The U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee has released a report on the North Korean nuclear issue entitled, “Anticipating a North Korean Nuclear Test: What???s to Be Done to Avert a Further Crisis.” It’s an interesting read, full of interesting scenarios, and I generally agree with its final policy suggestion:
What can the United States and its allies do to avert a North Korean nuclear weapons test? Essentially, the United States must demand that the PRC make a choice: either help out or face the possibility of other nuclear neighbors. Helping the United States would include participating fully in the quarantine of North Korea; tolerating Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese missile defense programs; and doing nothing to pressure the South Koreans to agree to a confederation with North Korea.
What struck the Chosun Ilbo, yesterday, however, was what appeared to them indication of extreme mistrust of South Korea on the part of the U.S. Republican Party. Discussing possible regional reaction to a North Korean nuclear test, the report said:
The democratic half of the Korean Peninsula would be under great pressure to respond to a definitive nuclear weapons program in North Korea. It would be reasonable to presume that Seoul would likely engage in intense diplomatic talks with the six parties involved in this crisis. South Korean government critics will insist that South Korea restart its long dormant nuclear weapons program and end all humanitarian assistance and political openings to North Korea. As tensions grew in the region as a result of other parties’ responding to a North Korean nuclear test, South Korea might mobilize its forces to protect against an invasion from the north. Additional steps that may be taken by South Korean diplomats and military planners could include purchasing and deploying Aegis and other theater defense weaponry from the United States, and beginning discussions with regional and global allies about possible support in a confrontation with the North.
However, another scenario that might develop is one in which Seoul determines it to be far safer to form some kind of arrangement or confederation with North Korea. The South Korean populace, afraid of possible all-out war that could include nuclear attacks, may well opt for the confederation option. This would likely result in Seoul asking that U.S. forces leave the Korean Peninsula. North Korean and Chinese officials would likely welcome this because it would remove the U.S. military from the region. Such a move could have dire security consequences for U.S. allies, namely Taiwan and Japan. [emphasis mine]
OK, while I’ll always grant the very real possibility of South Korea going even further out of its way to appease North Korea in the face of an undeniable North Korean nuclear threat, I believe Seoul entering into a confederation with Pyongyang as a result of a nuclear test to be very unlikely. First off, I’d imagine Seoul — like everyone else — is already operating under the assumption that North Korea has nuclear weapons. A nuclear test would simply confirm what everyone already knows. I can’t imagine a simple nuclear test would prompt such a massive shift in anyone’s foreign policy, other than possibly give states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (particularly the latter) one less excuse for not developing nuclear arsenals of their own.
As far as South Korean finlandization is concerned, while I don’t discount the possibility of Seoul terminating its alliance with Washington and asking U.S. troops to go home, the chances of that happening as a result of North Korean behavior — particularly threats — are, IMHO, very slim. To the extent that we are seeing some very curious moves on the part of the Roh administration in terms of Seoul’s relationships with Washington and Tokyo, the prime motivating factor is not the desire to keep out of the North Koreans’ crosshairs, but the desire to avoid having to choose between China on one side and an increasingly close U.S.-Japan alliance on the other. I could even foresee a scenario — albeit a highly unlikely one — where Seoul enters into some sort of “confederation” relationship with Pyongyang, but such an event would likely to be the result of nationalism and what some might argue to be the misplaced belief that such a move would bring the peninsula one step closer to unification, NOT because Cheong Wa Dae is pissing its pants about North Korean nukes.
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7 Comments
I think Marmot underestimates the symbolic significance of an actual nuclear test, which crosses all sorts of real strategic and psychological red lines.
A nuclear test does not merely make a statement as to NK’s capabilities (though it does elimitate the powerful human tendency towards denial), but more importantly, it makes a new statement as to NK’s willingness and intent. The photos of North Korean mushroom clouds splattered all over the global media will have a powerful effect–far more so than the endless bombastic North Korean words (”words, words, words,” to misquote Shakespeare) that we cannot underestimate.
