<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Sunshine Policy&#8217;s Execution?</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/</link>
	<description>Korea... in Blog Format</description>
	<pubDate>Sat, 11 Oct 2008 23:02:14 +0000</pubDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6.2</generator>
		<item>
		<title>By: usinkorea</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13087</link>
		<dc:creator>usinkorea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Apr 2005 10:48:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13087</guid>
		<description>Paul H,

Didn't the military people generally conclude the tactical nukes were a waste of effort?  They fit into the Cold War, because the two camps were doing any and everything to get a glimmer of an edge in the arms race.  But once things settled down, I thought the military said the tactical nukes were more of a headache than asset.

I think I remember something recently about the US looking to develop bunker buster tactical nukes stemming directly from the efforts of North Korea (and Iraq) to negate the US' advantage in air strikes.  I remember hearing one irrate American grad student mentioning the development of these nukes as a sign of the huge sham by the US in its nonproliferation talk -- as if the very idea of a low yielding, contained nuclear device was never thought of before.  He had obviously never heard of the artillery nukes developed long ago.

My initial thought on what the US could offer SK as we leave is that we would be constrained by our position in Japan.  If North Korea invaded the South, I sure as heck would not want to see the US throw troops back into Korea like we did in the first Korean War.  If we are going to do that, then we should stay there now.  But, I think it would cause some problems if we also agreed to provide air support from Japan, because it would give NK a reason/excuse to strike at Tokyo.  So, I am fairly limited on what kind of military agreement we can make with SK as we leave.
</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paul H,</p>
<p>Didn&#8217;t the military people generally conclude the tactical nukes were a waste of effort?  They fit into the Cold War, because the two camps were doing any and everything to get a glimmer of an edge in the arms race.  But once things settled down, I thought the military said the tactical nukes were more of a headache than asset.</p>
<p>I think I remember something recently about the US looking to develop bunker buster tactical nukes stemming directly from the efforts of North Korea (and Iraq) to negate the US&#8217; advantage in air strikes.  I remember hearing one irrate American grad student mentioning the development of these nukes as a sign of the huge sham by the US in its nonproliferation talk &#8212; as if the very idea of a low yielding, contained nuclear device was never thought of before.  He had obviously never heard of the artillery nukes developed long ago.</p>
<p>My initial thought on what the US could offer SK as we leave is that we would be constrained by our position in Japan.  If North Korea invaded the South, I sure as heck would not want to see the US throw troops back into Korea like we did in the first Korean War.  If we are going to do that, then we should stay there now.  But, I think it would cause some problems if we also agreed to provide air support from Japan, because it would give NK a reason/excuse to strike at Tokyo.  So, I am fairly limited on what kind of military agreement we can make with SK as we leave.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Paul H.</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13086</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul H.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 02 Apr 2005 09:33:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13086</guid>
		<description>Yes, a great idea, sadly the generals, diplomats and politicians don't listen to me.  

Just so you know, part of the resolution to the Cuban missile crisis involved the US withdrawal from Turkey of what were called "Jupiter" missiles (short-range (ie not intercontinental), liquid-fueled (took a long time to prepare for firing), nuclear warhead (how big a nuke? don't know)).  Supposedly these were obsolete even for that time period, so it was "no big deal" for the US to give them up anyway, but this gave the Soviet Union a face-saving compensation for the withdrawal of its "short-range" (not intercontinental) nuclear missiles from Cuba.   

Jupiter missiles were separate and distinct from US Army nuclear artillery shells, which could be fired from regular heavy artillery cannon just like regular shells. 

So what did a "Jupiter" missile look like?  Good question, I've never seen a picture now that I think about it, will have to google to see what's out there on the net.  

As far as the artillery shells, they were considered "tactical" nuclear weapons, with extremely short range (less than 30 km), and thus not seen as a "strategic" threat in the same way that the longer-ranged missiles and aircraft were (non-"intercontinental" though these latter might be).  

I suppose the idea was that such artillery shells could be used against Soviet ground forces invading Turkey in the event of a general war with NATO.  The shells were stored and maintained under strict US military control, though they were physically located in Turkey; thus, they were unavailable for use when the Turks and Greeks were having one of their periodic and traditional episodes of attempts at mutual throat-cutting.    

