The Chosun Ilbo ran a book report Friday by Kang In-sun on Cato Institute scholar Ted Carpenter’s The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea. Co-written, actually, with the eminently sensible Doug Bandow, the book suggests that the solution to Washington’s North Korean nuclear woes would be to wean Seoul and Tokyo off their dependency on U.S. security guarantees and allow both nations to pursue their own nuclear programs:
In a recently published book entitled, “The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea,” Carpenter said that nuclear weapons development by South Korea and Japan could make North Korea reconsider its intention to develop nuclear weapons.
He claimed that North Korea might not abandon its nuclear development program even if his suggestion were followed, but at least a new nuclear balance would appear in Northeast Asia that could replace North Korea’s nuclear monopoly.
The Chosun further explains:
The scholar said that bribing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons would likely result in Pyongyang continuing to try and pull the wool over the eyes of U.S. negotiators once more, while pre-emptive strikes were too risky as they might unleash a war on the Korean Peninsula. In his opinion, as tightened economic sanctions were unlikely to be effective, counter nuclear development was the best option given the current circumstances.
South Korean and Japanese nuclear weapons would mean that North Korea could no longer threaten Seoul and Tokyo without facing an equal and immediate threat, he said. Such moves would encourage North Korea to give up its nuclear programs by forcing it to deal with the burden of having to confront nuclear-armed neighbors.
My first impression here is that neither a nuclear-armed South Korea nor nuclear-armed Japan would encourage North Korea to rethink its nuclear program. After all, the one Pyongyang is currently working on is being developed, ostensibly, with the objective of confronting the United States, the world’s largest nuclear state. Nuclear parity is apparently NOT a consideration in North Korean strategic planning. What the threat of South Korean or Japanese nuclear development MIGHT do, however, is light a fire under Beijing’s ass to take Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions a bit more seriously. As Charles Krauthammer pointed out, “If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China’s is a nuclear Japan. It’s time to share the nightmares.”
Carpenter (and buddy Bandow, of course) coupled their suggestion for a very nuclearized Northeast Asia with a call for drastic reductions in U.S. security commitments in the region:
He also said the United States must inform Seoul and Tokyo that they should no longer rely on Washington for security aid and urge them to decide independently whether or not to develop nuclear weapons.
Carpenter also said that if North Korea didn’t give up its nuclear program, U.S. forces in Korea could become “nuclear hostages,” and there was no need for the U.S. military to expose its soldiers to such a risk.
If I’ve said it once, I’ve said it a thousand times: U.S. security relationships with South Korea and Japan — as they are currently structured — are unnatural and ultimately unsustainable Cold War relics that keep potentially powerful allies in a perpetually underdeveloped state of dependency, allow potential U.S. adversaries monopolies on nuclear weapons and rational defense policies, and needlessly burden the U.S. military and economy with unnecessary commitments and expenses. The sooner those relationships are brought into the 21st century, the better it will be for all parties involved.
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18 Comments
FWIW, your coherent posts on this subject have sure confirmed me in my pre-existing (but unformed) inclination toward the same policy. I was going to mention as well that the financial considerations of carrying the burden of Asian (& western) defense, while we approach the coming baby boom retirement/ social security/ medicare crisis, are ultimately unsustainable.
For this reason, I advocate the adoption of a similar attitude toward NATO as well, with the withdrawal of all ground forces from Germany (we can keep the airbases to sustain our ability to deploy, though frankly I’d be delighted if the appeasing Euros would boot us out of these as well. But — I guess it’s too much to hope that they’ll put the defense of their continent where their mouths are).
A pullback to Guam and Hawaii (I won’t say to our 1941 perimeter, because that included the Phillippines) is the logical end of current political developments in East Asia. The Bush administration can be faulted for not doing more to move things in this direction, now that Nork nukes (& their corollary, ROK appeasment) are inevitable; it’ll be interesting to see what the new Secy of State does in this direction.
I can’t imagine any scenario where we would go to war with NorK, short of them starting it. And no armies are going to cross the sea between Japan and any part of the Asian mainland, in any direction, regardless of whether US forces are there or not. Since our “friends” the Euros are champing at the bit to start selling modern Western armaments to the mainland, we might as well get out from the middle of that situation, so we can stop being the convenient political “fall guy” of choice for all the Asian politicians concerned.
My sentiments exactly. We need to get out of the business of providing a blank security check for East Asia. If East Asian states will not help constrain China, they are welcome to resume their erstwhile status as China’s vassal states. We need to resume our pre-WWII status as a free trader without the overseas entanglements that we have accumulated in the post-War period via an endless series of mutual (in name only) defense treaties throughout the world. Munich is out-of-date. As long as we do not disarm to the point of our pre-WWII military, we will be prepared for most eventualities.
I think it is important to remember that the ?€œblank security check?€? for East Asia was, when first installed, in the interests of the United States. While I certainly acknowledge that the current situation needs an overhaul that may be unsettling, let?€™s not blame everyone else for the current state of affairs. A cool regonition that the current situation is less than undeal is fine.
