The Marmot’s Hole

A defector friend this morning alerted me to this very disconcerting story at the JoongAng Ilbo about a North Korean spy who passed himself off as a defector and came to South Korea.

Although the JoongAng Daily’s English site has an English version of the story here I’ll translate the entire original article for you, because I believe it’s important enough that the whole story be available in English:

It has been revealed that a member of a North Korean military intelligence security organisation passed himself off as a North Korean defector and came to South Korea, where he spent 1 year and 3 months secretly working as a spy within the country.

Asking for anonymity, a source inside the central government said on the 1st December “In July this year authorities referred a man identified as a Mr Lee (28), who entered South Korea as a defector through China in January last year, to the Prosecutor without detention on suspicion of having broken the National Security Law, when after initial investigations the suspicion arose that he was a spy.” This is the first case of a North Korean defector (??????????/talbukja ) coming south, gaining South Korean citizenship and engaging in espionage.

According to authorities, Mr Lee was an agent belonging to the 11th Defence Command/Headquarters of the North Korean army who entered the consulate of the South Korean Embassy in Beijing with other defectors in November 2002 demanding passage to South Korea.

Two months later Lee came to the ROK via a south-east Asian country and proceeded to gather information about the talbukja interrogation center ‘Daeseongkongsa(’????????????????)’. [More on this '????????????????' place some other time. It needs to be covered but I haven't the time, energy or resources to do it today - Hamel.] Daeseongkongsa is run by the ROK Army Intelligence HQ. He also gathered information on the location and security facilities of ‘Hanawon‘, the talbukja resettlement facility, which has the highest level of security amongst national security installations, ‘ga‘.

Last April, saying that he was going to going to meet his North Korean family, Lee was issued a passport and left the country, crossing the border from China into North Korea. There he reported the secrets he had learned in South Korea in a document to the North Korean army’s border protection main office’s director for the North Korean State Security agency (the bowibu/?????????????). South Korean authorities are currently investigating this.

Furthermore, from late April until early May he reported his intelligence at some sort of place in South Pyongan-do where agents to be sent to South Korea are trained.

After this, from the 7th May for 10 days Lee received secret training in spying on South Korea at a guest house (chodaeso/?????????????) in Sinuiju City, North Pyongan Province, and was given an agent’s code name (127) and a pre-arranged noise/sound/call for secret communications. North Korean authorities ordered Lee to return to South Korea and infiltrate the Association of North Korean Defectors [the ??????????????????????, run by ex Korean Workers Party and prominent defector Hwang Jang-yop - Hamel] and other unification related groups and, after being active for a time, to bring membership cards and other pieces of evidence back to North Korea.

Authorities say that after arriving at Incheon port on may 19th via China, Lee sent the message “I have arrived safely” to North Korean agents in China.

Lee is originally from Deokseong County, South Hamgyong Province, and worked as a sergeant in a border patrol unit in Onseong Country, North Hamgyong Province, before fleeing North Korea and crossing the border into China in June 1997 [the Korean original uses the verb ?????????????? meaning to flee or escape from North Korea - Hamel] where he was caught by Chinese security police and forcibly repatriated to North Korea. The North Korean authorities threatened him with execution and forced him to swear an oath of loyalty and then gave him some Renminbi [the Chinese currency] as operational funds, ordering him “Go and ferret out the state of anti-DPRK activities and anti-Kim Jong Il conspiracies by South Korean-related organisations in China.”

Accordingly, from February till November 2002, Lee watched the movements of talbukja in China and reported them. Then he received new orders to enter South Korea as a spy and entered the consular section of the ROK embassy in China and “fake defected.” In a telephone call with a journalist on the night of the 1st of December, Lee said “I have neither engaged in spying activities nor turned myself in.” However, he did say “It is true that I have been under investigation by the security department of the Prosecutor’s office, but nothing concrete has been alleged,” and hung up the phone. This is the first time since the June 15th Joint Declaration by North and South Korea that a case of a North Korean agent directly inserted into South Korean society by the North Korean authorities for the purposes of spying has occurred.

The government and the National Safety Council received reports from the authorities concerned of the arrest of a talbukja spy over four months ago, but have not made the case public, rather concealing it.

The text on the graphic above reads:
Route of the fake defector spy’s movements
1) June 1997 fled North Korea while a sergeant in the North Korean army
2) July 1999 forced repatriation and spy training
3) Feb-Nov 2001 worked as a spy in China for the NK State Security Agency
4) Nov 2002 entered the Korean consulate in Beijing
5) January 2003 entered South Korea through a third, South-east Asian country
6) April 2004 left SK saying he was going to meet his family
7) Apr-May 2004 secret training at a NK guest house May 2004 re-entered SK and gave himself up to authorities

If true, this story is significant, because it shows what many on the conservative side have believed all along, and what many progressives in South Korea have hoped was not true; namely that North Korea still sends agents to China and South Korea to gather information on defectors and South Korea.

However, like all good stories, this one is quite tangled, and it will be some time before we get to the bottom of it. I will leave you with the links to the English translations of Friday’s JoongAng Ilbo, where it talks about conflicting reports given by the said Mr Lee, and the story late Thursday about a briefing given by (anti-)Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, who said he’s been aware of the case since June and denied allegations that the government had covered the case up because it would hurt the Uri party’s attempts to strike down the National Security Law. To further confuse things, the NIS released a statement saying “that Mr. Lee had not engaged in any espionage operations, reversing its original reports, which said Mr. Lee had said he had conducted spy operations in the South. … The agency acknowledged that Mr. Lee had gone back to the North without authorization, but said the purpose was to meet with his brother. When the agency referred the case to the prosecution for further investigation in August, intelligence officials said Mr. Lee had gone back to the North to report and to receive a new mission.”

Heck, what to believe? Stay tuned, folks.