President Bush (the first one) did away with these nuclear artillery shells as a weapon, in an obscure arms control announcement during his presidential term.   So I don't think these are available in the US arsenal any more, but they were definitely around through 1992 or so. 

So -- my proposal would actually be an escalation, a step up, from the Turkish example, but then changing times call for changing methods, not so?  After all, it's not our (US's) fault that NorK developed its own nukes; indeed, even the most rabid anti-Americans have never accused the USA of helping NorK to get nukes, in the same way they accuse the USA of helping to "arm" Saddam Hussein during the 1980's.   

No, unlike Saddam Hussein the NorKs did it all on their own.  Instead of pouring their energies into economic modernization they choose a classic bit of Stalinism from the 30's and starved their own people to develop their war machine.  So it seems only right that we should compensate "our" Koreans for our withdrawal from the peninsula  by making sure they have wartime retaliatory control of some of their own nukes as well, at least for long enough until the ROK can develop its own ones (which will undoubtedly be superior to the older American models).   

As to Dokdo, my idea is that the nukes would remain under US control unless needed for retaliation after NorK "first use" -- so could only be armed by US presidential order -- so such nukes would be unavailable to the ROK for use in resolving the Dokdo dispute (regrettably?  perhaps so, depends on your "point of view").    

Perhaps NorK could be called in to mediate the Dokdo dispute?  They could test one of their nukes on Dokdo, with two benefits: 

a) eliminating all ambiguity about whether or not NorK has an operational nuclear weapon;
b) eliminating the islets themselves, so they'd no longer be a cause of discord.   Both Koreans and Japanese could then fish the surrounding waters together (as soon as the radioactivity went down enough to make the fish edible again), with blessed harmony and smiles returning all around.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, a great idea, sadly the generals, diplomats and politicians don&#8217;t listen to me.  </p>
<p>Just so you know, part of the resolution to the Cuban missile crisis involved the US withdrawal from Turkey of what were called &#8220;Jupiter&#8221; missiles (short-range (ie not intercontinental), liquid-fueled (took a long time to prepare for firing), nuclear warhead (how big a nuke? don&#8217;t know)).  Supposedly these were obsolete even for that time period, so it was &#8220;no big deal&#8221; for the US to give them up anyway, but this gave the Soviet Union a face-saving compensation for the withdrawal of its &#8220;short-range&#8221; (not intercontinental) nuclear missiles from Cuba.   </p>
<p>Jupiter missiles were separate and distinct from US Army nuclear artillery shells, which could be fired from regular heavy artillery cannon just like regular shells. </p>
<p>So what did a &#8220;Jupiter&#8221; missile look like?  Good question, I&#8217;ve never seen a picture now that I think about it, will have to google to see what&#8217;s out there on the net.  </p>
<p>As far as the artillery shells, they were considered &#8220;tactical&#8221; nuclear weapons, with extremely short range (less than 30 km), and thus not seen as a &#8220;strategic&#8221; threat in the same way that the longer-ranged missiles and aircraft were (non-&#8221;intercontinental&#8221; though these latter might be).  </p>
<p>I suppose the idea was that such artillery shells could be used against Soviet ground forces invading Turkey in the event of a general war with NATO.  The shells were stored and maintained under strict US military control, though they were physically located in Turkey; thus, they were unavailable for use when the Turks and Greeks were having one of their periodic and traditional episodes of attempts at mutual throat-cutting.    </p>
<p>President Bush (the first one) did away with these nuclear artillery shells as a weapon, in an obscure arms control announcement during his presidential term.   So I don&#8217;t think these are available in the US arsenal any more, but they were definitely around through 1992 or so. </p>
<p>So &#8212; my proposal would actually be an escalation, a step up, from the Turkish example, but then changing times call for changing methods, not so?  After all, it&#8217;s not our (US&#8217;s) fault that NorK developed its own nukes; indeed, even the most rabid anti-Americans have never accused the USA of helping NorK to get nukes, in the same way they accuse the USA of helping to &#8220;arm&#8221; Saddam Hussein during the 1980&#8217;s.   </p>
<p>No, unlike Saddam Hussein the NorKs did it all on their own.  Instead of pouring their energies into economic modernization they choose a classic bit of Stalinism from the 30&#8217;s and starved their own people to develop their war machine.  So it seems only right that we should compensate &#8220;our&#8221; Koreans for our withdrawal from the peninsula  by making sure they have wartime retaliatory control of some of their own nukes as well, at least for long enough until the ROK can develop its own ones (which will undoubtedly be superior to the older American models).   </p>
<p>As to Dokdo, my idea is that the nukes would remain under US control unless needed for retaliation after NorK &#8220;first use&#8221; &#8212; so could only be armed by US presidential order &#8212; so such nukes would be unavailable to the ROK for use in resolving the Dokdo dispute (regrettably?  perhaps so, depends on your &#8220;point of view&#8221;).    </p>
<p>Perhaps NorK could be called in to mediate the Dokdo dispute?  They could test one of their nukes on Dokdo, with two benefits: </p>
<p>a) eliminating all ambiguity about whether or not NorK has an operational nuclear weapon;<br />
b) eliminating the islets themselves, so they&#8217;d no longer be a cause of discord.   Both Koreans and Japanese could then fish the surrounding waters together (as soon as the radioactivity went down enough to make the fish edible again), with blessed harmony and smiles returning all around.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: non korean</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13085</link>
		<dc:creator>non korean</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 23:44:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13085</guid>
		<description>Paul.  I think it is a wonderful idea.  The U.S. could get its troops out and SK would not have to worry about a nuclear threat from their brothers up North and be more secure with future relations with China.  Heck I think I am even for SK just having half dozen nukes themselves just as long as they don't use them against Japan over some rock named Dokdo:)  