The funny thing is of course how these things all work out. For example, it is now of course in China?€™s interests for the US to stay in the region, Taiwan is a non-state state, North Korea is an embarrassment to everybody, and Japan really doesn’t get it.
I am most worried about how political regimes in the region interact after the US scales down its presence in the region. We have three countries that are all as arrogant and xenophobic as each other. Other regions do not seem to have it this bad, but maybe there are some examples. Anyone care to enlighten me?
“Carpenter said that nuclear weapons development by South Korea and Japan could make North Korea reconsider its intention to develop nuclear weapons.”
LOL! The solution to convincing North Korea to stop making the Bomb is for South Korea and Japan to make more Bombs? This is brilliant! So like, what’s happening between Pakistan and India is a kind of a fluke? BTW, let’s say South Korea or Japan does make some Bombs, and for some reason decides to use a few. Which way is the wind gonna blow?
TRANSLATION OF CATO INSTITUTE: what a geopolitical headache. sorry to have created a mess over there, from the time Dean Atcheson decided, practically right out of his ass, to divide Korea at the 38th parallel to BU_ _ SH_ _’s inclusion of N Korea in the Axis of Evil. Basically we can’t afford this security arrangement any more, especially with this dragging War in Iraq. We’re gonna wash our hands of this matter. You guys do what you want, develop nukes to your hearts content, whatever. It aint our backyard.
We’ve been running a series of our friend Zak’s dispatches home describing his experiences teaching ESL in South Korea, Robert-I thought you’d be interested to know. We’ve run 7 so far and we’ll do 7 more, one a day.
o_O ?
This absolutely makes no sense. This guy needs to take his head out of the sand. We don’t need more countries building up in nuclear weapons. No countries, not even the US, should own nuclear weapons.
Bluejives:
“…let?€™s say South Korea or Japan does make some Bombs, and for some reason decides to use a few…”
You make no mention of the current NorK possession of nukes (or is it your position that Nork nukes are only a fiction, one cooked up by the BU__SH__ administration for its own nefarious purposes?)
So the relatively stable democracies of ROK and Japan, finding themselves in possession of nukes, may decide to randomly drop one at any time — but you’re not worried that the DPRK won’t? I’d call that a classical case of “projection” on your part, but of course I’m no psychologist.
BTW, what do the blanks in BU__SH__ stand for? I must confess a rueful admiration when someone finds an ingenious new way to deride our President. I’m sure eventually folks like you will find the right combination of insults — ones that will be sure to make us grovel before the righteously indignant citizens of the ROK, apologize for all the evil deeds we have perpetrated on them, and beg for the privilege of continued defense of their realm.
I take it your not a big Kenneth Waltz fan, aa?
(Note: Link is worth reading)
Deflet — I don’t think anyone is blaming “everyone else,” least of all Carpenter and Bandow, who tend to blame the US above all for perpetuating stupid policies. And of course, you’re right — when we first issued those blank cheques, they were issued because they were in the U.S. interests. Alliances and the security arrangements that come with them change as the interests of the concerned parties change, which is, I believe, Carpenter and Bandow’s point.
As for how regional powers will handle things after the US scales down its presence, well, yeah, there is always the risk that the shit might hit the fan, but there is no guarantee that a continued U.S. presence would do anything other than unnecessarily involve U.S. forces when something major did go down. Besides, and I think Zbigniew Brzezinski made the best argument for this in The Grand Chessboard (defininetly worth your time reading), one has to wonder for how much longer the current US commitment in the region will be able to guarantee peace in the region when you take into consideration the regional dynamics, and sooner or later, Washington is going to have to come up with a system other than the very lopsided one currently in place that can protect its interests in East Asia. And to do that, arrangements are going to have to be made with the powers in the region.
That’s an innovative long term policy solution, and I wonder why I haven’t read it elsewhere. Certainly a nuclear Japan would be a great bargaining chip to get China to crack down on North Korea. But would Japan even go nuke? I wonder… don’t they have a fear complex about nuclear weapons? Perhaps withdrawing our military support would simply leave them pacifist and unprotected, as opposed to pacifist and protected.
The same problems also apply to South Korea. Where’s the guarantee they would want nukes, or be willing to mount a credible defense in our absence? Those two countries choosing appeasement and falling into the Chinese orbit is not an acceptable outcome.
Marmot: And of course, you?€™re right ?€“ when we first issued those blank cheques, they were issued because they were in the U.S. interests.
Were they? Would anyone really have missed anything if Korea had been reunified in the 1950’s? Tens of thousands of American soldiers would have lived to see their grandchildren. And about a million Chinese troops would have lived to see theirs. The fear 50 years ago was that much of East Asia would become vassal states to the Communist behemoth to the north. Today, many of them are aligning with that same Communist behemoth. Fighting the Korean War was bad for American interests 50 years ago, and providing South Korea a security guarantee continues to be bad for American interests even today.
