more comfortable life and securing a better hold on their people by giving the North Korean government material support.

If giving such material support is weakening the hold of Pyongyang, maybe if the subject of morality comes up, you can make your argument, but as I said before, I don’t think you can make a good argument based on what we’ve seen in North Korea since 1998 that pumping in material support is going to produce an East Germany or Soviet collapse scenerio.

On China being much more key than South Korea, I agree. But in terms of morality, that doesn’t excuse Seoul.

And Seoul’s geopolitical support for Pyongyang is very significant, and the material support is not without significant influence in both keeping Pyongyang stronger and in actually helping make sure China will be willing to help Kim Jong Il –

this is definately debatable, but if China were faced with a unified front against Pyongyang, if South Korea cut North Korea, China would stand a good chance of jumping on board and putting much more effective pressure against North Korea. China has shown — it fears collapse of North Korea, but it has also shown it most definately knows which side its bread is buttered on. It has shown it understands it’s own economic future and fullfillment of its growth in power lies in playing with the rest of the world, not going against it. Seoul provides Beijing with a not insignificant cover for supporting Pyongyang against any pressure from the US and others.

“So what am I advocating? Am I saying we should slap sanctions on China until they come around on North Korea? That may not be practical, given how deeply enmeshed we are, economically, with the People?€™s Republic of China.”

That was my question…

In general, we’ve strayed far from the issue of morality or ethics in your defense of how Korea does the sunshine and against criticism of it.

But, I am all for more pressure on China. I don’t see the US government putting much pressure on South Korea on the sunshine policy, and what pressure they do extend seems to be in the ballpark with what it says to China in public about North Korea.

I’d like to see the US turn the screws up on both China and South Korea, but especially China since it has more influence on Pyongyang’s health.

I think your idea of the US trying to convince China it doesn’t have to fear a democratic North Korea (or more specifically that China doesn’t have to fear the US setting up shop (military bases) right up on the Yalu River or anywhere in North Korea if the Kim regime goes away.)

But, where I’m sure you and I differ, if I were in control of the US government, I’d make China and South Korea pay a significant economic (trade and investment) as well as geopolitical price for the amount of support it has given Pyongyang since early in the 2000s. I’d turn the heat up on both of them as well as pointing out how much I’d help if they see things my way.

Specifically, I’d make somewhat binding agreements with them going a long way into locking the US into specific massive amounts of developmental aid and material it will pump into North Korea (and China and South Korea) to handle North Korea after the collapse.

That, to me, is China and South Korea’s best bet.

North Korea even under their sponsorship will remain threateningly weak. Diverging from the US on North Korean policy simply gives the US less desire to help bail out China and South Korea if North Korea does collapse.

If I were China and South Korea, I’d get the US to put its money where its mouth is. I’d get the US to commit to specific areas and time-tables of massive, massive rebuilding support it will pump into a “reconstruct North Korea” campaign - lasting years if not a couple of decades - as the price for Chinese and South Korean support in major pressure on North Korea to get Pyongyang to open up or collapse.

And if I were American in that situation, I’d agree to rebuild North Korea into another South Korea despite the costs, because having another South Korea or Japan or Western Europe is ultimately good for the United States (and the rest of the world).

I discovered there are actually two buildings at Seoul National University with the same horrible black exterior and it is depressingly ugly, especially after having a layer of city grime applied to them!

What does it mean if they fix up the hotel? Yes, it means SK money pumped into NK, but it also means that Pyongyang will end up allowing a whole bunch of South Koreans (and others?) up into North Korea. Not just in controlled areas like Kaes??ng and K?­mgangsan or even Najin, but in the heart of the country.

And I think this is part of the point of the gradualist approach to reunification: aiming not toward collapse of the system, but of a creeping in of southern/Western values for two purposes. First, this gradual influx of capital, infrastructure, and know-how will make things a hell of a lot easier when reunification does come. And second, the more and deeper these connections are, the harder it is for the regime to control thoughts and ideas, which helps build up a critical mass of perception of both the outside world and the inside world, which may become very crucial at some future crisis point in the regime’s existence, leading to an East German-style throwing-in-of-the-towel rather than a going-down-with-both-guns-blazing scenario from the military or some other “leadership.”

Of course, there is the problem with all the refugees and the starvation, which this seems to fail to address. But are the two mutually exclusive? Can’t these ties be fostered while also providing food aid? Of course they can.

But then there’s the ugly idea that these ties are actually propping up the Pyongyang regime, forestalling the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime, thus prolonging the torture and death of many more.

But is this really true? Is South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” really forestalling their collapse while a hard-line approach would hasten their demise? I don’t think the evidence is there, considering that nearly fifty years of the latter did NOTHING to lead to Pyongyang’s collapse, and perhaps the greatest number of famine-related deaths occurred as a result of policies and actions took during that time.

In other words, decades of a hard-line approach did NOT lead to the collapse of the northern regime and it did not prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands or millions. Thus, calling the so-called “Sunshine Policy” of engagement morally bankrupt because it props up Pyongyang is a bit specious.

And it also ignores a very, very important point, that there is another elephant in the room we choose to ignore: China.

It is China that props up Pyongyang. China. That’s right: China. China props up Pyongyang. It is not Seoul, it is China.