Turkey is a good example but I believe the US pulled those nukes out of Turkey, as part of an agreement with the the Soviets not nuclearizing Cuba (Cuban missile crises).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Paul.  I think it is a wonderful idea.  The U.S. could get its troops out and SK would not have to worry about a nuclear threat from their brothers up North and be more secure with future relations with China.  Heck I think I am even for SK just having half dozen nukes themselves just as long as they don&#8217;t use them against Japan over some rock named Dokdo:)  </p>
<p>Turkey is a good example but I believe the US pulled those nukes out of Turkey, as part of an agreement with the the Soviets not nuclearizing Cuba (Cuban missile crises).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: nora sumi park</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13084</link>
		<dc:creator>nora sumi park</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 23:27:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13084</guid>
		<description>frenchy wrote:
?橫one disturbing thing i??ve noticed about the discourse many non-koreans make about korea is the tendency to take a minority or partisan opinion and then attribute it to the entire country?? NORA

So nora are you a non-korean or a korean?

depends on what you mean. as a korean-american, then korean by blood and, to some degree, by culture. but american-born and raised and, for the most part, culturally. there are probably a few people on this list who speak korean far better than i do and 'get' korean culture better.

??koreans went ape-poohpooh when george bush ?? ??? NORA

Dont koreans do the same thing? 

huh? i just said koreans do that. 

my point was not that they should or shouldn't, but that the 'getting credit for being there' was important from a national prestige point of view, as military and political allies of the u.s., not just in terms of the bottom line.

?橫so many of you salivating over a war on the korean peninsula. y??all would love that, now wouldn??t ya??? Noolji

Keep up the trolling nora. 

what? so now i'm responsible for what noolji writes, too?! gee, this is a tough crowd.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>frenchy wrote:<br />
?橫one disturbing thing i??ve noticed about the discourse many non-koreans make about korea is the tendency to take a minority or partisan opinion and then attribute it to the entire country?? NORA</p>
<p>So nora are you a non-korean or a korean?</p>
<p>depends on what you mean. as a korean-american, then korean by blood and, to some degree, by culture. but american-born and raised and, for the most part, culturally. there are probably a few people on this list who speak korean far better than i do and &#8216;get&#8217; korean culture better.</p>
<p>??koreans went ape-poohpooh when george bush ?? ??? NORA</p>
<p>Dont koreans do the same thing? </p>
<p>huh? i just said koreans do that. </p>
<p>my point was not that they should or shouldn&#8217;t, but that the &#8216;getting credit for being there&#8217; was important from a national prestige point of view, as military and political allies of the u.s., not just in terms of the bottom line.</p>
<p>?橫so many of you salivating over a war on the korean peninsula. y??all would love that, now wouldn??t ya??? Noolji</p>
<p>Keep up the trolling nora. </p>
<p>what? so now i&#8217;m responsible for what noolji writes, too?! gee, this is a tough crowd.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Paul H.</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13083</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul H.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 23:15:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13083</guid>
		<description>Well, I'm not saying break the alliance, just bring out the ground troops (unless ROK wants to withdraw from the treaty of course, I think it's one- year notice, Marmot posted a link to the text a ways down).  