Also, I hope they don’t test it tomorrow, as I’m on a flight from Philadelphia to Incheon and I’d hate to see what this would do to my flight schedule.
I’m sure they’d test it underground (unless perhaps they’ve come up with a new technique that causes the mushroom cloud to form in the shape of the head of KIS or KJI as it rises? Now that would indeed make a memorable photograph).
An above ground test would certainly cause fallout to drift over a neighboring country, and I imagine they would want to avoid this. They might even try to deny the actual test by claiming it as an earthquake; is the Korean peninsula an active earthquake zone like Japan? If so it might be hard to tell unless we’ve got continuous satellite surveillance of the expected ground zero and can get photos of the surface moving upward and then sinking, above ground zero.
It would be interesting to see the extrapolations made by the seismic sensors around the world as to the projected “size” of the nuke. If they’ve figured out a way to make a “small” one that might be really alarming, in terms their ability to sell a a weapon to an outside group; of course I’m not a physicist, and I suppose a small yield doesn’t necessarily imply a small physical size to the weapon.
A good chance I supppose that their weapons are physically large (like the first US nukes) which means they can’t be easily smuggled, unless the Chinese have shared their stolen US technology for “miniaturization” with the North. I can’t see why the Chinese would do this deliberately, but anything is possible and there’s always corruption.
I imagine the Pakistani ones are large in size as well (I think the current Pak arsenal is estimated at around 60 weapons). Anyone know anything different? I haven’t tried to research this topic on the net yet.
Who knows what would happen…
I think it isn’t an event that we can say would clearly produce this or that. I tend to believe it would not fundamentally alter the situation. I doubt very seriously it would cause either China or South Korea to give an OK to any US approach to using military force of any kind against North Korea. I doubt somewhat it would convince China and even less so South Korea to apply economic sanctions that would weaken North Korea even more. So, I can’t really imagine a nuclear test fundamentally altering things.
However, you can never tell with something that big. North Korea would be a tough, costly nut to crack even if all agreed to do it, and those costs make South Korea and China reluctant to even consider tougher measures.
But, seeing the reality of a nuclear test might swing the situation in a radical way….
SEOUL (Reuters) - North Korea offered rare praise to President Bush on Friday, saying the U.S. leader addressing the North’s leader as “Mr. Kim Jong-il” improved the tone for talks on Pyongyang’s nuclear programs.
Skip to next paragraph Reuters
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said Bush calling Kim “mister” was a way “of politely addressing our headquarters of revolution,” the official KCNA news agency reported.
The praise for Bush comes a day after the North labeled Vice President Dick Cheney a “bloodthirsty beast” after he had said Kim Jong-il was irresponsible and runs a police state.
I don’t think it’s likely that the Roh Administration, if it removes itself from the US/ROK alliance, will be able to successfully straddle China and the US.
I rather suspect that the depth of ill feeling over such a move (and the attendant pictures of Korean protesters jeering leaving American troops) will result in a “to hell with them” attitude on Washington’s part when Seoul comes begging for help against Chinese pressures. I don’t imagine the Japanese would be that much more sympathetic, either.
From an American point of view, the dissolution of the alliance would be a mixed bag. We’d lose an immense amount of “face,” a valued intelligence partner, and some forward bases on the Korean peninsula. We’d gain a good deal of freedom of action — we wouldn’t have to drag a recalcitrant ally along, and we would free up for further deployments all our troops on the peninsula. We could bomb Yongbyon without having to worry as much about Seoul and from a strict strategic point of view the Korean peninsula, which sits astride no major trade routes (and possesses few natural resources) is not so valuable anyways.
The spectre of a withdrawing America would probably encourage various other Asian countries to seek accomodations with China, but it would also decidedly cool some of the more irrational behavior we’ve seen on the part of Taiwan recently. It might also encourage more initiative and forward-lookingness on the part of various Asian powers as they struggle to keep the Americans in, the Japanese down, and the Chinese out.
[...] hat it has implied itself to be. Not the rarified language of the Senate is it? Hat-tip: The Marmots Hole a great blog on Korea.
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