Zhang Fei. Actually, The Soviet Union was viewed as the real power behind China at the time. As usual, our political views were a bit out of date. Marmot, Paul H., and Z.F., great ideas on the nukes, NATO, and the “ROK-U.S.” alliance. (Let’s add “grant Puerto Rico independence” to the list. Save us another $22 billion a year.) But, if we are to return to a more “America centric” vision of defense, let’s not overlook the restructuring of the U.S. Armed Forces. We need to define exactly what forces the President has for contingency operations short of war, and those which require a Congressional declaration of war to employ (such as long term activation of the Guard and Reserves). This problem has been with us and ignored since Vietnam, and needs to be addressed within the spirit of both reality and the U.S. constitution. Once that is defined, we can set about structuring the pay and benefits of a dual tiered armed forces.
Doug Bandow eminently sensible???!? Not two words I’d use to describe him.
“Bluejives:
?€œ?€?let?€™s say South Korea or Japan does make some Bombs, and for some reason decides to use a few?€??€?
You make no mention of the current NorK possession of nukes (or is it your position that Nork nukes are only a fiction, one cooked up by the BU__SH__ administration for its own nefarious purposes?)
So the relatively stable democracies of ROK and Japan, finding themselves in possession of nukes, may decide to randomly drop one at any time ?€“ but you?€™re not worried that the DPRK won?€™t? I?€™d call that a classical case of ?€œprojection?€? on your part, but of course I?€™m no psychologist. ”
- Paul H
The significance of a nuclear arsenal is not only the warhead itself but the range of the delivery system. Possession of missiles by South Korea with a radius that encompasses the Korean Peninsula, while South Korea is still under the US protectorate, is to go down a road of no return. Anything with greater range than is a potential threat to China. South Korea would never possess strategic weapons aimed at either North Korea nor China. On the other hand, the full range of the Taepodong-2 missile is 8000 km. The newer, submarine based missiles have an estimated range of 2500 km. What does this mean?
?€œIf our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China?€™s is a nuclear Japan. It?€™s time to share the nightmares.?€?
I think it would be more correct to say ?€œIf our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China?€™s is a nuclear Taiwan. It?€™s time to share the nightmares.?€?
Well, despite what WE(U.S.) do, Japan and SK WILL go nuclear the day NK successfully detonates an atom bomb. We don’t even have to make a threat to China that we will give them nukes, because even if we were stridently against a nuclear Japan or SK, it will be meaningless on that day. Remember couple months ago when SK press “discovered” that it had been violating nuclear research? And what did the UN do then?
If SK is far along in nuclear weapons research (which we should all assume is something along the line of Israel’s current status) we can only assume Japan has a far more advanced one. They practically have the know-how and they already have the fissile material. Both of those nations have missile technology.
Japan is flipping about after the “discovery” of less than 20 Japanese nationals kidnapped by NK. If political maneuvering can accomplish this, then I can only assume that the same exact Hiroshima Peace Memorial can soon become a reminder of what can happen to Japan if they do not achieve nuclear parity with NK.
SK youth no longer remember the American GI giving out C rations to orphans. Likewise, Japanese youth have no memory of impaling peasant farmers with a bayonet. Neither side is probably too squemish about going nuclear.
No matter what we do, China ALREADY shares threat.
The real question we have to face is the same one we’ve always been facing and arguing over: Are we simply putting money down the drain in NK or should we start a war now?
The real question we have to face is the same one we?€™ve always been facing and arguing over: Are we simply putting money down the drain in NK or should we start a war now?
I’m not sure there is a need to start a war even if NK goes nuclear. In fact, the current Washington “redline” seems to take a nuclear-armed North Korea as a given. It’s just that at that point, Washington and Tokyo will most likely say that, well, if Pyongyang has the resources to develop a nuclear arsenal, then it has the resources to feed itself without outside assistance. And after Tokyo and Seoul go nuclear, it puts pressure on Pyongyang to develop a deterrent large enough to be credible when faced with the threat of a Japanese or South Korean first strike.
North Korea probably believes with “sincerity” that it can succeed in a war with South Korea. They probably believe that they can bluff the Americans and the Japanese from entering a second Korean War.
I’m not sure about you, but I can’t imagine many Americans who would sacrifice Anchorage, Honolulu, or God forbid, Los Angeles in a nuclear strike in order to save the South Koreans.
In a mano-a-mano fight between the Koreas, with North Korea striking first and with WMD, North Korean leadership might believe they can win. It doesn’t matter what the facts are–they BELIEVE they can win.
If North Korea feels that it’s best strategy is to attack now before South Korea goes fully nuclear, they probably will. (and everyday South KOrea-North military force imbalance grows) After victory, they can then do a Deng Xiao Ming style reforms, and the hoopla about reunification can be enough to save the NK elite from mob death a la Mussolini.
My point is that, NK may not wait around until the final conclusion of a nuclear arms race with SK. We have to start to give KJI nice deals now. Like, if he starts a war, we recind any Geneva protection against torture specifically against HIM, but if he relinquishes power, he is given a billion dollars and a resort in the Swiss Alps, and a complete immunity from his crimes against humanity.
How to dismantle an atomic bomb:
http://www.thebestpageintheuni.....?u=11worst