ROK intelligence chiefs advise their President what they really think about DPRK possession of nukes; he and his govt have to decide if they want to really believe that DPRK has the nukes or not, no more "playing both sides against the middle".  If they decide "yes", they then need to decide "how many have they got, how many do we want to counter".  

US agrees to leave behind the equivalent amount (or maybe a few more?), deliverable by whatever means ROK wants (missile, aircraft, both?).  Nukes remain under US military control until time for delivery, then ROK has to provide targeting and means to deliver.  I'm sure US would be glad to train up ROK pilots/ missile crews on proper delivery of "special weapons".  

You think I'm joking?  Not at all, ROK prestige is enhanced, they get to decide for themselves "to nuke or not to nuke; that is the question".  Good idea to pay careful attention to crew proficiency, you don't want to miss an intended target and have the device go off on the wrong side of the Yalu, "elder brother" USA won't be held responsible.   

I think we had this type of arrangement with the Turks throughout the cold war if I'm not mistaken.  US "special weapons" (nuclear artillery shells) under US command and control, but deliverable by Turkish 155 SP artillery if needed.   Never heard that the Turks complained about this arrangment, surely ROK is just as tough as they were/are.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, I&#8217;m not saying break the alliance, just bring out the ground troops (unless ROK wants to withdraw from the treaty of course, I think it&#8217;s one- year notice, Marmot posted a link to the text a ways down).  </p>
<p>ROK intelligence chiefs advise their President what they really think about DPRK possession of nukes; he and his govt have to decide if they want to really believe that DPRK has the nukes or not, no more &#8220;playing both sides against the middle&#8221;.  If they decide &#8220;yes&#8221;, they then need to decide &#8220;how many have they got, how many do we want to counter&#8221;.  </p>
<p>US agrees to leave behind the equivalent amount (or maybe a few more?), deliverable by whatever means ROK wants (missile, aircraft, both?).  Nukes remain under US military control until time for delivery, then ROK has to provide targeting and means to deliver.  I&#8217;m sure US would be glad to train up ROK pilots/ missile crews on proper delivery of &#8220;special weapons&#8221;.  </p>
<p>You think I&#8217;m joking?  Not at all, ROK prestige is enhanced, they get to decide for themselves &#8220;to nuke or not to nuke; that is the question&#8221;.  Good idea to pay careful attention to crew proficiency, you don&#8217;t want to miss an intended target and have the device go off on the wrong side of the Yalu, &#8220;elder brother&#8221; USA won&#8217;t be held responsible.   </p>
<p>I think we had this type of arrangement with the Turks throughout the cold war if I&#8217;m not mistaken.  US &#8220;special weapons&#8221; (nuclear artillery shells) under US command and control, but deliverable by Turkish 155 SP artillery if needed.   Never heard that the Turks complained about this arrangment, surely ROK is just as tough as they were/are.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: non korean</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13082</link>
		<dc:creator>non korean</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 21:55:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13082</guid>
		<description>It is real easy what would happen if USFK were to leave and the US/SK alliance was broken.  North Korea would tell S Korea to surrender to NK in 48 hours or it will nuke some city.  SK thinks about all those people, and all that "history" the city holds and surrenders to the North.  The North marches in.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is real easy what would happen if USFK were to leave and the US/SK alliance was broken.  North Korea would tell S Korea to surrender to NK in 48 hours or it will nuke some city.  SK thinks about all those people, and all that &#8220;history&#8221; the city holds and surrenders to the North.  The North marches in.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Paul H.</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13081</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul H.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 15:13:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13081</guid>
		<description>Good argument US.  