South Korea could double, triple, quadruple, halve, or eliminate (zeruple?) its investment in North Korea and it would make little or not difference on when and if Pyongyang collapses. China controls that switch.

I think this is why it bothers me so that conservatives are so quick to bash Seoul for its political and economic engagement with the North while virtually ignoring Beijing’s role. Seoul is playing the piss-poor hand it was dealt, but it is China that set up the table and the rules.

Bash Beijing if you’re going to criticize Seoul.

But who is doing that? Virtually no one. China is a major economic cow to be milked, so we don’t criticize China. We don’t criticize China for torturing its own citizens, much less actively rounding up North Korean refugees and sending them back to North Korea where they will likely be tortured and imprisoned, likely forced to do hard labor, and possibly killed.

We don’t criticize China for keeping Pyongyang propped up even though they know that North Korea is a human rights nightmare that makes China look like a kindergarten by comparison.

No. We send them billions up billions of dollars in investment instead.

But we criticize every step South Korean government or business takes as part of the Sunshine Policy.

Not only is this hypocritical, but it may also be counterproductive. At least the Sunshine Policy has a shared goal (eventually) with the hardliners: eventual elimination of the North Korean regime and absorption of North Korea into South Korea. The difference is in tack: Sunshine Policy seeks to kill with kindness while the “Moonshine Policy” (Dr. Lee Jungmin of Yonsei) seeks to isolate it and let it die a quicker death.

But China has no such goal in mind. It wants its buffer state against Japan and the US (and perhaps Korea and democracy in general). It wants to keep propping up Pyongyang. It does not share the goals of Sunshine Policy. China is the culprit. China is country responsible (beyond North Korea itself) for keeping Pyongyang afloat.

China.

The People’s Republic of China, whose government still shares, nominally at least, a communist ideology with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

China in which we invest tens of billions of dollars and then tens of billions of dollars more. China which gives us cheap electronics to buy at Walmart. China.

So what am I advocating? Am I saying we should slap sanctions on China until they come around on North Korea? That may not be practical, given how deeply enmeshed we are, economically, with the People’s Republic of China.

But it does mean two things: we need to recognize that China is the one that needs to be pressured. We need to make China feel comfortable — or less uneasy — with the prospect of a democratic and capitalist and unified Korea at its doorstep and allied with the US and Japan. We need to plant the idea in Beijing’s head that they can and should flip the switch on Kim Jong-il. Whatever that entails.

And second, stop beating up on South Korea for the Sunshine Policy. It’s not anti-US. It’s not even pro-North. It’s an attempt to try something when the hardline way failed to work after half a century. It will take time, if it works at all.

Now, having said that, I do think there are some things that are deserving of criticism. The Roh administration and much of the press seem to go overboard not to offend Pyongyang or Beijing, almost to the point of kowtowing to them.

In particular, I think that Roh’s policy of preventing the refugees from coming here to South Korea crosses the line: it is not necessary to do so from a Sunshine Policy perspective, and it borders on moral repugnance. But again, the true culpability falls on Beijing, which is rounding up these North Koreans and sending them back. South Korea is merely slowing its process of accepting them, at a time when few other countries — including the United States — are willing to accept any North Koreans except those who make it to that country’s shores on their own.

South Korea is given the Hobson’s choice between continuing Sunshine Policy unabated but turning down the volume on the refugee issue or endangering Sunshine Policy progress, which (its proponents believe) could end up causing more good in the long run. Both choices may lead to considerable losses.

But Beijing is the one with the real choice: actively maintain its agreement with Pyongyang to round up and send refugees back to North Korea, knowing that they will likely be tortured and possibly killed, or tone down or even end the round-ups and let the North Koreans stay in China or quietly go to South Korea or some other country.

Ultimately, it is China’s choice, not South Korea’s. China, our economic partner.

Finally, and this is perhaps an entirely different issue, is the idea of Inch’??n taxpayers subsidizing a P’y??ng’yang hotel. I’m a Seoul taxpayer, but if I were an Inch’??n taxpayer, I might be livid.

But people will do strange things for civic pride, like building stadiums for sports franchises or for Olympic bragging rights. The 2014 Asiad that Inchon and Pyongyang are trying to jointly hold could lead to a 2020 Olympic bid for one or both of them (though I think the only way Pyongyang will get the Olympics anytime soon is as a nod to a newly reunified Korea).

But this does bring an odd twist: would, say, Detroit build subsidize a new stadium in Windsor, Ontario, just to get a sports franchise in the area? Would Seattle do this even for Vancouver, Washington, much less Vancouver, British Columbia? I couldn’t even see Los Angeles County doing this for Orange County (not that we need it, because we have Disney dollars).

Of course, I assume that all that food aid would actually end up going to those who actually need it. Admittedly, that’s assuming a lot. But then, we’re also assuming that Incheon’s half-bil would go into hotel construction.

My guess is, Inchoen is making promises just get get Pyongyang’s cooperation. It fascinated me what South Korea will do to prevent the collapse of a building and regime. They call it the Unification Minister, but in reality it’s all about how to prevent it. S. Korea saw what happened to Germany and knows the Korean ecomony could not handle it.

The hotel is a classic metaphor for the entire county of NK and the promise to fix it is a classic metaphor for the south attitude.