During a recent lecture at a university North Korean studies graduate school, former Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun accused the United States of “raising the nuclear issue every time intra-Korean relations improves.” He also said the U.S. Bush administration was convening the six-party talks with the goal of seeking North Korea’s surrender, not to negotiate.
Jeong, who served as Cheong Wa Dae secretary of unification affairs under Kim Young-sam and unification minister under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, also claimed that the North Korean nuclear issue was the result of U.S. strategy, claiming that Washington “neocons” believe that prolonged tensions on the Korean Peninsula serve U.S. interests.
He said, “During the last round of six-party talks, the U.S. was completely disinterested in plutonium or missiles, and all it did was stick to the issue of enriched uranium… The U.S. basic strategy is not to negotiate or compromise, but to pressure North Korea and seek its surrender.”
The content of Jeong’s lecture, which was entitled “Forecasts for North Korean Nuclear Negotiations and North Korea Policy,” was exclusively obtained by Shin Dong-A Magazine, which will run it in its March edition.
The Dong-A pointed out that given Jeong’s experience, his observations appeared to be well grounded on a good deal of information (!).
In his lecture, the former unification minister pointed out that during his debate with Democrat presidential candidate John Kerry, U.S. President Bush said North Korea was isolated 5-1 in the six-party talks, and that Washington was using China to put pressure on Pyongyang. Jeong then asked why the North would show up for talks in such a situation.
He described the current situation as a fight between “an eagle and a sparrow,” and said North Korea has a “victim complex” in which it believes that should it make the first concession, the other side would read it as a surrender and possibly move in for the kill. He said that if the U.S. wants to solve the issue, it must make the first concession. “The bigger nation must concede first,” he said.
He also pointed out that when the Clinton administration signed the Geneva Accords in 1994, it did so because it predicted that the North would soon collapse, but North Korea was already well aware of this. He also claimed that because of North Korea’s geopolitical location, it couldn’t collapse no matter how much one wanted it to, so one had to think more along the lines of leading the country to change.
He also said that North Korea had recently benchmarked reforms in China and Vietnam, but while Beijing and Hanoi labored five or ten years to adopt changes, North Korea adopted its reforms immediately, and quickly witnessed results. The reforms came with side effects, however, and North Korea had closed its doors to correct those side effects. He said that like had been seen with China and Vietnam, North Korea would increase the speed of its opening and reforms once those issues were resolved.
Frankly, I don’t even know where to begin with something like this. Perhaps by pointing out that the U.S. didn’t raise the nuclear issue this time — the North did by making a nuclear declaration at a time when intra-Korean dialogue has been suspended since July. Perhaps with the inherent contradiction between “U.S. wants N.K. surrender/end of N.K.” and “evil U.S. neocons perpetuating prolonged tensions.” Perhaps with the very offbase comparisons between reforms in China and Vietnam and those in North Korea (a comparison Jeong explained a bit more in this OhMyNews English interview). Perhaps with the very contradictory nature of Jeong’s former position in government. Perhaps with a list (kindly provided by Tony of Oriental Redneck) of some of Jeong’s previous jaw-dropping statements, including the time he told the WSJ’s Melanie Kirkpatrick that political freedom for North Koreans was like “a luxury, like pearls for a pig.” Perhaps by pointing out that in his OhMyNews interview, Jeong criticized U.S. arrogance for seeking North Korean “regime transformation,” but nonetheless suggests leading the North Korean horse to the waters of change above. Perhaps by pointing out the contradiction between demanding the U.S. treat North Korea as an equal (demands made by both North Korea and Jeong himself) and calling on the U.S. to make the first concession because it’s the “bigger power.” Or perhaps by pointing out that the corollary to “not beating up on those smaller than you” is “not to pick fights with those bigger than you.”
Or perhaps it would be best to simply let his statement as is, as a cautionary tale to U.S. officials who might be relying on its “allies” in the region to put pressure on North Korea to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Maybe it’s time for a divorce.