The other side of the coin is that as things are going now, in a crisis the US freedom of action could be seriously constrained by the ROK.  To the point of having to absorb a "first strike" in order to gain the political assent of the people of the ROK to use force, and what if we are facing simultaneous crises elsewhere in the world, such as with Iran in the gulf and across the Taiwan straits?  The Koreans are only concerned about themselves, we've got a lot more on the plate.    

I'm no longer willing to hang USFK out to dry as a "tripwire" any more, particularly now that they and we are the subject of teeth-grinding, clenched-fist anti-American fury on the part of a significant portion of the ROK population.  If their political leaders can't be bothered to educate them otherwise then that's their problem.  

The ROK is pursuing an effective policy of appeasment right now, propping up the DPRK with very significant amounts of aid.  Since money is fungible, just how long is the US expected to essentially subsidize this, with expensive defense funding for the ROK that we sorely need to use elsewhere?  2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20?  I'm sure that if the ROK can put off "unification" for the next 50 years, while we provide free "disaster" insurance for the "duration", they will be quite happy to do so.

The DPRK "system" isn't going anywhere.  If we are gone, it's just as likely that them boys up north will relax sufficiently to avoid going berserk, especially since the most likely result will be that the ROK just steps up the aid flow even more.   That may just reduce the likelihood of war sufficiently that the whole outcome will prove to be a "win-win-win" for everyone.  And maybe the two Koreas will have their pucker factors enhanced enough to make some actual progress towards a type of real "unification" (as opposed to a phoney-baloney one).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good argument US.  </p>
<p>The other side of the coin is that as things are going now, in a crisis the US freedom of action could be seriously constrained by the ROK.  To the point of having to absorb a &#8220;first strike&#8221; in order to gain the political assent of the people of the ROK to use force, and what if we are facing simultaneous crises elsewhere in the world, such as with Iran in the gulf and across the Taiwan straits?  The Koreans are only concerned about themselves, we&#8217;ve got a lot more on the plate.    </p>
<p>I&#8217;m no longer willing to hang USFK out to dry as a &#8220;tripwire&#8221; any more, particularly now that they and we are the subject of teeth-grinding, clenched-fist anti-American fury on the part of a significant portion of the ROK population.  If their political leaders can&#8217;t be bothered to educate them otherwise then that&#8217;s their problem.  </p>
<p>The ROK is pursuing an effective policy of appeasment right now, propping up the DPRK with very significant amounts of aid.  Since money is fungible, just how long is the US expected to essentially subsidize this, with expensive defense funding for the ROK that we sorely need to use elsewhere?  2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20?  I&#8217;m sure that if the ROK can put off &#8220;unification&#8221; for the next 50 years, while we provide free &#8220;disaster&#8221; insurance for the &#8220;duration&#8221;, they will be quite happy to do so.</p>
<p>The DPRK &#8220;system&#8221; isn&#8217;t going anywhere.  If we are gone, it&#8217;s just as likely that them boys up north will relax sufficiently to avoid going berserk, especially since the most likely result will be that the ROK just steps up the aid flow even more.   That may just reduce the likelihood of war sufficiently that the whole outcome will prove to be a &#8220;win-win-win&#8221; for everyone.  And maybe the two Koreas will have their pucker factors enhanced enough to make some actual progress towards a type of real &#8220;unification&#8221; (as opposed to a phoney-baloney one).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: usinkorea</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13080</link>
		<dc:creator>usinkorea</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 13:24:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13080</guid>
		<description>On the potential for North Korea making war again, I think people fall into a trap of expecting a nation to make reasonable decisions.  I used to have this argument in college classes all the time.  History wouldn't be written if nations and their leaders didn't make bad choices.

I think since the mid-1990s, the greatest chance for NK going to war again were internal.  I think there must be some balancing equation between the amount of deprivation in North Korea and the regime's desire to make war to unify the nation.  The more internal pressure, the more war as a last effort might "make sense" to the regime.

Remember back to the late 1990s when the former top level North Korean defector said North Korea would rather turn the South into a sea of fire than see North Korea go down alone?

