The Marmot’s Hole

Dr. Andrei Lankov published a piece in the IHT a couple of days ago suggesting that for the greater good of the North Korean people, the North Korean leadership should be granted amnesty for the crimes they have committed over the last 60 years. As with most things I link here, I ask that you read the thing in its entirety before passing judgment (and making comments). I will, however, cite a (large) portion of it below just to give you an idea of what we’re talking about here:

Thus the North Korean elite is cornered. These people do not want to tamper with the existing system, since they are afraid it would collapse. They have nothing to gain and everything to lose - not only their privilege and power, but also their freedom and perhaps even their lives.
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They know how they would treat the South Korean elite if they won, and they do not see why they would be treated differently by a victorious South. This means they have to continue with their policies, believing that their choice is kill or be killed. So the government does its best to keep the system going, at a cost of many human lives and dangerous international brinkmanship.
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What can be done? The short answer is amnesty. People who run the country should be granted immunity from persecution for all crimes committed during the 60-odd years of their rule. I am fully aware that we are talking about people who were in many respects as bad as Stalin and Hitler. But amnesty is necessary - not for them, of course, but for countless people whose lives would be so much better if the North Korean leaders were less persistent in their rejection of reforms.
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North Korean leaders are unlikely to take a promise of amnesty at face value. Hence to make such a promise believable, it should be public, unequivocal and all-inclusive, leaving as few loopholes for future revenge-seekers as possible.
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Perhaps international involvement will be necessary. The overthrown leaders will not feel too secure in their native land where they spilled so much blood, and they are likely to become a political burden for their former patrons in Moscow and Beijing. Thus it will probably help if some neutral country agrees to provide the Kims and their confidants with the right to stay there, freely spending their ill-gotten millions.
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This sounds quite cynical. But it’s a compromise that would save many lives. The North Korea’s leaders’ stubbornness has contributed to huge numbers of deaths in the famines of 1996 to 1999 (between some 600,000 and 900,000 perished), and it played a major role in the development of a nuclear crisis. So it might make sense to let a few overweight and retired executioners spend the rest of lives somewhere else.

Some of the discussion on the piece over at NKzone is worth checking out, Lirelou’s comment being particularly noteworthy.

My take on this is that while Dr. Lankov’s idea makes sense in that, unfortunately, the greater good sometimes requires justice to be sacrificed, I just can’t see an amnesty deal being worked out. Such a deal could be manageable if North Korea remains a separate political entity from the South, but should the North find itself absorbed by the Republic of Korea — as I believe it will be — then we need to take into account South Korean political dynamics. Nautilus Institute scholar William M. Drennan wrote in 1997:

Despite recent progress in democratization, there are still few constraints on South Korean politics. The cases of Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo demonstrate that, just as when they occupied the executive mansion, what the Blue House gives the Blue House can take away, even under a democratically elected civilian government. Shielded for almost three years by President Kim Young Sam from demands for justice, the two former presidents were suddenly arrested, tried and convicted under a “special law to punish” mandated by President Kim when he found it politically expedient to do so. While suspicious of both President Kim’s motives and the constitutionality of the action against them, a large majority of South Koreans nonetheless approve of the punishment of the two former presidents.

And yet, the imprisoning of Chun and Roh illustrates an enduring feature of South Korean politics with clear implications for a negotiated settlement: those who lose political power potentially lose far more than income or status (as distressing as that may be in extraordinarily status-conscious South Korea); they may find themselves defenseless against political enemies in a system where victors have not hesitated to use the full resources of the state against their opponents. The North Korean leadership surely understands the potential implications for them of South Korean enthusiasm for “setting history straight.” While President Kim speaks reassuringly of achieving unification through reconciliation and cooperation, other South Korean officials talk privately of retribution and war crimes tribunals once they are in possession of the territory and population of the DPRK — and not without justification, one hastens to add. Given the persistence of “grudge politics” in South Korea, the Northern elite would likely find ROK assurances of amnesty, immunity, pardons, or other guarantees of personal security less than convincing, heightening the probability that they will cling to power rather than entrust their futures to the vicissitudes of South Korean politics following a “soft landing.”

Now, let’s grant that in 2005, South Korean politics are considerably less “nasty” (albeit still very confrontational) than they were in 1997. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm for “setting history straight” is still very much alive. Cheong Wa Dae and the ruling Uri Party have been pushing bills (which were recently passed) to examine the nation’s colonial and dictatorial past. Even if we believe the that much of the current ruling party might be willing to forgive Kim Jong-il and crew in the name of intra-Korean reconciliation (and there is no guarantee they would), there is simply no way Korean conservatives are going to let them do it, especially after various presidential commissions spend the next couple of years scrutinizing their sins and those of their ancestors committed during the colonial period and South Korea’s less pleasant years. Try explaining to the GNP (or their constituents) why, after raking Park Chung-hee over the coals for what he did both as an officer in the Japanese military and as president of Korea, the greater good of the Korean people demands that the same questions not be asked about Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il. Just ain’t going to happen.

Moreover, if the cases of Messrs. Chun and Roh and South Korea’s ongoing re-examination of its colonial and dictatorial past aren’t enough to convince Kim Jong-il that justice catches up with you eventually, the courtroom drama awaiting Gen. Augusto Pinochet should do the trick. Now, I don’t feel sorry for the good general, but the fact that this man might actually see justice should serve as a warning to Kim Jong-il that if you’re a big enough schmuck — and Kim certainly qualifies — no immunity deal can protect you once you lose power, regardless of how ironclad it may seem. Chun, Roh and Pinochet gave up power. They were eventually hauled before a judge. Stalin stuck around, and he died in his sleep.

In fact, the only way out I can think of is for some nice country to offer to take Kim in should he fall from power (and he manages to stay one step ahead of the mob). Again, however, North Korea’s rulers aren’t just your average tin-pot dictators. They have overseen what has become one of the world’s most odious regimes, and with that honor comes a certain degree of notoriety that most states find somewhat burdensome. Moreover, Kim would have to muster an extraordinary amount of faith that the state that accepts him won’t eventually succumb to world opinion and extradite him either to a re-unified Korea or the Hague once it become expedient to do so. Personally, I’m not sure if the North Korean leadership, which has been at times characterized as “paranoid,” could ever muster the kind of trust needed to make such a deal work.

Anyway, at 4:00 a.m. while I work on something else, I guess what I’m trying to say is that while the idea of an amnesty might make sense, I just don’t see how such a deal could be hammered out realistically.

UPDATE: GI Korea offers his thoughts on this as well.