With the USFK in country, the desire to strike out at South Korea is kept in check despite any rising internal pressure, because the regime knows it can't win at all.  It is still dangerous, because if it starts to collapse, I think it will strike out anyway even if only some of the military follows the orders to do so.  But, with USFK gone, I think it would be MUCH easier for the crazy regime in North Korea to believe it could take over the South quickly in order to release pressure from the NK people.  The NK leadership isn't as tuned into the real world as we might think.  I remember one Korean prof in the US said that he had given a tour in Hawaii to some NK officials and they went to a Korean Buddhist temple.  They also passed a church, and the official asked the prof if Buddhism and Christianty were the same thing.  There is no telling how many gaps in understanding there are in the NK military and government.

I would not put my faith in their good judgement when it comes to another attempt to take over the South.

As someone else noted above, even in thinking outside of Korea, there is considered some possibility if North Korea were to use unconventional weapons (chemical and biological) against South Korea and South Korea was fighting the war alone, the North could win.   I think South Korea would win on its own, even now, but I really doubt North Korea believes so.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the potential for North Korea making war again, I think people fall into a trap of expecting a nation to make reasonable decisions.  I used to have this argument in college classes all the time.  History wouldn&#8217;t be written if nations and their leaders didn&#8217;t make bad choices.</p>
<p>I think since the mid-1990s, the greatest chance for NK going to war again were internal.  I think there must be some balancing equation between the amount of deprivation in North Korea and the regime&#8217;s desire to make war to unify the nation.  The more internal pressure, the more war as a last effort might &#8220;make sense&#8221; to the regime.</p>
<p>Remember back to the late 1990s when the former top level North Korean defector said North Korea would rather turn the South into a sea of fire than see North Korea go down alone?</p>
<p>With the USFK in country, the desire to strike out at South Korea is kept in check despite any rising internal pressure, because the regime knows it can&#8217;t win at all.  It is still dangerous, because if it starts to collapse, I think it will strike out anyway even if only some of the military follows the orders to do so.  But, with USFK gone, I think it would be MUCH easier for the crazy regime in North Korea to believe it could take over the South quickly in order to release pressure from the NK people.  The NK leadership isn&#8217;t as tuned into the real world as we might think.  I remember one Korean prof in the US said that he had given a tour in Hawaii to some NK officials and they went to a Korean Buddhist temple.  They also passed a church, and the official asked the prof if Buddhism and Christianty were the same thing.  There is no telling how many gaps in understanding there are in the NK military and government.</p>
<p>I would not put my faith in their good judgement when it comes to another attempt to take over the South.</p>
<p>As someone else noted above, even in thinking outside of Korea, there is considered some possibility if North Korea were to use unconventional weapons (chemical and biological) against South Korea and South Korea was fighting the war alone, the North could win.   I think South Korea would win on its own, even now, but I really doubt North Korea believes so.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Frenchy</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13079</link>
		<dc:creator>Frenchy</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2005 00:01:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13079</guid>
		<description>"one disturbing thing i??ve noticed about the discourse many non-koreans make about korea is the tendency to take a minority or partisan opinion and then attribute it to the entire country" NORA

So nora are you a non-korean or a korean?
"koreans went ape-poohpooh when george bush ... " NORA

Dont koreans do the same thing?
"so many of you salivating over a war on the korean peninsula. y??all would love that, now wouldn??t ya?" Noolji

Keep up the trolling nora.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;one disturbing thing i??ve noticed about the discourse many non-koreans make about korea is the tendency to take a minority or partisan opinion and then attribute it to the entire country&#8221; NORA</p>
<p>So nora are you a non-korean or a korean?<br />
&#8220;koreans went ape-poohpooh when george bush &#8230; &#8221; NORA</p>
<p>Dont koreans do the same thing?<br />
&#8220;so many of you salivating over a war on the korean peninsula. y??all would love that, now wouldn??t ya?&#8221; Noolji</p>
<p>Keep up the trolling nora.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: James</title>
		<link>http://www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/30/sunshine-policys-execution/#comment-13078</link>
		<dc:creator>James</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Mar 2005 23:35:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://rjkoehler.com/?p=1518#comment-13078</guid>
		<description>For NK, I think it is just a matter of selling the idea of a unified Korea to China-once they decide that it is more in their interests to have a unified Korea-it will happen and probably not before then.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For NK, I think it is just a matter of selling the idea of a unified Korea to China-once they decide that it is more in their interests to have a unified Korea-it will happen and probably not before then.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
